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PARIS AND ITS PEOPLE UNDER ENGLISH RULE

The Anglo-Burgundian Regime 1420–1436

GUY LLEWELYN THOMPSON

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In memory of my father,
who died on 1 January 1989

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PREFACE

THAT English regents should have ruled the capital of France for nearly sixteen years is one of the most remarkable aspects of the Hundred Years War, and it was a privilege to study this fascinating period for my doctoral thesis at the University of Oxford. This book is a revised version of that thesis, and both book and thesis owe much to recent work on the history of medieval Paris and to new objective studies of the Lancastrian domination of northern France. I have also been influenced by the contemporary *rapprochement* between political and social history, and the work could perhaps be described as a political and administrative history of Paris and Parisian society, in the context of a foreign war and internal factionalism. In order to do justice to this broad purpose I have tried to be as wide-ranging in my use of sources as possible, and have felt free to adopt such techniques as seemed appropriate to a particular source or question. When reconstructing the life or motivations of an individual, or the purpose of an institution, I have proceeded by examples and case-studies. Where the subject has demanded quantitative techniques I have not hesitated to count and to tabulate but, when doing so, I have normally restricted myself to dealing with one source at a time, the more readily to control any distortions. I have not dealt in any detail with questions of economic history, believing that such are better approached in studies of longer time-spans; indeed I have been happy to rely on the admirable works of Jean Favier and Guy Fourquin. Nor have I covered the history of the university, an enormous and largely distinct subject which, at the time that I was researching this book, was to have been treated in detail by another scholar.

Such limitations, along with any errors of fact or interpretation, are my own responsibility, but the work has only been made possible by the help, advice, and encouragement of many people on both sides of the Channel. I owe huge debts to my former supervisor, Dr Malcolm Vale, who guided my research throughout; to my examiners Mr Peter Lewis and Dr Christopher Allmand, and to Dr Roger Little, who first suggested the subject to me; to Dr Kathleen Daly, Dr Albert Hamscher, Dr Michael K. Jones, Dr Robert Massey, Mrs Jenny Stratford, and Dr Andrew Wathey; to Mme Françoise Autrand, Mme Claude Gauvarde,

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M. Alain Demurger, and M. Jean-Philippe Genet, as well as to Professors Jean Favier and Philippe Contamine, who welcomed me to their seminars. My overwhelming obligation is, however, to my wife for her assistance and support through the years it has taken me to complete the study. I must also thank the Department of Education and Science, and the Curators of the Taylor Institution, Oxford, who were good enough to award me a Zaharoff Fund travel grant to permit me to extend my research. And, in the final stages, Miss Enid Barker and Ms Mary Dortch of the Oxford University Press made many valuable suggestions.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ADN	Archives Départementales du Nord, Lille
ADSM	Archives Départementales de la Seine-Maritime, Rouen
AN	Archives Nationales, Paris
BEC	*Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes*
BL	British Library
Add. MS	Additional Manuscript
Add. Ch.	Additional Charter
BM Rouen	Bibliothèque Municipale, Rouen
BN	Bibliothèque Nationale
MS Clair.	Collection Clairambault
MS fr.	Fonds français
MS n. a. fr.	Nouvelle acquisition française
MS n. a. lat.	Nouvelle acquisition latine
PO	Pièces originales
Bourgeois	*Journal d'un bourgeois de Paris (1405–1449)*, ed. A. Tuetey (SHP, Paris, 1881)
BPHCTH	*Bulletin philologique et historique (jusqu'à 1610) du Comité des Travaux Historiques et Scientifiques*
BSHP	*Bulletin de la Société de l'Histoire de Paris et de l'Île de France*
CNRS	Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
DKR	*Annual Report of the Deputy Keeper of Public Records*
DNB	*Dictionary of National Biography* (22 vols., Oxford, 1921–2)
EHR	*English Historical Review*
English Suits	C. T. Allmand and C. A. J. Armstrong (eds.), *English Suits before the Parlement of Paris 1420–1436* (Camden 4th Series, 26, Royal Historical Society, London, 1982)
Fauquembergue	*Journal de Clément de Fauquembergue, greffier du Parlement de Paris, 1417–1435*, ed. A. Tuetey and H. Lacaille (3 vols., SHF, 1903–15)
Gallia Regia	G. Dupont-Ferrier, *Gallia Regia ou état des officiers royaux des bailliages et sénéchaussés de 1328 à 1515* (7 vols., Paris, 1942–66)
HGP	Histoire générale de Paris
l.p.	*livre(s) parisis*
l.t.	*livre(s) tournois*
MSHP	*Mémoires de la Société de l'Histoire de Paris et de l'Île de France*

Monstrelet	*Chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet*, ed. L. Douët d'Arcq (6 vols., SHF, Paris, 1857–62)
Ordonnances	*Ordonnances des roys de France de la troisième race* (22 vols., Paris, 1723–1849)
P&P	*Past and Present*
PPC	Sir N. H. Nicolas (ed.), *Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council of England* (7 vols., London, 1834–7)
PRO	Public Record Office
RH	*Revue historique*
RHDFE	*Revue historique de droit français et étranger*
RS	Rolls Series
Rymer	T. Rymer, *Foedera, Conventiones, Literae et Cujuscunque Generis Acta Publica* (20 vols., London, 1704–35)
Sauval	H. Sauval, *Histoire et recherches des antiquités de la ville de Paris* (3 vols., Paris, 1724)
SHF	Société de l'Histoire de France
SHP	Société de l'Histoire de Paris et de l'Île de France
TRHS	*Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*

A NOTE ON CURRENCY

THE MONEY OF ACCOUNT

Livre tournois (sometimes called a '*franc*')

This was the most commonly used money of account. It was divided up into 20 *sous*; each *sou* was worth 12 *deniers*.

Livre parisis

This was worth 25 per cent more than the *livre tournois*; it was used in the Royal Treasury, but elsewhere, particularly outside Paris, was less common than the *livre tournois*.

COINS

Neither the *livre tournois* nor the *livre parisis* had any physical existence as coins: they were measures of value. Transactions took place using gold and silver coins, to which the government (and, unofficially, the people) assigned different values at different times.

RATES OF EXCHANGE

Trying to exchange coins of one country for those of another would inevitably depend on the condition of the coins and on the money changer approached. The *livre tournois* was of lower value than the pound sterling. In the early 1420s English accounts used an exchange rate of about 6.6 *livres tournois* to 1 pound sterling; this shifted to 9:1 in 1427 and 11.3:1 by 1436/7 (R. Doucet, 'Livre tournois et livre sterling pendant l'occupation anglaise sous Charles VI et Charles VII', *Revue numismatique*, 4th ser., 29 (1926), 102–5).



MAP 1. Northern France



MAP 2. Paris in the fifteenth century

PART I

England, France, and Burgundy: the View from Paris

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1

THE PLACE OF PARIS IN A DIVIDED FRANCE

On 1 December 1420 King Henry V of England made his formal royal entry into Paris as regent of France and heir to the throne. The French king, Charles VI, was beside him; just behind rode the duke of Burgundy, foremost peer of France.[1] The Parisians lined the streets, glad to welcome their king and his new ally, and the duke whom they regarded as their special leader. Although the chapter of Notre-Dame, irritated by the efforts of Henry and the duke of Burgundy to impose their nominee as bishop, declined to step more than a few yards outside the cathedral, the rest of the population was welcoming, even enthusiastic, decorating the streets and as far as possible dressing in red as a sign of celebration.[2]

Henry's success in the period since landing in France in August 1417 had been remarkable. It had taken about eighteen months and some gruelling sieges (especially at Rouen) for virtually the whole of Normandy to fall into the hands of the English king. Thus Henry won back by systematic conquest the duchy he could claim through his forebears' historic rights as dukes of Normandy. Whatever Henry's intentions may have been when he began his invasion, however, he now showed no sign of limiting himself to the conquest of Normandy. One of the next places to fall was Pontoise, and because of that town's critical importance on the river routes to the Low Countries even Paris appeared vulnerable to the invaders.[3] None of the famous victories of the Hundred Years War—Crécy, Poitiers, or Agincourt—had achieved nearly as much.

Yet for all Henry's skill as a commander his success was only made possible by catastrophic divisions in the French ranks. This was the age

[1] J. H. Wylie and W. T. Waugh, *The Reign of Henry the Fifth* (3 vols., Cambridge, 1914–29), iii. 224–5.

[2] G. Grassoreille, 'Histoire politique du chapitre de Notre-Dame de Paris pendant la domination anglaise', *MSHP* 9 (1882), 124; *Bourgeois*, 144.

[3] C. T. Allmand, *Lancastrian Normandy, 1415–1450: The History of a Medieval Occupation* (Oxford, 1983), 17–18.

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of the 'Armagnacs' and the 'Burgundians'. Before the end of the fourteenth century King Charles VI of France had begun to suffer from periodic bouts of insanity and the king's illness had led inevitably to rivalry between his brother Louis, duke of Orléans, and uncle Philip, duke of Burgundy, for control of the royal council and the kingdom. Philip of Burgundy died in 1403 but the quarrel was continued by his son John the Fearless, who instigated the murder of Louis of Orléans in 1407. This criminal act, unconvincingly justified as tyrannicide, heralded no Burgundian victory but civil war. The Orléanists rallied under a loose coalition headed by the duke of Berry and his sons-in-law, the counts of Armagnac and Clermont; well before the count of Armagnac had established himself as leader of his faction the Orléanists were renamed the 'Armagnacs' by the Parisians, who were referring to the large and ill-disciplined contingent of troops that he had supplied.[4]

For both the Armagnacs and the Burgundians Paris played a vital role. As the English were soon to find, possession of the capital gave authority to anyone claiming to be in control of the kingdom. There were supporters of both parties in Paris, although John the Fearless did more to develop popular appeal, in particular by a propaganda campaign in favour of a wholesale reform of the central administration of the kingdom. Such extravagant promises led to a major setback for the Burgundians in 1413, however, because in that year the duke's rhetoric and the more measured proposals of the university of Paris were picked up and developed by the radical protests of the Cabochien movement. This movement ended not in any lasting reform but in bloodshed and the flight of the Burgundians from Paris. In 1415 and in 1417, therefore, Henry V was opposed primarily by the government of the count of Armagnac in Paris, and French efforts to reunite in the face of a common enemy ended in failure.

The years 1418 and 1419 saw two crucial events that led from this troubled background directly to the English domination of Paris. On the night of the 28–9 May 1418 the Burgundians retook the French capital after young Perrinet Le Clerc stole the keys of the Porte Saint-Germain from his father, to whom they had been entrusted.[5] The Burgundian captains l'Isle-Adam and Guy de Bar encountered minimal resistance as they took over the town, while the Parisians, glad to see the end of the previous regime, indulged in an orgy of blood-letting at the expense of

[4] F. Autrand, *Charles VI* (Paris, 1986), 458–9.
[5] *Monstrelet*, iii. 261.

the Armagnacs and their supporters. One man who did escape was the dauphin, the future Charles VII; he and his followers fled south of the Loire where they eventually established a rival administration based in Bourges and Poitiers. The second critical event took place on 10 September 1419, when the dauphin's men killed Duke John the Fearless at what was supposed to be a meeting of reconciliation at Montereau, some fifty miles south of Paris. Revenge for the killing of Louis of Orléans it may have been, but the immediate consequences were inevitable and disastrous for the dauphin and for the Armagnacs: the Burgundians and their new duke, Philip the Good, were driven into the arms of the English.

Now Henry V knew that he really could become king of France. Eight months of careful negotiations then led to the treaty of Troyes, sealed on 21 May 1420. Henry was to marry Catherine of Valois, daughter of Charles VI, and be regent of France during the lifetime of the mad king. On the death of Charles VI, Henry would become king of France, and the dauphin would be disinherited; there would continue to be two kingdoms, each with their own laws and administration, but there would be only one king.[6]

In practice matters turned out differently. When Henry died on 31 August 1422 at the age of 35 Charles VI had still two months to live, and it was left to the most statesmanlike of Henry's brothers, John, duke of Bedford, to protect the difficult inheritance which passed to the infant Henry VI. For several years Bedford succeeded in maintaining the Lancastrian territories on the continent although a large tract of central and southern France (the so-called 'Kingdom of Bourges' of Charles VII) remained outside his control. From 1429, however, the war turned increasingly against the English while the Burgundian alliance, frequently unsettled, finally collapsed when the French and the Burgundians made a separate peace at the Congress of Arras in 1435. Six months later the English were driven from Paris. But while it lasted the Anglo-Burgundian regime in Paris was the closest that the English came to establishing a credible claim to the throne of France, for the great institutions of the French Church and State had recognized an Englishman as regent and his son as king.

Paris was in the part of France that acknowledged the authority of the

[6] For the Burgundian alliance and the treaty of Troyes see P. Bonenfant, *Du meurtre de Montereau au traité de Troyes* (Mémoires de l'Académie Royale de Belgique, classe des lettres, 2nd ser., 52, Brussels, 1958) and, for the text of the treaty, E. Cosneau, *Les Grands Traités de la guerre de Cent Ans* (Paris, 1889), 102–15.

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English as a result of the Burgundian coup of 1418. The town ruled by Henry V and the duke of Bedford was a product of the political divisions of France, divisions with a special significance for the French capital. To hold Paris was to hold more than just a town, and more than just the largest town in western Europe. By the fifteenth century the position in France that Paris holds to this day was well established. Parisian events frequently had a national significance and ambitious men were attracted there from every part of the kingdom. The *Parlement* of Paris, the supreme law-court of France, was staffed by lawyers from all over the country.[7] Immigrant or native, the Parisian was always aware of the wider world, and the three principal districts of the capital—the Île de la Cité, the left bank, and the right bank—each had their own reasons to look beyond the walls.

The historic heart of Paris was the Île de la Cité, once the island stronghold of the Gaulish tribe of the Parisii. It remained the site of the royal palace, although in practice the king himself had been driven out by an expanding bureaucracy. Of the institutions based in the palace the *Parlement* was the most eminent. Originally a committee of the royal council it had developed over the preceding century into a body with the traditions, power, and status appropriate to an organization which represented the highest manifestation of the king's justice. The time was approaching when the workload of the *Parlement* of Paris would reach a level where it would have to accept the creation of local *Parlements* in an ever increasing number of regions, but in the early fifteenth century the judges were still trying jealously to defend and extend their position as the highest court of appeal throughout the land.

The royal palace sheltered other institutions whose role was perhaps less prestigious than that of the *Parlement*, but who also saw themselves as serving the kingdom as a whole. The *Chambre des Comptes* audited the accounts of administrators from all over France; the Chancery created the formal documents whereby the king's wishes were transmitted to his officers and people. We should be cautious before taking the officers' views as to their own importance entirely at face value, but still the Parisians were proud to have the *Parlement* and the other organs of the central administration in their midst, and they did play a major role in the emerging French State. In a large country, with regional variations of history, traditions, and language, the essential function of the king's

[7] F. Autrand, *Naissance d'un grand corps de l'État: Les Gens du Parlement de Paris 1345–1454* (Paris, 1981), 445.

officers was to impose a top layer of administrative unity across the localities.

No less outward-looking was the left bank, the home since the twelfth century of the university of Paris. Here the perspectives were perhaps even wider than on the Cité, for the reputation of the university was truly international, and its recruitment across Europe reflected the fact that it was generally regarded as being the greatest centre for the study of theology in the world. Despite grievous losses in the rioting that followed the Burgundian entry of 1418 and the departure of several of its greatest figures to the service of the dauphin the university remained a cosmopolitan institution where even under the English Paris-born students were a small minority.[8] As for the senior members of the university, they were always ready to play an active part in events far from Paris, whether in Rouen for the trial of Joan of Arc, at Basle for the council which began in 1431, or at Arras for the peace conference of 1435 which marked the collapse of the Anglo-Burgundian alliance.[9]

On the other bank of the Seine, the principal trading districts of the capital were equally preoccupied with the wider world. The two major ports of the capital, the Port de l'École-Saint-Germain and the Place de Grève, were on that side of the river, situated up and down stream of the bridges of Paris. The size of the capital made Paris a massive importer of all essential commodities, and its location on the river network of northern France gave the town a key position not only on the Seine itself, but between the rivers Yonne, Marne, and Oise.[10] The town hall, presided over not by a mayor but by the *prévôt des marchands* (provost of the merchants) and the four *échevins*, adjoined the Place de Grève; the location betrays the fact that in Paris the municipality had developed in order to administer the trading relations of the town, and to deal with the disputes and needs of the bourgeois of Paris and of their commercial partners.[11]

Thus for men from each district of Paris, the status of the town as capital and focal point of the nation was clear enough. But if Paris was the would-be heart, the body was dismembered. To the south was the

[8] J. Favier, *Paris au XV^e siècle 1380–1500* (Nouvelle histoire de Paris, Paris, 1974), 78.

[9] H. S. Denifle and E. Châtelain, 'Le Procès de Jeanne d'Arc et l'Université de Paris', *MSHP* 24 (1897), 1–32; J. G. Dickinson, *The Congress of Arras, 1435: A Study in Medieval Diplomacy* (Oxford, 1955), 16–18. Favier, *Paris*, 220–1, 232, indicates that the delegates at Basle and Arras were somewhat ineffective.

[10] Favier, *Paris*, 285, 239–45.

[11] The role of *prévôt des marchands* is not to be confused with that of the *prévôt* of Paris, who was an officer of the king. Both offices are discussed further in Ch. 3.

'Kingdom of Bourges': that part of France loyal to the dauphin Charles. To the north-west was Normandy, the power-base of the English; administered together with Normandy was the area known as the '*pays de conquête*', the part of France beyond Normandy which Henry V had succeeded in taking by force before the treaty of Troyes. This came as close to Paris as Saint-Germain-en-Laye, a mere twelve miles to the west.[12] Finally, there was the third sector of France, which had come under the authority of Henry V by virtue of the treaty. This included the relatively coherent areas of the Burgundian dominions within France, but also many other places which had happened to side with the Burgundians before Troyes.

The Kingdom of Bourges was, of course, beyond the authority of the government in Paris.[13] Yet, for the people of the capital, it can never have been possible to forget the existence of the regime south of the Loire, for the simple reason that many of them had friends or relations there. Contact between the two parts of France was tightly regulated. When, in November 1420, the canons of Notre-Dame sought permission to send messengers into the other obedience to summon their absent colleagues to the election of the bishop of Paris, the royal *prévôt* declared that it was not in his power to grant such a request; the Chancery of France said the same thing, and it was only after the letters had been approved by Henry V himself that they were sealed.[14] Naturally, there were occasions when it was necessary to communicate with the other part of France: information might be needed in a case over a disputed benefice where the previous incumbent had died in Bourges, for example.[15] Certainly there could be worthy reasons for passing through enemy territory. On 28 June 1434 the municipality gave leave of absence to three of its officers who wished to go on pilgrimage to the shrine of St James at Compostella, but it was on condition that they did nothing to assist the king's enemies while passing through their lands.[16]

[12] Wylie and Waugh, *Henry V*, iii. 236.

[13] G. Dodu, 'Le Roi de Bourges, ou dix-neuf ans de la vie de Charles VII', *RH* 159 (1928), 38–78; R. G. Little, *The* Parlement *of Poitiers: War, Government and Politics in France 1418–1436* (London, 1984), *passim*.

[14] Grassoreille, 'Histoire politique du chapitre', 120–3.

[15] AN, X^{1a} (civil cases of the *Parlement* of Paris) 4797, fos. 74^{r}, 91^{r}: 28 May and 8 July 1433. See also X^{1a} 68, fo. 26^{r}; X^{1a} 1481, fo. 69^{r}. For another case where a witness in the Kingdom of Bourges was to be examined see *Fauquembergue*, ii. 269–70.

[16] AN, Z^{1h} (hearings of the *Bureau de la Ville*) 9, fo. 147^{v}. No doubt these officers would also have required a safe conduct from the royal council.

Except with special permission, communication with enemy France was not allowed, and the *prévôt* of Paris did what he could to stamp out secret correspondence. In 1423 it was discovered that Michelette d'Auxerre, the widow of one Guiot de Bossu, had received and concealed a messenger from the enemy at her home in Paris, and she was seen subsequently distributing seditious letters.[17] She had been involved in such work for some time. Two years before, a messenger on his way from Paris to the lands of the dauphin had been captured by the garrison at Chevreuse, fifteen miles south-west of Paris, and she had been prepared to put up 40 out of the 100 francs of his ransom, rather than let him be brought to Paris where he was likely to be interrogated with disastrous results for those who had sent him.[18] It is highly probable that Michelette was the daughter of a leading Armagnac, Guillaume d'Auxerre (he had several daughters, famous for their beauty). Guillaume d'Auxerre had been executed by the Burgundians in 1418 and his widow was living in Bourges, so Michelette would have had both motive to hate the regime that had killed her father and opportunity to remain in touch with people in the other obedience.[19]

Many of the messengers who negotiated the hazards of soldiers and bandits to make the journey between Paris and Bourges or Poitiers were priests, usually monks or friars.[20] No doubt they were frequently seen on the road anyway, and their clerical garb would have acted as some form of safe conduct. But amongst the prisoners languishing in the Bastille in October 1428 were two Dominican friars—one from Rouen, one from La Rochelle—and a parish priest.[21] Since they were in the Bastille, their offence must have been political: probably the bringing of messages, but perhaps combined with spying. Charles VII certainly used priests as spies in the 1440s.[22] Yet, although maintaining relations with the Kingdom of Bourges was treated as a crime, it was not always the case that serious plotting was involved. Someone might wish simply to

[17] AN, X^{2a} (criminal cases of the *Parlement* of Paris) 16, fo. 453^{r}: 21 May 1423. On appeal to the *Parlement*, the sentence of the *prévôt*—pillory, banishment, and confiscation of goods—was commuted to a period of house arrest.

[18] A. Longnon, *Paris pendant la domination anglaise (1420–1436). Documents extraits des registres de la Chancellerie de France* (SHP, Paris, 1878), 226.

[19] *Bourgeois*, 100; Longnon, *Paris*, 266.

[20] e.g. *Fauquembergue*, i. 264–5; Longnon, *Paris*, 224–5; *Comptes du domaine de la Ville de Paris* (2 vols., HGP, Paris, 1949–58), i ed. A. Vidier, L. Le Grand, and P. Dupieux, ii ed. J. Monicat, vol. i, col. 105.

[21] F. Bournon, *La Bastille* (HGP, Paris, 1893), 251.

[22] M. G. A. Vale, *Charles VII* (London, 1974), 122.

keep in contact with a friend, or sort out a piece of family business: when Jean de La Fontaine heard in 1421 that a monk was going to make a journey into enemy territory he asked to be remembered to Jean Chastenier, the dauphin's secretary; he also requested that the monk try to trace some goods left by his wife's late brother-in-law. In this type of communication, no letters were carried, but only a signed scrap of parchment or—even safer—a token that would be recognized by the recipient.[23] The greeting would be entrusted to the memory of the messenger.

The exiles from Paris were almost without exception fugitives from the Burgundians who had entered Paris in 1418, rather than from the English alliance of 1420. Those who could live with the Burgundians could tolerate their English colleagues. The treaty of Troyes did have one important effect on people's attitude to the division of France: it showed that, if not permanent (and nobody knew), the partitioning was at least likely to be lengthy. When the Armagnacs fled Paris in 1418 there had been no overwhelming reason to believe that they would be away for years. It was by no means the first upheaval of the century. The twists of political life were such that Nicole de Longueil, son of a president at the *Parlement*, had to be given permission to return to Paris in 1426: he had left early in 1418 after his father had been expelled as a 'Burgundian'.[24] In the same way, people who fled with the Armagnacs had hoped that they would soon be back, and had attempted to safeguard property and offices ready for their return. The *huissiers* (bailiffs) at the *Parlement* of Paris, Aleume Cachemarée and Pierre Belle, appeared at the rival institution at Poitiers in 1419, but at first did what they could to hold on to their posts in Paris as well.[25]

With the English and the Burgundians in alliance, it became evident that no rapid settlement would be possible, and so some osmosis occurred between the two sides. The most eminent Armagnac to survive in Paris into the 1420s was Robert Louvel, the town clerk. One of his assistants was suspected of being 'Arminagois', but he himself appears to have escaped censure, despite his involvement in Michelette d'Auxerre's secret communications network.[26] By the summer of 1422,

[23] Longnon, *Paris*, 224–5.

[24] AN, JJ (*Trésor des Chartes*) 173, no. 577. His father had returned to Paris after the Burgundian entry, leaving Nicole to study law at Angers, which was by then in the Armagnac sphere of influence.

[25] Cachemarée relied on the feeble argument that he was held in Poitiers against his will; see Little, *The* Parlement *of Poitiers*, 24.

[26] AN, X^{1a} 4792, fo. 130^{v}; Longnon, *Paris*, 225.

however, he too had escaped to the Kingdom of Bourges, and his post was filled by a more reliable Burgundian.[27] People did cross from one part of France to the other, sometimes in order to secure an inheritance, sometimes to be back with family and friends.[28] Jeanne Costel had left Paris with her husband in 1418, and after his death she attempted to return home with her three children. Despite friends in high places, she was rejected on her first attempt as being suspect, and it was only in 1431 that she was able to obtain a pardon.[29] Unfortunately she had, in the meantime, contracted to marry a knight in Charles VII's army, and no sooner had she settled down in Paris with her mother than he sent word that he had come to claim her. Slipping out of Paris, first in an unsuccessful attempt to see him, then to try and break off the engagement, she laid herself open to prosecution once again.[30]

The strict opinion, as expounded by the *procureur du roi* at the *Parlement*, was that it was no defence for someone in the other obedience to be essentially a good person and sorry to be there.[31] The king's lawyers were only doing their duty by putting forward the strongest possible case against people in the other part of France, but in practice it was recognized that the full rigour of the law was often inappropriate when what was important was to encourage the erring to return to the fold.[32] Thus to be in communication with a relative or lover in the Kingdom of Bourges was understandable and could well be pardoned.[33] Yet the news that filtered through was partial and erratic: the Parisians heard quickly enough of the serious accident suffered by the dauphin when he fell through the floor of a room in La Rochelle in October 1422, but some people were still uncertain the following March whether or not

[27] See Ch. 6, n. 39.

[28] For example: going from Valois to Lancastrian France, Pierre l'Orfèvre (A. Bossuat, 'Une famille parisienne pendant l'occupation anglaise au XV^e siècle', *BSHP* 87–8 (1960–1), 88–9) and, in the opposite direction, Jean Sudre (Y. Lanhers, 'Deux affaires de trahison défendues par Jean Jouvenel des Ursins (1423–1427)', *Mélanges Pierre Tisset* (Recueil de mémoires et travaux publié par la Société du Droit et des Institutions des Anciens Pays de Droit Écrit, fasc. vii, Montpellier, 1970), 320.

[29] Longnon, *Paris*, 338–9.

[30] AN, X^1a 4797, fos. 251^v, 253^v, 254^v: May 1435. Husbands were also the trouble for Marie de Voisines, who left Paris with Jacques Janne, crossbow captain of the count of Armagnac, after his death married a doctor of law at Avignon, and then separated from him and returned to Paris (AN, X^1a 4795, fo. 163^r: May 1427).

[31] 'Ne sont mie excuséz ceulz qui sont en lobeissance des ennemis suppose que on dit quilz soient bons et quil leur desplaisse dy estre' (AN, X^1a 4795, fo. 31^v).

[32] A similar attitude prevailed in the lands of Charles VII (Lanhers, 'Deux affaires', 326).

[33] Cases from Longnon, *Paris*, cited Favier, *Paris*, 184–5.

he had been killed.[34] Candidates for the post of chancellor of the university of Paris appeared rapidly after news reached the capital in October 1425 of the death of the exiled theologian Jean Gerson, but it was to transpire that the report was nearly four years premature.[35]

Half of France, therefore, maintained only the most tenuous connections with the capital. In the north, too, the duchy of Brittany followed its own virtually independent line, and during the Anglo-Breton war of 1427 the duke's possessions in the Paris region were confiscated and given to the earl of Salisbury.[36] The state of war did not last, however, and before the end of the year the duke had even sent a Breton merchant to Paris to buy jewellery and fabrics for New Year's Day presents for the duchess and others.[37] His interest in Paris was still negligible, none the less, so that when his Paris *hôtel* was returned to him after the death of Salisbury,[38] he gave it away.[39] Only Normandy and north-eastern France were left to be the kingdom for which Paris was capital. But even in these areas, where the Lancastrians and the Burgundians held sway, there were difficulties.

For many Parisians, it must have appeared especially important that their sector of the kingdom included substantial territories of the duke of Burgundy, both in and near the duchy of Burgundy itself and, over a hundred miles to the north, in the Low Countries.[40] In the dukes of Burgundy, John the Fearless and Philip the Good, the Parisians put a great deal of trust, which was natural enough. Duke John had constructed the Burgundian regime that was established in Paris in 1418; for him it represented the culmination of a lifetime of work to win control of the central administration of France, and to that end he had

[34] *Monstrelet*, iv. 132 n. 1.

[35] Jean Gerson, *Œuvres complètes*, ed. P. Glorieux (10 vols., Paris-Tournai, 1960–73), x. 562–3.

[36] Longnon, *Paris*, 248–9. For the policies of the duke of Brittany between 1420 and 1435 see G. A. Knowlson, *Jean V, duc de Bretagne et l'Angleterre* (Cambridge-Rennes, 1964), 119–60.

[37] AN, Z^{1a} (*Cour des Aides*) 7, fos. 53^{v}, 59^{v}: 8 Nov., 3 Dec., 1427. Duke John had ratified the treaty of peace on 8 Sept. (Knowlson, *Jean V*, 137–8).

[38] BM Rouen, MS Leber 5870 (Extracts from registers of the *Chambre des Comptes*), 12, fos. 82^{r}–83^{r}.

[39] M. Félibien, *Histoire de la Ville de Paris, reveue, augmentée et mise à jour par Dom Lobineau* (5 vols., Paris, 1725), iii. 75–6.

[40] Both parts of the Burgundian dominions straddled the border between France and the Holy Roman Empire. See, for the Burgundian territories at this time, R. Vaughan, *Valois Burgundy* (London, 1975), pp. viii, 20–1.

created and nourished his relations with the capital. His son was expected to continue with the same policies. At first it seemed that this would indeed be the case: Philip the Good's participation in the treaty of Troyes accorded precisely with the wishes of the Burgundian faction in Paris and represented a crushing blow to the dauphin Charles, the heir to the Orléanist faction and the man held responsible for the murder of John the Fearless.

In the months after the treaty of Troyes, Philip the Good had seemed set to establish a constructive relationship with Paris. Entering into the siege of Melun with vigour, Duke Philip bought numerous weapons in the capital, kept in close touch with his principal officers (who were established in Paris), and when reinforcements were required sent urgent letters to the Parisians, who responded with a troop of militiamen.[41] He came to the capital with Henry V and Charles VI in December 1420, and the indictment of the dauphin before the Estates-General passed off smoothly.[42] Soon after his departure, the *Parlement* ordered one of their number to undertake an investigation of certain captives suspected of involvement in the murder of John the Fearless.[43] The result was the execution of at least one such criminal, Tanguy de Coismenet, known as Le Borgne Tanguy. He had certainly been present at the bridge of Montereau and was condemned to be dragged through the town and decapitated in Les Halles, his body hung on the gibbet and his four limbs at the principal gates of Paris.[44] But although Philip the Good doubtless wanted vengeance for his father, this did not require him to remain in the capital. Indeed, as the years passed, it seemed that there were few occasions that did call for his attendance.

The presence of Philip the Good in Paris was, in fact, to be a rare event. The town that had been the focal point of his father's ambitions was visited by him only fourteen times in the period 1420–36, ten of

[41] ADN, B 1923, fos. 47^{r}, 84^{r}, 166^{r}–169^{r}.

[42] Wylie and Waugh, *Henry V*, iii. 224–5, 229–31.

[43] AN, X^{2a} 16, fo. 397^{r}: 30 Jan. 1421.

[44] BN, MS Dupuy 250 (extracts from the *conseil* register of the *Parlement criminel*), fo. 138^{v}. The articles of Le Borgne Tanguy's condemnation are printed in Des Salles, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France et de Bourgogne* . . . , ed. L. F. J. de La Barre (2 vols., Paris, 1729), i. 308–10, and the expenses of his execution were met by the *prévôté* of Paris (Sauval, iii. 276). Also executed and quartered four days later was one Jean Gault, who had been captured at Melun (*Fauquembergue*, ii. 13).

these visits falling in three years: 1422, 1424, and 1429.[45] Only two lasted more than a month, and it was the longest of these that established, definitively, Philip's attitude to the town of Paris and to the English cause in France. This was the stay that ran from 31 August to 10 October 1422.[46] When Philip arrived, Henry V had been dead for less than a day;[47] when he left, Charles VI had only eleven days to live. Yet he skilfully avoided becoming involved in the consequences of these critical events. Admittedly, the archival sources are scanty, and the chronicles contradictory on almost every particular, but there is no compelling evidence that Philip adopted the title of regent for the insane and dying Charles VI,[48] or that he had any ambition to be regent for young Henry VI after the death of the French king.[49] On the contrary, since he was in Paris, he had every opportunity to declare himself regent for King Charles, and by leaving the town when the king was on his death-bed he avoided having to refuse the regency for Henry VI expressly.[50] It is unlikely that the duke of Bedford's assumption of the role of regent for his nephew was without Philip's consent, or that it displeased him.[51] Almost the last thing the duke of Burgundy did before leaving Paris was to attend a council meeting at which it was decided that Bedford be given the huge Hôtel des Tournelles (later to be the English regent's favourite

[45] H. Vander Linden, *Itinéraires de Philippe le Bon, duc de Bourgogne (1419–1467) et de Charles, comte de Charolais (1435–1467)* (Commission royale d'histoire de Belgique, Brussels, 1940), 12–137.

[46] Vander Linden, *Itinéraires*, 26.

[47] Henry V died in the early morning of 31 Aug. 1422. On 22 Aug. Philip had sent a messenger to Henry saying he was on his way to 'France', but although Henry spoke to Hugues de Lannoy in his last hours it appears that Burgundy wished to avoid seeing him again (ADN, B 1925, fo. 105^{v}; Wylie and Waugh, *Henry V*, iii. 416).

[48] R. A. Griffiths, *The Reign of King Henry VI* (London, 1981), 17, states that Burgundy probably did become regent for Charles VI, but the evidence of Thomas Walsingham, *Historia Anglicana*, ed. H. T. Riley (RS, London, 1863–4), ii. 345), is uncorroborated.

[49] C. A. J. Armstrong, 'La Double Monarchie France-Angleterre et la maison de Bourgogne (1420–1435): Le Déclin d'une alliance', *Annales de Bourgogne*, 37 (1965), 82–3, suggests that rather than refusing the regency it is more likely that Burgundy was pushed aside by Bedford.

[50] *Fauquembergue*, ii. 59, says that Charles died after the fourth or fifth 'acesz de fievre quatre': Philip may have had warning to get away.

[51] In fact, it is unlikely that Philip was anything but relieved. As for Bedford, his delay in coming to Paris suggests that he had hoped that Burgundy would take on the regency, and he only acted when it became essential to protect the inheritance of Henry VI (cf. B. J. H. Rowe, 'The *Grand Conseil* under the duke of Bedford, 1422–35', *Oxford Essays in Medieval History presented to Herbert Edward Salter* (Oxford, 1934), 208–9; Y. Grandeau, 'La Mort et les obsèques de Charles VI', *BPHCTH* 1970 (1974), 139–41, 144–5).

residence in Paris).[52] Furthermore, had Burgundy objected to Bedford's conduct, it is hardly likely that the marriage contract of the new regent and Anne of Burgundy, Duke Philip's sister, would have been sealed before the year was over.[53] At the end of October and beginning of November 1422 his messengers were sent to the duke of Bedford, the council in France, and the town of Paris.[54] Even though negotiations may have concentrated on wedding plans, it is scarcely conceivable that, if Philip had been interested in strengthening his position in the capital, this should have left no trace in the records.

By leaving Paris at the end of 1422, then, Philip demonstrated that he had no wish to play a central role in the government of Anglo-Burgundian France. He maintained his contacts,[55] but kept his distance. The Parisian municipality thought it worthwhile to try to enlist his help in a trade dispute with Rouen, but it is hard to see what the duke could have done.[56] Philip continued to buy luxuries from the goldsmiths and cloth merchants of Paris, but he could obtain almost everything he wanted in his towns of the Low Countries and his purchases in Paris were modest compared with those in Flanders.[57] Commercially and politically, Philip the Good was distancing himself from the town of Paris, as he sought to avoid too close a connection with the Lancastrian cause in France.

There was, however, more to north-eastern France than Burgundy alone. In 1418, at a town meeting in Château-Thierry in the county of Champagne, Colart Richart had argued that since Paris—the capital of the kingdom—had gone over to the Burgundians, they should follow suit.[58] Such anecdotal evidence perhaps needs to be substantiated: even

[52] BM Rouen, MS Leber 5870, xii, fo. 51^{r}: decision of the duke of Burgundy (not, incidentally, described as regent in this summary) and the *Grand Conseil* (8 Oct. 1422).

[53] As Griffiths, *Henry VI*, 26, points out.

[54] ADN, B 1927, fo. 55^{r}; B. A. Pocquet du Haut-Jussé, 'Anne de Bourgogne et le testament de Bedford (1929)', *BEC* 95 (1934), 296.

[55] For example, Jean de Belloy, *échevin* of Paris, 1422–29, had been in exile with John the Fearless, 1413–18, and was not forgotten by Philip the Good (ADN, B 1933, fo. 118^{r}; B 1938, fo. 148^{r}: gifts in 1425 and 1428).

[56] *Comptes du domaine*, i, cols. 105–6.

[57] Obviously, Philip invested in Parisian products when he was in the capital in person, for example in Dec. 1420 (ADN, B 1923, fos. 134^{r}, 142^{r}, 144^{r}–5^{r}, 153^{r}, 154^{v}; B 1925, fo. 74^{v}), Sept.–Oct. 1422 (B 1925, fos. 74^{v}, 82^{r}; B 1927, fos. 145^{r}–145^{v}) or in 1424 (B 1929, fos. 116^{r}–119^{v}). But every year purchases in the Low Countries predominate.

[58] AN, X^{1a} 4793, fo. 174^{v}.

if the story is true it failed to impress the Armagnac majority in the town. What is convincing is the picture presented by the cases coming to the *Parlement* of Paris, whether directly or on appeal, at the time when Anglo-Burgundian France was at its greatest extent. Map 3 indicates the origins of cases started in the legal year which began on 12 November 1427.[59] Of the 199 cases recorded, 78 were of a Parisian origin, which is predictable enough in view of simple geographical convenience, coupled with the fact that Paris was the home of many of those privileged to have their cases decided by the *Parlement* at first instance. No less predictable is the tiny number of Norman cases; these involved more or less genuine students who, regardless of Norman claims to judicial independence, were entitled to have their cases heard in Paris. The most striking feature is, however, the comprehensive cover of the administrative centres of north-eastern France, including those parts of the Low Countries within the kingdom of France. Throughout that area, people came to seek royal justice in the capital of France.

For many Parisians, the importance of northern and eastern France was determined by more mundane factors. Along with Normandy, this area supplied their most important commercial contacts. Even when Charles VII again governed the whole of France, Parisian trade would be concentrated in the arc from Saint-Lô round to Auxerre while, from the former Kingdom of Bourges, only Orléans could match the major towns of Normandy, Picardy, and Champagne for commercial traffic.[60] For the Parisians of the Place de Grève and the Port de l'École-Saint-Germain, no less than for the officers of the Palace, the routes to the east were essential to the functioning of a town that could not be self-contained. Wine from Beaune and Auxerre, wood from Compiègne and the towns of the Oise and the Marne:[61] these were things that the average inhabitant of the capital would miss well before he troubled himself about the presence or absence of litigants at the *Parlement*. Furthermore, for Parisian institutions dependent on their income from lands in this prosperous region it was very important to maintain the security of the territory.[62] Unfortunately, the area to the east of Paris was

[59] Based on AN, X^{1a} 4795, fo. 167^{r} to the end. Entries noted which commence 'Entre . . .', rather than 'En la cause . . .', which implies that the case was already under way.

[60] Favier, *Paris*, 431–3. [61] Ibid. 288–9.

[62] AN, H^{3} 2785^{7} (accounts of the College de Beauvais), (1422), fo. 13^{v}: graphic report by the college *procureur* of his visit to their lands in villages north of Meaux, which he found largely deserted.



MAP 3. The origins of cases at the *Parlement* of Paris 1427–1428

Note: The number in Paris includes 7 from the *requêtes du Palais*, 2 from the *maréchaux*, and 1 from the commission on confiscations.

Source: Compiled from AN, X^{1a} 4796, fos. 167^{r} onwards.

the most vulnerable to any successes achieved by the forces of Charles VII.

The region was never totally secure. Vitry-en-Perthois, in the county of Champagne, changed hands four times between 1424 and 1430.[63] The rivers, the primary routes for most heavy goods, formed perfect targets for bands of soldiers with an eye for plunder; their enterprises may have been of no lasting strategic value, but were an ever-present worry. Were those bandits and enemies visible through the trees near Vernou, eight miles downstream from Montereau? Jean de Woallecourt, as a 'bon compagnon', climbed on to the edge of his boat for a better view, but fell in and was drowned.[64] Merchants might even have to guarantee their boatmen against the losses that were all too likely at particularly hazardous times.[65] The exploits of small raiding parties were, however, insignificant compared with the general demolition of the Lancastrian position in Champagne in 1429. After the relief of Orléans and the victories of Joan of Arc, Charles VII made his famous progression to Reims for his coronation on 17 July 1429. Troyes, Châlons, Reims itself, then after Charles was crowned, Soissons, Château-Thierry, Compiègne, Senlis, Beauvais, and Saint-Denis were amongst the important and strategic towns taken before the end of August 1429.[66] The disruption was obvious: even if Meaux remained loyal to the English, Lagny-sur-Marne, on the river between Paris and Meaux, had gone over to the French.[67] Compiègne held the key to river communications between the capital, Picardy, and the Low Countries, which explains the efforts of the Burgundians to retake it in 1430.[68]

Although English and, to a lesser extent, Burgundian forces laboured in the 1430s to recoup their losses of 1429, their success was limited.[69] Places such as Troyes and Reims, as well as Compiègne and Lagny (where important sieges were undertaken), remained in the hands of the enemy. The reverses in and around the county of Champagne were to

[63] A. Longnon, 'Les Limites de la France et l'étendue de la domination anglaise à l'époque de Jeanne d'Arc', *Revue des questions historiques*, 18 (1875), 491–3.

[64] L. Douët d'Arcq, 'Deux actes du XV^{e} siècle relatifs à la justice de Saint-Magloire dans Paris', *BSHP* 7 (1880), 131.

[65] AN, X^{1a} 4796, fo. 145^{v}: dispute following a contract to supply the royal *greniers* of the upper Seine in Feb. 1429.

[66] See e.g. A. Lang, *The Maid of France* (4th edn., London, 1922), 154–74.

[67] Longnon, 'Limites', 468, 493.

[68] Favier, *Paris*, 341. The Burgundians were assisted from English finances (PRO, E 101/52/35, no. 2).

[69] Allmand, *Lancastrian Normandy*, 36–9.

force the Parisians to depend more than ever on their links with Rouen and Normandy, the stronghold of the English in France. Paris and Normandy had, however, conducted an ambiguous relationship since the conquest of the duchy by Philippe-Auguste at the beginning of the thirteenth century. 'The duchy had never accepted its role as one of the crowning glories of the French monarchy',[70] and the tensions were reflected in the strengths and weaknesses of the Lancastrian position in France. Normandy was rich and fertile: Rouen, the second city of the kingdom, was ideally placed between Paris and the sea. Paris and Rouen could benefit from each other,[71] but still the two great towns had conflicting interests. The merchants of Rouen sought entry to the consumer society that was Paris; the merchants of Paris wanted access to the sea. Both towns had jealously guarded privileges; each tried to encroach on the preserves of the other.[72] Thus conflict was inevitable and, although the king of France—in person or through his officers —supported his capital, the merchants of Rouen did not accept the supremacy of the Parisians uncritically.

At the time of the treaty of Troyes, the fear of rivalry had been entirely subordinated to the desire to restore commercial links. The last major commercial dispute, decided in favour of Paris, had been in 1380;[73] altogether more pressing was the threat to Parisian supplies posed by the English occupation of Normandy. The siege of Rouen in 1418 had provoked immense concern in Paris: on the back of a business letter written from the capital on 22 November a description can be found of relief plans for Rouen and the prices being charged for foodstuffs in the beleaguered city, including cat's flesh.[74] When in July 1419 Pontoise fell too the other major supply route from the north was in English hands.[75] It is not surprising that, in the absence of strong action against the English, ambassadors from Paris were in the forefront when negotiations for peace were afoot. In the aftermath of the murder of John the Fearless at Montereau, men from Paris approached Henry V at Gisors while, for his part, Henry appointed an embassy to treat with the

[70] Ibid. 123.

[71] M. Mollat, *Le Commerce maritime normand à la fin du Moyen Age* (Paris, 1952), 12–13, 297–304.

[72] R. Cazelles, 'La Rivalité commerciale de Paris et de Rouen au Moyen Age: Compagnie française et compagnie normande', *BSHP* 96 (1969), 99–112.

[73] Ibid. 104–5; AN, X^{1a} 4794, fo. 229^{r}.

[74] BL, Add. Ch. 74. Cf. the reaction of the *Bourgeois*, 112.

[75] Wylie and Waugh, *Henry V*, iii. 178–80.

governor of Paris and the chancellor of France, and with the citizens and clergy of the capital.[76] The council of the new duke of Burgundy was well aware of the war-weariness of the major towns of France, and by the end of October 1419 the royal council in Paris was warning the Burgundian leadership to be under no illusions: the *menus gens* would be unlikely to resist any attack by the English on Paris, and were waiting day by day for an announcement of peace.[77] Thus the Burgundian faction in the capital was diligent in its efforts to distance the effects of the war.

The benefits of such a policy were soon apparent. On 20 November 1419, Henry V conceded a truce for Paris and its neighbourhood until 4 December and this was subsequently extended until the 12th.[78] By 24 January 1420 the Parisian ambassadors were looking ahead to the time when Henry would have the throne of France, and had extracted a promise that he would maintain the rights and privileges of the town.[79] Of more immediate importance to the Parisians was the fact that supplies were beginning to come through from Normandy again. The first safe conduct for Paris merchants to trade in the duchy was issued by Henry on 13 December 1419; thenceforward, as peace negotiations advanced, the quantity of provisions for Paris increased.[80] Although, in late February 1420, the council in Paris hesitated in the face of the English king's demand that they surrender Beaumont-sur-Oise, which would increase his control over supplies, it does not appear that their commitment to the idea of peace was shaken.[81] On receiving news of the conclusion of the final peace, the leaders of the municipality wrote promptly and enthusiastically to declare their support.[82]

Once the treaty of Troyes was sealed, however, Henry V seemed less interested in allowing merchants to bring supplies into the capital. When his ambassadors arrived in Paris, they reported the citizens ready to show their allegiance, but eager to claim their reward: 'the provost of this towne, the provost of marchants, and others in grete nombre, come to us dayly makying the most piteuse compleint that men mowe here', for supplies had been held so long at Rouen that they had gone rotten in the

[76] Rymer, ix. 797.

[77] Bonenfant, *Du meurtre de Montereau*, 206–9, 219.

[78] Rymer, ix. 812, 815.

[79] Ibid. 854. A copy of this document was kept by the municipality until at least the seventeenth century (AN, KK 495^2, p. 12).

[80] *DKR* 41 (1880), 808; 42 (1881), 332–74. Numbers of safe conducts were especially high in February 1420 (13) and April (12). Goods imported included fish, corn, cheese, and wood.

[81] *Fauquembergue*, i. 349–53; Favier, *Paris*, 173.

[82] Rymer, ix. 910.

ships.[83] Eventually the blockade was lifted,[84] and traders soon came forward to register as members of the Paris *hanse*. The first year for which records survive is 1424–5, when the enthusiasm of 1420 would presumably have begun to wear off but, even so, the number of merchants seeking the privileges of membership of the *hanse* is the highest for the century.[85]

Communication with Normandy was to be the key to the provisioning of Anglo-Burgundian Paris, just as it had been a decisive factor in persuading the Parisians to seek an alliance with Henry V.[86] Protecting river communications was a high priority. The important bridge and castle at Meulan were in enemy hands for ten days in April 1422; this worried the Parisians greatly, for at that time all foodstuffs had been coming from Rouen.[87] During the 1420s patrols of the river and routes between Paris and Rouen were organized in an effort to limit the problems of raids by brigands and enemy soldiers,[88] and after the disasters of 1429 lengthy sieges were needed to recapture Louviers and Gaillon.[89] As matters remained unstable in the 1430s it became necessary for ships to be grouped into convoys with their own armed guard.[90] The most spectacular of these convoys was that of some 56 boats and 12 barges brought by the duke and duchess of Bedford in January 1431, guarded by well over 400 men.[91] These were necessary precautions, for the enemies were said to be waiting in ambush all along the river; some months previously four fully-laden ships had been captured on their way from Rouen and the merchants in charge put to ransom.[92]

Although it could be hazardous, the route from Rouen to Paris was still the safest of supply routes for the capital; upstream on the Seine, or

[83] BL, MS Cotton Caligula DV, fo. 85^{r}: 17 June 1420.

[84] Merchants from Rouen had arrived by 1 July 1420 (AN, Z^{1h} 7, fo. 193^{r}).

[85] Mollat, *Commerce maritime*, 301 n. 191. For the Paris *hanse*, see also Ch. 3, n. 16.

[86] G. Fourquin, *Les Campagnes de la région parisienne à la fin du Moyen Age* (Paris, 1964), 371.

[87] *Bourgeois*, 168; Fourquin, *Campagnes*, 369–70.

[88] In 1424 Thomas, Lord Scales, was in charge of 20 mounted men-at-arms and 60 archers for this purpose (BL, Add. Ch. 11521; BN, MSS fr. 26046/192–3; 26047/310) and in 1427 William Appleby was captain of 16 archers guarding the routes between Paris and Mantes (BN, PO 974, Dappybly no. 2).

[89] Allmand, *Lancastrian Normandy*, 36, 162.

[90] E.g. AN, Z^{1h} 9, fos. 24^{r}, 153^{r}, 180^{r}.

[91] *Bourgeois*, 261; *Fauquembergue*, iii.2–3; J. Stevenson (ed.) *Letters and Papers Illustrative of the Wars of the English in France during the Reign of Henry the Sixth, King of England* (2 vols. in 3, RS, London, 1861–4), ii (2), 424–6; BL, Add. Chs. 3678–9, 11701.

[92] AN, X^{1a} 4796, fo. 216^{v}.

along the Marne or the Oise, the dangers were often greater. Unfortunately for the Parisians, the men of Rouen were prepared to exploit this fact: they saw the opportunity to challenge the privileges of Paris merchants as granted by several kings of France and confirmed by judgements of the *Parlement* in 1315 and 1380.[93] By claiming that only merchants of Rouen could transport goods through Rouen, and levying a fine on a merchant bringing wine from Paris, the Rouennais attempted to assert their control over the trade of the Seine. This the Parisians could not accept, and they were joined in their protest not only by the *procureur du roi* (who could not allow royal privileges accorded to the capital to be ignored) but also by several Norman towns, who objected to the growing influence of Rouen.[94] The lawyers for Rouen claimed that cases involving Normans could not be heard outside Normandy, but the *procureur du roi* lost no time in penetrating this smokescreen, for this was not an exclusively Norman issue, but affected the whole kingdom of France, and indeed England as well.[95] Since the men of Rouen could produce no better arguments, the *Parlement* stood by the ancient rulings, but this was not the end of the affair. New test cases followed soon afterwards, and were interwoven with a criminal action against the *procureur* of the town of Rouen for obstructing the principal judgement.[96] The *Parlement* avoided stringent penalties, but was firmly in favour of Paris against Rouen.[97] Even so, the matter was still not settled: a year later the town and university of Paris joined with several other towns to argue against the people of Rouen in front of the duke of Bedford.[98]

Thus the fact that Paris and Normandy were pressed into close contact created tensions in Lancastrian France. Paris, *chambre du roi* (king's bedchamber), was forced into a secondary position; the markets contracted. Wishing to sell a valuable set of altar cloths and vestments in 1430–1, while Henry VI was in France and staying at Rouen, Jeanne du Pont took it from Paris, where she claimed she was unable to find a buyer, to Rouen where it was eventually acquired by Cardinal Beaufort

[93] 'Nagaires lesdits de Rouen, regardans que la ville de Paris avoit eu assez a souffrir ont voulu entreprendre sur ladicte marchandise' (AN, X^{1a} 4794, fo. 229^{r}: 22 April 1426). For the earlier disputes see Cazelles, 'Rivalité', 102–5.

[94] Caen, Coutances, Carentan, Caudebec, and Saint-Lô. The copy of the 1315 *arrêt* made for Caen at the time of the 1426 case still survives (AN, K 949, no. 20).

[95] AN, X^{1a} 4794, fo. 238^{v}.

[96] AN, X^{1a} 4794, fos. 240^{v}, 274^{v}, 292^{r}–298^{v}.

[97] *Fauquembergue*, ii. 211–12; AN, X^{1a} 1480, fos. 347^{r}, 347^{v}; X^{1a} 65, fos. 44^{v}, 45^{v}.

[98] AN, Z^{1h} 8, fo. 103^{r}. It was left to Charles VII to abolish the conflicting privileges of both Paris and Rouen in 1450 (Cazelles, 'Rivalité', 111).

or Louis of Luxembourg.[99] It was necessary to go to the Norman capital to sell to the leading counsellors of the king.

Jealousy was particularly acute when the administration of the law was at issue.[100] Traditionally, Normandy had preserved an independent appeals procedure, which the central law courts, and notably the *Parlement* of Paris, were always pleased to break down.[101] While the Normans hoped that the English conquest and the treaty of Troyes would maintain, or even strengthen, the independence of the duchy, the Parisian lawyers hoped the opposite. It was not that they were wholly opposed to the *Échiquier*, the traditional court of appeal in Normandy, which was staffed in part by men from the *Parlement*.[102] The problem concerned the large intervals between meetings of the *Échiquier*, especially in view of the growing importance of a new judicial committee of the royal council in Normandy, which gradually began to adopt the structures and organization of a full court.[103]

The *Parlement* began to worry about the activities of the council in Rouen as soon as it became apparent that the duke of Bedford was determined that one particularly important series of cases—those involving disputes over royal gifts of land and benefices in the duchy of Normany and *pays de conquête*—should always be heard by the new committee.[104] The problem was clearly in the tradition of disputes between Paris and Normandy; the principal novelty lay in the fact that the English had defined a class of case—gifts of lands and benefices—which on political grounds should be decided by the council in Rouen. Whether or not a piece of land was confiscated and, if it was, who was entitled to a gift was obviously not simply a judicial matter. This the *Parlement* found difficult to accept, but no more difficult than the claim that this argument applied not only to the duchy of Normandy, but also to the other lands conquered by Henry V before the treaty of Troyes: the *pays de conquête*. When, in 1429, the *procureur du roi* conceded that cases

[99] AN, X^{1a} 4797, fos. 87^{v}, 279^{r}, 288^{r}.

[100] Allmand, *Lancastrian Normandy*, 129–42.

[101] Clément de Fauquembergue drew a pointing finger in the margin of his register when a Norman case was heard in Paris in 1419 (AN, X^{1a} 4792, fo. 148^{v}).

[102] In the 1420s these included Philippe de Morvilliers, first president, and Jean de L'Espine, criminal *greffier* (E. M. Burney, 'The English Rule in Normandy, 1435–1450' (Univ. of Oxford B. Litt. thesis, 1958), 25 n. 26).

[103] Burney, 'English Rule', 41–2; Allmand, *Lancastrian Normandy*, 142–51.

[104] A. Bossuat, 'Le Parlement de Paris pendant l'occupation anglaise', *RH* 229 (1963), 25–6. See Allmand, *Lancastrian Normandy*, 134–5, 142, for the vexed question of exactly which grants were supposed to be covered.

concerning Norman lands might be heard in Normandy, he went on to say that this could hardly be taken to include lands in the *prévôté* of Paris or *bailliages* of Senlis or Meaux, conquest or not.[105]

The question of the *pays de conquête* was extremely worrying to the administrators and lawyers in Paris, as it suggested (correctly) that the English wished to consolidate the stronghold that was based on what they had won by force, leaving a secondary role to the lands gained by treaty, even if they included Paris. Nominally, Bedford abolished the separate Norman *Chambre des Comptes*, but in practice Norman finances, including those of the *pays de conquête*, were kept apart.[106] It was perhaps comprehensible that Henry V and the duke of Bedford should have wished to govern Normandy separately, but to a French royal officer the concept of a *pays de conquête* was meaningless after the treaty of Troyes. As late as 10 February 1431 the *Chambre des Comptes* decided to order the receiver of Paris to collect the revenues of places such as Saint-Germain-en-Laye and Poissy, which for some time had been 'occupied' by others.[107] There is no evidence he met with any success.

If the *Parlement* and the royal officers were suspicious of Normandy, so too was the university of Paris, the oldest university in the kingdom and—certainly as regards theology—the most prestigious in Europe. After suffering its share of losses in the massacres and expulsions of 1418 the university had sworn loyalty to the treaty of Troyes and settled into a modest and relative tranquillity.[108] In 1424, however, the duke of Bedford obtained papal authorization for the foundation of a new university at Caen, a potential competitor for the patronage of Norman students.[109] In practice the doctors of the left bank were to be given a reprieve, as nothing was done to bring the project to fruition for the rest of the decade. The reverses of 1429, and the consequent need to consolidate the position in Normandy, opened the way for a revival of this plan and the formal act of foundation of the new university was dated January 1432. The university of Paris was predictably hostile, and it could count on the support of the *Parlement*, the municipality, and the chapter of Notre-Dame in resisting this assault on the so-called 'favourite daughter' of the kings of France. With eloquent protests, coupled with the offer to permit the study of civil law if it was really

[105] *English Suits*, 70. [106] Rowe, 'The *Grand Conseil*', 216.
[107] BM Rouen, MS Leber 5870, xii, fo. 163^{v}. [108] Favier, *Paris*, 229–30.
[109] Allmand, *Lancastrian Normandy*, 107.

necessary (this was to be available to Caen; it was not taught in Paris) the theologian Guillaume Erart marshalled the arguments against the new institution before the *Parlement* in November 1433.[110] By the time the *studium* at Caen was in a position to teach anything Paris had been retaken by the French but, once again, a great Parisian institution had seen its position challenged by the readiness of the English to divide their loyalties between the capital and the duchy.

Thus Lancastrian Paris and Lancastrian Normandy were far from forming a united front against the Valois. Normandy was the wealthiest part of Northern France, but its finances were administered separately; it was the route to the sea for the Parisians, but the men of Rouen were determined to profit from the fact; it was the military base of English rule, but the incorporation of the *pays de conquête* made sure that this was never forgotten. Finally, a university was established in the duchy. Was Paris still the capital? It must have seemed uncertain when young Henry VI came to France for his coronation and stayed sixteen months in Rouen as against three weeks in Paris (or rather—for most of the time—at Vincennes).[111] With the position outside Normandy always fragile, the Parisians were forced to rely on their own resources and, if all else failed, to appeal beyond their own kingdom to England.

[110] Ibid. 109; *Fauquembergue*, iii. 111–12.
[111] *DNB*, ix. 508.

2

PARIS AND ENGLAND: THE SEARCH FOR INDEPENDENCE

One of Henry V's objectives following the treaty of Troyes was to ensure that the kingdoms of England and France were kept as independent as possible. Indeed, his subjects would have expected nothing less, for a basic principle of the treaty, ratified by the Estates-General in France and the Parliament in England, was that all the customs and laws of each kingdom should be preserved. Plainly essential to the French, who had had to accept the imposition of a foreign monarch, this was no less important to the English, who wished for assurance that they would never be subject to the kingdom of France and that they would not be required to continue paying for the fighting overseas. The question of money was therefore of fundamental importance, because in English eyes the war could now properly be regarded as a strictly French affair, with the regent of France (Henry) subduing a troublesome rival (the dauphin).

An anonymous memorandum, apparently prepared for the Burgundian authorities, describes how Henry therefore set about reorganizing French finances with a view to tightening-up the authorization of payments, and in order to make it possible for balances to be calculated within about half an hour.[1] Such a programme marked a dramatic improvement over what could have been done prior to the treaty of Troyes, when it had been impossible even to obtain monthly balances, and when in fact there had been two financial systems running in parallel without reference to each other. When the Burgundians took power in 1418 Duke John the Fearless had established one of his officers as receiver-general of all finances, thus doing away with the divisions that had traditionally existed between 'ordinary' and 'extraordinary' receipts. Unnecessary duplications had not been eliminated, since the Treasury

[1] BN, MS Moreau 1425, no. 101, fos. 1^{r}–1^{v}. The location of this report on the administration of finances in the 1420s and 1430s in a collection of documents from the Burgundian archives suggests that perhaps the duke's officers felt that they could learn from Henry's efforts.

in Paris carried on recording its own receipts and expenses regardless of the so-called receiver-general.[2] Henry was guilty of his own duplication in that he kept the finances of Normandy and the *pays de conquête* quite separate from those of the rest of Lancastrian France, but within the area ruled from Paris he did create a unified financial system and at the same time swept away the obsolete accounting practices of the French Treasury.[3] When Henry and his advisers had finished work on their ordinance setting out the simplified structure they were so pleased with their efforts that they declared that if all the wisest people in the world were brought together they would not be able to do so well.[4]

Masterpiece or not, one ordinance was not enough to place royal finances on a sound footing or make the French kingdom independently viable. This was true particularly because the method that John the Fearless had found for raising money was not one likely to appeal to Henry V. Duke John had obtained his money by issuing a coinage with a face value far higher than its precious-metal content warranted: a policy that enabled him to claim that he had kept his promise to abolish taxation, and also had the advantage of not requiring the collection of taxes in the middle of a civil war.[5] Such a policy presented its own problems, however, since the regular issue of ever more debased coinage undermined public confidence in the money and created a colossal inflation. Henry V, therefore, attempted to re-establish a strong coinage, even though the inevitable corollary was the reintroduction of general taxation.[6]

Issuing coins with a high silver content meant that large amounts of silver would be needed, but even with the type of money in circulation under John the Fearless it had been difficult to obtain the quantities required.[7] Thus when direct taxation first reappeared, in December

[2] B. A. Pocquet du Haut-Jussé, 'Le Compte de Pierre Gorremont, receveur général du royaume (1418–1420)', *BEC* 98 (1937), 66–98, 234–82. The surviving *Extractus Thesauri* (AN, KK 17) for 1 Jan. to 9 Sept. 1420 contains payments authorized by the royal council in Paris, apparently independently of the other council that had followed the king. The *Trésor* was a bank, and had no interest in recording transactions in which it was not involved.

[3] R. Fawtier, *Comptes du Trésor (1296, 1316, 1384, 1477)* (Recueil des historiens de France: Documents financiers, ii, Paris, 1930), pp. viii–x; *Ordonnances*, xi. 103–4.

[4] BN, MS Moreau 1425, no. 101, fo. 2^{r}.

[5] As Autrand, *Naissance*, 80, points out.

[6] Wylie and Waugh, *Henry V*, iii. 228–9; J. Favier, *Les Contribuables parisiens à la fin de la guerre de Cent Ans: Les Rôles d'impôt de 1421, 1423 et 1438* (Geneva-Paris, 1970), 4.

[7] In Jan. 1419 money-changers were offered a special price to induce them to bring silver to the Paris mint (*Ordonnances*, x. 506).

1420, it was in the form of a general levy of silver, described as a loan and in fact a very broadly-based tax. The records for Paris show that 1,332 heads of household were assessed, and that is without the missing register for the densely populated western half of the right bank. The exaction was highly unpopular:[8] apart from the slowness of collection, the only redeeming feature was the possibility of obtaining a revision of one's liability. The royal commissioners, Pierre Cauchon and Jean de Pressy, made extensive adjustments, cutting the dues of nearly one third of all contributors, and raising that of only one man, but it was the people who had been assessed for the highest amounts who gained the most.[9] Those just wealthy enough to cross the tax threshold were the hardest hit, and some were genuinely unable to pay: they were poor and had nothing; others had fled or were dead.[10]

Henry was certainly successful in shifting the source of revenue back from the coinage to taxation, perhaps too successful. His attempts to create a 'strong' coinage meant that despite the levy of silver carried through in 1421 and 1422 there would always be a shortage of precious metal in the mints of Lancastrian France.[11] The dauphin's coins retained a lower metal content throughout the period of the occupation,[12] and the result was that there was little possibility of attracting silver to the mints when a higher face value could be obtained elsewhere. Arnoulet Ram bid successfully for the farm of the Paris mint in December 1423, but by the following August he had discovered that it was impossible to obtain the silver necessary, chiefly because it was being drawn to the mints of the duke of Burgundy, whose weaker coinage was being allowed to circulate in France.[13] He complained that over 200,000 marks had been taken out of the kingdom, that at the Geneva fair Lancastrian 2-*denier* coins were being bought in bulk (being worth three times the equivalent Flemish coin), and that Flemish merchants had recently taken six pack-horse loads of coins and silver back

[8] *Bourgeois*, 161.

[9] Favier, *Contribuables*, 45–9. In addition to these regressive concessions the royal council made further reductions, particularly to wealthy royal officers (ibid. 57).

[10] Ibid. 152–3, 246–7.

[11] For the monetary history of the period see F. de Saulcy, *Histoire numismatique de Henri V et Henri VI, rois d'Angleterre, pendant qu'ils ont regné en France* (Paris, 1878), A. Dieudonné, 'La Monnaie royale depuis la réforme de Charles V jusqu'à la restauration monétaire par Charles VII', *BEC* 72 (1911), 473–99, 73 (1912), 263–82, and J. Lafaurie, *Les Monnaies des rois de France* (Paris, 1951), 68–107.

[12] Lafaurie, *Monnaies*, 95.

[13] AN, X^{1a} 4793, fos. 468^{v}, 472^{v}, 474^{r}, 475^{r}; X^{1a} 4794, fos. 24^{r}, 27^{v}; X^{1a} 1480, fos. 307^{v}, 311^{v}–312^{r}; X^{1a} 64, fos. 134^{v}, 175^{v}.

to Flanders; the purpose of that was to melt down the coins and reissue a larger number with a lower silver content. With Burgundian coins circulating freely, forgeries appearing within months of the issue of the new Anglo-French coinage, and with the farm of the mint always a hazardous investment in times of instability, profits to the crown were minimal.[14]

Taxation must, therefore, have filled the gap in royal finances left by the reform of the coinage. The indirect taxes were all-pervading and bitterly resented. The *quatrième*, a tax of 25 per cent on wine retailed in Paris, was the most unpopular, since the commissioners insisted on investigating stocks in private houses. Cattle, fish, firewood, and exports of luxury goods also suffered from the impositions that many recognized as hitting trade and traders.[15] It was the added cost of imported necessities that was the greatest burden for most Parisians, but even the duke of Brittany's New Year's Day presents were not immune from confiscation when the export tax was not paid.[16] A special tax on wine from Burgundy, levied to meet the cost of the siege of Orléans, provoked widespread evasion, with the unloaders of wine agreeing to turn a blind eye in return for half of the profit from the deception.[17]

These taxes may have harmed trade, but they also depended upon it. If the commercial links between Paris and the rest of France were disturbed, then revenues fell. Thus the amounts that people were prepared to pay for the farm of a toll or a tax rose or fell in line with their expectation of profit and of levels of commerce; never very optimistic, the bids of the tax-farmers declined steeply in the latter part of the period.[18] This harmed both royal revenues and those of the municipality for, traditionally, the king had allowed Parisians a substantial share in the indirect taxes levied in the capital. Those items seen as particularly

[14] Forgeries were circulating as early as March 1423 (AN, Z^{1b} (*Cour des Monnaies*) 3, fo. 9^{v}), and in March 1424 an English soldier was found with forged coins received from a Paris merchant (ibid. fo. 22^{v}); for the execution of a forger in 1426 see AN, X^{1a} 4794, fos. 222^{v}, 235^{v}.

[15] *Bourgeois*, 149 and n. 1; cf. AN, X^{1a} 4794, fo. 138^{v}, which notes the harmful effects of a levy on imported wine.

[16] AN, Z^{1a} 7, fo. 53^{r}. The duke of Bedford considered the case in person, doubtless because he did not wish to alienate his new ally.

[17] 'Limposition ou aide monte tant; bailliez-nous la moitie et nous le ferons' (AN, Z^{1a} 7, fo. 282^{r}). The case here involved wine for the *hôtel* of the archbishop of Sens, unloaded tax-free at dead of night. The *déchargeurs de vin*, although employees of the Hôtel de Ville, never liked to be cast in the role of unofficial tax-inspectors (cf. AN, X^{1a} 4793, fos. 23^{r}, 25^{v}).

[18] Favier, *Paris*, 346–8. The graph concerns figures derived from ecclesiastical sources (Fourquin, *Campagnes*, 352, 376), but doubtless royal finances followed a similar pattern.

important to the town in December 1434—the one third of royal *aides* raised in Paris that the king had granted to the town, a levy on wine and salt, and the rents from the houses on the Pont Notre-Dame—were all heavily dependent on the level of economic activity.[19]

Direct taxes and forced loans helped to complete the independent resources available to the government in Paris. To begin with, these were usually levied for specific purposes. We have seen how the first such imposition—a so-called 'loan' of silver—was intended for the restoration of the coinage. This was followed in August 1421 by a tax to pay for labourers to demolish surplus fortresses in the region, and in September 1422 a tax of 800*l.t.* was raised on people with lands outside the Porte Saint-Jacques, to the south of Paris.[20] The purpose this time was to finance a campaign against the enemies at Marcousis and Orsay, a campaign that was still under way when the next imposition was ordered in 1423.[21] This levy was in two parts: a loan from those with the money to pay at once, collected between 15 March and 4 June 1423, and then a tax of nearly 10,000*l.t.*[22] The loan was to allow military operations to be undertaken quickly, and the tax was supposed to have been collected in July and August, but in fact the collection had not been completed in April 1424 and some of the lenders had still not been repaid.[23] These taxes early in the period were raised for specific purposes, but we know rather less of subsequent levies, which took place every year from 1424 to 1428 at least.[24] Some of these were aimed at particular military necessities, others at more general expenditure, although usually related to the war in some way.[25]

Taxation may well have formed the backbone of the regime's finances, but it was still only one aspect of a general reform undertaken by Henry V and in the early years of the regency of the duke of Bedford.

[19] AN, Z^{1a} 9, fo. 139^{v}.

[20] Favier, *Contribuables*, 5; AN, X^{1a} 4793, fos. 236^{r}, 238^{v}; X^{1a} 1480, fo. 266^{r}.

[21] *Bourgeois*, 186.

[22] Favier, *Contribuables*, 251–64. It was, however, J. Guerout, 'Fiscalité, topographie et démographie à Paris au Môyen Age (à propos d'une publication récente de rôles d'impôt)', *BEC* 130 (1972), 75–9, who demonstrated that the document printed by Favier related to a combination of loan and tax.

[23] Favier, *Contribuables*, 263–4; *Fauquembergue*, ii. 127.

[24] *Bourgeois*, 202, 208, 217 (1424, 1426–7); AN, Z^{1a} 7, fos. 206^{v}, 232^{v} (1425, 1428).

[25] The tax of 1427 was for the siege of Montargis, for example (*Bourgeois*, 217 n. 4). In Dec. 1428 the *procureur du roi* explained that 'pour les grans necessitez et affaires qui sont en ce royaume et par especial pour le fait de la guerre certains aides ont esté mis sus depar le roy' (AN, Z^{1a} 7, fo. 232^{r}).

Furthermore, it was axiomatic—at least in France—that any prince who wished to be powerful would begin by the restoration of his 'ordinary' domain revenues.[26] These may well have been modest in comparison with possible 'extraordinary' income from taxation but, in a society where it was still a commonplace that the king should live on his own resources, it made a good beginning if he could show that he had done all that was possible. In the first half of the 1420s the *Chambre des Comptes* commissioned an important survey of the royal domain in Paris, in an effort to improve its yield.[27] The report showed why revenues had been disappointing: records of the king's feudal rights (his *censive*) were confused and thirty years out of date, while in some cases it was quite unclear what, if anything, the king's theoretical entitlement might be.[28] Efforts for reform met with some success, for even by the time of the survey the organization of fines at the Châtelet were improving, and we know that in 1427 the municipality was required to pay the ground rent at the Hôtel de Ville for all the previous nine years.[29] But good intentions were insufficient by themselves, and without political stability: it was useless for the farmers of the *boîte aux Lombards* (the tax on Italian traders) to suggest ways of improving their administration, if Italians had largely abandoned the capital.[30]

The importance of political stability was self-evident so far as the dues on trade and commerce were concerned.[31] Efficiency in collecting taxes

[26] B. Guenée, *L'Occident aux XIV^e et XV^e siècles: Les États* (Paris, 1971), 164.

[27] AN, Y1 *bis*, pp. 20–40. This report was compiled by Guillaume Breteau, formerly receiver of confiscations and of the royal domaine in Paris, who seems to have begun a new career in the 1420s advising on the efficiency of the administration. Cf. AN, X^1a 4794, fo. 103^r: 'depuis lan cccxxii ou environ fu le pais de Valois reduit en lobeissance du roi qui envoia Breteau a Crespi pour veoir lestat des officiers du pais'. Breteau's survey of the domaine in Paris adds valuable detail to the general account of the royal domaine in M. Rey, *Le Domaine du roi et les finances extraordinaires sous Charles VI* (Paris, 1965).

[28] e.g. 'Des grosses finances du guet; des amendes du guet; et savoir que cest: lon y peut bien regarder le bien du roy sil y est' (AN, Y1 *bis*, p. 26).

[29] Ibid. 37; *Comptes du domaine*, i, col. 166. This was still a modest sum, however, and the records were probably not fully revised. The new *terrier du roi* drawn up in 1437 (BN, MS fr. 8611) was based on that of 1391, confirming Bretau's report that in the early 1420s the records were thirty years out of date.

[30] C. Piton, *Les Lombards en France et à Paris* (2 vols., Paris, 1892–3), i. 233–40: copy of letters establishing the *boîte aux Lombards*, followed by amendments dating from Bedford's regency. According to Breteau, the levy had been 'petitement gouvernée' (AN, Y1 *bis*, p. 34). For the departure of many Italian merchants see Favier, *Paris*, 67.

[31] Distinct from indirect taxes, certain levies on trade and on the places where it was carried out formed part of the royal domaine. The king had originally developed Les Halles for his own financial benefit.

(even if achieved) was not enough by itself. A detailed review of the revenues from Les Halles in the year to June 1420 had revealed a financial disaster: those to whom collection had been farmed out had been unable to recoup what they had paid, and calculations showed that nearly a third of total income from Les Halles had been lost because of the economic and political situation.[32] After the treaty of Troyes, the position doubtless improved, because traders from the towns of northern France were able to occupy their stalls once again, and new initiatives were launched to improve the yield.[33] Yet difficulties continued; the hard-hit weaving trade had abandoned its '*halle*' by 1426, and the master of the trade challenged the right of the receiver of Paris to collect money for a place they no longer used.[34] With the onset of renewed fighting around Paris in the 1430s, all domain revenues dependent on trade became uncertain, and the farmers of the *boîte au blé* found that it was not the lucrative tax that they had been led to expect.[35] Finally, in 1435, Pierre de Saint-Amand, receiver of Paris since 1427, was indicted on serious corruption charges.[36] It must have appeared that efforts to reform the royal domain had come to nothing.

The rulers of Anglo-Burgundian Paris had been unable to live up to their good intentions. Henry V's reforms were to have been the end of expedients, such as raising loans on the security of the king's jewels, which had been relied upon by the Armagnacs and, to a lesser extent, the Burgundians prior to 1420.[37] To begin with, major efforts were made to recover these jewels, the most important quest being to regain valuables lodged with the Italian Galvano Trente before and after the Burgundian entry.[38] There was also the mysterious affair of an expensive jewel sold

[32] AN, Y1 *bis*, pp. 47–54, esp. p. 51.

[33] A proclamation was issued on the subject of Les Halles in June 1423 ($Y6^{7}$, pp. 44–5), and in Dec. 1426 the *Chambre des Comptes* decided to undertake a new investigation (BM, Rouen, MS Leber 5870, xii, fo. 157^{v}).

[34] AN, X^{1a} 4794, fos. 267^{r}, 273^{r}; cf. Favier, *Paris*, 313.

[35] AN, Z^{1f} (*Cour de Trésor*) 8, fo. 166^{r}: 8 Nov. 1432.

[36] AN, X^{1a} 4797, fo. 242^{r}: 8 April 1435. Saint-Amand was charged with embezzlement of royal money, defrauding churches to whom it was owed, and giving worthless assignments.

[37] A. Coville, 'La Très Belle Couronne royale au temps des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons', in *Mélanges offerts à M. Nicolas Iorga* (Paris, 1933), 183–98; P. Henwood, 'Administration et vie des collections d'orfèvrerie royales sous le règne de Charles VI (1380–1422)', *BEC* 138 (1980), 179–215.

[38] L. Mirot, 'Études lucquoises: Galvano Trenta et les joyaulx de la couronne', *BEC* 101 (1940), 116–56.

TABLE 1. Finances of Lancastrian France (outside Normandy). All figures are in *l.t.*

	Income	Expenditure	Surplus	Deficit
1423[1]	154,191	154,391		200
1424	183,492	175,805	7,687	
1427/8 (estimate for 12 mths from 1 Oct. 1427)[2]	129,240	175,366		46,126
Comparisons with:				
(a) Normandy May 1421–Aug. 1422[3]	388,942	396,915		7,973
(b) England Estimates for 1433[4], converted from sterling	583,272	726,300		143,028

[1] The figures for 1423 and 1424 are derived from G. Ritter, 'Extraits du Journal du Trésor, 1423–1424', *BEC* 73 (1912), 470–89. These extracts are the most systematic to survive for the Anglo-Burgundian period.

[2] From Stevenson, *Letters and Papers*, ii (2), [532–4].

[3] From Wylie and Waugh, *Henry V*, iii. 258.

[4] From Griffiths, *Henry VI*, 108; figures for pounds sterling have been multiplied by nine to give rough equivalents to the French *livre tournois* of the 1420s.

by the lord of l'Isle-Adam to the money-changer Robin Clément in 1419; by the time the chancellor lodged a claim that it really belonged to the king it had been sent to Bruges for sale, and before it could be recovered for identification it had been sold to a German merchant.[39] In any event, it was impossible to recover all the crown jewels, for where they had been given as security for a loan the money was needed for more urgent requirements. Thus in 1427 Jean Sac and Galiache (Galeazzo?) Pinel were given permission to sell one of the *fleurons* of the crown, which had been given to them as security for a loan of 8,790*l.t.*[40] They probably did not stress the fact that the debt had been contracted

[39] AN, X^{1a} 4793, fos. 193^{r}, 193^{v}: June 1422. The arguments then went on inconclusively until 1425. On 24 Sept. 1418 a report on the royal jewels had said that l'Isle-Adam had received one of the king's diamonds 'et ne scet on que icellui dyamant est devenu' (Coville, 'Tres Belle Couronne', 195).

[40] AN, PP 110, p. 175; Favier, *Paris*, 178, treats the transaction as a sale by the English.

in July 1417, under the Armagnac regime.[41] In 1429, Bedford and his wife were to be obliged to pawn their own jewels, as it became increasingly clear that regular sources of income could not support the siege of Orléans, or the consequences of failure.[42]

Because the vast bulk of the archives of the French *Chambre des Comptes* was destroyed in a great fire in 1737 it is not possible to give a full analysis of the state of English finances in France. Table 1 sets out some of the more complete figures that can be extracted, from which it is clear that in the first years of the dual monarchy a reasonable balance between income and expenditure was maintained, and there was even a small surplus in 1424. By the time estimates were prepared for the year from 1 October 1427 (apparently based on actual figures for the preceding year) matters looked much less certain; expenditure was virtually unchanged, but income had dropped to leave a deficit of some 46,000*l.t.* after deduction of administrative expenses and 10,000*l.t.* assigned to the earl of Salisbury out of the receipts of Troyes, Meaux, and Provins for the defence of those areas. In itself the deficit was not exceptional (it was perhaps only a third of that which Lord Cromwell was anticipating for England by 1433), but taken in conjunction with the very modest overall level of income it meant that it would be essential to borrow, or to obtain money from the separate finances of Normandy, or to appeal to England. Certainly there was no margin that could absorb the cost of any setbacks.

Although it is impossible to give a precise account of the inherent strength—or weakness—of the finances of Lancastrian France, one thing is certain. Healthy finances depended on political stability. Looked on from the perspective of Paris, the capital, this meant successful warfare—but at a distance. When the war closed in, in 1429, it made it very much more difficult to demand money from the people of Paris, and knocked away a substantial part of the support structure of the capital.[43] Not only was Paris not self-sufficient in food, it depended on

[41] BN, MS n. a. lat. 184, fo. 110^{r}. A survey drawn up early in the Burgundian regime had, however, recognized that Sac and Pinel were holding the jewel as security for this sum (Coville, 'Tres Belle Couronne' 188).

[42] A. Bossuat, 'Le Rétablissement de la paix sociale sous la règne de Charles VII', *Le Moyen Age*, 60 (1954), 155–6. See also M. K. Jones, 'The Beaufort Family and the War in France, 1421–1450' (Univ. of Bristol Ph.D. Thesis, 1983), 71 n. 2, for a loan by Cardinal Beaufort on the security of Bedford's jewels.

[43] For the hand-to-mouth financing of the defence of Paris in 1429 see Ch. 4. The *Bourgeois* does not mention direct taxes after 1428.

its kingdom for financial assistance. To help fund the last stages of the siege of Orléans all royal officers were required to lend a quarter of their annual wages,[44] a loan that was likely to prove difficult to repay after the collapse of the siege and with the army of Charles VII overrunning Champagne and Brie. In the years 1426–9, some two-thirds of the wages of the *Parlement* of Paris had been paid by the receivers of Laon and Reims, places which in the summer of 1429 opted for the cause of Charles VII.[45]

Traditionally, much is made of the morale-boosting effect on the French of the campaigns of Joan of Arc and of Charles VII's triumphal ride to Reims and his coronation. If 1429 really was a turning-point, however, this may well be less because of the effect on the position of the French than on that of the Lancastrians. We can see that the collapse of the siege of Orléans and the ensuing loss of large parts of Paris's kingdom outside Normandy administered a severe shock to a financial system that had been carefully nursed back to health after the excesses of John the Fearless. The balancing of the books in 1423 and 1424 had showed that a regime based on Paris and on less than half of France could be viable, and we can demonstrate the decisive impact of the failure at Orléans by looking at the effect that this had on relations between Paris and England.

Throughout the 1420s the Parisians had expected to maintain their independence, and the English were glad to co-operate. After the treaty of Troyes Henry V was regent of France, and it seems that the only contact that the French capital had with England was when Henry was in his other kingdom (from February to June 1421), and the Parisians were campaigning for him to hurry back across the Channel.[46] With the deaths of Henry and of Charles VI, and the realization that Charles's death would entail the succession to the Anglo-French dual monarchy of an infant who could not be expected to travel, the authorities established limited links with England. The Parisian municipality took the logical step of writing to its counterpart in England—the corporation of the city of London—to say that the Parisians were ready to show their loyalty to Henry VI.[47] They had had great confidence in the government of Henry V, and asked the mayor and his colleagues to maintain efforts for the recovery of the rest of France, adding rather

[44] BN, MS n. a. fr. 7627, fo. 140^{r}: 3 Mar. 1429.

[45] See *Fauquembergue*, ii. 206–96.

[46] *Monstrelet*, iv. 44.

[47] J. Delpit, *Collection générale des documents français qui se trouvent en Angleterre* (2 vols., Paris, 1847), i. 233–4.

quaintly that they would help the Londoners if the positions were reversed. At about the same time the university took steps to strike up relations with the duke of Gloucester, Henry V's cultured youngest brother.[48] French envoys were soon on their way to England. Travelling via Lille (where they conferred with the duke of Burgundy) and Calais they stayed in the London residence of the bishop of Bath from 21 January to 9 March 1423.[49]

It is doubtful how far this was a deputation from the town of Paris, rather than from the royal council in France, who would obviously have been interested in general questions of strategy at the beginning of the dual monarchy. The chroniclers Waurin and Monstrelet are contradictory as to the role of the Parisians.[50] English sources concentrate on the eminent pro-Burgundian counsellors Louis of Luxembourg, Jean de Mailly, and Lourdin de Saligny, who were given substantial presents, while certain *doctores* and the influential royal secretary Jean de Rinel were given smaller gifts. The bishop of Thérouanne, Louis of Luxembourg, was regarded as the leader of the mission and there is in fact no evidence that a Parisian delegation was noticed.[51]

Even if the Parisians sent representatives in 1423, they probably abandoned this policy for some years afterwards, leaving the royal council in France to maintain contact with England.[52] Similarly, there is no sign of cross-Channel interference in the administration of the town. Even the sending of an Englishman to serve on the royal council in France was a rare event.[53] As Henry VI claimed to be king of France there was certainly some correspondence. On 22 February 1424, the English council was drafting letters to be sent to important people in France.[54] The list included twenty-two towns which had written to the

[48] *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, ed. H. S. Denifle and E. Châtelain (Paris, 1889–97), iv. 411: letters of credence issued 3 Dec. 1422.

[49] *Monstrelet*, iv. 133–4; Jean de Waurin, *Recueil des croniques et anchiennes istories de la Grant Bretaigne a present nommé Engleterre, 1422–1431*, ed. W. and E. L. C. P. Hardy (RS, London, 1879), 6–7; PRO, E 101/322/4; Stevenson, *Letters and Papers*, i. 389–92.

[50] *Monstrelet*, iv. 135; Waurin, *Recueil . . . 1422–1431*, 8–9.

[51] *PPC*, iii. 35–6; PRO, E 28/39/21a; E 28/40/7,26. Louis of Luxembourg's absence caused great inconvenience to the *Chambre des Comptes* in Paris, who on 6 Feb. 1423 decided to overrule Bedford's order that no accounts should be closed until the bishop's return from England (BM Rouen, MS Leber 5870, ii. fo. 63^{v}).

[52] PRO, E 101/322/6 (Nov. 1423 to Feb. 1424); Stevenson, *Letters and Papers*, i. 402–3, ii (1). 65–7; PRO, E 101/322/13; E 404/42/279 (Jan. to Mar. 1426).

[53] Rowe, 'The *Grand Conseil*', 210–14 shows that this body was almost exclusively French.

[54] PRO, E 28/44.

king; they considered sending a separate letter to the university of Paris before crossing it off their list. In the pro forma letter to the towns the two-year old king assured his French subjects of his health and thanked them for keeping the town of 'N' in peace under his lordship since the death of his 'grant pere de France'. He explained that he could not yet come in person, but promised military aid so that his subjects could live in peace and security. Such a formal newsletter stressed, if anything, the remoteness of the English government to the Parisians.

The fact that exchanges between Paris and Westminster were so infrequent in the 1420s suggests that the regime in Paris succeeded in maintaining its independence for several years, guided by a council that remained in contact with its counterpart in England without needing constant assistance. The year 1429, however, saw the Lancastrians suffer their first serious reverse since the start of the occupation. It was not simply that they failed to capture the town of Orléans, nor that their greatest commander, the earl of Salisbury, was killed by a stray cannon-ball. The French were—at least temporarily—on the offensive as they advanced to Reims for the coronation of King Charles VII, thereby pre-empting the plans of the English council for Henry VI and reasserting the Valois presence in the lands east of Paris. It was obvious to people on both sides of the Channel that assistance from England would be necessary to shore up the English position. The situation required more than bland circulars, even though when a letter from Henry VI did arrive on 11 July 1429 the chapter of Notre-Dame sent one of its number to hear it read out in public.[55] For his part, the duke of Bedford, realizing that the coronation of Charles VII was inevitable, wrote to urge on the visit of King Henry to France for his own coronation.[56]

While the military situation remained highly uncertain, the council in England was reluctant to commit itself to a royal expedition, but this would have been the main priority for the high-ranking delegation from the councils in Paris and Rouen who travelled to England in October once the French tide had retreated.[57] It seemed that the English were now ready to act for, on 31 October 1429, letters were read out at the Hôtel de Ville in Paris, announcing that Henry VI's coronation in England was imminent, and that he would set out for France immediately afterwards.[58] The coronation as king of England did indeed

[55] AN, LL 113, p. 168.
[56] Rymer, x. 432: instructions to Garter King of Arms, 16 July 1429.
[57] BN, MS fr. 26052, nos. 1237, 1244; PO 1023, Doule en Normandie no. 15.
[58] Grassoreille, 'Histoire politique de chapitre', 180 n. 2.

take place promptly, on 6 November 1429, but there was no sign of the promised departure for the continent. On 20 December further letters were drafted by the Privy Council, for dispatch to Paris, Rouen, and other towns of France, and the king repeated his promise to come soon bringing an army that, it was hoped, would push the war far away.[59]

Most of the embassy from France stayed on in England until February 1430, no doubt wanting to be sure that the king really did set off for France, and by then they had been joined by two other well-known figures, Jean Rapiout, advocate of the king at the *Parlement*, and Laurent Calot, royal secretary.[60] They were able to see that preparations were at last being made for a departure from London, although in fact the council had no intention of leaving England until April.[61] The king finally began his slow journey to the coast on 24 February, and the ambassadors left on the same day.[62] So the two friars who were paid on the 26th for bringing letters from the town of Paris and council in France were able to return with good news.[63]

Henry crossed the Channel on 23 April 1430, and after that there was less reason to send letters and envoys to England. On 18 June messengers from the town of Paris and council in France were being paid in London but, once the king and his council had arrived in Rouen, on 17 July, there was no doubt of the centre of the Anglo-Burgundian administration.[64] The coronation expedition made Rouen its base and it soon became apparent that the council, having got that far, was not inclined to go further. Thus, on 8 August, the chancellor left the capital to be with the king.[65] Although he returned to Paris, the administration in Rouen was increasingly influential. This was shown by the *Parlement* as it endeavoured to solve the perennial problem of its wages, which by October 1430 were some two years behind. The judges decided to send their own representatives to Normandy in search of payment; these men were met with promises that money was on its way from England, and a series of ambassadors spent many difficult weeks trying to win the attention of the English council, and especially of Cardinal Beaufort.[66]

[59] *PPC*, iv. 10–11. [60] PRO, E 404/46/185.

[61] BL, Add. MS. 14848, fo. 76^{v}: in a letter of 12 Feb. 1430 to the Abbot of Bury St Edmunds the king writes that 'nous sumes concluz de passer en nostre royaume de France en le moys davril prochain venant pour la recouvrance de nostre royaume'.

[62] PRO, E 28/51, the petition of 26 Feb. 1430 by John Hotoft for the expenses of the ambassadors, gives the date of their departure.

[63] *PPC*, iv. 29; PRO, E 404/46/344.

[64] *PPC*, iv. 52. Henry's itinerary is taken from *DNB*, ix. 508.

[65] *Fauquembergue*, ii. 357. [66] Ibid. 364–71; iii. 14–15, 22–4.

Although in June 1431 the council did in fact decide to pay £1,000 sterling to the *Parlement* and *Chambre des Comptes* (half of the money being lent by Beaufort), it appears that the *Parlement* may have refused this offer and held out for more.[67] None the less, the principle of looking to government beyond Paris, and for money from England, was significant for the breakdown of the dual monarchy system established at Troyes. In the 1420s, wages had been paid with some regularity from French finances, and the inevitable complaints were addressed to a French government, based in Paris.[68]

For the first time it was seen as possible for money from England to be directed to the French capital. If there was money for lawyers (whether or not sufficient) there would certainly be money for soldiers. In May 1431 Bedford received 345*l.t.* from the English treasurer of wars for 310 men sent to supplement his retinue in Paris for that month, and in June he obtained £1,253 sterling for his wages and those of others involved in the security of the capital and nearby garrisons.[69] A further £3,555 collected on behalf of the chancellor, Louis of Luxembourg, may also have been intended for the Paris region,[70] and 100 francs given by the council in Paris to l'Isle-Adam, the captain of the town, had to be found from English finances.[71] After the visit of the king to Paris in December 1431 Bedford found that he had been underpaid for the security of the area for the last three months of the year, and succeeded in obtaining reimbursement from the Exchequer in England.[72]

The men in charge of royal finances in Paris hoped that assistance would continue even after Henry VI's coronation expedition returned home. On 1 January 1432 the Treasury in Paris opened a new account devoted to money from England and Normandy. The surviving extracts show that the money was used almost exclusively to help pay the captains of Lancastrian France, including the captain of the Bastille and of at least two of the gates of Paris.[73] The *Chambre des Comptes*, too, was paid from Normandy.[74] It is probable, however, that only a fairly small proportion of the money came from England, as opposed to Normandy, and there is no trace in English records of money from England being

[67] Bodleian Library, Oxford, MS Ch. Eng. 20. On 26 June the councillors declined an offer of three months' arrears, insisting on a full year's wages (*Fauquembergue*, iii. 16–17).

[68] e.g. ibid. ii. 194. [69] PRO, E 101/52/33, no. 115; E 101/52/39, no. 6.

[70] PRO, E 101/52/39, nos. 1, 4; collected in Rouen for 600 men-at-arms and 1,200 archers. [71] Ibid. no. 5.

[72] PRO, E 404/48/154: petition and warrant of 28 Feb. 1432.

[73] BN, MS fr. 20691, pp. 761–3. [74] AN, P 2298, at the date 13 Oct. 1432.

used to help finance the civil administration. Indeed the council left in England during the coronation expedition had been firmly of the opinion that no English funds should be dispatched to the *Parlement*, the *Chambre des Comptes*, or other officers; instead, the number of people employed should be limited.[75]

The military dangers could not be ignored so easily. When Henry VI left Paris after his coronation one of the principal reminders of the capital's vulnerability was the continued enemy occupation of Lagny-sur-Marne on a key river route east. Further up the Marne, Meaux remained in the Anglo-Burgundian obedience, but links with Champagne and Brie had been severely upset by the capture of Lagny by Valois forces in August 1429. Bedford's failure to retake the town in March 1431 undermined the promises that the coronation expedition would push the war far away. In March 1432, just two months after Henry VI's return to England, the *prévôt des marchands* of Paris wrote twice urging action against hostile towns of Champagne. These should be captured and have their walls demolished so that they could not form a refuge for the enemy. Something had to be done, especially about Lagny, for otherwise 'totale perdition' seemed inevitable. Copies of the municipality's forthright letters were sent to the mayor and aldermen of London asking them to use what influence they possessed to assist the Parisians, who were confident that with the help of the Londoners they could be relieved of the evils and sorrows that they had patiently endured for so long under the lordship of their king.[76]

Preparations were soon under way for both the royal council and the Parisian municipality to send further representatives to England. On 11 April 1432 Guillaume Le Duc, a president in the *Parlement* and one of Bedford's personal councillors, was ready to leave Paris with others of the council for a visit to England that was expected to last at least eleven weeks.[77] In fact, he was still in England on 17 July, as was Jean Milet, the royal secretary. Also present in England were representatives of the town of Paris, Master Guillaume Erart and former *échevin* Anthoine Ymbert des Champs.[78] In May 1432 a shuttle service of heralds was established, 'uno ibidem existente, alius abhinc illuc revertetur', and Louvre Pursuivant (alias Francis de Paris) was in England on 17 June and 30 August having brought messages from the council in France.[79]

[75] *Rotuli Parliamentorum* (6 vols., London, 1767–77), v. 417.
[76] Delpit, *Collection*, i. 249–51.
[77] BN, MS fr. 26055, no. 1786.
[78] *PPC*, iv. 122, 125; PRO, E 404/48/344.
[79] Rymer, x. 455, 505; PRO, E 404/48/302, 349.

The English council could not fail to be aware of the seriousness of the position, and the *ad hoc* issues to the Paris region that had characterized the coronation expedition continued, albeit less frequently. During 1432 Bedford was paid a total of £7,500 towards the support of troops for the six months from May to October.[80] A siege at Lagny was begun on 1 May and on 7 August the Exchequer was ordered to pay for military equipment for the regent, to be sent with all speed.[81] Bedford and Louis of Luxembourg were forced to contract heavy debts raising forces to try to resist a large enemy relief force, and again their repayment came —eventually—from the English Exchequer.[82] Thus the council did not entirely ignore the pleas of the Parisians, although, to the dismay of the Parisians, its efforts to help turned out to be unsuccessful.

After the failure at Lagny of August 1432, there seems to have been a pause in the dispatch of money to France, although clearly the councils in England and France were now determined to keep in close contact. When Bedford came to England in person in June 1433 he sought not only to justify his conduct of the war but also to obtain much needed finance. The Parisians looked on anxiously while Bedford was away (he was in England for over a year) and sent yet another appeal, this time in the form of a poem, to their colleagues in the City of London.[83] No doubt Bedford was doing his best to win support for his subjects overseas: on 16 July 1422, 5,000 marks (£3,333. 6*s*. 8*d*.) were ordered to be sent to Louis of Luxembourg and on 16 December warrants were made out for a further 8,000 marks.[84] Yet another 5,000 marks were ordered to be paid in June 1434 to cover arrears in the wages of French garrisons during the previous Easter term.[85] Evidently Bedford's visit to England did yield fruit, although these payments were all made to pay off debts, or fill gaps when they appeared, and there was no sense in which a regular structure of support had been created. The insecurity of the Parisian administration at this time was revealed by Louis of

[80] PRO, E 404/48/250, 306, 340.

[81] PRO, E 404/48/347. But the equipment cannot have arrived before the collapse of the siege on 13 Aug. 1432 (cf. E. C. Williams, *My Lord of Bedford, 1389–1435*, (London, 1963) 213–17).

[82] PRO, E 30/443/1: receipt from Louis of Luxembourg of 2 Feb. 1434.

[83] 'Jeo suis Parys que ne faiz que languir . . . | Long temps desja que le duc de Bethffordz | S'en est alle pour moy, en Angleterre, | Devers son Roy et le mien, secours querre, | Qui pas ne vient, dont je perds esperance . . .' | (Delpit, *Collection*, i. 238.).

[84] *PPC*, iv. 167, 187–8; Rymer, x. 565, 568; PRO, E 404/49/14; E 404/50/143, 168.

[85] *PPC*, iv. 233; PRO, E 404/50/323; E 30/443/2, 3: indentures between Bedford and Lord Treasurer Cromwell.

Luxembourg when he wrote to Lord Cromwell, the treasurer of England, on 17 May 1434, telling him of the great hardships he was suffering in order to maintain the captains and soldiers at Paris and in the fortresses of France (that is, outside Normandy). He had been forced to borrow money from the influential Genoese banker Jean Sac, and asked Cromwell to see that this was repaid through Anferon Spinola, a Genoese merchant in London.[86]

Before Bedford returned from England, however, he had proposed to the council that revenues from the duchy of Lancaster be used to finance a permanent force of 200 lances and 600 archers for deployment in France. The money that he had in mind was a part of the revenues of the duchy of Lancaster that had been settled by Henry V for his chantry and other works which, Bedford believed, had largely been fulfilled. After deliberation, the feoffees of the duchy of Lancaster gave their consent, subject to strict conditions.[87] Soon after this, Bedford returned to France and for a while nothing was heard of the scheme, but in February 1435 the matter came up again at the council and the decision of the previous June was confirmed.[88] A warrant of 18 February explained that for the security and defence of Paris and the lands of 'France', and to resist the enemies in that region, the wages of 200 lances and 600 archers would be sent to Louis of Luxembourg for a full year from Michaelmas 1434 to 1435.[89] It seemed that at last a regular issue would be made to the Paris region.

If the chancellor of France had looked into the mouth of this gift horse, however, he would have seen the defects. Although the period covered by the money began on 29 September 1434 the decision to pay was not made until 1435. Thus, by the time the first warrant (for the period up to Christmas) was issued wages were already in arrears.[90] This warrant was dated 8 February; that for the second quarter followed ten days later. This was a significant burden for the English Exchequer, and it was not until 27 May that Louis of Luxembourg received the money and undertook to hand it over to the Treasury in Paris.[91] That was rapid payment by comparison with the second six months, leading

[86] PRO, SC 1/51/70.

[87] *PPC*, iv. 227, 229–32; B. P. Wolffe, *Henry VI* (London, 1981), 77.

[88] *PPC*, iv. 294–5.

[89] PRO, E 404/51/168.

[90] PRO, E 404/51/154; E 403/718, m. 14; E 30/443/6.

[91] PRO, E 404/51/168; E 30/437. The payment for the second quarter is recorded in the Issue Rolls under 16 June, which is after the money was in the chancellor's hands, perhaps for accounting reasons (E 403/720, m. 6).

up to 29 September 1435, for which the warrants were not made out until 23 and 29 October, and for which payments were still being made in March 1436.[92] It was not until 9 September 1436 that the chancellor finally acknowledged receipt of all that he was owed.[93] An additional shortcoming was that, even had the money been paid on time up to Michaelmas 1435, there had been no provision for an extension beyond that date. Paris would have had to fend for itself in the conditions that followed the peace of Arras.

This payment of the wages of 200 lances and 600 archers for a year was not the only money sent from England in the last year of the occupation. With each of the three latter instalments was paid an additional £500 to cover loans taken for the security of Paris and Lancastrian France.[94] Also sent to the chancellor were several thousand pounds for assorted wages and equipment, but Paris was not always mentioned specifically, and some money must have been intended for Normandy. Furthermore, the hard-pressed Exchequer does not seem to have fulfilled all the warrants in full. An order of June 1435 for the payment of 60 men-at-arms and 180 archers is endorsed with the instructions that payment should be for 50 and 150 instead.[95] In any event most of these payments were for periods that were passed, and even if Louis of Luxembourg was still loyally trying to persevere with the war effort the Parisians were looking for another solution to their difficulties.

On 13 May 1435 the duke of Burgundy had written to the inhabitants of the capital telling them of his plans for a general peace, and by the 27th of that month an Augustinian friar named Jerome was being paid in London, having come from Paris with various letters. By 4 June, Jean de Belloy and another Parisian had arrived.[96] De Belloy had held office as *échevin* in the early years of English rule, but his first loyalty was to the duke of Burgundy. Paris was delighted by the prospect of peace, and sent an envoy who would stress the town's support for the Burgundian policy. Reacting to this pressure the English council wrote to Paris and other towns of northern France, asking them to send representatives to the forthcoming peace conference, reminding them to be on their guard

[92] PRO, E 404/52/119, 136; E 30/443/10; E 403/722, mm. 11, 13, 18.

[93] PRO, E 30/443/9. This is wrongly catalogued to 1435 in PRO, *Lists and Indexes*, xlix (1923), 45.

[94] As is explained in PRO, E 30/443/7.

[95] PRO, E 404/51/323. I have not found an issue to correspond with E 404/51/144, and it seems that only half of E 404/51/151 was paid (E 403/718, m. 13; E 30/443/4).

[96] Delpit, *Collection*, i. 251–2. PRO, E 404/51/293, 298; E 403/720, m. 5.

against the enterprises of the enemy, and promising that should negotiations come to nothing a powerful army would be sent.[97] This letter, of 6 June 1435, had been received in Paris by the 25th of the month, when general processions were ordered to thank God for the good intentions of the king.[98]

With the failure of the Congress of Arras to produce a peace formula that could satisfy the English the occupation entered its final six months, distinguished from all that had preceded by the defection of the duke of Burgundy from the alliance. This terminal phase, and the inevitable collapse of the regime, will be described in the last chapter of this book. For the purpose of understanding the first fifteen years of English rule, the important thing is the degree to which Paris remained independent of England at least until 1429. This was because the English wanted the French kingdom to pay for itself as far as possible and thus important (and in some cases lasting) reforms to the French financial system were directed to that end. The council in France maintained regular links by messenger and important French councillors visited England in 1423, 1423–4, 1426, 1429–30, 1432, and 1435, while Bedford himself was in England in 1425–7 and 1433–4. Such visits were necessary to a co-ordination of efforts between the English and French kingdoms. The missions of the Parisians themselves give a better idea of the very limited extent to which England influenced the government of the town: after a possible embassy in 1423 the next specifically from the town is that of 1432 and two more in 1435 complete the total.[99] Furthermore, letters from Paris to England appear to have been restricted to paying courtesy to King Henry, or appealing for soldiers to subdue the rest of France, with the second component predominating as the years passed.

The business of the town was dealt with in Paris: to that extent the regime remained distinct from England even when money ran short after 1429. As Lancastrian France grew less able to look after itself and financial resources dwindled, relations with England were tightened. Yet it seems that only matters of general strategy—the siege of Lagny or the Congress of Arras—prompted the Parisians to send to England important ambassadors such as a past or present *échevin* or a notable university figure. It was special need that prompted the dispatch of money to France. To send expeditions of soldiers with pay for six

[97] BL, MS Cotton Caligula D V, fo. 121[r].

[98] AN, LL 253, fo. 32[r].

[99] For a different emphasis see Favier, *Paris*, 177, 178, 190. It appears, however, that the serious weaknesses in the English position only really date from 1429.

months was one thing, and the English council performed this role loyally. It was quite another to shore up a crumbling regime that could not support itself financially, and here the council restricted itself to modest military assistance, and that only in the later years. The civil administration in Paris received nothing from England except, perhaps, at the time of the coronation expedition. The town was always vulnerable, and increasingly isolated in the later years. Throughout the period, the Parisians and their governors depended a great deal on their own resources. Thus, while these opening chapters have established the context in which the history of Anglo-Burgundian Paris was made, a full account of the regime depends on a study of the government and society within the walls.

PART II

The Government of Anglo-Burgundian Paris

3

POWER AND INFLUENCE IN PARIS, 1418–1436

This chapter is about the administration of Paris during the English occupation. It is concerned less with the major strategic decisions of the Lancastrian council than with local justice and government. As a brief consideration of the network of jurisdictions will show, legal institutions were subject to the vagaries of their own inherited structures and of the human agents who worked within the system. What is true of the judicial system is true of every part of the administration. There were many anomalies, skilfully exploited by those who operated the machinery of government. Most of this chapter will be concerned with the interplay between the royal council, the municipality, and the *prévôté*, the three bodies who held the bulk of power and influence over the people of Paris. On the nature of the council itself we are well informed: it was filled by men who came to power in the Burgundian coup of 1418; from 1422 it was headed by the regent, the duke of Bedford, who delegated everyday administration while keeping key political matters in his own hands.[1] None the less, the regent and his council were only a part of the administrative system, so a survey of the political history of the municipality and *prévôté* during the years of the Anglo–Burgundian regime will indicate how power was distributed in the complex society of fifteenth-century Paris.

THE QUESTION OF JURISDICTIONS

On the face of it, diversity and confusion are the most striking characteristics of the administration of Paris in the later Middle Ages. Some seventeen religious bodies had *haute justice* in the capital of France; they claimed jurisdiction over all civil causes in the first instance, and many criminal matters were still in their power.[2] As one would expect, the

[1] Rowe, 'The *Grand Conseil*', 210–14, 224–5.

[2] L. Tanon, *Histoire des justices des anciennes églises et communautés monastiques de Paris* (Paris, 1883), 2, 92–105.

result was a large amount of uncertainty. The *parvis* in front of Notre-Dame was much smaller than it is today but, all the same, offences committed in some parts were judged by officers of the bishop, in others by the canons, while it was debatable whether houses round the edge of the *parvis* were in the jurisdiction of the king or the chapter: it depended on where the main entrance was.[3] The monks of Saint-Magloire had jurisdiction over an important section of the river in central Paris (though commercial disputes were judged by the *prévôt des marchands* and *échevins*) yet it was not clear whether the Pont Notre-Dame, which went over their part of the Seine, was in their jurisdiction or that of the king.[4] One would expect that most Parisians were quite clear about who had authority over them, although in 1426 Perrette d'Arennes was in doubt on the question; she had to remember whether she was standing inside the door of her house in the rue Saint-Honoré (in the jurisdiction of the bishop) or on the pavement (under the authority of the king) when she struck her neighbour. The *procureur du roi* accepted that some houses in the rue Saint-Honoré were in the bishop's jurisdiction, but countered that their doors and walls were under the authority of the king.[5] All this bickering helps prove that the administration of the law continued along traditional lines under the Burgundians and the English. The officers of the king did not normally overrule established jurisdictions, but nor did they abandon their relentless struggle to squeeze their rivals into the smallest possible space.

These illustrations show how justice for the Parisian did not have to mean royal justice and that a fundamental problem in the history of administration is to determine exactly who was responsible for what. Even within the royal government the question of jurisdiction emerges, and can have political implications. All the courts of first instance acknowledged the authority of the sovereign courts such as the *Parlement* and, within their specialities, the *Cour des Aides* (taxation) and the *Cour des Monnaies* (the coinage), but even on that exalted level other disputes could break out between the royal courts and the royal council. Although these courts had originally been set up by the kings of France as offshoots of their council, they were jealous guardians of their delegated powers and fought hard against the actions of any other

[3] AN, X^{1a} 4793, fo. 235^{r}: 3 Dec. 1422.
[4] AN, X^{1a} 4794, fos. 76^{r}, 98^{v}, 286^{r}–287^{r}: 26 Apr. and 25 June 1425, 23 July 1426.
[5] AN, X^{1a} 4794, fo. 282^{r}: 16 July 1426.

authority. Conflict over a large quantity of salt brought the Burgundian knight Jean de Torcenay against the Parisian Jacquet Alart at the *Cour des Aides*. The case had got as far as the investigation of evidence when it was reported to the court that at Torcenay's request the duke of Bedford had ordered the matter to be heard at the *Grand Conseil*. This was on 18 July 1427; the next day Alart's lawyer and the *procureur du roi* condemned the manœuvre as a *grant abus*, meriting a fine, and demanded that the case should remain where it belonged.[6]

While recognizing the righteous anger felt by the lawyers at this type of action, one should guard against attributing too much significance to their complaints. No doubt all strong rulers of *ancien régime* France had sometimes to infringe carefully guarded privileges, but because the regent and his council were, after 1422, acting for a foreign-born king there was a special sensitivity to their actions. Priorities accorded to Normandy were resented, and the policy of regarding confiscations and subsequent grants as political matters rather than simply judicial questions was contested by the *Parlement*.[7] In these discussions the question of nationality was seldom raised explicitly, but can be detected beneath the surface. At the beginning of the dual monarchy the council of Henry VI made a vigorous effort to sort out the corrupt practices that had accompanied the dispersal of royal jewels both before and after the entry of the Burgundians, and in particular attempted to trace the jewels from the crown of Charles VI. One trail led to the Lucca-born merchant Michel Totti who was then temporarily imprisoned. The arbitrary manner of his arrest was denounced by his advocate: a kingdom should keep a close grip on justice, and actions should always be in due form, 'because on account of injustice rule is transferred from one race to another': the maxim—an adaptation of Ecclesiasticus 10: 8—betrays the particular standards that were applied to Henry VI's council.[8]

The racial element added another dimension to jurisdiction disputes which in themselves were traditional enough. Bodies like the *Parlement* were quite accustomed to such disputes, and were far from being always on the defensive. Even under the English and the Burgundians the lawyers were keen to present their powers in the broadest terms

[6] AN, Z^{1a} 7, fo. 26^{v}. [7] See Ch. 1.

[8] 'On doit bien tenir la main en ung royaume a la justice *quia propter iniusticia transferuntur regna de gente in gentem* et doit on bien prendre garde que iniustice ne soit faite a aucun et ne souffist mie de faire sil nest fait par la maniere et forme que doit estre fait *per ministros justicie*' (AN, X^{1a} 4793, fo. 298^{r}: 18 May 1423).

possible. In the case of Michel Totti just cited, his lawyer reminded the rulers of their duties to the court which every day (as he claimed) discussed royal letters and commands and often set them aside as obtained under false pretences or for other such cause.[9] The *procureur du roi* certainly subscribed to this theory of judicial review, arguing that the king was frequently pushed into certain actions and was quite happy that these should be discussed in judicial proceedings.[10] Letters of remission granted in July 1420, by the advice of Henry V, to a baker of underweight bread were vigorously opposed by an earlier *procureur du roi* and remissions for political offences, although granted by Bedford himself, did not always escape scrutiny by the court as they looked for ambiguities in the drafting and failings in the procedure followed.[11]

These jurisdiction questions serve as an introduction to the issue of the distribution of power during the period of the Anglo-Burgundian regime, for they show how it is impossible to write the history of royal power in isolation: the monarchy was only one part of the total system of authority. However, these fragmentary jurisdictions were not consistently significant on the political level. The seigneurial lords could not aspire to speak for the town as a whole, or to exercise any authority outside their own territory, while the role of the courts was normally limited to judging the actions of others. The people who could personify the town were the municipality: the *prévôt des marchands* and *échevins*. They were the representatives—in principal the elected representatives—of the bourgeoisie of Paris. Their lawyer could speak of 'la ville, qui represente le fait de la chose publique',[12] which suggests that the Parisian leaders could be powerful rivals to the Crown for the loyalty of the people. The notion that they were responsible for the common good was clearly expressed when they ran up against some of the particular jurisdictions of Paris. In 1433 the municipality decided to adapt to the changed (for the worse) economic conditions and build water mills under the Pont Notre-Dame. The houses on the bridge were difficult to let, whereas the mills would be useful to bakers who were afraid to take their corn out of Paris. This was strongly opposed by parties with interests on the Grand Pont and elsewhere; the clergy of Notre-Dame, Saint-Germain-l'Auxerrois, Saint-Merri, Sainte-Opportune, the Saintes-Chappelles at Paris and Bois-de-Vincennes, the monks of the

[9] AN, X^{1a} 4793, fo. 298^{r}.

[10] AN, X^{1a} 4794, fo. 118^{r}: 23 July 1425 ('par impression le roy passe aucunes choses . . .')

[11] AN, X^{2a} 16, fo. 391^{v}, 477^{v}.

[12] AN, X^{1a} 4794, fo. 279^{r}.

Bois-de-Vincennes, Saint-Martin-des-Champs, and Saint-Jean (in charge of the Temple) joined forces against the development.[13]

Very interesting arguments were put forward by both sides in this case, but for present purposes the merits of the scheme are less significant than was the municipality's notion of its own importance: the *prévôt des marchands* and *échevins* were responsible for the public weal of Paris—mistress of the kingdom—'*domina et magistra huius regni et imperii* ainsi que souloit estre [dit] de Romme'.[14] The image was taken up by the *procureur du roi* in deciding to join with the municipality rather than with their opponents; he too saw the position of Paris in France as analogous to that of Rome in the Roman state and the good of Paris (the responsibility of the *échevins*) as representing the good of the kingdom.[15] Yet although the king's *procureur* supported the town in this case against some of the smaller rights and jurisdictions, the monarchy was not always on the side of Paris. The position of a capital city is distinct from that of other towns or cities in that, while it has certain interests of its own and requires administration in its own right, it provides the base for the government of the whole state. Paris, like every part of France, had its own royal officer, the *prévôt*, who had status and powers equivalent to a *bailli* or *sénéchal* in any other area of France: his *prévôté*, extending far beyond the capital itself, corresponded to a *bailliage* elsewhere. Over the local officers were the organs of central government, the royal council, the central financial administration, and the king's lawcourts; already the ambiguity between central and local power is plain. Alongside these authorities was the municipality, with its own extravagant claims. The purpose of the rest of this chapter is to distinguish the influence which these three forces—central, local, and municipal government—exerted on each other and on the Parisian population. Because the municipality was a most unusual body, at an important phase in its history, it is essential to explain the position that had been reached in 1418.

THE PARISIAN MUNICIPALITY AND THE ROYAL COUNCIL

The Parisian municipality had its origins in the river traffic of the capital. The Norman Conquest of England expanded opportunities for trade between England and the Continent, and in this Rouen, as the capital of

[13] AN, X^{1a} 4797, fos. 122^{v}, 126^{v}, 129^{r}–132^{v}.
[14] AN, X^{1a} 4797, fo. 130^{r}: 11 Jan. 1434.
[15] AN, X^{1a} 4797, fo. 131^{r}.

Normandy, played a leading role. It appears that it was in response to this that the king of France attempted to boost the position of his capital and therefore certain privileges were granted to the Parisian merchants. No one could trade between Paris and the bridge at Meulan without being a member of the *hanse* at Paris, a status obtained by payment of an entry fee. Furthermore, members of the *hanse* who were not resident at Paris had to enter into *compagnie française* or partnership with a Parisian member of the *hanse.* The administration of this was in the hands of the *prévôté de la marchandise de l'eau*, a body that, with the consent of the king, came to take on a general supervision of trade on the river.[16]

It was in the king's interest that representatives of the Parisian merchants should have control over shipping near the capital, for they possessed the necessary expertise and motivation for the task. Nor was he opposed to the process whereby the *prévôté des marchands de l'eau* came to represent the Parisians in their dealings with the Crown: the *prévôt des marchands* (abandoning the *de l'eau* in his title) established himself from the mid-thirteenth century to the mid-fourteenth as a moderating force useful both to the king and to the Parisian élite. This was not in any sense a democratic body; a few major families dominated the municipality, and the 'elections' were apparently made by acclamation, or arrangement, within a small group of leading bourgeois.[17] Yet, although the municipality was élitist, its independence could make it a force for violent dissent rather than moderation. This was the case twice in the second half of the fourteenth century, once in the revolt of the most famous of all *prévôts des marchands*, Étienne Marcel, and later in the taxpayers' uprising called the revolt of the Maillotins. The failure of the first, in 1358, led to the hardening of royal attitudes (symbolized by the building of the Bastille), the failure of the second, in 1382, provoked the abolition of the municipality itself.[18] Its functions were to be exercised by royal officers and its own organization was dismantled. One octogenarian was still complaining in the 1420s that he was owed money from work carried out by himself and his colleagues nearly half a century

[16] For the evolution of the municipality see R. Cazelles, *Paris de la fin du règne de Philippe-Auguste à la mort de Charles V 1223–1380* (Nouvelle histoire de Paris, Paris, 1972), 198–200, and Cazelles, 'Rivalité', *passim.* Amongst older studies, the most important are F. Lecaron, 'Les Origines de la municipalité parisienne', *MSHP* 7 (1880), 79–174; 8 (1881), 161–272, and G. Huisman, *La Juridiction de la municipalité parisienne de Saint-Louis à Charles VII* (Paris, 1912).

[17] Cazelles, *Paris . . . 1223–1380*, 202.

[18] Favier, *Paris*, 140–1.

before: a judgement that they should be paid had been given, but he had not known how to claim because there were no longer any *échevins*.[19]

The story of the gradual reconstruction of a separate municipal organization, and of the formal reinstatement of the *prévôt des marchands* and *échevins* in 1412 under the auspices of the duke of Burgundy cannot be told here.[20] Nor can we look in detail at the influence exercised by the royal council over the composition of the municipality during the years 1412–18 when the Hôtel de Ville was gradually taken over by enemies of the Burgundians. In general terms, however, the early elections were apparently made by acclamation—by 'bourgeois notables' under little overt political pressure—but following the collapse of the Cabochien movement of extreme Burgundian reformers intervention became the norm. At first the approach of the dauphin, Louis, duke of Guyenne, was conciliatory and the *échevinage* was divided between moderate Burgundians and Armagnacs. Indeed the four *échevins* appointed on 18 April 1415 'par lelecion de monditseigneur de Guienne et des bourgois notables' all remained in Paris after the Burgundian coup of 1418 and took an oath of loyalty to John the Fearless.[21] A rather different policy was adopted by the arch-Armagnac Tanguy du Châtel on 10 October 1415, however, when he summarily ejected these men from office; going far beyond his written instructions to institute a new *prévôt des marchands* in place of Pierre Gencien, who had been appointed treasurer, he deposed all the *échevins* as well, appointing new men without any consultation at all, to the astonishment of the previous officers.[22]

The arbitrary character of this action is confirmed by the fact that two of the new *échevins* were not natives of Paris, and were thus ineligible for municipal office anyway,[23] and the Armagnac grip on the Hôtel de Ville remained tight until 1418. Furthermore, of the four minor changes made in personnel in the years 1416–18, two are described expressly in the records as having been made in the presence of members of the royal council.[24] This period was not wholly damaging to the town, for

[19] AN, X^{1a} 4794, fo. 303^{v}: 22 Aug. 1426. [20] See Favier. *Paris*, 141–51.

[21] AN, KK 1009 (elections and appointments of municipal officers), fo. 2^{r}; 'État des bourgeois de Paris qui pretèrent serment entre les mains de Jean sans Peur, duc de Bourgogne, au mois d'août 1418', ed. A. Le Roux de Lincy and L.-M. Tisserand, *Paris et ses historiens aux XIV^{e} et XV^{e} siècles*, (HGP, Paris, 1867), 372–5: Pierre de Grandrue, Jean de Louviers, André d'Espernon, and Jean de L'Olive.

[22] AN, KK 1009, fo. 2^{r}; *Bourgeois*, 64. Two versions of Charles VI's letters are in Lecaron, 'Origines' (1881), 271–2.

[23] AN, X^{1a} 4792, fo. 233^{r}. [24] AN, KK 1009, fos. 2$^{r–v}$.

February 1416 saw the publication of a massive ordinance summarizing the customs and regulations of the *prévôté des marchands*.[25] This text remained the basic statement of the workings of the municipality until the seventeenth century: the Armagnacs did not allow the duke of Burgundy all the credit for the revival of the Hôtel de Ville. Yet the years since the restoration of the municipality had seen a marked subjection of the town to the ruling factions; sometimes the supposed elections were mere dictation, never was there any sign of a secret ballot or 'scrutin', so that the discussions of the bourgeois were easy targets for political manipulation. Nor was there any regular renewal of the town's officers. Places were filled when they became vacant, or when the rulers decided on a change, but there were no established annual elections. One subject missing from the new ordinance of 1416 was any scheme for elections. Bearing in mind that it has been shown that from 1440 onwards Charles VII regularly intervened to secure the election of a suitable *prévôt des marchands*, who was often a trusted officer,[26] one might expect that the years of the Burgundian regime and foreign dominance would have maintained the trend towards interference in municipal elections.

Table 2 shows the methods of election used during the period 1418–36 and presents, at first sight, a confusing picture.[27] There were two elections (1418 and 1422) under obvious political influence; two (1419 and 1429) by mass gatherings at the Hôtel de Ville; one (1420) staggered election; one (1430) by secret ballot—probably the first in the history of the Parisian municipality—and the last four with no indication of the methods adopted. As for their frequency: from 1422 to 1429 there were no elections at all, while from 1430 to 1434 they were held regularly at the end of July or beginning of September. A proper understanding of the unity that this period in fact possesses means looking behind this puzzling variety.

The first 'election' took place very soon after the Burgundian coup of 29 May 1418, for the Armagnac Guillaume Cirasse quickly resigned as *prévôt des marchands*, and the lord of l'Isle-Adam, Claude de Chastellus,

[25] *Ordonnances*, x. 257–348.

[26] J. Favier, 'Autonomie municipale et tutelle royale au XV^{e} siècle: Les Élections à Paris', in *Cultus et cognitio. Studia z dziejów sredniowiecznej kultury* (Essays presented to A. Gieysztorowi) (Warsaw, 1976), 145–9.

[27] Established after the records of elections, AN, KK 1009, fos. 2^{v}–4^{r}. The records of audiences at the Hôtel de Ville (AN, Z^{1h} 7–9) sometimes mention these elections, but do not give details as to how they were carried out.

TABLE 2. Elections to municipal offices 1418–1436

Date	Method of election
6, 10 June 1418	Elections by numerous bourgeois in the presence of the Burgundian captains who had led the coup
22 Sept. 1419	Election by numerous bourgeois
26 Dec. 1420	Election by bourgeois 'pour ce mandéz par plusieurs fois en lostel dicelle ville'
12, 16 Dec. 1422	Election at the house of the chancellor and one appointment by a retiring *échevin*
12 July 1429	Election by a very large number of bourgeois and *notables*
30 July 1430	Election 'par voix de scrutine'
1 Sept. 1431	Election by unspecified method: 'furent esleuz'
24 July 1432	Election by unspecified method: 'furent esleuz'
22 July 1433	Election by unspecified method: 'furent esleuz'
23 July 1434	Election by unspecified method: 'furent esleuz'

and Guy de Bar went to the Hôtel de Ville to join with the bourgeois in choosing a successor. Four days later Charles de Lens, admiral of France and captain of Paris, was present when new *échevins* were elected, the former officers having fled.[28] Under the circumstances, one would not expect free elections, but the 'Armagnac' sympathizer who was still town clerk commented in his register that these were to be short-term expedients only and without prejudice to the privileges, franchises, and liberties of the town of Paris.[29] Later, it was possible to maintain that the Burgundians had not behaved with much more respect for Parisian rights than had Tanguy du Châtel.[30]

The election of 12 December 1422, shortly after the acceptance in the capital of Henry VI's claim to the throne, was the other election made in the years 1418–36 under political pressure. It was the practice that the appointment of the *prévôt des marchands* and *échevins* be made at the Hôtel de Ville, however small the actual influence of the Parisians might be. Even Tanguy de Châtel had gone there in 1415 to place his nominees in power. In 1422 three men were 'elected' *échevins* in the house of the chancellor, Jean Le Clerc (disregarding the customs of the

[28] Jean du Pré later returned to Paris, but on 10 June he is noted with the other *échevins* as absent (AN, KK 1009, fo. 3^{r}; cf. 'État des bourgeois', 386 and AN, X^{1a} 4792, fo. 221^{v}).

[29] AN, KK 1009, fo. 3^{r}.

[30] AN, X^{1a} 4793, fo. 99^{r}: 7 Aug. 1421.

municipality), while the appointment four days later of the fourth *échevin*, Jean de La Poterne, in the Hôtel de Ville by the nomination of former *échevin* Jean de l'Olive was scarcely more democratic.[31] Yet if these appointments ignored the traditional role of the Parisian bourgeoisie they were not otherwise very remarkable. Garnier de Saint-Yon, Cabochien and (since 1419) keeper of the royal library, was perhaps the most politically important: he and his brother Jean were loyal servants of the Anglo-Burgundian regime.[32] Jean de Belloy had good Burgundian credentials in that his father had been executed for plotting against the Armagnacs in 1416, while he himself had been absent from Paris from 1413 to 1418 in the service of John the Fearless.[33] As for Jean de La Poterne, his parents were members of well-established families of goldsmiths and he and his brother (a royal secretary) inherited six houses from them in Paris.[34] There seems no evidence that any of the *échevins* of 1422 were closely tied to the English rather than the Burgundian cause, and nor for that matter was the chancellor, Jean Le Clerc, who was obviously in control of proceedings.[35]

It seems most probable that the motive for the private 'elections' of 1422 was not so much the imposition of any particular individuals as the avoidance of a major gathering of Parisians at the Hôtel de Ville with the dual monarchy only a few weeks old. After the riots of June 1418 all popular assemblies had been banned, and although this measure was aimed chiefly at 'gens de petit estat', a gathering of the principal inhabitants of the town to discuss their leaders would have been no less alarming.[36] Even a meeting for the election of new churchwardens at the church of Saint-Merri required authorization and the presence of a sergeant from the Châtelet.[37] Seen in this light one can understand the 1420 election as well. Whether this was ordered by Henry V during his stay in Paris in December is not clear, for although the choice of a new *prévôt des marchands* was made necessary by the death of Noel Marchand on 3 December this need not have required the election of new

[31] AN, KK 1009, fo. 3^{v}. [32] *Bourgeois*, 40 n. 1.

[33] Ibid. 321 n. 3; AN, JJ 170, no. 185.

[34] Their father, Roger de La Poterne was a goldsmith; through their mother, Jeanne, they were also connected with the de Martroy and Luillier families (AN, T (*Papiers d'origine privée*) 159/18, liasse 2, nos. 17, 19; AN, X^{1c} 133, no. 32.

[35] Cf. Rowe, 'The *Grand Conseil*', 209. The background of the other *échevin*, Raoul Dourdin, is obscure.

[36] AN, Y 4^{2}, 182–3: 24 July 1418. [37] AN, X^{1a} 4797, fo. 25^{v}: 11 Aug. 1432.

échevins.[38] In any case the election was apparently made freely, in contrast to the contemporaneous election of a new bishop of Paris, which was subject to heavy, though unavailing, pressure from Henry V and the duke of Burgundy. Officials of the municipality were nominated and elected by the bourgeoisie of Paris who were summoned for this purpose in several stages to the Hôtel de Ville.[39] This mention of a staggered election is most curious: it suggests that the government was reasonably confident that, divided up, the predominant Burgundian faction would elect satisfactory men, but that it would be wise to avoid any mass meetings outside its control.

The only two elections in which the people of Paris did take part *en masse*, in 1419 and 1429, were held under special circumstances. The first, an election of two new *échevins*, came just twelve days after the murder of John the Fearless on 10 September 1419 and was part of a general expression of solidarity amongst the leading Parisians. In the aftermath of the death of Duke John no one of Armagnac sympathies would have dared to express his views. On 12 September 1419 the bourgeois of Paris had taken an oath to avenge the murder of the duke; the public election of two prominent Burgundian supporters as *échevins* —Jean de Saint-Yon and Anthoine Ymbert des Champs—in the place of the less well-known Pierre Le Voyer and Michel Thibert was part of the strengthening of the faction.[40] The second public election was on 12 July 1429. Again it was a show of strength, this time for Duke Philip of Burgundy, who had arrived in Paris two days before to discuss the Lancastrian reverses of the first six months of the year. In the face of the menace of Charles VII public demonstrations could, under certain circumstances, be useful. The presence of the duke of Burgundy in Paris meant that the large assembly was not dangerous to the government and by electing Guillaume Sanguin (one of the richest and most experienced of the capital's money-changers, and one of the duke's household officers) as *prévôt des marchands*, the Parisians showed that

[38] Marchand's death is recorded in AN, Z^{1h} 7, fo. 223^{r}.

[39] AN, KK 1009, fos. 3^{r}–3^{v}. The municipal election took place on 26 Dec., the episcopal election the next day (Grassoreille, 'Histoire politique du chapitre', 116–30).

[40] Jean de Saint-Yon was a leading Cabochien and, later, councillor of the English (*Bourgeois*, 319 n. 2). Soon after his election as *échevin* des Champs received a safe conduct from Henry V to go from the English king to the duke of Burgundy ('Rôles normands et français et autres pièces tirées des archives de Londres par Bréquigny en 1764, 1765 et 1766', *Mémoires de la Société des Antiquaires de Normandie*, 3rd ser., 23 (1858), 223). He visited England as a representative of the Parisians in 1432. See also *Bourgeois*, 239 n. 3.

they would follow the duke in any policy that he undertook.[41] In creating an impression of unity in times of crisis a mass election could be valuable.[42]

This fear of a popular gathering obviously would explain the absence of any election between 1422 and 1429. Regular changes of officers had been normal before the suppression of the municipality in 1383, and were so again after 1430. It is thus striking to find the same men remaining in place without interruption. There was not even a token confirmation of their offices such as occurred when, for example, master Jean Colletier was kept in place as *échevin* from 1471 to 1485, being re-elected every other year.[43] The Anglo-Burgundian leaders clearly preferred stability to the risks of potentially uncontrolled public elections. When a regular turnover of officers was re-established, from 1430 onwards, general acclamations were not used. The year 1430 saw what was probably the first use of a ballot (*scrutin*) in Parisian municipal history.[44] It is not clear why this was adopted, but the arguments advanced above suggest that while the royal government could be confident of reliable 'Burgundian' supporters being elected it would be unwise to risk a large gathering. Hence, paradoxically, the secret ballot, usually seen as a guarantee of liberty of choice, was probably introduced into the Hôtel de Ville as a move to control dangerous assemblies. Later French rulers would regret the innovation, which sometimes made the results into unpredictable irritations.[45]

Whatever the reason for the *scrutin* of 1430, the highly erratic conduct and timing of elections which had characterized the municipality since 1412 was plainly due for reform. In 1431 an ordinance on this subject was issued. No text of this document survives, but its existence is

[41] AN, KK 1009, fo. 3^{v}; for Sanguin's career see D. Bossuat, 'Guillaume Sanguin, bourgeois de Paris (*c.*1370–1442)', *Positions des thèses . . . de l'École des Chartes* (1945), 59–67.

[42] Cf. the comments of R. Trexler on Florence: 'The government feared public gatherings during crisis and often suppressed them, yet turned about and generated processions in the same circumstances to marshal and channel emotional excitement.' (*Public Life in Renaissance Florence* (New York–London, 1980), 340.) Processions are considered in Ch. 7; mass elections may have presented the same dangers and possibilities.

[43] Favier, *Paris*, 487–9.

[44] AN, KK 1009, fo. 3^{v}. Cazelles considers that acclamation was the norm in the fourteenth century, and there is no evidence of balloting 1412–29.

[45] See the *procès-verbal* of the 1464 election printed by Favier, 'Autonomie municipale', 148–9. At this date the *scrutin* involved sealed boxes, one for the *prévôt des marchands* and one for the two *échevins* who were due to be changed.

revealed by an ordinance of 25 July 1450 which purports to follow the ancient laws and to correct others made in 1431 during the wars and divisions.[46] One error in the 1431 ordinance is easily detected: the elections of the years 1431–50 were held in the second half of July, normally on the 23rd of the month, rather than on the traditional date of 16 August re-established in 1450. The other provisions of 1431 are much harder to discern. The pattern of elections shows that two of the four posts of *échevin* were to be contested each year, but whether the complicated rules for the selection of officers drawn up in 1450 were new or based on the earlier regulations is impossible to tell. Nor is it certain whether a secret ballot was required from 1431, although this is likely.[47] Despite the uncertainties over procedure, we may be sure that large public elections were avoided after 1429, and were replaced either by secret ballot or by discussion amongst a small group meeting behind closed doors.[48]

It follows then that from 1412 to 1418 there was considerable sensitivity to political change, while from 1418 to 1436 the nomination of individuals was rare and the choice was usually made by a larger or smaller number of Parisian citizens. This was perhaps the result of Cabochien reforming ideas and the restoration of healthy practices of election; it was certainly made possible by the extent to which supporters of the Burgundians dominated the higher ranks of the population. After 1418 the rulers of Paris were not worried that hostile individuals might gain control of the Hôtel de Ville, although they did try to avoid trouble by keeping elections to a small scale except when it could actually be useful to profit from an emotional atmosphere. None the less, at least when compared with the years before 1418, or after 1440, this was a period of little interference with the appointment of the *prévôt des marchands* and *échevins*.

If we turn to the influence exerted by the municipality on the royal council we find that, naturally enough, it was the interests of Paris that aroused particular concern. Above all, the town's leaders were eager to

[46] AN, KK 1007, fo. 161^{r}. Printed several times in the sixteenth century, and by Lecaron, 'Origines' (1881), 208–10, where it is wrongly dated to 1350.

[47] The 1450 ordinance merely says that elections will be 'par voy de scrutin ainsi quil est accustumé' which suggests that it had been the practice since 1431, and the 1437 election was specifically said to be 'par scrutine ainsi quil est accoustumé' (AN, KK 1007, fo. 161^{r}; KK 1009, fo. 5^{v}).

[48] *Bourgeois*, 284, 300, notes the changes of personnel in 1432 and 1434, but does not mention any election.

protect the supplies of the capital, which was so big that meeting the needs of the population was always the greatest problem of the Parisian economy. The issue was particularly acute in times of war, so that it frequently happened that an order that came nominally from the king, and effectively from the council, originated in fact with the leaders of the municipality. Gilet and Jacquotin De Coquerel were sent to protect merchants coming to Paris, in 1420, on the orders of the count of Saint-Pol, lieutenant at Paris 'a la requeste et instance du prevost des marchans'.[49] In January 1421 Charles VI wrote to the towns of Amiens and Beauvais, asking them not to hinder supplies coming to Paris since these towns were much better placed to obtain provisions. He acted at the urgent request of the *prévôt des marchands* and *échevins*, the bourgeois, and inhabitants of Paris, as well as on the advice of the *Grand Conseil*.[50] We should take such statements about the origins of royal action literally.

Questions of provisioning were of enormous importance to the Parisians. It is easy to pass over ordinances that the municipality helped to draw up (on, say, the cutting of wood), as being of marginal importance. Prosecution of men who imported firewood into Paris without being members of the *hanse* seems petty, and so does a long dispute over whether or not the *prévôt des marchands* should be able to regulate the price of wood.[51] Yet such matters were likely to be of greater immediate concern to the people of Paris than were questions of high politics; when fires were lit to celebrate the arrival of Henry VI in France the common people were far from happy, because of the price of firewood.[52] The activity of the Hôtel de Ville in the government of the town, even when confined to issues of trade and supplies (and it often went further than that), was of real importance to the Parisians in their everyday lives. This could involve the *prévôt des marchands* and *échevins* in making claims for their rights in the capital that actually conflicted with the views of the royal council. This was shown by a clash over the apparently insignificant issue of fishing in the moats of Paris, traditionally farmed out by the municipality. Fishing was one of the few parts of the economy that could absorb men deprived by war of their livelihood,[53] and was of vital importance in supplying food for the Parisians. The fishermen who worked the moats concentrated their

[49] AN, X^{1a} 4793, fo. 13^{r}. [50] *Ordonnances*, xi. 116.
[51] Ibid. x. 497–9; AN, Z^{1h} 7, fos. 109^{r}, 111^{r}, 112^{v}, 119^{v}; AN, X^{1a} 4792, fos. 178^{r}–179^{v}.
[52] *Bourgeois*, 255. [53] AN, X^{1a} 4797, fo. 172^{r}.

efforts on catching small fish, an important part of the diet of poorer people.[54] The *prévôt des marchands* and *échevins* were responsible for the upkeep of the walls and moats of the town, and considered that the revenues from the fishing should be applied to that purpose and that administration of the activity should be entirely in their hands.

The perspective of the royal administration was quite different. While it was satisfactory that the town of Paris should do the work of maintaining the walls, this was seen as the delegation of a job rather than as any type of grant of sovereignty, and the Parisian need for fish could not stand against other royal orders. In a case which attracted the attention of the lieutenant of the *maître des eaux et forêts*, the royal council and the *procureur du roi*, it was asserted that the fishermen were obliged to follow ordinances laid down by the king.[55] The problem arose because in times of cold, or heavy rainfall, most of the fish in the river retreated into the moats to keep warm ('pour estre en abry plus coyement et plus chaudement pour les sources et fontenys') and could then easily be taken by the fishermen of the town using fine nets, which trapped large and small fish alike.[56] The *procureur du roi* argued that the unrestricted use of fine nets would lead to the depopulation of the river, while the *prévôt des marchands* and *échevins* maintained that the moats were their own affair, that these small fish were particularly valuable to the inhabitants of Paris, and that in any case it was better that they should be taken there, rather than live to be caught at a town outside Paris and then imported.[57]

The royal argument rejected such a selfishly Parisian point of view in considering the fish population as a whole, and not simply the needs or convenience of the capital. The underlying motive was the rejection of the claims of the municipality to sovereignty in this area: the moats around the town belonged to the king because the town belonged to the king; supervising, maintaining, and cleaning the moats did not give rise to '*segnorie ou justice*'. From questions of supplies and nets it could be but a short step to contests over wider issues. Yet although lordship and jurisdiction were at stake here the dispute arose because of the different viewpoints of the two administrations: for the municipality Paris came first, for the king's council the capital was only part of

[54] 'Dont le petit peuple est fort aisié et soubstenu' (AN, X^{1a} 4793, fo. 192^{r}).

[55] A. Bossaut, 'La Pêche en Seine au XV^{e} siècle', *BSHP* 90 (1963), 69–74.

[56] AN, X^{1a} 4793, fo. 192^{v} (18 June 1422); Bossuat, 'Pêche en Seine', 70 n. 29.

[57] AN, X^{1a} 4793, fo. 209^{v}–210^{r}.

the whole kingdom, subordinate to wider considerations—and general laws.[58]

If questions of provisioning caused the municipality to put pressure on the royal administration, it is not surprising that matters concerning the conduct of the war were also raised. Throughout the period, the objective of the leaders of the Parisians was to keep the war as far from the capital as possible by encouraging one of two policies: vigorous fighting, or peace. Concern to re-establish trade links with Normandy made leading members of the bourgeoisie into enthusiastic campaigners for peace in the negotiations that preceded the treaty of Troyes but, as soon as formal notice of the treaty reached them, the municipality adopted another tactic. On 22 June 1420 the *prévôt des marchands* joined with the *Parlement* and the *prévôt* of Paris in writing to the kings of France and England and the duke of Burgundy, warning of the danger from the Armagnac party.[59] Action was what the Parisians required: the decision to send Sir John Fastolf to campaign in the county of Valois and around Paris in 1423 was made by Bedford and the *Grand Conseil* and at the 'grans instances et prieres' of the *prévôt des marchands* and bourgeoisie of Paris.[60] We have seen how envoys and letters to London always stressed the necessity for assistance from England, which was, to a limited extent, forthcoming. In the end, however, the failure of the English to keep their promises to drive the war far away was to make a new peace seem an attractive option.

While the royal council wished to have some control over the personnel of the municipality and had, conversely, to accept a certain amount of pressure from the Hôtel de Ville, it was recognized that the *prévôt des marchands* and *échevins* were valuable allies. In 1418, for example, the siege of Rouen by the English had required a response from the Burgundian government in Paris, but John the Fearless had abolished *aides* as part of his campaign for popularity.[61] The council turned to the municipality for advice as to the best means of raising

[58] AN, X^{1a} 4793, fo. 210^{v}. Although the matter was still *sub judice*, the winter of 1425–6 saw the fishermen again making excessive catches of the small fish retreating into the moats because of the springs: AN, X^{1a} 4794, fo. 184^{v}.

[59] *Fauquembergue*, i. 374.

[60] AN, JJ, no. 203. For the consequences of this expedition for Fastolf see C. A. J. Armstrong, 'Sir John Fastolf and the Law of Arms', in C. T. Allmand (ed.) *War, Literature and Politics in the Late Middle Ages*, (Liverpool, 1976), 46–56.

[61] The probable date of their abolition is 13 Jan. 1418 (Pocquet du Haut-Jussé, 'Compte de Pierre Gorremont', 70n.).

money, and the *prévôt des marchands* and *échevins* summoned a large meeting to discuss the position. This assembly could not escape the conclusion that a tax on wine, to run for ten months, was the only way of obtaining adequate money. This opinion was embodied in a written document given to all the *quarteniers* of Paris, who each read it out in their quarters, obtaining wide approval on the condition that everybody be made to contribute.[62] Thus the reversal of the longstanding 'Burgundian' policy on taxation was obtained by the shrewd moves of introducing the municipality to the financial problems and using their network of local administration to obtain general consent from men of influence. Not only did the municipality give its advice and consent on the reintroduction of *aides*, it was given powers to administer the levy. On 21 October 1418 the *prévôt des marchands* and *échevins* forbade the unloaders of wine at the Hôtel de Ville to move any wine on water or land without ensuring that the tax had been paid, under pain of a 5*l.p.* fine.[63] This co-operation is in striking contrast to the events of 1382, when the reimposition of *aides* provoked revolt and the consequent suppression of the municipality.

Henry V, in his turn, had to call on the municipal administration for assistance. The second half of 1421 saw him engaged in a difficult campaign to drive back supporters of the dauphin.[64] He decided to demolish several fortresses in the Paris region that had been giving shelter to the enemy, and for this needed 'macons, charpentiers, pionniers, et autres manouvriers'. In response to his appeal, the council in Paris ordered the *prévôt des marchands* and *échevins*, *quarteniers*, and *dizainiers* to organize the largest possible number of such labourers with all necessary tools, and commissioned the municipality to assess a tax on all the inhabitants of Paris to pay the wages and expenses of the expedition. Payment was to be enforced on any officers or churchmen who might oppose or appeal on account of their privileges, notwithstanding any such protests.[65] It is evident that a rapid mobilization of men and money was best obtained through the *prévôt des marchands* and his officers and in the next chapter we shall look more closely at the role of the municipality in ensuring the security of Anglo-Burgundian Paris.

[62] *Ordonnances*, x. 482: 4 Oct. 1418. Taxes were permanently restored in Dec. 1420 (Pocquet, 'Compte de Pierre Gorremont'; *Ordonnances*, xi. 109).

[63] AN, Z^{1h} 7, fo. 101^{r}. The *déchargeurs* were to examine the 'cedule ou contre-script des receveurs sur le fait de laide'.

[64] Wylie and Waugh, *Henry V*, iii. 325–33.

[65] AN, K 949, no. 19: 14 Aug. 1421.

The labours of the *prévôt des marchands* and *échevins* were such that they bitterly resented any slight on their efforts. Philippot Le Cousturier, farmer for a levy on wine in 1434, ventured to withhold part of his receipts to repay money that he claimed was owing to him from his losses as receiver of another tax in 1418. To the argument that the levy of 1434 was supposed to be used for the repair of the fortifications of the town (and so could not be diverted to the repayment of his debt) he countered that Parisian revenues were used for many other purposes such as paying for robes, pens, wine, and capons for the town's officers, and that despite large receipts they had spent virtually nothing on repairs or fortifications for sixteen years.[66] Although these charges were actually made by an advocate, there was no doubt but that they expressed the sentiments of Le Cousturier, and the response of the municipality was bitter: they had enormous burdens to bear, incomparably more than in the past. Once there was nothing but honour, now there was nothing but trouble; their benefits were certainly no greater than those of their predecessors but their duties would be long in the telling.[67] This fierce retort summarized the anger of the over-burdened municipality in the last years of the Anglo-Burgundian regime.

THE *PRÉVÔTÉ* OF PARIS

Although the *prévôt des marchands* and *échevins* were right to regard themselves as important, they were not the only local government in Paris. If the municipality could claim to represent the citizens, the royal *prévôt* of Paris was the effective agent of the king in his capital.[68] As such, he had two principal roles, the judicial and the political (which in times of war meant military). It was important for the ruling party to be certain of the loyalty of the *prévôt*, and in the years 1400–18 the office had been periodically in the hands of each of the major factions; all the *bailliages* and *sénéchaussés* became political targets.[69] In any case, the political

[66] AN, Z^{1a} 9, fo. 140^{r}: 12 Oct. 1434. This is a case rich in information about the finances of the capital; see also AN, Z^{1a} 9, fos. 108^{v}, 120^{r}, 121^{r}, 129^{r}, 136^{r}, 139^{v}–140^{r}, 144^{r}–148^{r}, 150^{r}, 154^{r}, 159^{v}, 167^{v}, 175^{r}; also AN, Z^{1h} 9, fo. 155^{r}.

[67] AN, Z^{1a} 9, fo. 150^{r}: 13 Nov. 1434.

[68] The classic exposition of the greatness of the office of *prévôt* is in N. de La Mare, *Traité de la police*, (4 vols., Paris, 1705–38), e.g. i. 106.

[69] A. Demurger, 'Guerre civile et changements de personnel administratif dans le royaume de France de 1400 à 1418: L'Exemple des baillis et sénéchaux', *Francia, Forschungen zur Westeuropaïsen Gesichte*, 6 (1978), 151–298.

aspects of his job often left the *prévôt* with less time and interest to bestow on his judicial functions; these were exercised through the Châtelet of Paris, where abuses were notorious.[70] After some false starts, the Anglo-Burgundian regime made a major effort to resolve the problems associated with the office of *prévôt* and, although it remained a highly political office, it was eventually made stable and efficient.

The coup of 29 May 1418 had been accomplished by force, so it was natural that the man appointed to replace the ousted dauphinist, Tanguy du Châtel, as *prévôt* should have been a soldier as well as a loyal Burgundian. He was Guy de Bar, one of the captains who had led the Burgundian troops. Although this appointment was a logical consequence of the entry it did not mean that the Burgundians were committed to stressing the military aspects of the office. Elsewhere, indeed, the years 1418–22 saw a tendency to appoint lawyers as *baillis*, leaving full-time soldiers to deal with military questions.[71] In Paris this policy was most erratically carried out, because the political and strategic importance of the capital made it very difficult to find the right man for the job. In fact it took over four years to redefine the office satisfactorily, as Table 3 shows.

For Guy de Bar the post was military. He was effective when leading the Parisians against the Armagnacs but was less successful in other areas, failing to pacify the riots of June 1418 and, it was suggested, not daring to bring the rioters to justice.[72] He could not provide the leadership necessary in the winter of 1418–19, when the king and the duke of Burgundy had left Paris, supposedly for the relief of Rouen. Consequently, on the initiative of the *Parlement*, a committee was set up to supervise the administration of the capital. This commission began inauspiciously but, after it was revised and placed under the leadership of Gilles de Clamecy (formerly a councillor at the *Parlement* and, since, *maître des comptes*), it began to operate much more fruitfully.[73] One of the

[70] E. Glasson, 'Le Châtelet de Paris et les abus de sa procédure aux XIV^{e} et XV^{e} siècles', *Séances et travaux de l'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques*, new ser., 40 (1893), 45–92.

[71] As is remarked by Demurger, 'Guerre civile', 232, and by Autrand, *Naissance*, 194–5.

[72] *Bourgeois*, 91, 99, 102.

[73] The first commission was set up on 2 Jan. 1419, and by the 9th several meetings had been held 'qui avont sorti petit effect' (*Fauquembergue*, i. 221, 225). On the 10th a new commission was set up under de Clamecy which on the 18th was commended by the *Parlement* for its good work (ibid. 226–7, 232–3).

TABLE 3. The *prévôts* of Paris 1418–1436

Name[1]	Date[2]	Background[3]	Division of Office[4]
Guy de Bar	31 May 1418	*chambellan* of duke of Burgundy	25 Jan. 1419, count of Saint-Pol assumes military command of Paris
Gilles de Clamecy	3 Feb. 1419	*Parlement* and *Chambre des Comptes*	
Jean de Mesnil	17 Dec. 1420	*maître d'hôtel* of king	Dec. 1420, duke of Clarence is captain of Paris; 10 Jan. 1421, duke of Exeter appointed lieutenant
Jean de La Baume-Montrevel	14 Mar. 1421	*chambellan* of duke of Burgundy	La Baume has judicial functions only (i.e. Exeter keeps military role)
Pierre de Marigny	3 May 1421	*Avocat du roi*	8 July 1421, La Baume made captain of Paris in place of Exeter
Pierre Le Verrat	30 July 1421	*Écuyer du roi*	7 Nov. 1421, police of Paris in hands of Philippe de Morvilliers
Simon de Champluisant	3 Feb. 1422	lawyer	
Simon Morhier	1 Dec. 1422	*maître d'hôtel* of queen	1423, Bedford has title of captain of Paris, with Jean de Courcelles his lieutenant 16 July 1429, L'Isle-Adam is captain of Paris

[1] List based on the records of the *Parlement* (*Fauquembergue*, i. 129–30, 246, 390; ii. 12, 16, 37, 76). This is complete apart from Le Verrat, who took his oath at the *Chambre des Comptes* (BN, MS fr. 20684, p. 90). Not shown are Jacques de Lamban, who deputized for the absent de Bar, Aug.–Oct. 1418, nor Gaultier Jayer who, as *procureur du roi*, filled the breach for three days after de Mesnil died in office. *Gallia Regia*, iv. 312–14, adds the names of Robert de Montjeu, Hugues Restoré, and Jacques de Luxembourg, in 1419, 1421, and 1422 respectively, on the basis of BN, MS Clair. 990, but there is no evidence that they were received by the *Parlement* or carried out any of the *prévôt*'s functions.

[2] Date of their reception at the *Parlement* or, for Le Verrat, *Chambre des Comptes*, and not necessarily of their appointment.

suggestions made by this body was that the count of Saint-Pol should take on the military and political administration of the capital, and this was implemented on 25 January 1419. But this meant that there was no real need for a soldier as *prévôt*, and it was a logical step to replace Guy de Bar by the lawyer and administrator Gilles de Clamecy, despite the opposition of the former and the extreme reluctance of the latter.[74] Part of de Clamecy's unwillingness to become *prévôt* was due to the fact that, as a native of Paris, he was theoretically debarred from the position but his protests were ignored, as was a subsequent attempt at resignation; the council, meeting in the *Grande Chambre* of the *Parlement*, were adamant that he should keep the office.[75]

From 1419 to 1420, the Burgundian regime in Paris followed the policy of dividing judicial and military functions: Gilles de Clamecy was highly competent in the former, but when left to deal with questions of defence he was noticeably less experienced.[76] The policy of a separate military administration was maintained in 1421–2, as the dukes of Clarence (briefly) and Exeter, then Jean de La Baume-Montrevel were in turn made captain of Paris. But this does not mean that trained lawyers were always made *prévôt*: only Pierre de Marigny and Simon de Champluisant answer to that description. Otherwise household officers of the king or the duke of Burgundy were appointed who must have had little experience of the administration of justice. While Pierre Le Verrat was *prévôt* it became necessary to appoint Philippe de Morvilliers, first president at the *Parlement*, to provide for the police and justice of the capital as he should think fit.[77] By this order of 7 November 1421, issued by the *Grand Conseil* held by Henry V, the *prévôt* of Paris in effect had

[74] Demurger, 'Guerre civile', 231–2; *Fauquembergue*, i. 245–7.

[75] *Bourgeois*, 122; *Fauquembergue*, i. 323. [76] *Bourgeois*, 128.

[77] AN, Y 6^7, 37–8: there was a need to provide against 'plusieurs fraudes, abus, rencherissements de vivres et autres marchandises . . . et aussi de pourveoir sur plusieur autres choses concernant le bien de la justice d'icelle notre ville, dont maintes plaintes sont venues a nous et viennent de jour en jour'.

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[3] For de Bar, Clamecy, Mesnil, La Baume, Le Verrat, and Morhier, see *Bourgeois*, 88 n. 3, 121 n. 2, 147 n. 1, 152 n. 4, 156 n. 2, and 181 n. 3, respectively. For Marigny and Champluisant see Autrand, *Naissance*, 193–4.

[4] Saint-Pol, *Fauquembergue*, i. 241; Clarence and Exeter, *Bourgeois*, 148 n. 2; La Baume (judicial functions), *Fauquembergue*, ii. 12 and (captain of Paris) *Bourgeois*, 152 n. 4; Morvilliers, AN, Y 6^7, pp. 37–8; Bedford and Courcelles, BN, MS n. a. lat. 184, fo. 70^r. For fuller details of military organization see Chapter 4.

his judicial functions reduced, rather as his military and political functions had already been curtailed. One cannot escape the conclusion that between December 1420 and December 1422 the government had little coherent idea of the role that the *prévôt* should try to fulfil nor, consequently, how or by whom it might be done. Overall, between May 1418 and December 1422 the average length of tenure of the post was less than eight months, and it was even shorter (under five months) in the last two years. All this is in striking contrast to the performance of Simon Morhier, who was appointed *prévôt* during Bedford's first visit to the capital as regent, and remained in office until the English were expelled from Paris over thirteen years later.

The fact that Simon Morhier was able to remain *prévôt* from 1 December 1422 until the end of the Anglo-Burgundian regime bears witness not only to the relative stability of these years but also to his talents, which have been widely recognized.[78] In his own person he embodied the reunification of the military and judicial aspects of the *prévôté* that was accomplished at this time. He was a member of an ancient family of the Chartres region, inherited from his father the lordship of Villiers-le-Morhier, and was quite at home with the military functions of a *chevalier*.[79] But though a true noble of the sword, he was also excellently connected with the world of justice: an ancestor, Guillaume Morhier, sat at the *Parlement* from 1361 to 1369 and married the daughter of one of the most influential of first presidents of that court, Simon de Bucy, after whom Bedford's *prévôt* was perhaps named.[80] Simon Morhier himself followed this precedent: his first wife, Blanche de Popincourt, was the daughter of Jean de Popincourt, first president of the *Parlement* in 1400–3.[81] With this background, it is not surprising that the dismemberment of the *prévôté* that had marked the previous four years should have been reversed.

In so far as Morhier himself was responsible for the revival of the *prévôt*'s office during the Anglo-Burgundian regime, it is probable that his efficiency and ruthless enthusiasm must take the credit. He was no paragon: he was condemned in the *Parlement* for enforcing a levy (of capons) from the sergeants of the Châtelet when they renewed their oaths after the death of Charles VI, though he claimed to be following precedent; rather worse, it was claimed in 1430 that he made excessive

[78] Originally by A. Vallet de Viriville, 'Sépultures de Blanche de Popincourt, femme de Simon Morhier, prévôt de Paris, et de Jean Pluyette . . .', *Mémoires de la Société Impériale des Antiquaires de France*, 25 (1862), 259–96.

[79] Ibid. 279–82.

[80] Autrand, *Naissance*, 337.

[81] Vallet, 'Sépultures', 264.

military demands on the inhabitants of his village of Le Mesnil-Aubry. He had bought the lordship from the executors of his late wife, who had died in 1422, and some of the unfortunate inhabitants were forced out of the village church, where for some six to eight months they had been living in refuge, to guard his house and obtain supplies for his soldiers.[82] He was scarcely more generous in the arrangements he made for another of his fiefs—Houdan—when he drew up a strict contract for its protection in 1435.[83] His fierce loyalty to the English was demonstrated as the forces of Charles VII entered Paris; when a wealthy merchant advised him to make peace he struck him to the ground with his sword and had him killed by his men.[84] But his energy was never in doubt, and he was highly regarded by the English and the Parisians. The former readily rewarded his labours with grants of land, and when Morhier followed his masters out of Paris in 1436 he was given a place on the council in Normandy and made treasurer of the duchy, a role in which we find him acting with all his old decisiveness.[85]

The Parisians respected Morhier as a soldier. Although the post of captain of Paris was still used to provide a focus for military control at sensitive times, the *prévôt* was recognized to be a fighting man. When challenged over the exactions levied on the personnel of the Châtelet, he reminded the *Parlement* that the war made many demands on his purse, as the *prévôt* had to maintain a larger household than in peacetime.[86] His first effort as leader of 'grant foison de gens de Paris'—an attempt at the recapture of Compiègne made around Christmas 1423—was a failure, but subsequent enterprises were more successful. In a campaign against thieves and brigands in January 1426 he took over 200 prisoners in under a week, and the next year helped organize the capture of the brigand chief Sauvage de Fremainville. In 1429 he was present at one of the few Lancastrian successes of that year when his Parisian militia and Fastolf's English soldiers together beat off the Franco-Scottish assault on a supply convoy going to Orléans, at the Battle of the Herrings. His

[82] *Fauquembergue*, ii. 87, 97, 355–6.

[83] J. Harmand, 'Un document de 1435 concernant Houdan et la fin de l'occupation anglaise dans l'ouest de l'Île-de-France', *Bulletin de la Société Nationale des Antiquaires de la France* (1975), 239, 244.

[84] *Bourgeois*, 316.

[85] Longnon, *Paris*, pp. 147, 158; AN, JJ 174, no. 331 bis; Vallet, 'Sépultures', 286 ff., J.-M. Roger, 'Simon Morhier en Normandie', *BPHCTH* 1980 (1983), 101–64. See BL, Add. Ch. 3957 for Morhier acting quickly to get payment to soldiers who were on the point of departing for lack of pay: 12 Mar. 1442.

[86] *Fauquembergue*, ii. 163.

effort to retake Chartres by strategem in 1432 came to nothing but the anonymous author of the *Journal d'un Bourgeois*, normally hard to please, still describes him as '*saiges homs*' and accepts that it was not his fault.[87]

If the military functions of the *prévôt* were restored in the years from 1422 onwards, this was not at the expense of his judicial role. Of course, the Châtelet was the forum for so many cases, often of considerable legal complexity, that the *prévôt* was not expected to rule on every dispute in person. In fact it was doubtful whether he could make a ruling by himself: he needed the authority of legal experts at his side to back up his opinion. Morhier attempted to lay down how much meat the butchers of Paris should take to the siege of Montargis in 1427; when charged with disobedience the butchers countered that the *prévôt* was only speaking by way of advice, not sitting in judgement with his lieutenants and '*gens du conseil*'.[88] In any case, he was not personally responsible for the great advance made in the execution of justice when new ordinances for the administration of the Châtelet were drafted in 1424–5, ordinances that were to be perhaps the best legacy of foreign domination for the Parisians.

Frequently disorganized, sometimes corrupt, the Châtelet of the early fifteenth century was plainly due for reform.[89] The upheavals of 1418 brought no sign that the rhetoric of John the Fearless would yield any fruit in practice, for incompetent individuals motivated largely by the desire for profit were nominated to key posts left vacant by the purge of the Armagnacs.[90] The slow progress made with trials of men suspected of hostility to the Burgundians, and inadequate security in the prisons, helped provoke the disastrous riots of August 1418.[91] On 5 August 1424, however, Bedford and the council commissioned the *Parlement* to draw up ordinances for the administration of the Châtelet.[92] It is probably right to see this as an example of how Cabochien ideas did survive into the 1420s, for several of Bedford's council had first made

[87] *Bourgeois*, 192, 206–7, 223 n. 4, 284. But see Harmand, 'Document', 242 n. 1, for the suggestion that Morhier's loyalty to the English much exceeded his competence.

[88] AN, X^{1a} 4795, fo. 153v: 22 Aug. 1426; cf. the case of 1395, when the *prévôt*, feeling that his councillors had given too harsh a judgement in a case where no appeal was normally allowed, had to ask the *Parlement* what he should do (Tanon, *Histoire des justices*, 71).

[89] L. Battifol, 'Le Châtelet de Paris vers 1400', *RH* 61 (1895), 225–64; 62 (1896), 225–35; 63 (1897), 42–55, 266–83.

[90] *Ordonnances*, x. 492–3. [91] Favier, *Paris*, 169. [92] *Ordonnances*, xiii. 88.

their political mark in 1413, and Guillaume Gente, the royal secretary who signed the order commissioning the reform of the Châtelet, had himself been associated with the movement.[93] The *Parlement* worked busily at the task from February to May 1425, and in the latter month a very substantial set of regulations was issued: 185 articles covering everything from the conduct of hearings to the sleeping and feeding regulations in the prisons.[94] It is unlikely that Morhier himself had much influence over what was decided, indeed articles five and six specifically repudiate certain exactions (such as demanding capons from sergeants at their institution and keeping for his own profit impounded knives, and fancy belts and clothes confiscated from prostitutes), to which the *prévôt* claimed that he was entitled.[95]

Along with these institutional reforms can be seen a new purpose at the Châtelet, notably in resisting the pretensions of the *prévôt des marchands* and *échevins*. The court of the municipality was supposed to deal only with matters arising out of trade disputes, but gradually more and more types of case had come to be heard at the Hôtel de Ville. When, on 24 September 1420, Robin Trochelle succeeded in getting his case transferred from the Châtelet to the Hôtel de Ville because he was a *dizainier* of the town and his case had a bearing on the 'bien publique' of Paris, this was regarded as such an important precedent that the relevant letter from the Châtelet was copied out in full into the register of causes of the municipality.[96] As the *prévôté* recovered its direction such laxity was eliminated: a test case at the *Parlement* resulted in a favourable ruling on 1 April 1424 and later the *procureur du roi* at the Châtelet rejected the claims of the municipality to hold 'ung grant auditoire des causes' that should go before the *prévôt* and attempted to limit its competence to the most minor disputes amongst river merchants.[97]

Once again, the pattern noticed at the beginning of this chapter can be discerned: disputes over jurisdiction reveal the ambiguities in the system whereby power was distributed. Because the *prévôt des marchands* was elected by the bourgeois and presented to the king he claimed to be in a sense a 'prevost ou juge royal' with a well-founded jurisdiction.[98]

[93] Cf. Rowe, 'The *Grand Conseil*', 210, and for Gente see A. Coville, *Les Cabochiens et l'ordonnance de 1413* (Paris, 1888), 400, 404–5.

[94] *Fauquembergue*, ii. 158–77; *Ordonnances*, xiii. 88–103.

[95] *Ordonnances*, xiii. 89; *Fauquembergue*, ii. 163.

[96] AN, Z^{1h} 7, fo. 210^{v}.

[97] AN, Y 3, fo. 76^{v}, cit. Huisman, *Juridiction*, 205; AN, X^{1a} 4795, fo. 15^{r}: 17 Dec. 1426.

[98] AN, X^{1a} 4795, fo. 22^{r}: 7 Jan. 1427.

But the *procureur du roi* utterly rejected such claims and maintained that the king, 'prince et roy, empereur en son royaume', had all ordinary justice in the capital and had made no grant of power to the Parisians. He was scornful of the book of precedents that the municipality produced and, for good measure, cast doubt on the validity of the 1416 ordinance, the product of the Armagnac regime and never published at the *Parlement.*[99] Thus the lawyers succeeded in translating the principles followed by the various administrations into their own terms. The king was emperor in his kingdom and the *prévôt* was his agent in Paris. On the other hand, counsel for the town was doubtless correct to stress that the *prévôt des marchands* was in some sense a royal officer since, although elected, he was required to take an oath to the king as well as to the Parisians. It is the practical implications of these different viewpoints that have been surveyed in this chapter.

There can be no static account of the administration of Paris at this time because there was no single structure, nor even a well-defined hierarchy: the royal council could concern itself with the fish in the moats; the municipality could influence the pursuit of peace and war. The lawyers were called in to justify the actions of their clients when it was necessary to rationalize conflicts but, day by day, the interplay between the components of the administration was orderly. The council had a difficult task in leading one half of France in a civil war and, from 1422, pressing the claims of a foreign infant as king but, in Paris at least, the problems were eased by the assistance of the more influential inhabitants. The great majority of the bourgeoisie sympathized with the cause of the duke of Burgundy, so that the manipulation of municipal elections that had characterized the stormy years 1413–18 was less often needed after the coup of John the Fearless. This in turn made the job of the *prévôt* of Paris much easier so that, by 1424, secure tenure had been re-established and it was possible to think in terms of administrative reforms at the Châtelet. As far as one can tell, the royal council under Bedford aimed for stability in the administration of Paris to set against the tumult of the first decades of the century and to provide a firm base for the imposition of a Lancastrian monarchy. The same municipal officers stayed in place from 1422 to 1429 and Simon Morhier remained *prévôt* from 1422 to 1436. The Anglo-Burgundian rulers wished to avoid the upheavals that had undermined previous governments and it appears that they succeeded, thanks to the general support for Bur-

[99] AN, X^{1a} 4795, fo. 196^{r}: 19 Jan. 1428.

gundy shown by the officers of the Crown, *prévôté*, and municipality. After the peace of Arras of September 1435, this would mean that the Lancastrian cause was hopeless but, before that, the common Burgundian loyalties helped to form an administration that worked smoothly for common ends.

4

DEFENCE AND SECURITY

Anglo-Burgundian Paris was a town at war. One only need turn the pages of the *Journal d'un Bourgeois* to see how, even when the battles were far away, the war could still be near at hand. This was the dominant consideration of the town's politicians and an inescapable fact of life for everybody else. Thus merchants bringing cattle for the butchers of Paris came with an armed guard.[1] To understand what it was like to govern —or to live in—the Paris of the 1420s and 1430s involves knowing how the town responded to the menaces of war, to the occasional serious assaults and raids, and to the constant fear of surprise attacks. Privileged to live behind strong walls, the Parisians had to face the fact that towns, by reason of their military power, were bound to be strategic targets in any long war. The problem was not only one for the citizens: from 1420 the government in Paris was led by an English regent, for whom possession of the French capital gave credibility to claims to the French throne. Inevitably, English soldiers were to be found in the Paris of Henry V and the duke of Bedford, but their numbers and influence need to be assessed. The previous chapter showed how the overlapping of authorities so typical of urban life under the *ancien régime* continued despite the nationality of the head of state; indeed the *prévôté* and municipality emerged from the period of Anglo-Burgundian rule stronger than they had been for years. One would expect this co-operation to extend to questions of defence and security. A study of the military history of Paris must range from professional soldiers to militiamen, and should not neglect the fortifications with which generations of rulers had endowed their capital.

We can begin with the material state of the defences of Paris in the first half of the fifteenth century. Of these the most important were the city walls.[2] To the south of the Seine the walls built by Philippe-Auguste

[1] AN, X^{1a} 4797, fo. 71^{v}.

[2] These are indicated by Favier, *Paris*, 24, and in more detail in A. Bonnardot, *Dissertations archéologiques sur les anciennes enceintes de Paris, suivies de recherches sur les portes fortifiées qui dependaient de ces enceintes* (Paris, 1852).

were still in service; some ten yards high, they had been refurbished in the late 1350s as a response to the threat from the English after the capture of King John II at the Battle of Poitiers (1356). Access to the walls was improved and a moat was added to the defences. Naturally, in view of the pronounced slope, this was a dry moat, except for short distances at each end which could be fed from the Seine.[3] While on the south bank the walls of Philippe-Auguste remained the basis of defence, to the north they had been superseded by those erected since 1356 and known as the walls of Charles V, which covered a much larger area. About the appearance of these walls we are less well informed. From the Place de la Bastille to the Porte Saint-Denis their trace is left by the boulevards, but no material remnant survives. Guillebert de Metz, writing in the early fifteenth century, described the walls of Charles V as very high and strong, with great towers.[4] Beyond the walls, two substantial moats kept the enemy (men and firepower) from approaching too close to the town; the moat nearer the walls was full of water, the outer moat was dry.[5]

The main walls of the town occupied the attention of both the king and the municipality. Successive rulers had taken care to provide their capital with adequate defences; they could scarcely be indifferent to the fate of the most important town in their kingdom. At the same time, they were ready for the routine maintenance of the fortifications to be left in the hands of the *prévôt des marchands* and *échevins*; the Parisians had a vested interest in their own defence. The suppression of the municipality in 1383 had led to all responsibility for security being taken on by the king and his officers: the restoration of this function to the royal keeper of the *prévôté des marchands* helped to prepare the way for the re-establishment of the municipality.[6] Shortly before the treaty of Troyes the royal council based in Troyes wrote to the municipality confirming that the administration of fortifications was in the hands of the Parsians

[3] Bonnardot, *Dissertations*, 30 (height), 67 (moats); A. Berty, H. Legrand, L.-M. Tisserand, and C. Platon, *Topographie historique du vieux Paris* (6 vols., HGP, Paris, 1886–97), v, *Région occidentale de l'Université*, 29, 34.

[4] Guillebert de Metz, 'Description de Paris sous le règne de Charles VI', in Le Roux de Lincy and Tisserand (eds.), *Paris et ses historiens*, 220. Guillebert described the walls of Philippe-Auguste as 'moult fors et espés que on y menoit bien une charette dessus' (ibid. 174).

[5] Cf. *Fauquembergue*, ii. 322: there was 'grant eaue' in the second moat in Sept. 1429.

[6] See the letter of 12 Aug. 1405 printed in Felibien, *Histoire . . . de Paris*, vol. i, p. cxxi.

and approving recent alterations made around the Château de Bois near the Louvre.[7]

These defences were overhauled by the municipality at the beginning of the Anglo-Burgundian regime; in January 1420 the town received financial assistance towards work recently begun on a pallisade and boulevard to protect the approach from the river.[8] It is more difficult to be confident of the state of the defences elsewhere. In 1417 the moat between the Porte Saint-Jacques and the Seine required repairs.[9] In general, it seems that it was on the left bank that particular problems were to be found: Charles VII was to write in 1439 that large sections of the walls had collapsed near Saint-Germain-des-Prés, while by 1441 the situation had deteriorated further, not only towards Saint-Germain but elsewhere as well.[10] This suggests some neglect during the years of the Anglo-Burgundian regime, and it will be recalled that in 1434 Philippot Le Cousturier had accused the *prévôt des marchands* and *échevins* of spending their revenues on luxuries rather than fortifications. Very little building had been done for sixteen years, he maintained, which was to say since 1418 exactly.[11] The response of the municipality was unconvincing, for to say, as they did, that they had spent over 3,000 francs on 'recent' work near the Château de Bois was to take a poor example: this work had been well under way by April 1420 and the royal government paid some 8,000*l.t.* towards the cost.[12]

In fact, the municipality was in an unenviable position: the war demanded that it increase spending on defences but, at the same time, restricted its income. Traditionally, the king had allowed a tax on wine brought into the capital to be used by the *prévôt des marchands* and *échevins* for the fortifications, but trade cannot have been at a high level during the war.[13] Nor did municipal domain revenue yield as much as in

[7] *Ordonnances*, xi. 78–80.

[8] AN, KK 17, fo. 61^{r}: a 'palicia' and 'boulevert' lately begun 'in ripparia Secane ad oppositum castri Luppete Parisius' (24 Jan. 1420). This is a very early use of the term 'boulevard' (cf. C. T. Allmand, 'L'Artillerie de l'armée anglaise et son organisation à l'époque de Jeanne d'Arc', in *Jeanne d'Arc: Une époque, un rayonnement*, (CNRS, Paris, 1982), 79).

[9] AN, LL 112, p. 166; the canons of Notre-Dame gave 100 francs towards the cost of the work.

[10] AN, H^{2} (Bureau de la Ville de Paris) 2010: unnumbered bundle of documents.

[11] AN, Z^{1a} 9, fo. 140^{r}. Also Ch. 3, n. 66.

[12] AN, Z^{1a} 9, fo. 141^{r}; *Ordonnances*, xi. 79–80; AN, KK, 17, fos. 59^{r}–60^{r}.

[13] By 1434 Le Cousturier had held the *ferme* for 28 years; in that year he was supposed to pay some 400*l.t.* for it (AN, Z^{1a} 9, fo. 136^{r}).

peacetime, for then the gatehouses and towers on the walls could be let as dwellings. But these were not very desirable residences when they were liable to be in the front line of an attack: they were almost all unoccupied during the 1420s and were either used as watch-stations or fell into disrepair.[14] The Tour Saint-Bernard, at the eastern end of the southern walls, was given rent free to one Poncelet Jossouin on condition that he look after the chain that was stretched across the river to keep out unauthorized boats, and that he guard the tower by day and by night.[15] At the Porte Saint-Martin, a compromise was reached for the year 1418–19, when it was rented for the modest sum of 40*s.p.* together with a commitment to carry out all but major repairs;[16] by 1424, this too was held free of charge in return for guard duty and maintenance work.[17] Transactions along these lines were essential to the town's security, but diminished the income of the municipality.

An attempt can be made, then, to characterize the main weaknesses and strengths in the military position of Paris. First of all, the *faubourgs* of the town were largely unprotected. Of small importance on the right bank, where the walls of Charles V were fairly realistically positioned with regard to the population, this was a serious problem on the other side of the Seine, where the walls of Philippe-Auguste excluded the important settlements around the monasteries. On 23 November 1418 the abbot of Saint-Germain-des-Prés gave permission for wooden barriers to be erected in the 'town' for the defence of the inhabitants and of their goods. He acted at the request of 'la plus grante et saine partie' of the populace in the face of recent pillaging, killing and taking of prisoners by enemies of the king.[18] When Jean, bastard of Thian, was ordered to guard Paris at the end of 1422, in the company of Guy Le Bouteillier, it was in Saint-Germain that he took up his position, but such defence was exceptional.[19] The other major *faubourg* was that of Saint-Marcel; it was virtually a separate town, according to Guillebert de Metz.[20] The *faubourg* was proud of its independence, and probably

[14] *Comptes du domaine*, i, cols. 12–20.

[15] Ibid., cols. 19–20; Jossouin evidently had a responsible position: in addition to the Tour Saint-Bernard he was in charge of a hut on the Île Notre-Dame (now Île Saint-Louis) opposite, used in peacetime by a laundress, and also of the first tower inland on the walls of Philippe-Auguste (AN, K 949, no. 23). Although he continued to live in Paris after the entry of Charles VII's troops, he was removed from this sensitive post (*Comptes du domaine*, i, cols. 184, 198, 240).

[16] BL, Add. MS 46172 (fragments of Parisian accounts), fo. 59^{r}.

[17] *Comptes du domaine*, i, col. 16.

[18] AN, K 59, no. 22.

[19] *Fauquembergue*, ii. 250 n. 1.

[20] 'Description', 222.

possessed some rudimentary fortifications, since the rue des Fossés-Saint-Marcel still exists.[21] Yet these could not prevent the Armagnacs entering Saint-Marcel by night in May 1433, when they did a considerable amount of damage.[22] Nor were the inhabitants in any position to defend themselves against their fellow countrymen even when they were on the same side. In August 1441 Charles VII gave permission for Saint-Marcel to be refortified because, in the absence of such defences, numerous (French) soldiers had installed themselves by force, so that the inhabitants had been obliged to choose between fighting back and fleeing into Paris.[23]

Lack of protection for the *faubourgs* meant that advancing forces would have a certain amount of cover, and was, of course, unfortunate for the inhabitants of the settlements. This did not in itself affect the safety of Paris too seriously, but the defences to the south were unsatisfactory for other reasons. The walls were unsound in places, were forced to climb the Mont Sainte-Geneviève and so, as remarked above, the moat was dry. Furthermore, the top of the hill, dominating the left bank of Paris, was just outside the walls.[24] A similar problem was met with on the right bank where the *Butte-aux-Gravois* or *Mont-Orgueil*, a rubbish-tip five hundred years old and therefore tall, overlooked the fortifications of Charles V. But in general the terrain was much flatter.[25] At some distance the village of Montmartre formed an excellent observation post for an enemy, but was too far away to create any real danger.[26] To the east and, to a lesser extent, to the west the town was overlooked by other important slopes.[27]

The greatest vulnerability of a town was to subterfuge rather than to direct assault. A potential weakness was found in Paris where the walls

[21] V^e^ arrondissement. Despite the fact that Saint-Marcel normally claimed to be independent, it was taxed as part of the capital in 1421 (Favier, *Contribuables*, 111–12).

[22] *Bourgeois*, 294. [23] AN, JJ 176, no. 38.

[24] The present-day Place de l'Estrapade at the top of the slope would have been just outside the moat. See B. Rouleau, *Le Tracé des rues de Paris* (CNRS, Paris, 1975), 52, and his *Carte de Reference* no. 2 (relief map). The difference was not, however, sufficient for hostile forces to have been able to see into the capital.

[25] Ibid. 60. In the late sixteenth century this was incorporated into the defences as a bastion, and is now the site of the church of Notre-Dame-de-Bonne-Nouvelle.

[26] In 1411 the Armagnac commanders had been established in Montmartre, and could see who was going in and out of the capital 'dont ceulx de Paris avoient grant doubte' (*Bourgeois*, 13).

[27] To the east, present-day Belleville and the Père-Lachaise cemetery; to the west, what is now the Champs-Elysées.

met the river, especially on the right bank. We have already noted that work was being carried out early in 1420 in the region around the Louvre; the position at the other end of the walls of Charles V was equally delicate: it was claimed in July 1422 that were it not for a small ditch running from the walls to the river one would, in summer, be able to walk into the town without getting wet feet.[28] Furthermore, the walls of Paris could be climbed in many places: in 1426 the authorities had to ban people from clambering down into the moats in search of fish and grass.[29] The defences were designed to stand against siege and assault, not to contain or exclude isolated individuals. It only needed one man to obtain a key to a gate for disaster to strike. Hence a concern to limit the number of entries into the town, and in wartime danger could be reduced even further, to a point where only one gate to the north and one to the south were left open.[30] Even so, it was essential to have reliable men in charge of any gates not walled up. Robert Stafford was discredited when captain of Le Mans; he put his trust in the wrong men and the enemy entered without a fight.[31] After the French conquest of Gascony, the English sympathizer Bernard Georges held on to his key to the Porte Seguynot at Bordeaux, but he was not able to make use of his secret because the gate had been walled up.[32]

Strong walls were not, in themselves, enough. No less important were reliable men and good equipment. In so far as equipment was concerned, Paris did not lag behind other towns of western Europe: her merchants, manufacturers, and politicians were well aware of the growing importance of gunpowder. By the fifteenth century, the leaders of European towns accepted the need for modern firearms and artillery. In 1417 Dijon needed twenty-five cannons firing stones weighing from eight to twenty pounds, and a further fifty to fire lead *plommées*.[33] These were light-weight pieces compared with some of the artillery at Bordeaux where, by the end of 1420, three cannons firing stones of five hundredweight (560 pounds) or more were in service or on order,[34] but they bear witness to the growing use of cannon in attack and defence. By

[28] AN, X^{1a} 4793, fo. 210^{r}: 'yroit on dedens la ville selon la riviere a pie sec en temps desté'.

[29] *Ordonnances*, xiii. 109–10: 14 Jan. 1426.

[30] Favier, *Paris*, 25.

[31] *English Suits*, 225.

[32] M. G. A. Vale, 'A Fifteenth-Century Interrogation of a Political Prisoner', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 43 (1970), 83.

[33] R. C. Clephan, 'The Ordnance of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries', *Archeological Journal*, 68 (1911), 99.

[34] M. G. A. Vale, *War and Chivalry* (London, 1981), 130.

the time of the English occupation, Paris too was making use of artillery. In the autumn of 1417 the town had been under siege from the Burgundians; at least five *canoniers* had been on duty at the gates with their *compaignons*.[35] It was evidently possible to buy munitions in the capital; earlier in 1417, officers of the duke of Orléans had bought supplies from Pierre Le Maunier, *artilleur*, and Jean Bequet, *canonier*, for use in the castle of Fère-en-Tardenois. Bequet and the ubiquitous Italian merchant Jean Sac supplied more military equipment for La Ferté-Milon soon afterwards.[36]

Military stocks and technical resources were investigated at the end of 1420, in response to a series of questions drawn up by Henry V on his first visit to the capital as regent.[37] He enquired about the expense of repairing the 'grosse bombarde' known as Alençon at the Louvre, and about the cost of supplying twelve more smaller bombards. He also asked about stocks of gunpowder, saltpetre, and sulphur, and how much a supply of cannon-balls would cost. He was not only interested in artillery: his questions covered everything from siege engines to battle-axes, and it was obvious that the crossbow remained the standard weapon as far as French suppliers were concerned. There was, however, no difficulty about obtaining ammunition in Paris. A list of eighteen arms dealers was drawn up, of whom five had very substantial stocks of a variety of weapons, while the remainder included merchants for whom this was only one amongst a variety of commercial interests.[38]

Both the king and the municipality possessed stocks of arms in Paris. In the crisis of 1429 the *prévôt des marchands* and *échevins* made sure that the disposition of artillery and the supply of ammunition was equal to the situation.[39] No general inventory of municipal weapons survives for this period, although by 1505 the Hôtel de Ville possessed a massive

[35] BL, Add. MS 46172, fo. 64^{r}.

[36] BL, Add. Chs 2609, 2612 (22 June, 14 Aug. 1417).

[37] Wylie and Waugh, *Henry V*, iii. 226; BN, MS fr. 1278, fos. 60^{r}–62^{v}, printed in G. Chastellain, *Œuvres*, ed. J. M. B. C. Kervyn de Lettenhove (8 vols., Brussels, 1863–83), i. 189–93, 199–200. Allmand, 'L'Artillerie', 73–81, demonstrates the importance that the English commanders attached to the use of artillery.

[38] For example, Robin Clément, a money-changer with connections in the Low Countries and future *échevin*, was offering 1,400 lbs, of saltpetre at 20 *écus* (25*l.t.*) per 100 lbs. (Chastellain, *Œuvres*, i. 200); for Clément or Climent cf. Favier, *Contribuables*, 311; AN, X^{1a} 4793, fo. 193^{v}. There was a cannon called the 'Robyn Clement' in the castle at Rouen in 1435 (Stevenson, *Letters and Papers*, ii (2), 566).

[39] *Bourgeois*, 243 n. 4.

arsenal.[40] Nor do we know the extent of the supplies preserved for the use of royal troops at the Louvre. However, the most important fortress in Paris was the Bastille, the castle that guarded the eastern entrance to Paris, the Porte Saint-Anthoine. Later infamous as a symbol of royal oppression, the Bastille was already a symbol of royal strength: for Guillebert de Metz the castle was *moult forte*.[41] We are fortunate to possess a very clear idea of the state of the Bastille at this time, thanks to two full inventories of its contents. One of these dates from 1428, the other from 1431, and a further list of the more important items, drawn up in 1436, also survives.[42] From these one may judge that the Bastille was a building ready for war, and scarred by it: a gunpowder explosion that had destroyed four out of five floors in one tower was a recent event in 1428.[43] Despite this accident, it is evident that substantial stocks of equipment were ready for use if needed. The armoury contained hand guns and cannons, while on the terraces were various cannons firing stones weighing between five and twenty pounds or measuring five inches across, and one device firing seven lead shots at a time.[44] The crossbow had not been abandoned; in 1428 five large free-standing bows were in full working order, probably of the type that was capable of firing up to half a mile, and a good supply of assorted crossbow bolts was maintained throughout the period.[45]

The Bastille was capable of repelling attacks both from outside Paris and from within. With the Porte Saint-Antoine immediately adjacent, the fortress could be used to wage war on the town. Holding the Bastille in June 1418, the Armagnacs had been able to attempt a final assault against the victorious Burgundians by bringing fresh troops into Paris.[46] In the inventory drawn up in 1428 the disposition of some of the smaller cannons on the terraces of the castle is recorded.[47] One was aimed at the

[40] Napoleon III and I. Favé, *Études sur le passé et l'avenir de l'artillerie* (Paris, 1846–71), i. 376–83.

[41] 'Description', 194.

[42] AN, P 1189, nos. 15–16. Published by L. Douët d'Arcq, 'Inventaire de la Bastille de l'an 1428', *Revue Archéologique*, 12 (1855–6), 321–49, and by Bournon, *Bastille*, pp. 238–54. The portions relating to artillery had already been included in Napoleon III and Favé, *Études*, i. 266–73. References here are to Bournon's edn.

[43] Bournon, *Bastille*, 244.

[44] Ibid. 241–2, 250: 'gettant sept plommées à une fois'; described in 1436 as 'ung canon à sept trous, sans chambre' (ibid. 253).

[45] Ibid. 241, 242, 252–3; cf. Napoleon III and Favé, *Études*, ii. 27.

[46] See the account by one of the participants in this assault in J. Vielliard, 'Les Journées parisiennes de mai-juin 1418 d'après des documents des Archives de la couronne d'Aragon', *Annuaire-bulletin de la SHF*, Année 1940 (1941), 125–53.

[47] Bournon, *Bastille*, 250.

Porte Saint-Anthoine itself, one towards the route outside. Another was directed towards the Tour de Billy at the vulnerable eastern end of the walls of Charles V. A fourth was 'gettant vers l'Ostel-Neuf' not, presumably, in order to destroy the Paris home of the archbishop of York,[48] but so as to counter any hostile force that might gather in the rue Saint-Anthoine. Also in the armoury were 1,000 caltrops, spiked iron balls intended to restrict the movement of crowds and horses if scattered in the road in front of the Bastille.[49] And the 'deux pommes de cuivre à getter feu' were probably intended to be used against the town rather than in its defence: the usual use of flame-throwing devices and 'greek fire' was in attack during a siege, when the effect on thatch and wood could be devastating.[50] This was by no means the main priority of the English commanders, however, for we do not find any additions to the incendiary equipment after 1428—indeed they may have been left by previous occupants of the Bastille, as was the old jousting equipment still in the armoury. But the weapons available to the captains of the Bastille ensured that they were ready for assaults from inside the town as well as from the eastern approaches, while control of the castle would provide the cover necessary to a counter-attack even if the rest of Paris had fallen to the enemy.

The material basis for the defence of Paris was, therefore, both strong and flexible. The English were assisted by the measures that had been taken to fortify the town against their own incursions, especially since 1356 and, although the regime could not afford to spend large amounts on new work, the fortifications were adequate, while weapons were modern and numerous. There was, however, much more to the defence of the town than walls and weapons. At least as important were the people called upon to make use of them. Writing a hundred years later, Rabelais placed in the mouth of the rascally Panurge a scornful denunciation of the walls of the capital: 'competement meschantes pour une telle ville comme ceste cy'. That, replied Pantagruel, was not important as long as the people were good fighters.[51] It is therefore important to assess the contribution of the Parisians to their own defence, particularly at a time when, from some points of view, they could be said to have been 'under occupation'. But, because this was a

[48] Given to the archbishop in 1425 (AN, PP 110, p. 168).

[49] Bournon, *Bastille*, 242. [50] Bournon, *Bastille*, 242; cf. Clephan, 'Ordnance', 67.

[51] François Rabelais, *Pantagruel, roy des dipsodes*, ch. XV (*Œuvres complètes*, ed. P. Jourda (2 vols., Paris, 1962), i. 295).

time of civil and foreign war, the nature of the military control needs to be explained, together with the strength of the occupying forces.

There was no invariable system of military command in the capital, and certainly no clear succession of 'captains of Paris'. The post of captain of a town tended to be created or dispensed with according to circumstances. Tours had a captain for most of the period of the Hundred Years War, but by 1460 the inhabitants reckoned that they could do without, as the war had ceased.[52] The Parisians did not benefit from the same autonomy: the ordonnance of 1317 whereby Philip V granted to a large number of provincial towns the right to choose a captain when need dictated does not appear to have applied to them.[53] Yet the title 'captain of Paris' was used at critical times from 1358, with certain populist connotations, and in the years that precede the Anglo-Burgundian regime there is occasional mention of a captain. The dukes of Berry and Bourbon were joint captains in 1405; it was one of the titles ascribed to the *prévôt* Pierre des Essarts at the time of his execution by the Cabochiens in 1413.[54] The Burgundians, of course, saw that it was possible to focus the loyalties of the people on a popular individual, established in the office, and Table 4 shows that John the Fearless himself was captain from July 1418, though naming Charles de Lens his lieutenant.[55] Duke John was on hand from 24 August 1418 to 10 September 1418 to receive an oath from 1,602 of the leading inhabitants of Paris that they would be loyal to the king, to the duke, and to Paris, [56] but in fact he did not take his duties very seriously and after he left in November 1418 the Parisians never saw him again. On 21 January 1419 the task was entrusted to the count of Saint-Pol, who kept the office until after the treaty of Troyes in May 1420.

Henry V, naturally enough, wished to bring Paris under his direct control, rather than rely on his Burgundian allies. The count of Saint-Pol did not remain captain. When, at the end of May 1420, English ambassadors arrived with news of the treaty of Troyes, Saint-Pol had even refused to swear loyalty to the treaty until he heard from his liege lord, maintaining that, in any case, he should be receiving the oath

[52] B. Chevalier, 'Pouvoir royal et pouvoir urbain à Tours pendant la guerre de Cent Ans', *Annales de Bretagne*, 81 (1974), 371, 707.

[53] *Ordonnances*, i. 635.

[54] *Bourgeois*, 1, 33; for the office in the fourteenth century see Cazelles, *Paris . . . 1223–1380*, 192–3.

[55] Evidence for the sequence of office-holders in each of the posts discussed in this chapter is set out in the notes to Table 4.

[56] 'État des Bourgeois', 371.

TABLE 4. Military office holders 1418–1436

Captain of Paris	Captain of the Bastille	Captain of the Louvre	Captain of Charenton	Captain of Vincennes	Captain of Saint-Germain-en-Laye
July 1418 John the Fearless[1]	June 1418 Lord of Chauny[10]	27 July 1418 Lord of l'Isle-Adam[25]	27 July 1418 Jean Grant[29]	6 Aug. 1418 Jean de Pulligny[36]	
	16 Aug. 1418 Guillaume de Champdivers[11]				
21 Jan. 1419 Count of Saint-Pol[2]	(May 1419) Antoine de Vergy[12]				Nov. 1419 *Taken by English*[48]
July 1420 *Duke of Clarence*[3]	(7 Sept. 1420) *English garrison*[13]	1420/21 *English garrison*[26]	9 Mar. 1420 *William Gascogne*[30]	(Before June 1420) André de Valins[37]	
				June 1420 Pierre Le Verrat[38]	
				Late Dec. 1420 *Earl of Huntingdon*[39]	
10 Jan. 1421 *Duke of Exeter*[4]	24 Jan. 1421 *John Fastolf*[14]				18 Jan. 1421 *William Tirwhit*[49]
8 July 1421 Jean de La Baume-Montrevel[5]					
	(11 Sept. 1422) *Roger Fiennes*[15]			11 June 1422 Pierre Le Verrat[40]	(27 Nov. 1422) *Philip Branche*[50]
(1423)	(24 Sept. 1423)	Nov. 1423	(1423)	(Jan. 1423)	29 Sept. 1423

Duke of Bedford[6]	John Middlemore[26]	Lord of l'Isle-Adam[27]	Jean Le Gois[31]	Hugues de Saubertier[41]	John Handford[51]
(1424) Jean de Courcelles[7]					
				(Mar. 1425) *John Handford*[42]	
					24 Jan. 1427 *Robert Harling*[52]
	4 Oct. 1428 *Ralph Butler*[17]				
16 July 1429 Lord of l'Isle-Adam[8]	16 July 1429 Lord of l'Isle-Adam[18]			(Sept. 1429) Pierre de Trie[43]	19 May 1429 Louis Despoy[53]
	(After May 1430) *John Salvain*[19]		(April 1430) Robinet de Rebretengues[32]	18 Aug. 1430 *English*? captain drowned[44]	
	c. 28 Feb. 1431 *Thomas More*[20]				
			15 Feb. 1432 Pierre de Chastraupers[33]	1432 (for Charles VII) Jacques de Chabannes[45]	
	? 1433 *William Buckton*[21]		17 Feb. 1433 Jean de Pressy[34]	1433 Guillaume de Lansac[46]	
	? May 1434 *John Talbot*[22]				20 Oct. 1434 *John Talbot*[54]
	Mar. 1436 *Robert Willoughby*[23]	17 Mar. 1436 Jean de Courcelles[28]	11 Feb. 1436[35] Captured by French	19 Feb. 1436[47] Captured by French	
13 Apr. 1436 Fall of Paris[9]	17 Apr. 1436 Surrender of the Bastille[24]	13 Apr. 1436 Fall of Paris			27 Apr. 1436[55] Captured by French

Notes: The names of Englishmen are in italics. Where satisfactory references are given in *Gallia Regia* only that work is cited. Further notes are given where clarification is called for, or where a person is omitted altogether. Dates in brackets indicate that the captain was in place by that time, although the date of his appointment is unknown.

[1] *Gallia Regia*, iv. 292; Charles de Lens was the duke's lieutenant.

[2] Ibid. 292; *Fauquembergue*, i. 237.

[3] *Gallia Regia*, iv. 292; *Monstrelet*, iv. 5; *Bourgeois*, 148, dates the appointment to Dec. 1420.

[4] *Gallia Regia*, iv. 292; Morelet de Bethencourt was his lieutenant (BN, MS fr. 20691, p. 704).

[5] *Gallia Regia*, iv. 292, but he replaced Exeter rather than being his lieutenant (Wylie and Waugh, *Henry V*, iii. 381). La Baume-Montrevel was still described as being captain of Paris in Jan. 1422 (AN, X^{1a} 4793, fo. 126^{v}).

[6] *Gallia Regia*, iv. 293 (the reference is misprinted and should read BN, MS n. a. lat. 184, fo. 70^{r}).

[7] By 1424, Courcelles is described as keeper of Paris in BN, MS fr. 20691, p. 701, and as captain in Grassoreille, 'Histoire politique du chapitre', 161.

[8] *Gallia Regia*, iv. 293; *Bourgeois*, 241, is specific about the date.

[9] *Bourgeois*, 314.

[10] *Gallia Regia*, iv. 376.

[11] B. A. Pocquet du Haut-Jussé, *La France gouvernée par Jean sans Peur: Les Dépenses du receveur général du royaume* (Paris, 1959), 105.

[12] AN, X^{1a} 4792, fos. 135^{v}, 138^{r}.

[13] Wylie and Waugh, *Henry V*, iii. 218, n. 9.

[14] J. G. Nichols, 'An Original Appointment of Sir John Fastolfe to be keeper of the Bastille of St Anthony at Paris in 1421', *Archeologia*, 44 (1873), 113–22.

[15] AN X^{2a} 16, fo. 424^{v} (MS: Fenix). For Sir Roger Fiennes (or Fenys) see Griffiths, *Henry VI*, 339. On 18 July an order had been issued that men from the retinues of Fastolf and Fiennes should muster together at the Bastille (*DKR* 42 (1881), 437); the change of captain may have taken place at that time.

[16] *Gallia Regia*, iv. 376.

[17] Ibid.; Butler succeeded Midelstret directly (Bournon, *Bastille*, 238).

[18] This assumes that he became captain of Paris and of the Bastille at the same time. He held both posts together in May 1430 (*Bourgeois*, 254).

[19] Bournon, *Bastille*, 238 n. 1. Salvain's captaincy cannot have begun before May 1430 (cf. *Bourgeois*, 254).

[20] Bournon, *Bastille*, 238. Strictly speaking, More was only lieutenant for Sir John Fastolf.

[21] Bournon, *Bastille*, 252. Buckton, Talbot, and Willoughby certainly succeeded each other in an unbroken sequence, but it is not clear when the first two took office, nor if Buckton succeeded More directly. More was still captain in 1432 (BN, MS fr. 20691, p. 761), but was captain of Breauté-sur-Marne in 1433 (ibid. 762). Buckton was in England in May and Nov. 1434 (PRO, E 404/40/297; E 404/51/130), and was lieutenant for Bedford at Bayeux by 29 March 1435 (BN, PO 546, Bucton no. 5).

[22] Bournon, *Bastille*, 252. Talbot's captaincy probably began when he was appointed lieutenant-general of the Île de France (before 16 May 1434: A. J. Pollard, *John Talbot and the War in France, 1427–1453* (London, 1983), 19). Talbot made Paris his headquarters until the winter of 1435–6 (ibid. 19–20) and, although he made a brief visit to England in

May–June 1435, he was apparently back in control at the Bastille by 4 July 1435 (AN, X^{1a} 4797, fo. 271^{v}).

[23] Bournon, *Bastille*, 252.

[24] *Bourgeois*, 318.

[25] BN, MS fr. 20684, p. 88 gives the correct date (cf. *Gallia Regia*, iv. 388–9).

[26] *Monstrelet*, iv. 2.

[27] *Gallia Regia*, iv. 388–9.

[28] Ibid. 389.

[29] *Gallia Regia*, iv. 381.

[30] Wylie and Waugh, *Henry V*, iii. 201.

[31] *Gallia Regia*, iv. 381.

[32] Ibid. In April Rebretengues' lieutenant was Robinet Le Mercier, while in June it was Huet de Corbie.

[33] BN, MS fr. 20691, p. 761.

[34] Ibid.

[35] *Fauquembergue*, iii. 178.

[36] *Gallia Regia*, iv. 404.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid.; *Monstrelet*, iv. 23.

[40] BN, MS n. a. lat. 184, fo. 70^{r}.

[41] AN, X^{1a} 4794, fos. 247^{v}, 253^{r}.

[42] *Gallia Regia*, iv. 404; *English Suits*, 48.

[43] *Gallia Regia*, iv. 404; still in office on 29 Mar. 1430 (BN, MS Clair. 108, no. 50).

[44] *Gallia Regia*, iv. 405; *Bourgeois*, 257.

[45] See Chapter 4, n. 103.

[46] BN, MS fr. 20691, p. 762.

[47] *Bourgeois*, 311 n.2.

[48] Wylie and Waugh, *Henry V*, iii. 194.

[49] *DKR*, 42 (1881), 397.

[50] BN, PO 492, Branche no. 2; he had probably taken over at Michaelmas (29 Sept.) 1422, when he replaced Tirwhit as *bailli* of Mantes.

[51] *Gallia Regia*, iv. 399.

[52] With Poissy: A. E. Curry, 'Military Organization in Lancastrian Normandy 1422–1450' (Teeside Poly. Ph.D., 1985), vol. ii, p. cxxii; BN, PO 1515, Herling nos. 2, 3.

[53] *Gallia Regia*, iv. 399; BL, Add. Ch. 11632.

[54] Curry, 'Military Organization', vol. ii, p. cxxii; Despoy took on Talbot's post at Neufchâtel (BN, PO 996, Despoy no. 2; 2725, De Spoy nos. 4, 5).

[55] C. Samaran, *La Chronique latine inédite de Jean Chartier (1422–1450)* (Paris, 1928), 78–9. This is the most detailed account of the reduction of Saint-Germain; other sources (e.g. *Bourgeois*, 311) vaguely suggest a date prior to the fall of Paris.

rather than taking it, since he was the highest-ranking man in Paris.[57] In the event, Philippe de Morvilliers, first president at the *Parlement*, supervised the oath.[58] Although Saint-Pol was reconciled to the treaty, and was commissioned on 22 July 1420 to go into Picardy and elsewhere to receive oaths of allegiance, the captaincy of Paris was given to Henry V's brother, the duke of Clarence, and several of the principal fortresses of the capital were placed in English hands.[59]

It turned out to be a mistake to give the captaincy of Paris to an Englishman during this transitional period. The Parisians were not to be subjugated by displays of force and needed a leader with whom they could work in partnership. The *Bourgeois* observes of Clarence and the other men left by Henry V on his departure from Paris in December 1420 that they did the town very little good.[60] Clarence's replacement, the duke of Exeter, appointed on 10 January 1421,[61] was also notably unsuccessful. One report has it that after the news that Clarence had been killed at the battle of Baugé (22 March 1421), Exeter kept himself inside the Bastille until Henry V returned from England in July.[62] This was certainly an exaggeration, but the imprisonment on treason charges of Jean de Villiers, lord of l'Isle-Adam, in June 1421, all but provoked disaster. L'Isle-Adam was arrested because of a convincing report that he had contacted the dauphin's counsellor George de La Tremoïlle with a view to surrendering Paris to the dauphinists. It was not, as the Burgundian chroniclers (and some modern writers) claim, because Henry V objected to his manners.[63] In any event, rioting followed the reports that the English had killed the popular marshal of France, and Exeter and Sir John Fastolf had to look on from the Bastille while peace was restored by royal councillors, the *prévôt* of Paris, and the municipality.[64] At this stage in the Anglo-Burgundian regime, it appears

[57] See the letter, apparently from Ralph Cromwell, describing the tense conversations of early June 1420 in BL, MS Cotton Caligula D V, fos. 75^{r}–76^{r}.

[58] *Fauquembergue*, i. 365–9.

[59] *Monstrelet*, iv. 6; Chastellain, *Œuvres*, i. 161–2. These authors suggest that Clarence replaced Saint-Pol by 22 July 1420, but the *Bourgeois*, who should have been well placed to know, does not mention Clarence as captain until December.

[60] *Bourgeois*, 148.

[61] J. J. Champollion-Figeac (ed.), *Lettres dē rois, reines et autres personnages des cours de France et d'Angleterre*, (2 vols., Paris, 1839–47), ii. 388.

[62] 'Extrait d'une chronique anonyme pour le règne de Charles VI, 1400–1422', L. Douët d'Arcq (ed.), *Monstrelet*, vi. 294.

[63] AN, X^{2a} 16, fo. 466^{r}. Cf. Wylie and Waugh, *Henry V*, iii. 323–4; Autrand, *Charles VI*, 590.

[64] *Fauquembergue*, ii. 17–18.

to have been Henry V's intention to keep supervision of politically sensitive positions in English hands: even the guard of the bishop's prisons had his status confirmed by the duke of Exeter.[65] On his return Henry must have recognized that the arrangements had not worked well, for he replaced Exeter by the Burgundian Jean de La Baume-Montrevel.[66] We do not hear of another English captain of Paris under Henry V or Charles VI.

At the end of his life Henry V entrusted the security of Paris (though probably without the title of captain) to Guy Le Bouteillier, who had led the defence of Rouen against the English, but had since then become a staunch supporter of the invader.[67] Le Bouteillier kept the job until after the funeral of Charles VI but in the first half of 1423 the duke of Bedford was captain of Paris with the Burgundian Jean de Courcelles as his lieutenant.[68] In the next year Courcelles was using the title of captain himself, but he does not appear to have done very much: by this time the *prévôt* was beginning to reassert his position in the regular running of the Parisian military system.

Perhaps because of the revival of the office of *prévôt* in the 1420s and 1430s, we hear little about a captain of Paris after 1424. In fact the only individual to make a mark was l'Isle-Adam, the suspected traitor of 1421, who was jointly captain of Paris and of the Bastille from 16 July 1429 (when he was given the posts by the dukes of Burgundy and Bedford) until the end of 1430. He led the Parisians during the assault of Joan of Arc of 8 September 1429 and into the next year. He and his soldiers evidently took their role seriously, centralizing tasks that normally were devolved amongst the bourgeoisie, guarding the gates to make sure that no goods of potential use to the enemy were taken out of the capital during the winter of 1429–30.[69] By the summer of 1430 the immediate perils were over, and l'Isle-Adam's retinue in Paris began to disperse. Fifty strong on 18 May, it was down to twenty-one on 18 June, and we do not find him playing such an active role in the capital.[70] The

[65] AN, X^{1a} 4793, fo. 161^{v}. [66] Wylie and Waugh, *Henry V*, iii. 381.

[67] J.-M. Roger, 'Guy Le Bouteillier', in *La Guerre et la paix au Moyen Age* (Actes du 101^{e} Congrès National des Sociétés Savantes: Section de Philologie et d'Histoire jusqu'à 1610, Lille, 1976 (Paris, 1978)), 299–300. Roger believes that Le Bouteillier was appointed by Bedford, but the reference he cites (Longnon, *Paris*, 88) shows that Henry V was responsible for the three-and-a-half-month posting. Since Le Bouteillier was still in command at the time of Charles VI's funeral (as Roger shows) the period of his command must have been from Aug. to Nov. 1422.

[68] See Table 4. [69] AN, X^{1a} 4796, fo. 166^{r}. [70] BN, MS Clair. 112, nos. 31, 32.

administrators of Henry VI's coronation expedition paid him 685*l.t.* on 17 November as captain of Paris for 'certaines choses secretes qui ne sont pas a declarer quant a present',[71] but he was much less in evidence in Paris in the 1430s, even though he may have kept his title of captain up until his defection from the English cause after the peace of Arras.[72]

The post of captain of Paris was held by Englishmen only for short periods. The main English presence in Paris was at the Bastille. The fortress was in English hands by 7 September 1420, when the garrison was composed of men from the retinues of Walter Hungerford, John Robesart, and Richard Wydeville.[73] On 24 January 1421 the captaincy was entrusted to Sir John Fastolf. By his indenture with Henry V, Fastolf undertook to keep the Bastille safely, and to deliver it up to no one but Henry or his heirs.[74]

On 20 February 1421 further steps were taken to make the Bastille into a stronghold against all eventualities when Fastolf was given permission to import substantial provisions from Rouen for the fortress.[75] This move produced a certain amount of confusion because Fastolf's factor, one Guillaume Larbonde, turned out to be using a boat claimed by another merchant, who had it arrested while it was moored up at the Port de l'École-Saint-Germain.[76] Fastolf stood by his agent when the case came before the *prévôt des marchands* and, whatever the merits of the dispute, events were to prove that he was quite right to be concerned about supplies for his fortress. Obliged to withdraw to the Bastille in 1421, when rioting followed the arrest of l'Isle-Adam, Exeter was 'comforted gretly' to learn that the careful captain had laid in provisions for half a year.[77]

For most of the period of English rule the Bastille stayed in the hands of Englishmen. Fastolf's successor was another English knight, Sir Roger Fiennes, and he was followed by John Midelstret, esquire, who is found in the post from September 1423 until his replacement by Sir

[71] BN, PO 3021, Villiers no. 28.

[72] *Monstrelet*, v. 126, refers to him as captain of Paris in Aug. 1435.

[73] *DKR* 42 (1881), 390–1. The story told in Thomas de Elmham, *Vita et Gesta Henrici Quinti Anglorum Regis*, ed. T. Hearne (Oxford, 1727), 282, of the deception whereby the English took the Bastille, may well come from Hungerford, who is mentioned as a possible source for the *Vita* in C. L. Kingsford, *English Historical Literature in the Fifteenth Century* (Oxford, 1913), 61.

[74] See Table 4, n. 14.

[75] Champollion-Figeac, *Lettres de rois*, ii. 343–4.

[76] AN, Z^{1h} 7, fo. 242^{r}: 26 Mar. 1421. See also fos. 243^{r}, 246^{r}, 248^{v}, 251^{v}, 263^{r}, 263^{v}.

[77] William Worcester, *The Boke of Noblesse*, cit. Nichols, 'Original Appointment', 117.

Ralph Butler in October 1428. In fact it appears that the only non-Englishman to be in charge of the Bastille during the period 1420–36 was l'Isle-Adam, during the period that he was active as captain of Paris in 1429–30. He made various repairs to the castle during the period that he occupied it.[78] By the beginning of 1431 the sequence of Englishmen was re-established, as Sir John Salvain, who had had the guard of the Bastille for Bedford, passed on the charge to Thomas More, acting on behalf of Fastolf, nominally captain once again. After Fastolf and More we find Sir William Buckton in command, succeeded by John, Lord Talbot who, in March 1436, passed on to Robert, Lord Willoughby the unenviable task of holding the flag for the Lancastrians in the last weeks of English dominance.

The Bastille was the only place in Paris where an English garrison was to be found for almost all of the period 1420–36. The other major stronghold in Paris, the Louvre, was both fortress and palace. Henry V stayed there on his first visit to Paris, in December 1420, and again in 1422, while in May of the latter year it was used as a prison for men taken at Meaux.[79] One would expect an English garrison to be in control during these years 1420–2, and Monstrelet does say that Henry V placed Englishmen in charge after the treaty of Troyes.[80] However, for most of the period the captain of the Louvre was none other than l'Isle-Adam, playing yet another role in the military history of Paris. First appointed captain in July 1419, he would have lost the job either after Troyes, or after his disgrace in June 1421.[81] He was finally cleared of all charges in November 1423,[82] and in the same month was reinstated as guard, castellan, and captain of the Louvre. L'Isle-Adam kept the office until he abandoned the English cause in 1435, and he was replaced by Jean de Courcelles, a Burgundian who remained loyal to the English until their expulsion from Paris. The Louvre, however, was not normally the site of an important garrison and when entrusted with the captaincy of all Paris l'Isle-Adam established himself at the Bastille. It could be used as a temporary station for troops moving on elsewhere (on 24 July 1428 two musters were held in the inner courtyard there; a week

[78] Bournon, *Bastille*, 248 n. 1.

[79] Wylie and Waugh, *Henry V*, iii. 225; Favier, *Paris*, 104; *Fauquembergue*, ii. 45.

[80] *Monstrelet*, iv. 5.

[81] According to Monstrelet, iv. 5, an English garrison was installed after Troyes, but *accords* at the *Parlement* suggest that l'Isle-Adam was still in office in Jan.–Feb. 1421; perhaps these refer to back-payments (AN, X^{1c} 121, nos. 35–6).

[82] AN, X^{2a} 16, fo. 466^{r}.

later another body of men were mustered near the Louvre),[83] but the Bastille was the only place regularly garrisoned by Englishmen.

How many men were available for the defence of Paris? Fastolf's indenture of 1421 stipulated a force of twenty men-at-arms and sixty archers, all mounted, for the guard of the Bastille.[84] In those early days, Henry V would have wished to make sure that Paris was securely held, and so a fairly substantial garrison was installed. Whether this was typical of the period as a whole is questionable. Fastolf later claimed that he had not been paid for eight men-at-arms and seventeen archers employed in the defence of the Bastille during the month of November 1421, but exactly who these men were is unclear.[85] Even if they were added to a full garrison, there would appear to have been only just over a hundred men serving under Fastolf, and the garrison was probably much less at other times. In the estimates for expenditure for 1427–8, only 1,800 francs were allowed for the Bastille, which suggests a garrison of about twenty men, while in December 1431, the month of Henry VI's coronation in Paris, the force was nine men-at-arms and twenty-eight archers.[86]

In addition to the basic garrison at the Bastille, one must reckon with the retinues of the most important English nobles. The duke of Exeter, in command of Paris in the first half of 1421, probably had some three hundred men with him.[87] Later, when Bedford came to Paris as regent, he would have brought with him not only a civilian household, but a military force as well; he had 100 men-at-arms and 300 archers attached to his household during the 1420s.[88] Serving in Paris for a fortnight in November 1430, Thomas Beaufort, count of Perche, had with him 29

[83] BN, MS fr. 4484, fos. 112^{r}, 120^{r}, 121^{v}. [84] Nichols, 'Original Appointment', 120.

[85] PRO, E 101/50/5. These are probably men added to Fastolf's retinue: his indenture provided for payment by the treasurer-general of France, while this is a claim against the English treasurer of wars. Favier, *Paris*, 177, reckons these men to be the total of Fastolf's garrison, which is uncertain, and by a slip dates their stay at the Bastille to 1430 (9 Henry VI), instead of 1421 (9 Henry V).

[86] Stevenson, *Letters and Papers*, ii (2), 538; e.g. 2 esquires, 3 men-at-arms, and 16 archers, earning 15, 8, and 6 francs per month respectively would give a total of exactly 1,800 francs. There were 17 hand-guns in the armoury in 1428 (Bournon, *Bastille*, 241). For the garrison in 1431 see Favier, *Paris*, 177; PRO, E 101/53/1.

[87] Cf. his retinue later in the year: 318 men on 14 Nov.; 288 on 24 Dec. 1421 (PRO, E 101/50/10, 11: unnumbered).

[88] e.g. BL, Add. Ch. 522. Bedford's household was a military establishment: see A. E. Curry, 'The First English Standing Army? Military Organisation in Lancastrian Normandy, 1420–1450', in C. D. Ross (ed.) *Patronage, Pedigree and Power in Later Medieval England* (Gloucester, 1979), 196.

men-at-arms, a trumpeter, and 67 archers,[89] but when Bedford was in the capital the following year he had a force to match his rank: 110 men-at-arms and 330 archers, increased to 120 and 360 in May 1431, from which he had to provide for his own person and for the defence of the Bastille.[90] The picture that emerges is of a basic garrison of a few dozen, which could be boosted by several hundred men from the retinues of important nobles. In times of crisis an even greater show of strength was possible; at the end of August 1422, when it became obvious that Henry V was dying, the English forces in the Paris region were mustered and paid for sixty days in advance.[91] In Paris itself, 321 men-at-arms and 844 archers were assembled on 27 and 28 August 1422, while 9 household officers, 50 other esquires of the household, and 146 archers were in attendance on the king at Vincennes: 1,370 soldiers in or near Paris while Henry V was on his deathbed.[92] Payment of wages for two months in advance would help to bridge the gap between the regime of Henry V and that of his successor, while the sight of hundreds of Englishmen mustering in Paris would remind the Parisians where their loyalties lay.

Although the garrison in Paris itself was normally small, the capital was not far from other fortresses. The nearest potential bases were at the bridge at Charenton upstream, and at Saint-Cloud or Saint-Denis downstream, but these were not in fact given a high priority. The English brought Charenton under their control early in 1420, while Henry V was negotiating at Troyes[93] but the captain in 1423 and 1425 was not an Englishman but a well-known Parisian butcher, Jean Le Gois.[94] In 1427–8 only 100*l.t.* was allocated to the defence of Charenton (barely enough to pay the wages of one man-at-arms), while the garrison in June 1430 consisted of one man-at-arms and one archer.[95] Downstream, there is no evidence of a captain or garrison at Saint-Cloud at this time, and Saint-Denis had so many privileges and

[89] BN, MS Clair. 11, no. 159. He was serving 'a la garde de la ville de Paris et tenir le peuple dicelle en bonne union et seurté'. [90] PRO, E 101/52/33, no. 115.

[91] PRO, E 101/50/12, 13, 17 (warrants and receipts of the treasurer of wars).

[92] This may well be an underestimate: I have counted only those forces which are specifically said to have mustered in Paris and, furthermore, a few of these warrants are damaged. Most of these forces had been at the relief of Cosne earlier in the month (Wylie and Waugh, *Henry V*, iii. 410–11; my figures differ slightly from those of Professor Waugh who, at this point, was not concerned with Henry's household troops).

[93] 'Afin que le pais ne fust clos a leur roy' ('Extrait d'une chronique', *Monstrelet*, vi. 285).

[94] See Table 4.

[95] Stevenson, *Letters and Papers*, ii (2), [539]; BN, MS Clair. 34, no. 139.

immunities that it was not a suitable site for a royal garrison.[96] After the easy entry into Saint-Denis made by Charles VII in 1429 some attempt was made to improve security and, in July 1430, Simon Morhier was captain of a new military base in the town, but had only one man-at-arms and five archers with him.[97] In any case, no great efficiency seems to have resulted from this initiative, and in 1433 the monks of the abbey complained that one Pierre de Cheruel, self-styled captain of Saint-Denis, had infringed their jurisdiction. Cheruel's lawyer treated the *Parlement* to an account of how his client had led the capture of a homicidal Englishman, but it soon transpired that he was only guard of one gate and not in fact captain after all.[98]

Rather more important were Vincennes, five miles east of Paris, and Saint-Germain-en-Laye, twelve miles to the west. Saint-Germain was the nearest stronghold to Paris to fall within the *pays de conquête.* In fact, the duke of Gloucester had captured Saint-Germain from the Burgundians in the autumn of 1419, and as a result it was brought into the administration established by Henry in Normandy.[99] Along with the fortress of Montjoye and the bridge at Poissy, it gave control of a huge sweep in the Seine, protecting the route from Paris to Pontoise and Picardy, Mantes and Normandy.[100]

The position at Vincennes was rather different, for this fortress was plainly in the Burgundian area of influence at the time of the treaty of Troyes. In December 1420 Henry V entrusted Vincennes to the earl of Huntingdon, who was captured at Baugé, but later the captaincy reverted to the Burgundians Pierre Le Verrat and Hugues de Saubertier. During the captaincy of the latter the royal authorities had an opportunity to stress the importance of the fortress for the capital: the villagers of Noisy-le-Sec nearby tried to avoid doing guard duty at the castle, saying that they would rather have refuge in Paris and were ready to help with the watch there, but Saubertier and the *procureur du roi* contested this strongly, claiming that the castle had to have a proper watch because of the damage to Paris if it was taken by the enemies.[101]

[96] See G. Ll. Thompson, '"Monseigneur Saint Denis", his abbey, and his town, under the English Occupation, 1420–1436', in C. T. Allmand (ed.), *Power, Culture, and Religion in France, c. 1350–c. 1550* (Woodbridge, 1989), 21–2, 26–7.

[97] Ibid. 29. [98] AN, X^{1a} 4797, fos. 61^{v}, 65^{r}.

[99] R. Newhall, *The English Conquest of Normandy, 1416–1424* (New Haven, 1924), 141; Wylie and Waugh, *Henry V*, iii. 193–4, 236.

[100] For a discussion of the strategic importance of Saint-Germain and Montjoye see G. Lefèvre-Pontalis, 'Un détail du siège de Paris par Jeanne d'Arc', *BEC* 46 (1885), 5–15.

[101] AN, X^{1a} 4793, fo. 253^{r}: 4 Feb. 1423.

Naturally, both the Burgundians and the English were interested in control there. By March 1425 it was back in English hands but after the duke of Burgundy became lieutenant in the Paris region in 1429 he gave it to one of his men. According to the *Bourgeois*, the English were again in control in 1430, since he describes how an English captain rode into the Marne in hot pursuit of a band of Armagnacs, missed the ford and was drowned.[102] But the sequence of captains cannot be established with certainty for the 1430s and in 1432 Vincennes was even occupied briefly by Charles VII's captain, Jacques de Chabannes.[103]

Vincennes and Saint-Germain formed essential supports for the military position in Paris. It is interesting that for a period in the 1420s both fortresses were under the command of the same man; Sir John Handford, captain of Vincennes by March 1425, had at this time also been captain of Saint-Germain and Montjoye since September 1423.[104] Bedford probably intended to build up Handford's position in the Paris area both through his military offices and by grants of land. Hence the gift to Handford of a house in the capital and of the important lordship of Maisons-sur-Seine, at the top of the bend in the river between Saint-Germain and Poissy.[105] Certainly, the connection between Handford's military role and the land was not lost on those who questioned the legality of his title to Maisons: it was claimed, inaccurately, that the soldier had had no formal gift, but had installed himself *de facto*, being captain of Saint-Germain-en-Laye.[106] For a period in the 1420s, then, Handford controlled the most important fortresses on each side of Paris, and was the natural choice of military leader when it was necessary to strengthen the English hold in the capital. In March 1427, when the chancellor and others of the *Grand Conseil* were away meeting Bedford on his return from England, Handford was brought in with twenty English archers to serve in Paris.[107]

Twenty men: the figure is a reminder that, even when we are

[102] *Bourgeois*, 257. There is perhaps some confusion here as Pierre de Trie, who was captain in 1429, is described as being drowned along with the unnamed captain of Vincennes.

[103] G. de Chabannes, 'Le Château de Vincennes, propriété privée 1432–1442 de Jacques 1er de Chabannes', *Bulletin de la Société des Amis de Vincennes*, 26 (1975), 5–6. Charles VII was so pleased with the exploit that he gave Vincennes to Chabannes, subject to a right to repurchase for 20,000 *écus*, which he exercised in 1442.

[104] See Table 4. He was replaced at Saint-Germain in Jan. 1427, but in February 1428 was appointed captain of Marly-le-Chastel nearby (*English Suits*, 295).

[105] Longnon, *Paris*, 124–5 (where a reading of 'Haveford' is given); *English Suits*, 44–5.

[106] *English Suits*, 55.

[107] BN, MS fr. 4484, fo. 39^{r}.

considering people brought into Paris from the surrounding fortresses, we are dealing with tiny numbers. The standard English garrison in Paris seems to have been under a hundred, and probably closer to twenty in the mid-1420s, with a great noble perhaps bringing a retinue of some three hundred soldiers, and other reminders of war coming from armies passing through the capital or mustering nearby. It was certainly the policy of the Lancastrians to keep garrisons small where possible.[108] Apart from the cost, the authorities were aware that excessive numbers of soldiers were counter-productive in times of peace: their aggressive and violent behaviour could do nothing to encourage the loyalty of the ordinary people of Paris.

That loyalty was decisive in determining the security of Paris. In the previous chapter we considered how the distribution of authority depended on co-operation between various centres of power and influence, and this is nowhere more evident than in the military organization and police of Paris. Many of the routine tasks that ensured the safety of Paris were carried out not by soldiers, English or Burgundian, but by the normal police authorities. The men responsible for the *guet* (the watch) concerned themselves both with crimes such as theft,[109] and with offences that might have more serious political implications, such as slipping out of town at night. Only his known good character saved Richard de Verdelet from a fine when, in July 1420, he was found by the *guet* going downstream after curfew and without knowing the password.[110] Two years before, Perrinet Le Clerc had arranged for the entry of the Burgundians into Paris during just such a nocturnal excursion: two years later an assignation in the small hours of the morning was nearly the prelude to an Armagnac infiltration of Paris.[111] The success or failure of such exploits depended on the vigilance of the watch and the keepers of the gates. A discussion of security arrangements in Paris would be incomplete without these more humble custodians of the status quo.

There were in fact two 'watches' in Paris, the *guet royal* and the *guet* of the municipality, the latter being variously known as the *guet bourgeois*,

[108] At Bayeux in 1433–4 the force numbered only twelve, 'et non plures gentes armorum protunc, quia est civitas bene populata, at adversarii ex parte Dolphine multum remota a dicta civitate' (Stevenson, *Letters and Papers*, ii (2), 541).

[109] e.g. Longnon, *Paris*, 12.

[110] 'Oultre heure et sans savoir le nom de la nuit' (AN, Z^{1h} 7, fo. 198^{v}).

[111] *Monstrelet*, iii. 260; iv. 104–5.

guet des métiers, *guet assis*, or *guet dormant*.[112] In overall charge of the system, but with particular responsibility for the *guet royal*, was the *chevalier du guet*. In 1418 this post was filled by the Burgundian knight Gaultier Raillart, who surprised the Parisians by having his watch preceded by a troop of musicians, thereby warning malefactors of his approach.[113] From 1 December 1425 until the end of the Anglo-Burgundian regime, the Norman Morelet de Bethencourt was in charge.[114] De Bethencourt was no stranger to the military demands of the capital; as early as 1410 he had been commissioned to arrange supplies of bread for the Parisians and had served in Paris and elsewhere leading a company made up of another knight, twenty-four esquires, and twelve archers.[115] The post of *chevalier du guet* allowed him to use his experience in Paris as well as his broader military talents, for his tasks spilled out beyond the capital: in 1426 he was employed to guard the Lendit, the great fair at Saint-Denis, with sixteen Englishmen borrowed from the *bailli* of Mantes; the next year he was a leader of the expedition that captured the brigand chief Sauvage de Fremainville in the castle of l'Isle-Adam.[116]

Although the *chevalier du guet* did sometimes lead the Parisians outside the capital, this was usually the *prévôt*'s role (the capture of de Fremainville was a joint venture with Simon Morhier). The main responsibility of the *chevalier du guet* was the watch in Paris; to assist him a house was provided, the *maison du chevalier du guet*, in the rue Perrin Gasselin, at the centre of the busy Sainte-Opportune quarter.[117] Sometimes the *guet royal* assembled in the road outside the house, otherwise the rounds began at the Châtelet nearby.[118] This royal watch was composed of twenty mounted sergeants and twenty-six on foot, who patrolled the town at night, checking that the townsmen on duty were present and awake.[119] For some of them, the job gave them the chance to serve their preferred faction: Henriet Petit had been forced to leave

[112] For this basic division see M. Garsonnin, *Le Guet et les compagnies du guet d'Orléans: Étude historique précédée de notes sur le guet de Paris* (Orléans, 1898), 11–14, but this is not to be relied upon for the organization of the municipal watch at this time, any more than is the sketch of fourteenth-century practice in Cazelles, *Paris . . . 1223–1380*, 190–1.

[113] *Bourgeois*, 105–6. [114] BN, MS fr. 21405, p. 96; MS Clair. 782, p. 150.

[115] *Bourgeois*, 8; BN, PO 325, Bethencourt nos. 12–14.

[116] BL, Add. Ch. 3606; *Bourgeois*, 223 n. 2. [117] Garsonnin, *Guet*, 21.

[118] See AN, X^{1a} 4792, fo. 7^{v} (14 Nov. 1417), where it is a question of whether nearby building works will obscure the view from the house and narrow the street.

[119] Garsonnin, *Guet*, 23.

Paris for his native Langres during the Armagnac ascendancy, and on his return to Burgundian Paris he was recruited as a *sergent du guet à pied.*[120] It is not likely that all the *compagnie du guet* were politically motivated, however, as service as a sergeant was seen by them as a job of work, and one in which the anti-social hours were regarded as unattractive.[121] Their wages were supposed to come out of the royal receipt at Paris, and (reckoned the sergeants) the king wished them to be paid before anyone else, because of their good work for the town. Certainly, as royal finances shrank in the 1430s the authorities made some effort to ensure that these important men continued to be satisfied.[122]

The sergeants of the *guet*, rather than the soldiers, English or Burgundian, were the real supervisors of the watch in Paris. Yet they were only supervisors: night by night the men huddled in the semi-derelict turrets along the walls were ordinary Parisians—like the 60-year-old Guillaume Bouyn, who possessed a small dagger for use on the days when he was on watch at the Porte Saint-Jacques.[123] If he was on duty at the gate on 19 June 1422, his companions would have included Gerart Nycot, one of the archers of the town, armed for the night's work with a small axe, a man called 'Quarrefour', a *dizainier* to organize operations, and Master Robert Agode, councillor at the *Parlement* who, even though the judges of the *Parlement* were exempt from attendance at the *guet*, had left his official fur hood at home and joined the men on watch.[124]

Service at the watch was, however, disagreeable work, and it was rare to see men of the status of a councillor at the *Parlement* on duty. The minters of the 'serment de France' took care to have their privilege of exemption confirmed and, when efforts were made to get them to do '*guet de nuit*' and '*garde de la porte*' regardless of this, the men from the mint took legal action to protect their rights.[125] The university attemp-

[120] Longnon, *Paris*, 190.

[121] 'Vacquerent continuelement chacune nuyt a la garde de laditte ville et a cest cause ont chacun deulx par jour ii s. vi d.p. qui est peu de chose en regard a la grant peine quilz ont car ilz ne pevent faire autre chose et car fault a cest cause avoir cheval, et se aucun deulz default il paie x s. damende' (AN, Z^{1f} 8, fo. 166^{r}: 8 Nov. 1432).

[122] Ibid. [123] Longnon, *Paris*, 198–9.

[124] AN, X^{1a} 4793, fo. 197^{r}; Favier, *Contribuables*, 126, 157; Autrand, *Naissance*, 200, 312. Perhaps Agode regretted his decision to attend, when he became involved in a brawl between Nycot and 'Quarrefour'.

[125] *Ordonnances*, xi. 1: 2 May 1419; AN, Z^{1h} 9, fo. 81^{v}: 4 May 1433, referring to a case pending in the *Parlement* of which I have seen no trace.

ted to have the same immunity confirmed for students, but letters issued to this effect in October 1418 and registered at the Châtelet had to be struck out when the *Parlement* refused to allow them.[126] Exempt or not, whether the students actually went often to the watch is doubtful: the accounts of the College de Beauvais for 1419 include an entry for money paid in lieu of attendance.[127] Those who could afford to pay their way out probably did so. Georges Loe was more than 60 years old, so his *dizainier* offered to send someone in his place if he would pay 1*s.* 4*d.*; Loe said that he would gladly pay 2*s.*[128]

This daily watch on the walls reminds us that arrangements for the security of Paris parallel the general distribution of authority: central government, *prévôté*, and municipality. If the professional soldiers were under the direct control of the Crown, the *guet royal* was associated with the *prévôt* and the Châtelet, and the *guet* on the walls was organized by the municipality. At other times in the Middle Ages the watch was maintained by men of certain trades, each trade coming on duty once every three weeks.[129] During the Anglo-Burgundian period the expression '*guet des métiers*' seldom occurs, but rather *guet* alone, or *guet des quartiers*.[130] The latter title indicates how the watch of the inhabitants was organized at this time, for Paris was divided into sixteen quarters, the *quarteniers* being under the overall supervision of the *prévôt des marchands* and *échevins*.[131] Below the *quarteniers* were a number of *cinquanteniers*, who might receive written instructions as to when they should send to the watch.[132] Organizing matters on the most local level were the *dizainiers*, who made sure that men from their area turned up on the appointed day.

In this way, the whole of the population was integrated into the enterprise of guarding the town. At every level there was responsibility: when Lambert Kathelin, *quartenier* and churchwarden at Notre-Dame, neglected to punish two men who had failed to turn up for the watch he joined them in prison; when Pierre Hune, *cinquantenier*, forgot to

[126] AN, Y 4^2, p. 193: a copy of the (lost) register of the Châtelet, reproducing the lines through the ordinance.

[127] AN, H^3 2785^7 (1419), fo. 16^v.

[128] AN, X^{1a} 4792, fo. 117^v: 21 Mar. 1419.

[129] Cazelles, *Paris . . . 1223–1380*, 187.

[130] AN, Z^{1h} 7, fo. 198^v. It is possible that the *guet des métiers* continued in parallel, guarding the Sainte-Chapelle, the prisons at the Châtelet, etc., in the traditional fashion, but the security of the gates and walls was certainly arranged by quarters.

[131] G. Picot, 'Recherches sur les quartiniers, cinquanteniers et dizainiers de la ville de Paris', *MSHP* 1 (1875), 132–66.

[132] 'Ordonnance . . . bailli par cedule' (AN, Z^{1h} 9, fo. 70^v).

organize the guard at the Porte Saint-Honoré he was fined.[133] It was in the *dizaines*, however, that the security of Paris was guaranteed. The *dizainiers* were ordinary Parisians of no special rank, numbering 128 in 1418.[134] They held their unpaid office in the area where they lived, which meant that they were well placed to observe the loyalty—or lack of it—of their neighbours.[135] Needless to say, their efforts were often unwelcome: insults from Jean de Nanteuil, a mason living in the rue du Puit, led to his *dizainier* bringing him before the municipal court, while Yvonnet Lorcet was equally uncooperative and more offensive: blaspheming against *dizainiers*, *quarteniers*, and the sergeant who tried to imprison him despite the fact that the bishop claimed him as a 'clerc non marié'.[136] Jean Baillif, scrivener, likewise found himself in prison after 'rebellions et desobeissances ... iniuries et villenies' against his *dizainier*.[137]

Exactly how burdensome these duties were it is impossible to say. Doubtless they were more severe in times of great uncertainty but, even so, Andriet Moreau was probably right to feel aggrieved at being told on 6 November 1422 to do duty at the gates the next day: he had already attended on three of the preceding nine nights, when he should only have been once. Although these were the difficult days that led up to the funeral of Charles VI and Bedford's adoption of the regency, this still seemed to be too much, and the scene between Moreau, the *dizainier*, and a sergeant from the Châtelet (joined by Moreau's wife, who 'moult fort de paroles defendi son dit mary') expanded to the point where a full lawsuit seemed to be looming.[138] In principle, every household was obliged to send a representative at its turn, and this was strictly defined: the shoemaker's boy Perrin Adam was only exempted after he swore he had no home of his own and was servant 'a pain et a pot' of Denisete, widow of Jean Drouart. The widow was to be obliged to send someone at her turn, and it was said that if Perrin ever had a room of his own he too would be summoned.[139] The burden was general enough for shirking to

[133] AN, Z^{1h} 7, fo. 211^{r}; Z^{1h} 9, fo. 70^{v}.

[134] 'État des bourgeois' indicates 128 *dizainiers* who took the oath to John the Fearless in Aug./Sept. 1418.

[135] *Ordonnances*, xii. 272.

[136] AN, Z^{1h} 7, fo. 213^{v}; X^{1a} 4793, fo. 102^{v}. To claim such protection meant only that one had been tonsured at some time and had not married.

[137] AN, Z^{1h} 9, fo. 25^{r}. Offenders could find themselves in the prisons of the king, but the municipality also maintained a 'trappe et descendu' for people who failed in their duty at the watch. This was in one of the turrets in the walls on the south bank (AN, KK 949, no. 23).

[138] AN, X^{1c} 125, nos. 44, 45.

[139] AN, Z^{1h} 7, fo. 246^{v}.

be resented; when Master Guillaume Rose did not want to fulfill his obligations his neighbours came to call him, and ended up assaulting and damaging his closed door.[140]

To serve on the watch was not, of course, the end of military commitments for the Parisians. The town maintained its own companies of archers and crossbowmen, who were ordinary innkeepers, merchants, carpenters, and the like. They had to be ready to serve in the defence of Paris as need dictated, and were sometimes used outside the capital as well; on 24 January 1426 Guillaume Jouan, master of the crossbowmen, and nineteen other crossbowmen of the town of Paris mustered ready to serve under the earl of Warwick, in the earl's campaign east of the capital.[141] The *prévôt* and the *chevalier du guet* could expect the sergeants of the Châtelet to join them on expeditions out of Paris: on one such adventure—the capture of the brigand chief Sauvage de Fremainville—Colin Laignel, sergeant, was killed leaving a young widow, who had difficulty in obtaining any compensation for her loss.[142] Just as almost all Parisians would find themselves summoned to the *guet* sooner or later, so they might have to take part in these out-of-town expeditions as well. Sometimes the essential characteristic of these troops was their disorder, for the trip to Montlhéry by the commune of Paris in August–September 1418 was essentially a ruse to divert the murderous anti-Armagnac feelings of the common people away from fellow-Parisians.[143] Normally, however, the structure of the militia organization was provided by the *dizaines*: even the Montlhéry expedition had a nucleus of disciplined soldiers, like Jacquet de Tournay, paid at the standard man-at-arms' rate of 8*l.p.* per month as a man-at-arms for the *dizaine*.[144] Those who did not fight in person would be called upon to provide money or supplies.[145] Those who did play an active role in an excursion such as that sent to join the Burgundians at Melun in September–October 1420 expected it to be taken into account in assessing duty for the watch immediately afterwards.[146]

So the security of Paris, even under a foreign regent, depended very

[140] AN, X^{1a} 4792, fos. 169^{v}, 174^{v}. [141] BN, MS fr. 32510, fo. 368^{v}.

[142] AN, X^{1a} 67, fo. 27^{v}; X^{1a} 1481, fos. 11^{v}, 15^{r}; X^{1a} 4795, fos. 231^{v}, 241^{v}, 295^{r}, 310^{r}.

[143] *Bourgeois*, 111 n. 1. [144] AN, Z^{1h} 7, fo. 114^{v}.

[145] Ibid., fo. 117^{v}: this concerns a tunic that one man should have supplied 'pour le fait de sa dizaine et pour sa parte et porcion de laide', for an expedition to Pontoise.

[146] AN, Z^{1h} 7, fo. 211^{v}: Colin Rogier missed the *guet* on 30 Sept., but was not punished as he had newly come to live in the *dizaine*, that day had returned from the host before Melun to see his wife, and did not know of the *dizainier*'s order.

largely on the Parisians themselves. The officers of the Châtelet formed a paid police force of uneven quality but, when it was a question of organizing the watch or of resolving disputes between neighbours, the *dizainier*, as a local man probably well known in the district, had the more important role. Whereas the sergeants were not rigidly bound to one area each, but patrolled where mood or business took them, the *dizainier* was responsible for only one or two streets. Accordingly, he was well placed to know the political views of his neighbours and report back to the authorities.[147] It seems possible that the Armagnacs did not obtain the full support of the sergeants and *dizainiers* that was essential to the relationship between governors and governed. On 18 August 1416 it was recognized that several officers of the Châtelet were still seditious and partisan and efforts to raise funds to pay for defence against the duke of Burgundy a year later foundered on the reluctance of the people to comply and the slack organization of the *dizainiers*.[148] When, in the closing months of the Armagnac domination, Jean de Saint-Yon was accused of Burgundian sympathies he countered that he had been a *dizainier* and thus no suspicions could be levied against him—a laughable claim from one who had been a notorious Cabochien and was to be a linchpin of the Burgundian domination.[149] The defence of Paris depended as much on the people who filled the minor offices of the *prévôté* and municipality as on the walls and cannons and soldiers. The Anglo-Burgundian regime lasted as long as the distribution of power from the *Grand Conseil*, Châtelet, and Hôtel de Ville down to the streets continued to work constructively.

We may draw together some of these threads by considering the response of the regent and the Parisians to the French advance of 1429. By June of that year, and in particular after the defeat at Patay on the 18th, it was plain that the relief of Orléans was more than simply a halt to progress—all that had been achieved up to then was threatened. As key places such as Troyes and Reims went over to Charles, and his coronation on 17 July pre-empted that of Henry VI, it became more important than ever to hold the line at Paris.

The first requirement of Bedford and the Parisians on learning of the defeat at Patay was to call forth the duke of Burgundy. An embassy was sent consisting of Jean de Mailly, bishop of Noyon, with two members of the university and several notables of Paris, on behalf of the regent and

[147] *Ordonnances*, xii. 272.

[148] AN, Y 4^2, pp. 108, 173.

[149] AN, X^{1a} 4792, fo. 8^r.

the town.[150] Philip acted with unusual haste, for in response to this appeal he was in Paris on 10 July 1429, and consulted with Bedford for the next five days.[151] Their first action was striking: on 12 July they replaced the leading figures of the municipality, the *prévôt des marchands* and all four *échevins*. New men were elected at a great popular assembly, not so much as a sign of dissatisfaction with the men who had held office since 1422, but in order to bring some new blood into the administration. Guillaume Sanguin, elected *prévôt des marchands*, was a man much trusted by the duke of Burgundy. No less important, he was rich. Philip himself was not prepared to suffer much of the financial burden, and it was agreed that receipts in Normandy should help to meet the cost of any soldiers sent into France from the Burgundian lands.[152] Within a week of Burgundy's departure from Paris, Pierre Surreau (receiver general of the duchy) was on his way from Rouen to Arras, taking with him 20,000*l.t.* for the payment of Burgundian troops.[153] After confirming their hostility to the murderers of John the Fearless, both dukes left Paris on 16 July. Before he went Bedford sent Garter King of Arms to England with lengthy instructions. The importance of Paris was stressed, as was the necessity of nurturing the Burgundian alliance, since without Philip's support Paris and all the rest would be gone in one blow.[154]

The departure of the dukes left Paris bereft of leadership, but on 25 July Bedford returned with l'Isle-Adam (who had been appointed captain of Paris), Cardinal Beaufort, several thousand men diverted from the Hussite crusade and seven hundred Picards.[155] These men helped to bolster the morale of the Parisians, but Bedford intended in any case to forestall any assault on Paris by offering battle to Charles VII before the French army could approach the capital.[156] At the beginning of August Beaufort returned to Rouen while Bedford, his English and Picard troops reinforced by the cardinal's crusaders, marched south-

[150] *Monstrelet*, iv. 333. [151] *Bourgeois*, 240–1.

[152] Stevenson, *Letters and Papers*, ii (1), 101; Vaughan, *Philip the Good*, 17.

[153] BN, MS fr. 4488, p. 656. [154] Rymer, x. 432.

[155] *Bourgeois*, 242. For Beaufort's army, raised in England to combat heresy in Bohemia, see G. A. Holmes, 'Cardinal Beaufort and the Crusade against the Hussites', *EHR* 88 (1973), 721–50, and Jones, 'Beaufort Family', 65–8.

[156] On 28 July orders were issued that various Norman contingents should assemble as soon as possible under Sir Ralph Butler at Lagny-sur-Marne, east of Paris. They were to be paid for 15 days without muster 'pour cause de leur hastif partement' (BN, MS fr. 4488, pp. 541–3).

east. On 7 August he issued a challenge to Charles VII that led to a few skirmishes but not to a full-scale battle. After some inconclusive confrontations, between Crépy-en-Valois and Senlis, the two sides separated. Charles VII moved north and took Compiègne, while Bedford returned towards Normandy, to resist other French incursions into the duchy.[157] L'Isle-Adam and his Picard troops withdrew, no doubt, to Paris. The way was now clear for Charles VII to make a second march on Senlis; this time his path was clear and the town surrendered on 22 August. Pressing on south, the French took Saint-Denis on the 25th or 26th, and were soon riding right up to the gates of Paris. Possession of Saint-Denis meant that river communications between Paris and Normandy were ruled out. Furthermore, Montjoye, an outpost of the important castle at Saint-Germain-en-Laye, which controlled the next bend in the river towards Normandy, was taken at about the same time.[158]

Contact between Paris and the English strongholds in Normandy now became very difficult. One messenger set out from Rouen on 7 August, was set upon, lost his horse and was obliged to return seriously wounded with his mission unfulfilled; another started out two days later and, although his horse was captured, succeeded in saving himself and his letters and arrived in Paris (an insight into the priorities of his assailants).[159] The last miles were the most hazardous: a foot-messenger sent to Willoughby at Pontoise in the first week of September was obliged to wait two and a half valuable days for news to come out of Paris, while yet another man was forced to hire a guide to lead him from Mantes to Saint-Cloud, just outside Paris, to avoid the Armagnacs at Saint-Denis and the tower at Montjoye.[160]

Bedford did not wish to leave the Parisians isolated but, perhaps because he was confident that Paris could not be taken quickly, he did not advance at once. Instead he stayed at Vernon, halfway between Paris and Rouen, dispatching Sir John Radcliffe to Paris with some eight

[157] *Monstrelet*, iv. 340–7, 353.

[158] For Saint-Denis see *Bourgeois*, p. 243, and J. Quicherat (ed.) *Procès de condemnation et de réhabilitation de Jeanne d'Arc* (SHF, Paris, 1841–9), iv. 25; for Saint-Germain and Montjoye, BL, Add. Ch. 11632; BN, MS fr. 4488, pp. 297–8; Lefèvre-Pontalis, 'Un détail du siège', 6.

[159] BN, MS fr. 4488, pp. 714–15, 756.

[160] Ibid. 766, 769–70. Uninterrupted, the journey could be done quite quickly, even on foot: Richard Tuebeuf made the first of two round trips from Rouen to Paris at this time in under eight days (ibid. 715).

hundred men fresh from England.[161] On 27 August they were paid a supplementary wage to help them cope with the expense of living in Paris.[162] On the same day Bedford issued urgent appeals for soldiers in Normandy to muster as soon as possible in order to march on Paris.[163] Everyone accustomed to bear arms, both Norman and English, was to assemble at Caen, Rouen, or Mantes and proceed thence to Paris where, it was hoped, battle would be joined on 10 September. This expedition took time to organize, however, because communications were difficult and auxiliary troops were scattered across Normandy. John Salvain, *bailli* of Rouen, brought one of the largest forces: 34 men-at-arms and 140 archers. They mustered at Rouen on 7, 8, and 9 September and reached Mantes by the 14th, which was a typical rate of progress.[164] The main army seems to have reached Paris on the 15th or 16th of the month, while small groups of stragglers made their musters in Paris for another week. Thus, while Sir John Radcliffe's force had probably gone to Paris earlier, none of the main Anglo-Norman army for 'la rescousse de Paris' could have arrived by 8 September, the date on which the French assault was launched.

We shall see that Bedford's relief force may not have been as irrelevant as its late arrival suggests but, meanwhile, the Parisians were to make valiant efforts for their own defence. The men who kept the walls against Joan of Arc were largely Parisian natives, and they were to prove more than a match for the troops of the maid of Orléans, who was herself shot in the leg by a plain-speaking Parisian crossbowman.[165] The *Bourgeois* claimed that the only professional soldiers were forty to fifty Englishmen, and he magnanimously gave them credit for doing their duty very well, while making it clear that the real credit lay with the

[161] 95 men-at-arms and 700 archers; see Jones, 'Beaufort Family', 69 n. 2. Dauphinist sources suggest that the English force under Jean 'Rathelet' or 'Rachel' was about 2,000 strong (*Chronique de la Pucelle ou Chronique de Cousinot*, ed. A. Vallet de Viriville (Paris, 1859), 290; Jean Chartier, *Chronique de Charles VII roi de France*, ed. A. Vallet de Viriville (3 vols., Paris, 1858), i. 107). But accounts written inside Paris do not mention Radcliffe's arrival at all.

[162] In Paris 'ilz ne pourient vivre de leurs gaiges ordinaires qui paiez leur avoient esté oudit pays Dangleterre' (BN, MS fr. 4488, p. 618).

[163] Stevenson, *Letters and Papers*, ii (1), p. 111–14. The Norman receiver-general included a special section in his accounts for this expedition (BN, MS fr. 4488, pp. 563 ff.).

[164] BN, MS fr. 4488, pp. 564–5; cf. the troops of John Harpesly, *bailli* of Evreux, for example; mustered in Caen on 6–7 Sept. they too had reached Mantes on the 14th (ibid. 576–7). The last man to arrive made his solitary muster on 22 Sept. (ibid. 600).

[165] *Bourgeois*, 245.

citizens.[166] Nicolas Sellier, *greffier* of the Chapter of Notre-Dame, described how Englishmen were among the wounded, but again the victory was seen as an achievement by the town, with divine assistance.[167] Clément de Fauquembergue is another who told how the appointed garrison kept to its position, while the inhabitants came to their aid, with good strong resistance to the men of Charles de Valois.[168]

The Parisian victory was a dramatic reminder of the strength of municipal and popular organization, and was not simply a spontaneous outburst of Burgundian loyalty. Since June 1429 the *guet* had been closely enforced, while the walls were fortified with cannon and other artillery. Such work was the responsibility of the municipality. Stone cannon-balls were acquired in large numbers, one man supplying 1,176 such projectiles, which he delivered to the gates in the presence of the *dizainiers*, *cinquanteniers*, and *échevins*.[169] The *quarteniers* checked the walls and moats adjoining their districts on the eve of the assault and erected barriers both inside and outside the town.[170] Financially, the town was in a very difficult position because of its isolation, and was forced to improvise. The new *prévôt des marchands*, Guillaume Sanguin, was fortunately a man of great wealth: he was one of a consortium who had already lent money to the duke of Bedford earlier in 1429.[171] None the less, the town was obliged to borrow, and the wealthy merchant Jean Sac was one of those who obliged.[172] Royal finances were in an even more precarious position than were those of the municipality, and the government was forced to adopt extreme measures. On 31 August the *Grand Conseil* ordered that out of urgent necessity goods confiscated from the bishop of Troyes and others who had recently gone over to the French should be auctioned and the money used for essential payments such as wages for troops. Three days later officials of the Châtelet were ordered to hand over any money deposited with them by people with cases in progress.[173] This money too was for the payment of soldiers; the policy was upheld by the *Parlement* on 7 September.[174] Debts incurred during the last desperate week before the French assault were repaid once money from Normandy was able to reach Paris later in the month.[175]

[166] Ibid. 246. [167] Cited ibid. 244 n. 1.
[168] *Fauquembergue*, ii. 322.
[169] *Bourgeois*, 239, 243 n. 4. [170] Ibid. 243.
[171] Bossuat, 'Rétablissement', 155–6.
[172] AN, X^{1a} 4796, fo. 178^{r}. [173] AN, Y 6^{7}, pp. 54–5.
[174] AN, X^{1a} 4796, fo. 134^{r}. [175] BN, MS fr. 4488, pp. 667–8.

Despite their financial difficulties, the Parisians were well prepared. This was true not only materially but morally. The pro-Valois preacher Brother Richard had given out badges bearing the name *Jesu* during his preaching mission in the capital, and the same word on the banner of Joan of Arc indicates how a popular religious and political crusade was attempted.[176] This was evidently realized from the beginning by Clément de Fauquembergue: Joan of Arc's banner is the one detail in his celebrated sketch to be rendered accurately; other important points about her appearance (notably her male dress) he did not know about or ignored.[177] But when less astute Parisians came to appreciate the political associations of the cult of the name of Jesus as preached by Brother Richard they discarded his badges and replaced them with ones displaying the St Andrew's cross, the symbol of their Burgundian allegiance.[178] The leaders of society did what they could to orchestrate this sentiment: in July there had been a meeting to reactivate memories of the murder of John the Fearless; since then rumours had been spread that all were to be put to the sword if the French entered Paris.[179] Over the summer people of suspect loyalty had been listed and expelled from the capital. Philippe de Vitry complained that his old enemy Macé Ogier had arranged for his name to be added to the list of people to be thrown out of Paris; although de Vitry escaped this fate his numerous relatives in the Armagnac camp had made him a prime suspect.[180] Others were not so fortunate: Michel de La Tillaye, royal secretary, had been suspected of favouring the 'parti contraire' since 1418, and he was expelled from the capital in 1429.[181] La Tillaye died in exile; another man expelled from Paris, Lorin Laignolet, was able to return soon afterwards.[182]

The victory of 8 September depended on the readiness and resolve of

[176] *Bourgeois*, 243. 'Her army . . . was like a revivalist meeting in motion' (Vale, *Charles VII*, 57).

[177] AN, X^{1a} 1481, fo. 12^{r} (many times reproduced). For the importance of Joan's dress see M. Warner, *Joan of Arc: The Image of Female Heroism* (London, 1981), 119–35.

[178] *Bourgeois*, 243. [179] Ibid. 241.

[180] AN X^{1a} 4796, fo. 162^{r}. Ogier and de Vitry were confirmed enemies (ibid. fo. 146^{v}). When de Vitry died his heirs were all in the other obedience (*Fauquembergue*, iii. 139).

[181] The *procureur du roi* said that 'du temps que Jehanne appellée la pucelle vint avecques le daulphin en ce pais de France . . . aucuns demourans a Paris vouldrent donner entrée aux ennemis du roy dont les aucuns furent prins et les autres qui estoient souspeconnéz furent envoiéz hors et eslonguéz de la ville de Paris' (AN, X^{1a} 4797, fo. 102^{v}). See also ibid., fos. 101^{r}, 181^{r}, 185^{v}; X^{1a} 8302, fo. 259^{r}.

[182] AN, X^{1a} 68, fo. 154^{v}. Laignolet was back in Paris by 16 Feb. 1432 (BN, MS Dupuy 250, fo. 147^{r}).

the Parisians; defeatist rumours begun by sympathizers of Charles VII had little effect against the strong Burgundian tradition in Paris coupled with the fear of Armagnac reprisals in the event of a French victory. The English relief force was still gathering strength and was many miles from the scene of action. But this does not mean that the army for 'la rescousse de Paris' was irrelevant. Its importance lay in the fact that it limited the French to making only a '*vaillance*' (a display of force rather than a sustained assault) 'esperans par commocion de peuple grever et dommagier la ville de Paris plus que par puissance ou force d'armes'.[183] Bedford trusted in the will of the Parisian people to resist a limited attack but, if a full assault was ordered, he was ready to bring down a powerful army. This he believed would be necessary. Writing on 1 September he said that the French planned 'to laye the siege unto Paris, and there to abide til thai have the town or elles the battaille'.[184] In the event, it took him a week longer than he had hoped to muster his full force in Paris, and by then the French had gone.

The fact that the forces of Charles VII made only one assault on the capital (and that lasting less than a day and directed at only one part of Paris) has often led to the belief that the king was half-hearted about retaking the town.[185] Perceval de Cagny, the chronicler of the duke of Alençon, presents a story in which Alençon, Joan of Arc, and the rest of the 'war-party' are constantly held back by the king who, finally, forbids them to renew the assault on Paris and orders a retreat to the Loire.[186] Certainly, no assaut on the left bank was attempted, although Alençon had bridged the Seine downstream towards Saint-Denis, and that town and the tower of Montjoye were in French hands.[187] But to castigate the king for failing to extend his assault against a well-fortified and highly organized town is to ignore the lesson of Orléans. Charles was far from his power-base, while a very considerable army (stronger than the force mustered by Bedford in August) was bearing down on Paris with all speed. To remain near Paris would be to risk the destruction of everything that had been achieved since May of that year. Accordingly,

[183] *Fauquembergue*, ii. 322. Lang, *Maid of France*, 180–2, recognizes that this is the correct interpretation of the French assault but, like all warm partisans of Joan, blames Charles VII for not sustaining or extending the attack.

[184] Stevenson, *Letters and Papers*, ii (1), 118 (a letter to the lieutenant of Falaise).

[185] More extreme views of Charles VII's 'betrayal' were refuted by G. du Fresne de Beaucourt, 'Jeanne d'Arc trahie par Charles VII', *Revue des questions historiques*, 2 (1867), 286–91.

[186] Quicherat, *Procès*, iv. 25–9.

[187] Lefèvre-Pontalis, 'Un détail du siège', 5–15.

the diplomats in the king's entourage were given the chance to extend their work. The truce with Burgundy of 28 August had excluded Paris from the peace, allowing the king to see if a display of force and the charisma of Joan of Arc would encourage the Parisians to open their gates to him of their own accord. This did not happen and so, on 18 September, the truce was extended to include Paris which, for the time being, could not be taken.[188]

Success against the army of Charles VII demonstrated the efficiency with which the military system in Paris could work. With the town well supplied and fortified, and the people united, the capital could not be captured in a short campaign, while the English army waiting in the wings made a long siege impossible. This is a dramatic example of the general arrangements for security under the Anglo-Burgundian regime, which depended on municipal organization and on the readiness of the people to involve themselves in their own defence. English and Burgundian soldiers provided a nucleus of trained men and, no doubt, these professional forces gave credibility to the claims of their masters. The essential component in the administration of fifteenth-century Paris was, however, the consent and co-operation of the governed. Administrative history can tell us a great deal about popular attitudes, particularly when something as politically sensitive as the security of a town in wartime is at issue. This is also true of the matters discussed in the next chapter: the confiscation, administration, and disposal of enemy property.

[188] G. du Fresne de Beaucourt, *Histoire de Charles VII* (Paris, 1881–91), ii. 410–11. Charles's army was running short of money and would have been forced to live off the land (ibid., ii. 239 n. 1; iii. 518–19).

5

ENEMY PROPERTY IN PARIS: CONFISCATIONS AND GRANTS

From the first days after the entry of the Burgundians, indiscriminate pillage had been directed against the goods of suspected Armagnacs 'sans commission et sans inventaire', as Clément de Fauquembergue observed legalistically.[1] The wife of the late Guillaume Boisseau hid her valuables down a well in fear that her house would be ransacked, since her husband had died in the prisons of the Châtelet as a suspected Armagnac.[2] During the chaos in the summer of 1418 the Burgundian soldier Raolin de Hallus appropriated certain handsome tapestries from the house of the Armagnac marshal Jean de Rieux which, as it turned out, bore the arms of the d'Orgemont family from whom they had been stolen two years before.[3] Indeed, as this last example reminds us, confiscation of property had become an intrinsic part of the oscillations in political fortunes during the second decade of the fifteenth century.[4] It is therefore important to know how successive 'Burgundian' and 'Anglo-Burgundian' governments dealt with the problem of enemy property, and especially with confiscated buildings. Furthermore, this can tell us a great deal about the politics and society of the period, about the people who lost and the people who gained.

The long-standing practice whereby the property of a traitor was forfeit to the Crown received a new dimension as party divisions hardened after 1411.[5] Members of the Armagnac and Burgundian

[1] *Fauquembergue*, i. 127.

[2] AN, Z^2 3756 (Hearings of the *bailliage* of the Temple) at the date 19 June 1418.

[3] AN, X^{1a} 4792, fos. 148^r–149^r, 153^r. The house of the marshal de Rieux was also confiscated (Sauval, iii. 286).

[4] Bossuat, 'Rétablissement', 139. In this article Bossuat drew attention to the importance of confiscations in the period after 1411, but his brief description is essentially a prelude to his account of the conciliatory role of the *Parlement* after 1436.

[5] For the legal background see P.-C. Timbal, 'La Confiscation dans le droit français des XIII^e et XIV^e siècles', *RHDFE*, 4th ser. 22 (1943), 44–79; 23 (1944), 35–60, and S. H. Cuttler, *The Law of Treason and Treason Trials in Later Medieval France* (Cambridge, 1981), 120–41.

factions had, in turn, to leave Paris when their group was ousted from power, the party in exile being traitors in the eyes of the government left behind. On 7 May 1412 (the Burgundians being in power) a special commission was set up to sell the goods forfeited by the rebellious princes of the blood.[6] After the failure of the Cabochien movement and the downfall of the Burgundians in 1413 the Armagnacs decided to institute general commissioners for the reformation of the kingdom.[7] By the advice of the dauphin, the duke of Guyenne, the commission was suppressed in February 1415,[8] but the banished remained banished and confiscations continued to be pronounced against those guilty of offences against the regime.[9] Then in 1418 one of the first actions of the Burgundians on returning to power was to revoke the confiscations and proscriptions pronounced since 1413,[10] and by this time a new group of people were open to charges of *lèse-majesté*, for it was now the turn of the Armagnacs to face the choice between flight and the risk of execution or murder.

The rout of the Armagnacs brought large amounts of land into the hands of the king, but loyal Burgundians were keen to put the process of royal acquisition into reverse. Jean de Pulligny was remarkably speedy. On 29 May 1418, the very day of the Burgundian entry, he obtained the goods of his predecessor as keeper of the royal jewels, Jacques l'Empereur.[11] This gift was so rapidly obtained that the notary who signed the royal letters, Pierre Ferron, was himself an Armagnac, and was in fact soon to disappear from Paris.[12] l'Empereur's property was, in the main, situated outside Paris, but soon eyes turned to houses in the capital. The first to have her claims recognized was Marguerite de Harcourt, dame d'Estouteville, whose husband had been captured at Harfleur and whose lands were largely under the occupation of the English. On 12 June 1418 she obtained compensation for the loss of lands and husband when the Hôtel de Besançon, confiscated from the

[6] *Bourgeois*, 12 n. 2.

[7] Cf. Coville, *Cabochiens*, 386: that the commission was indeed instituted is proved by its subsequent repeal (see n. 8).

[8] AN, $Y\,4^2$, p. 12.

[9] See e.g. $Y\,4^2$, p. 81: a proclamation required the Parisians to denounce the goods of anyone involved in a serious conspiracy in Easter 1416.

[10] *Ordonnances*, x. 453–5: 9 June 1418.

[11] Henwood, 'Administration et vie des collections', 210.

[12] L. Douët d'Arcq (ed.), *Choix de pièces inédites relatives au règne de Charles VI* (2 vols., SHF, Paris, 1863–4), ii. 126; G. Tessier and G. Ouy, 'Notaires et secrétaires dans la première moitié du XV^{e} siècle d'après un document inédit', *BPHCTH* 1963 (1966), 866, 867 n. 1.

absent bishop of Clermont, Martin Gouge, was granted to her by royal letters.[13] She had moved, perhaps, too quickly: John the Fearless did not reach Paris until 14 July, and no other grants are recorded before his arrival. Before the end of the year, the gift had been revoked and the house given to Jacques de Montberon, chamberlain of the king and marshal of France.[14]

The latter gift was rather more typical of the grants made in the aftermath of the Burgundian entry. Despite the good intentions of the new administration, whereby confiscated land would be used for the payment of soldiers,[15] the pressure from Burgundians seeking reward for their loyalty was too great to be resisted. The first grant enregistered after the arrival of John the Fearless was the gift to his son Philip, count of Charolais, of the Hôtel d'Armagnac, given because the future duke of Burgundy did not possess any *hôtel* in Paris where he and his countess could stay.[16] Other grants were made to household officers of the duke: his *panetier*, Robert de Belloy;[17] his *varlet de chambre* and controller of household expenses, Étienne Morel;[18] his principal war-trumpeter, Christophle Dalbourt.[19] Loyal Burgundians now employed in the royal household also benefited: Pierre de Fontenay and Jean de Mesnil were to share a house in the rue de Saint-Pol for as long as they were *maîtres de l'hôtel* in order to reduce the problems that had arisen from such officers living too far from the principal royal residence,[20] while Phillipot de Juilly, *varlet tranchant* for forty years, received another house near the Hôtel de Saint-Pol, confiscated from another decapitated Armagnac.[21] The admiral of France, Charles de Lens, and the *bailli* of Melun, Simon Le Boyne, both profited.[22] The duke and duchess of Brabant took advantage of the atmosphere of liberality to gain possession of the Hôtel du Porc-Épic, which had been in the hands of the king since the death of William of Bavaria, father of Duchess Jacqueline.[23] Not forgotten in the

[13] AN, JJ 170, no. 152: letters 'par le roy'.

[14] Ibid., no. 286 (21 Dec. 1418): 'Par le roy, messire Charles de Savoisy et Jehan de Pulligny, dit Chappelain, presens'.

[15] *Ordonnances*, x. 456–9: 16 July 1418. On this day Jean de Neufville was appointed to receive money from the sale of confiscated land (BN, MS n. a. fr. 7932, fo. 26^{v}).

[16] AN, JJ 170, no. 180. Confirmed shortly before the treaty of Troyes, on 12 May 1420 (Des Salles, *Mémoires*, i. 352–3).

[17] AN, JJ 170, no. 185.

[18] Ibid., no. 256. After Morel's hasty flight in Oct. 1413 his house had been pillaged by the Armagnacs (Coville, *Cabochiens*, 386).

[19] AN, JJ 170, no. 252.

[20] Ibid., no. 208.

[21] Ibid., no. 239.

[22] AN, JJ 171, no. 37; JJ 170, no. 219.

[23] Ibid., no. 207; opposed by Louis, duke of Bavaria (AN, X^{1a} 4792, fo. 88^{r}).

distribution of largess was Ydette de l'Ours, who received a confiscated house as reward for her services to the king and duke of Burgundy, and to help her to look after her two orphan children—their father, the eminent soldier Enguerran de Bournonville, had been executed by the Armagnacs in 1414.[24]

The Burgundians, some absent from Paris since 1413, others since the plot of Easter 1416, were now anxious to recoup their losses, or profit from having opted for the right side. The problem of petitioners surrounding the sources of patronage was no novelty in later medieval government: in 1363 the king had ordered *baillis*, *sénéchaux*, and their staff to swear secrecy over fines, forfeitures, and revenues lest those who came to hear of them attempted to have them given away.[25] It is probable that the grants actually recorded at the *Trésor des Chartes* formed only a modest proportion of the total volume of land distributed in the first years of the Burgundian regime, for by the time the receiver of Paris sent his clerk round in 1420–1 to collect rents on properties in Paris he found a number of them occupied by people with more or less doubtful claims to ownership but influential enough to be respected. For example, at a house in the rue Saint-Sauveur he found Thomas de Herlay, esquire, *concièrge* for the count of Saint-Pol, who claimed a royal gift of the house,[26] while in the rue de la Bretonnerie and the rue Frogier-Lasnier were houses which Philippe de Morvilliers, first president at the *Parlement*, claimed as royal gifts; again in the rue Vieille-du-Temple was another house that Morvilliers had occupied without paying anything.[27]

Despite the uncomfortable position of administrators who had to deal with generous rulers and demanding subjects, it was accepted that goods confiscated from Armagnacs formed a valuable asset for the new regime. Even gifts made in the first lavish months up to Christmas 1418 usually stated that this was a specific breach of the principle whereby confiscated goods were to be used for the needs of the Crown.[28] Consequently, efforts were made as soon as possible to place the government of these possessions on a sound footing. When matters calmed down after the general pillage of June, the *prévôt* of Paris

[24] AN, JJ 170, no. 191; for Bournonville's execution see *Bourgeois*, 52–3.

[25] W. Paravicini, 'Administrateurs professionnels et princes dilettantes: Remarques sur un problème de sociologie administrative à la fin du Moyen Age', in W. Paravicini and K. F. Werner (eds.) *Histoire comparée de l'administration* (Beihefte der Francia, ix (Munich, 1980)), 168–81 (ordinance of 1363 cited p. 173).

[26] Sauval, iii. 291. [27] Ibid. 286, 288–9.

[28] e.g. AN, JJ 170, no. 185 of 27 July 1418, alluding to the ordinance of 16 July.

imposed some order onto the acquisition of goods,[29] and on 6 September a commission against the Armagnacs was set up with extensive powers.[30] Three months later, in an effort to induce some of the absent to return, this body was disbanded,[31] but a separate commission was maintained to administer the very considerable quantity of property that had, at least nominally, passed into the hands of the king.[32]

It appears that, by 1419, a system for the administration of these goods was working with tolerable efficiency. Thus, when the king gave one of his followers a gift 'sur les confiscations', the royal letters were presented to the commissioners, who made an order—in theory in writing—for the sale of goods to the required sum.[33] So much may be deduced from appeals to the *Parlement*, although none of the commission's records survive for the period.[34] In any case, political events moved so quickly that arrangements were only temporary and after the murder of John the Fearless on 10 September 1419 new *commissaires et réformateurs généraux* were appointed, with powers over the whole kingdom.[35] These men certainly had jurisdiction over the goods of suspected rebels for some months but, once again, the commission turned out to be short-lived, because when Henry V took on the government of France after the treaty of Troyes he too reorganized the system whereby confiscated property was administered.

Confiscated land was proving lucrative for the Crown,[36] while providing the rewards sought by the Burgundians after their exile from the capital. Henry V, however, was not attracted to the expedients that had found favour with the Burgundian leadership, and did not wish to see

[29] Perreson Tube, acting on his own initiative, arrested the goods of Étienne Binel (or Binet), who was a suspected Armagnac. The *prévôt* of Paris then took control and a ruling was made at the Châtelet as early as 19 July 1418 (AN, X^{1a} 4792, fo. 72^{v}: appeal of 29 Aug. 1418). The response of the *Parlement* was less rapid, as matters were still unresolved in 1423 (ibid., fo. 82^{v}; X^{1a} 4793, fo. 251^{r}; X^{1a} 1481, fos. 169^{r}, 268^{r}), and the parties finally settled out of court in 1427 (X^{1c} 134, no. 66).

[30] *Fauquembergue*, i. 164. No copy of this ordinance survives. The *procureur du roi* objected to the commission, which would have detracted from the authority of the *Parlement*, but before that body could rule on this the commission was revoked.

[31] *Ordonnances*, x. 500–1: 6 Dec. 1418.

[32] On 9 Mar. 1419 reference was made to the commissioners of the '*reformacion*' administering property. This body included two noted Cabochiens, Jean de Troyes and Jacques de Rouen (AN, X^{1a} 4792, fo. 114^{r}).

[33] AN, X^{1a} 4792, fo. 133^{r}.

[34] See ibid., fo. 120^{v}, for a dispute over the contents of the house of Jean Jouvenal.

[35] The ordinance of Sept. 1419 establishing this body is lost, but it is referred to in that of 4 Mar. 1420 whereby 4 more people are added to the original 7 (*Ordonnances*, xi. 56–8).

[36] Pocquet du Haut-Jussé. 'Compte de Pierre Gorremont', 253: AN, KK 17, fo. 11^{r}.

confiscated property, which should have been a long-term asset, sold or given away indiscriminately. A few grants were confirmed immediately after the treaty of Troyes, mainly to people involved with the Burgundian entry into Paris in 1418,[37] but Henry was much less interested in giving away property than in establishing a reliable administration for it. On 10 July 1420 a council meeting attended by Henry and Philip the Good sent letters to the *prévôt* of Paris. These noted that people were taking possession of confiscated lands, whether or not they had received gifts from King Charles or Queen Isabelle. The *prévôt* was ordered to supply an accurate declaration of the value of any gifts, and an inventory of all confiscated goods in the *prévôté.* Appropriate people were to be appointed to administer the lands and prepare accounts without allowing anyone, no matter what their rank, to take possession of property on account of gifts.[38] Confiscated lands were no longer to be the spoils of party allegiance, and during July the commission against the Armagnacs that had been set up after the murder of John the Fearless was abolished.[39]

Those people who had obtained possession of lands before the imposition of Henry V's policy were reluctant to abandon their new properties to the *prévôt*'s commissioners. Although the orders of 10 July were restated on 10 August little progress had been made after another month, for the council held by Henry V wrote again on 9 September reminding the *prévôt* of his task.[40] Appeals were undermining the new policy, so it was now ordered that the *prévôt* should proceed to take control of all confiscated territory without more ado, regardless of any appeals. There would be no further reminders, and Henry expected to receive an adequate account of anything that was done. All this was in the spirit of the simultaneous reorganization of royal finances, being designed to ensure the centralization of income and the rigid control of expenditure.[41] Land confiscated from 'Armagnacs' was to be subject to the same supervision as the rest of French government.

[37] AN, JJ 171, nos. 185–95: dated Troyes, 29 May 1420. The confirmations were noted in abbreviated form, and room was left for others to be added.

[38] AN, P 2298, p. 681.

[39] Letters of 6 Apr. 1421 refer to the suspension of the commission against the Armagnacs in the previous July (AN, Y 6^7, p. 31). These may well be the 'lettres patentes concernant la regie des biens des rebelles' issued on 23 July 1420, which have not survived (BN, MS fr. 8046, fo. 371^v).

[40] *Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal*, MS 4111, p. 417. Henry's letters of 10 July are here referred to as being of the 11th. I have not found a copy of the first reminder of 10 Aug. which is also mentioned here.

[41] *Ordonnances*, xi. 95, 103–4; cf. Ch. 2.

Implementation of these objectives was to prove difficult. Letters of 8 January 1421 condemned delays in reporting seizures and inventories to the *prévôt*, and gave four days for this to be done properly.[42] These were soon followed by further letters, which attempted to regularize the procedure for banishments: anyone suspected of being absent from Paris for political reasons was to be formally summoned to the Châtelet to answer charges and only after failure to attend was banishment to be pronounced, and with it confiscation of property.[43] Pressure was increased in February, when the wives and unmarried daughters of absent Parisians were ordered to leave, either to join their menfolk, or to go somewhere else in the Lancastrian obedience.[44] They would no longer be able to look after goods that should have been confiscated.

Still, however, matters remained utterly unsatisfactory, and the king continued to reap virtually no benefit from the confiscations. On 6 April 1421, the *Grand Conseil*, held by the duke of Exeter and the Burgundian Lourdin de Saligny, issued lengthy letters that, in effect, recognized that the normal machinery of the Châtelet was not equipped to deal with the burdens of confiscated goods on a major scale.[45] There was no option but to revert to the use of special commissioners. This time four men were nominated who could bring together the necessary training and experience to deal with the administrative debris of nearly three years of political upheavals. These were: Guillaume d'Orgemont (involved in financial administration since 1385), Jean de Pressy (governor of all finances), Jean Dole (*maître des requêtes*), and Guillaume Cotin (councillor at the *Parlement*).[46] Any two could give summary judgement of disputes, dispose of property as they saw fit, whether by rent or sale, and recoup debts owing to the king from anyone who had made use of confiscated goods to his own advantage. No appeals were allowed—all

[42] *Ordonnances*, xi. 113–14. Other letters regarding the goods of rebels, issued on 3 Jan., have not survived (cf. BN, MS fr. 8046, fo. 374^{r}). But clearly interest in the question did not decline with Henry's departure from Paris at the end of 1420.

[43] AN, Y 6^{7}, pp. 20–3: 13 Jan. 1421.

[44] Ibid. 30: 22 Feb. 1421.

[45] AN, Y 6^{7}, pp. 31–6.

[46] Two of the commissioners had inside knowledge of the rigours of confiscation since, on 27 Jan. 1421, Henry V had restored to Guillaume d'Orgemont his possessions near Pontoise (BN, MS fr. 26044, no. 5592; for d'Orgemont see also Autrand, *Naissance*, 63, 288 n. 42), while Jean Dole had suffered the loss of lands in Normandy during the invasion (PRO, SC 8, 346/63 (E 1415): petition for their restoration), granted 17 Jan. 1421 (DKR 42 (1881), 397).

their rulings were as binding as judgements of the *Parlement*[47]—and they could institute any officials they needed, including *greffiers*, advocates, *procureurs*, and a receiver.

This was the type of organization maintained for the next ten years, although the commissioners changed over time. On 18 February 1422 Louis of Luxembourg (first president at the *Chambre des Comptes*) and Jean Aguenin (second president at the *Parlement*) were placed at the head of a commission to seize and put in the hands of the king all goods confiscated from rebels[48] while, by other letters of the same date, all gifts up to the meeting of the Estates-General in December 1420 were revoked.[49] The efficiency of the commission established on 6 April 1421 is open to some doubt, as no direct evidence of its activity survives, but about the new body of February 1422 we are well informed. Louis of Luxembourg, Jean Aguenin, and their successors worked diligently throughout the 1420s. Only on 24 January 1432 was the commission finally revoked, and on that date all outstanding issues were sent to Simon Morhier, *prévôt* of Paris, for resolution, which is to say that they were placed back into the regular Parisian administration.[50]

The commission had to deal with a number of difficult problems in the sensitive area where administrative and political questions merged. In the accounts for confiscations were four mentions of a house backing on to the walls in the north-western part of Paris, which had belonged to a certain Jean Poteau, who was receiver of the bishop of Paris prior to his flight from the Burgundians.[51] In the accounts for 1421 no further details were given, but when the commissioners came to render account for the years 1423–7 it was obvious that they had run into difficulties. They noted that the house had been rented to Guillaume de Nesle, notary and secretary of the king, but that a physician, Guillaume

[47] Ibid. 35. Doubtless this implied challenge to the *Parlement* explains why there is no trace of these letters in the records of the court. But later in the 1420s cases from the commissioners certainly could go to the *Parlement* on appeal, although Bedford tried to claim them for the *Grand Conseil* (*Fauquembergue*, ii. 91–2).

[48] AN, PP 110, p. 128; BN, MS n. a. fr. 7931, fos. 302^{r}, 390^{r}, supplies the date. The letters were published in the *Parlement* on 16 Mar. 1422 (AN, X^{1a} 4793, fo. 160^{v}), but apparently not at the *Chambre des Comptes* until 4 Jan. 1423 (BN, MS n. a. fr. 7931, fo. 302^{r}).

[49] G. Besse (ed.), *Recueil de diverses pièces servant à l'histoire du Roy Charles VI* (Paris, 1660), 341–2.

[50] Sauval, iii. 564; cf. AN, X^{1a} 4797, fo. 70^{v}: 'et depuis [1431] cessa le reformacion et fu la cause renvoiée a lordinaire devant le prevost'.

[51] Sauval, iii. 242, 309, 330, 582: concerning a house at the 'Agoux' [Égouts] de Montorgueil.

Charpentier, claimed that it belonged to him.[52] Later in the accounts the commissioners returned to the subject, and this time recorded that they had rented the house to de Nesle for 8*l.p.*, but that he was not able to take possession because Charpentier claimed that in fact he had bought the house from its former owner, Jean Poteau.[53]

It happens that the background to these entries is explained in the registers of the *Parlement*.[54] In 1417, said Charpentier, he bought the house from Poteau for 45 *écus* (56*l.p.* 5*s.*) down payment and an annual rent of 9*l.p.* 5*s.* Unfortunately, he was unable to show any documentary evidence for this as the letters were lost—he claimed—during a period of imprisonment under the Armagnac regime, when he was hated for his Burgundian origins. With the establishment of the new order after 1418, the fact that the house had formally belonged to the vanished Jean Poteau cast suspicion on the possibly fraudulent transaction whereby ownership had passed to Charpentier. Despite his denial of Armagnac sympathies, Charpentier was ordered to hand over the keys and move out; opposition to this brought a period in prison, and while he was thus incarcerated the doors and windows of the house were sealed and neighbours recruited to forbid his return. Subsequently, the commissioners did agree to rent the house to him for 16*l.p.*, but when it transpired that there was no prospect of his paying, they withdrew the lease and rented the house to Guillaume de Nesle for the more reasonable sum of 8*l.p.* The *Parlement* decided that Charpentier had a case worth considering, but sent the matter to the *Chambre des Enquêtes* for further investigation, whence it never returned.[55]

The administration of confiscated property needed constant supervision. The building between the rue de la Harpe and the rue Serpente on the left bank, confiscated from Henriet Hazart, horseman of the duke of Berry, supplies another example.[56] Jean Preudhomme, a notary at the Châtelet who was, his lawyer claimed, 'Preudhomme by name and *preudhomme* [sensible fellow] by nature',[57] was ordered to look after it.

[52] Ibid. 309.

[53] Ibid. 330. The entry from the accounts for 1427–8 (p. 582) is less informative.

[54] The main arguments were put forward on 21 Jan. and 1 Mar. 1423 (AN, X^{1a} 4793, fos. 250^{r}, 259^{v} *bis*).

[55] On 17 June 1423, the court agreed to hear the parties again. The advocates restated their positions on 29 July and 19 Aug. but, since the facts were obviously contradictory, the judges ordered further investigation. On 1 Sept. the rent was further lowered to 7*l.p.*, but it is not known who finally obtained possession (AN, X^{1a} 1480, fo. 276^{v}; X^{1a} 4793, fos. 330^{v}, 341^{v}; X^{1a} 8302, fo. 131^{v}).

[56] Sauval, iii. 317, 579.

[57] 'Dit quil est preudhomme, et *nomen consonans rei*' (AN, X^{1a} 4796, fo. 269^{r}).

But the fact that he also had his own interests to protect, in the form of a rent-charge on the house, left him open to claims that he placed his own concerns ahead of those of the king. 'Il na mie preudommement fait' was the observation of the *procureur du roi* since, over the years, Preudhomme had behaved as the owner of the house rather than as its custodian.[58]

The difficult problems meant it was essential that the commissioners on the confiscations be reliable individuals, expert in financial and legal matters. We have already noted the balanced composition of the board of 1421. Their successors from 1422 onwards were equally well-qualified. The commission established in February 1422 was controlled by Louis of Luxembourg and Jean Aguenin, two of the most respected men in the Anglo-Burgundian administration.[59] The commissioners in the period 1423–7 (Hugues Rapiout, Simon de Champluisant, Jean de Pressy, and Jean de Saint-Yon) were leading figures in the *Parlement* or the financial administration,[60] while their counterparts in the period 1427–34 were equally distinguished lawyers or household officers.[61]

It is evident that the confiscated property was in the hands of able people who had spent their careers in fields relevant to the efficient discharge of these new duties. It is equally clear that the commissioners had followed the original letters patent of 1421 and established a full subordinate organization. The staff in the years 1423–7 included an *avocat* and *procureur du roi*, a controller of the receipts, and three *greffiers* of the *chambre des confiscations*.[62]

Some idea of the volume of confiscated property in Paris is given by long extracts made by Henri Sauval in the seventeenth century from three series of accounts later destroyed in the great *Chambre des Comptes* fire of 1737. The first account he used covered the year to 24 June 1421 and was, apparently, compiled under the auspices of the ordinary

[58] Ibid. fo. 269^{v}. On 27 Aug. 1432, the case was sent back to the Châtelet, for resolution by the *prévôt* (AN, X^{1a} 1481, fo. 60^{r}).

[59] AN, PP 110, p. 128. A procedural point raised in Charpentier's case was based on the claim that unless either Louis of Luxembourg or Jean Aguenin was present 'les autres commisseres navoient aucune puissance' (AN, X^{1a} 4793, fo. 259^{v} *bis*).

[60] Sauval, iii. 330.

[61] Richard de Chancey, president at the *Parlement*, Hugues Le Coq, president at the *Parlement* and *prévôt des marchands*, Jean de Voton and Jean de Bordeaux, councillors at the *Parlement*, Thomas Fassier, *maître des requêtes*, Jean Rapiout, *avocat du roi* at the *Parlement*, Guy Le Jay, *argentier* of the duke of Bedford, and Jean de Saint-Yon (Sauval, iii. 564).

[62] Ibid. 333–4.

receiver of Paris.[63] The second ran from 20 December 1423 until 24 June 1427,[64] while the third followed on from there and continued up to Christmas 1434.[65] Sauval's work has been mined by historians seeking information about particular properties and individuals, but it may be that it can also indicate the number of confiscated houses, and their distribution across Paris.[66]

The initial appearance of the extracts is not promising. Sauval's concerns were so far removed from those of the twentieth-century historian that he almost never included the figures for money spent or received—a notable omission when dealing with accounts. Then again, his summaries were obviously not intended to be complete and sometimes he recorded the name of a person or place without any indication of the reason.[67] Furthermore, there are a number of doubtful readings, probably compounded by the carelessness of his editors. Sauval himself died without preparing his work for publication, and when this was finally undertaken, decades later, the volumes were put together very hastily, in competition with the official history of Paris written by Dom Félibien.[68]

Yet, as one studies the pages of volume 3 of Sauval's *Histoire et Recherches* one becomes aware of the extent of his work: he did much more than jot down a few names that interested him from the historical or topographical viewpoint. Any full evaluation of these three accounts depends on the extent to which they may be compared with each other. One cannot arrive at an estimate of the number of confiscated houses in Paris simply by totalling the numbers of entries in all three accounts since, if they are at all complete, it is likely that some buildings will appear in two, or even all three of them. On the other hand, one cannot rely on one account only since, if there are gaps, it would be useful to use the others in an effort to compensate. Careful scrutiny of Sauval's

[63] Ibid. 283–97 (cf. pp. 653–4, which appear to relate to the same account). The original register contained at least 216 folios, and dealt with one or two houses on each page.

[64] Ibid. 298–334; this was an account comprising 60 *cahiers*, of which the first 10 were already missing in the seventeenth century.

[65] Ibid. 564–91; an account of 312 folios, of which the last 36 related to the period when the administration was back in the hands of the *prévôt*.

[66] My study of these problems has been much facilitated by my wife, who compiled an excellent card-index to this often awkward material.

[67] This happens particularly in the extracts for 1427–34.

[68] Sauval's work finally appeared in 1724, the year before Félibien's *Histoire . . . de Paris*.

extracts demonstrates the possibilities as well as the limitations of such an approach. As an elementary example one may take the short rue du Pélican, just north of the rue Saint-Honoré. In the records of 1423–7 a house that had belonged to master Guillaume Claustre is mentioned, and this is presumably the same as the property of master Guillaume 'Chaustier' mentioned in 1427–34. In the 1421 extracts a house in this street is mentioned, but no details are given. However, this bare entry is immediately followed by a note in italics to the effect that master Michel 'Clastre' succeeded to the goods of his brother master Guillaume Claustre which, in the light of the other entries, shows that it is indeed the same house in all three cases.[69] On the other hand, it is impossible to prove that a house in the rue Arnoul-de-Charonne, with a main entrance in the rue Saint-Germain (1421) is the same as the house in that street which had belonged to Jean Gaude (1423–7), or that either is the same as the house that is vaguely mentioned in the last account (1427–34), even though it is highly likely.[70]

If one performs this collation for each of the 216 streets, three crossroads, and five ecclesiastical cloisters mentioned in Sauval's extracts, confidence in the work increases. There are 76 houses definitely mentioned in all three of the accounts, and a further 177 mentioned in at least two. Another 436 entries could, possibly, refer to different houses. Of these 436 there are, however, many that may well concern buildings described elsewhere. Thus the single entry in each account relating to a house in the rue Arnoul-de-Charonne could imply that there were three different confiscated houses in the street, but it is probable that there was only one. Depending on whether or not one accepts these speculative, but highly plausible, identifications, one of the distributions set out in Table 5 (a) is obtained.

It appears that Sauval made notes on a minimum of 562 confiscated houses and a maximum of 689. In the pages that follow, the minimum number has been used consistently, as experience suggests that some

[69] Sauval, iii. 292, 310, 576. Guillaume Claustre died in Paris some months after the Burgundian entry; his children were in the other obedience, and so his house was confiscated even though his brother was a councillor in the Burgundian *Chambre des Enquêtes*. It was restored to its rightful owners in Aug. 1437 (Autrand, *Naissance*, 125, 291, 307).

[70] Sauval, iii. 75, 312, 577. Further information on Gaude's possessions in this area is to be found ibid. 310, 581, and in the accounts of the College de Beauvais (AN, H^3 2785^7) where it is a question of rent owed on his house in the rue Saint-Germain, backing on to his property in the rue Arnoul-de-Charonne.

TABLE 5. Confiscations

(a) Numbers

	Definite identifications	Plausible identifications
All 3 accounts	72	122
2 accounts	177	216
1 account	436	224
TOTAL	685	562

(b) By region

Les Halles	226
Grève	198
Université	115
Cité	21
Uncertain	2
TOTAL	562

(c) In proportion to the population

	Confiscations (excluding uncertainties) (%)	Distribution of taxpayers 1438 (%)
Les Halles	40.4	55
Grève	35.4	25.3
University	20.6	13.1
Cité	3.7	6.6

note, however brief, was made on the vast majority of entries in the accounts.

It would be desirable to know how these properties were distributed through Paris, and the extent to which it is possible to identify particular 'Armagnac' areas. Ideally the properties could then be allocated between the sixteen quarters that were already in existence at the time of the Anglo-Burgundian regime.[71] Unfortunately, we do not know the precise location of the fifteenth-century quarters, and the identification

[71] Favier, *Contribuables*, 13.

of their boundaries is a most difficult undertaking.[72] It would be possible to make use of the eighteenth-century quarters, but these were certainly different from those of the fifteenth century.[73] It seems preferable to adopt a simpler, but contemporary, division for the initial analysis, making use of the four regions through which indirect taxation was organized.[74] By this scheme the Île de la Cité formed one region, the left bank or 'Université' another, and the populous right bank was divided into two: Les Halles to the east, Grève to the west. To distinguish the latter two regions, one may adopt the policy of the tax-receivers of 1421: the rue Saint-Martin and all to the east of it is in the Grève region; the rest in Les Halles.[75]

The distribution of confiscated properties in these four regions is set out in part (b) of Table 5,[76] with just two uncertainties.[77] The largest number of confiscations was in Les Halles, although not by an overwhelming majority. The figures, in any case, need to be set against the general distribution of the population. It is impossible to obtain exact figures, but it is certain that Les Halles was the most densely populated part of the capital. The best available guide is the tax roll of 1438 (although this is limited to the richest inhabitants) and the distribution is shown in part (c) of Table 5.[78] In 1438 Les Halles was the residence of more wealthy Parisians than in the rest of Paris put together so, even though the region contained some 40 per cent of confiscated property, this was slightly below the proportion that might be anticipated. Indeed, if Grève, with 25 per cent of the taxable population, contained 198

[72] See Guerout, 'Fiscalité', *BEC* 130 (1972), 83–106, 419–30; J. Favier, 'Les Rôles d'impôt parisiens du XV^e^ siècle (à propos d'un article récent)', ibid. 467–91; Guerout, 'Fiscalité, . . . (réponse à M. Jean Favier)', *BEC* 131 (1973), 177–85.

[73] Guerout, 'Fiscalité' (1972), 89.

[74] *Bourgeois*, 149 n. 1.

[75] Favier, *Contribuables*, 159 n. 1.

[76] The most useful works have been Jaillot, *Recherches critiques, historiques et topographiques sur la ville de Paris depuis ses commencements connus jusqu'à présent* (21 vols. in 5, Paris, 1772–5); J. Hillairet, *Dictionnaire historique des rues de Paris* (2 vols., Paris, 1963). Also invaluable is F. Boudon, A. Chastel, H. Couzy, and F. Hamon, *Système de l'architecture urbaine: Le Quartier des Halles à Paris* (2 vols., CNRS, Paris, 1977) while H. Legrand, *Paris en 1380: Plans de restitution* (HGP, Paris, 1868) gives an overall view that may be complemented by reproductions of sixteenth and seventeenth century maps, especially that of Truschet and Hoyau (1550). The never-completed work of A. Berty *et al.*, *Topographie historique du vieux Paris*, was less helpful when tracing old street names.

[77] The rue des Deffichaulx and the rue Jehantian (Sauval, iii. 298, 565).

[78] Favier, *Contribuables*, 269–82. For the general location of these quarters see ibid. 20; the Dalier quarter is, however, in Les Halles rather than on the left bank (Guerout, 'Fiscalité' (1972), 105, 111; see Ch. 6, n. 24).



MAP 4. The distribution of confiscated property in Paris

confiscated houses, one might expect Les Halles, with 55 per cent, to have not 226 houses, but over 430.

The four regions of Paris represent fairly large divisions; we need to seek out the concentrations of Armagnac dwellings rather more precisely. Map 4 is a schematic representation of all streets with more than one confiscation. In Les Halles, the region with the largest number of confiscations overall, it is clear there is a division between north and south. In the area around the rue Saint-Honoré and to the south of it there were a significant number of Armagnac properties. Indeed, as one entered Paris by the Porte Saint-Honoré (A), the first large house on the left was the Hôtel d'Angennes, confiscated from Regnault d'Angennes, next door to the Hôtel d'Armagnac.[79] Almost opposite was a confiscated house on the corner of the rue Jean-Saint-Denis.[80] Moving along and beyond the rue Saint-Honoré one would have come to ever more confiscated properties, while turning left at the rue du Nesle led to a modest cluster near the Hôtel d'Orléans (B).[81]

In the area south of the rue Saint-Honoré it is difficult to find a street in which there was no confiscated property under the administration of the commissioners. In addition to the important *hôtels* of the duke of Alençon (C)[82] and of the de La Trémoïlle family (D)[83] there were dozens of smaller houses, in the area round the Louvre, and between there and the rue Saint-Denis. We are here in an area defined by Favier as one of the principal residential districts for the aristocracy and officers of the royal household, merging as we proceed eastwards with a prosperous locality favoured by men who moved comfortably between the worlds of commerce and of local and national government.[84] It is this rectangle in and south of the rue Saint-Honoré that gives to Les Halles its majority of confiscations.

On the other hand, as we move north, away from the rue Saint-Honoré and into the district of the small businessmen who formed the core of Les Halles proper—that is, the commercial and market area

[79] Sauval, iii. 293–4. Both *hôtels* are within the site of the Palais Royal.

[80] Ibid. 163.

[81] Numerous references in the accounts to houses in the rue Saint-Honoré (called in places the rue de Château-Festu and the rue de la Charonnerie: Sauval, iii. 284) and around the rue de Nesle, rue de Four, and rue des Prouvaires.

[82] Sauval, iii. 576.

[83] The Hôtel de La Trémoïlle was supposed to have been sold to one Jeanette Alexandre and subsequently confiscated, but was occupied *de facto* by the 'Burgundian' brother Jean 'disant lui appartenir de droite ligne' (Sauval, iii. 287, 312).

[84] Favier, *Paris*, 110–11, 113; Favier, *Contribuables*, plan no. 3 (p. 69).

—the numbers begin to thin out. This suggests, possibly, that this was Burgundian territory. Certainly the Hôtel d'Artois (E), which became the Paris home of the Valois dukes of Burgundy, was one of the most important buildings in the locality. It was somewhat separate from the residences of the rest of the high aristocracy. The famous tower of John the Fearless, which still stands today, recalls the contemporary Italian fashion whereby the urban nobility manifested their influence in the towns through displays of military strength and, above all, by the possession of a fortified tower.[85] After the downfall of the Cabochiens in 1413 John the Fearless had complained of reprisals against his servants living near his *hôtel* and of suspicions that he was seeking to organize a rising of the people of Paris, and especially of Les Halles.[86] Accordingly, a search for Armagnac houses is, if not entirely vain, at least much less fruitful than elsewhere in the region. In the rue Montmartre (F), the principal street in the triangle between the rue Saint-Denis and the rue Saint-Honoré, only three confiscations occurred, compared with eight in a similar length of the rue Saint-Honoré and nine in the rue Saint-Germain-l'Auxerrois.

Having completed a survey of the Halles region, one may cross the Pont aux Meuniers (G) on to the Île de la Cité. Here the 'grand hôtel qui fut á messire Jean Juvénal, chevalier', in the ill-famed rue de Glatigny, catches one's attention (H).[87] This was by no means an isolated case: backing on to the Juvénal mansion was the house of Aleaume Cachemarée, *huissier* at the *Parlement* of Poitiers. However, there were perhaps only twenty-one confiscations made on the island, some 3.7 per cent of the total. This is a small proportion, even when the limited size and population of the region is taken into account. Only three streets—de la Calendre, de la Licorne, and des Marmousets—contained as many as three confiscated houses. Continuing on to the left bank, the position became rather different, for more than one in five confiscated houses were in the Université region. Although distanced from the main centres of commerce and government the region was far from being apolitical. It was an attractive residential area, favoured by almost all of the higher clergy—many of whom were closely linked with the world of politics—as well as by a number of the higher aristocracy and officers of

[85] Favier, *Paris*, 108–9; J. Heers, *Le Clan familial au Moyen Age* (Paris, 1974), 190–214.

[86] *Monstrelet*, vi. 130–1.

[87] Sauval, iii. 318, 580; cf. P. S. Lewis, *Later Medieval France: The Polity* (London, 1968), 68.

the Crown.[88] Furthermore, the university itself had had a role to play in most of the important political events of the reign of Charles VI.[89] Accordingly, one finds confiscated houses in the important roads of the region such as the rue Saint-André-des-Arts (I), and many others in the minor streets, including the rue de la Parcheminerie (J) and the rue Galande (K).

In both the Cité and Université regions the spread of confiscated property was fairly even, while there was a clear differentiation between north and south in Les Halles. The last of the four regions, Grève, is like Les Halles in that the distribution is uneven. In one respect this is inevitable: the walls of Charles V had included a substantial amount of undeveloped land and around the eastern perimeter was property on which little building had taken place by the fifteenth century; it was held by the abbey of Saint-Martin, the Temple, the church of Sainte-Catherine, and the abbey of the Celestins.[90] The rue de la Mortellerie (L) and the important rue Saint-Anthoine (M), on the other hand, saw numerous confiscations while, in general, the concentration of Armagnac property of the southern part of Les Halles continued across the rue Saint-Martin into the south-western part of Grève.

It is in the central area of the Grève region, however, that another very dense concentration of Armagnac property can be discerned. As Charles V and Charles VI had come increasingly to live at the Hôtel de Saint-Pol to the south of the rue Saint-Anthoine, so a number of leading officers had moved into this region.[91] Particularly popular was the area between the rue du Temple and the rue Vieille-du-Temple. Their successors to the properties, frequently their descendants by blood, continued to live in the district, and very many saw their property confiscated after 1418. Especially notable for this was the square largely filled today by the Hôtel Soubise, the home of the Archives Nationales (N).[92] Within this boundary only three or four tiny houses remained untouched, while the Hôtel de Clisson, the Hôtels de la Grande and de la Petite Rivière, the Hôtel de Nouvion, the Hôtel des Bordes, and the

[88] See Favier, *Paris*, 98, 109 (maps), and 115–16.

[89] C. Gross, 'The Political Influence of the University of Paris in the Middle Ages', *American Historical Review*, 6 (1900–1), 440–5.

[90] Legrand, *Paris en 1380* (maps).

[91] Favier, *Paris*, 111.

[92] For this area see the articles of L. Mirot, 'Notes et documents pour servir à l'histoire de la formation topographique de Hôtels de Rohan-Soubise au Marais', *Annuaire-bulletin de la SHF*, 55 (1918), 159–248, and 'L'Hôtel de Jean Le Mercier (Hôtel de Nouvion), rue de Paradis au Marais', *MSHP* 46 (1919), 157–222.

houses of Henri de Lissac and Hémon Raguier all came into the hands of the commissioners for confiscations.[93]

Just south of this block, in and around the rue des Blancs-Manteaux, the rue des Singes (O), and the rue de la Bretonnerie, many more houses were confiscated—too numerous to be listed separately. Hémon Raguier, mentioned at the end of the previous paragraph, could be taken as an example, however. This man was treasurer of Queen Isabelle of Bavaria, and in addition to his house in the rue de Paradis (now 'des Francs-Bourgeois') he possessed another in the rue des Blancs-Manteaux and one more in the rue Vieille-du-Temple nearby.[94] All these properties were given to Queen Isabelle in April 1423 as a contribution to debts owing since his departure from Paris.[95] His own links with the Armagnacs were compounded by those of his relative Raymond Raguier, who was even more deeply involved in French financial administration.[96] Raymond had two houses just south of Hémon's, in the rue Franc-Meurier (now 'de Moussy') and the rue du Bourg-Tibourg; another relative, Jean Raguier, had a house in the rue des Singes.[97]

From the extracts published by Sauval, it is possible to reconstruct this type of grouping, and also the spread of Armagnac property across Paris. It is clear that some confiscations were to be found all over the capital and that, in the last resort, it is impossible to say whether a man was Armagnac or Burgundian simply because of where he lived. The conclusion must be that the spread of confiscated property tells us less about direct political motivations than about society. A relatively small number of Armagnacs lived or owned property in the triangle formed by the rue Saint-Honoré, the rue Saint-Denis, and the walls of Paris. This was the site of the *hôtel* of the duke of Burgundy, also the home of many people connected with the markets at Les Halles. Equally marked is the concentration of Armagnac dwellings in the area south of the rue Saint-Honoré and in the centre of the Grève region—areas inhabited by wealthy merchants and officers, above all, officers of the household and of finance. The relatively large number of confiscations in the Université region is surprising if one thinks of 'Outre-Petit-Pont' as a political backwater; if one regards it as a fashionable residential area for

[93] Sauval, iii. 287–8, 302–3, 573. [94] Ibid. 320, 571, 573.
[95] Longnon, *Paris*, 85. [96] *Bourgeois*, 118 n. 3.
[97] Sauval, iii. 297, 304, 574; 302, 320. Raymond and, especially, Jean Raguier, like other Armagnacs, also possessed houses in the southern part of the Les Halles region (ibid. 291–2, 310–11, 320, 576).

bishops, civil servants and royal officers it begins to fit into a pattern. Caution is required: both 'parties' contained members of every social rank, confiscations struck members of the old Parisian bourgeoisie as well as men recently advanced in the service of the crown,[98] the prostitute as well as the archbishop.[99] The groupings will need to be investigated more closely when we consider the political society of fifteenth-century Paris, in the next chapter.

What was done with all the confiscated buildings? The first task for the commissioners was to stop them falling down, for no benefit could accrue to the king from houses that were dangerous or ruined. This was by no means an easy task since the Parisian house of the late Middle Ages was not a very substantial edifice, and required constant maintenance if it was not to deteriorate.[100] Several of the confiscated houses required some attention before they could be used but, as soon as possible, they were placed in other hands. The commission of 1421 had provided for the possibility that they could be sold, but there is no evidence that this was done on any scale; much more often they were rented out for the highest sum that could be obtained.[101] So much, at least, was the responsibility of the commissioners, but their plans might be subject to amendment in the light of political developments; above all, they had to take account of the changing policy of the government over the giving away of property—and the taking of it back.

Of the various uses to which confiscated property could be put, the most politically important was its grant to faithful supporters of the regime. As was demonstrated above, confiscations and gifts went hand in hand in the first months of Burgundian rule, but Henry V looked to the long term and tried to keep the confiscations in the possession of the Crown. In this respect, his most important initiatives appear to have been those of 10 July 1420, whereby all such land in the *prévôté* of Paris, including that which had been given away, was placed in the hands of the *prévôt*, and of 18 February 1422, whereby all gifts not made on his

[98] Favier, *Paris*, 181–3.

[99] Sauval, iii. 308, 316. One could give further examples of bishops.

[100] S. Roux, 'La Construction courante à Paris du milieu du XIV^{e} siècle à la fin du XV^{e} siêcle', *La Construction au Moyen Age: Histoire et archéologie* (Actes due Congrès de la Société des Historiens Médiévistes de l'Enseignement Supérieur Publique, Besançon, 1972 (Paris-Besançon, 1973)), 175–89.

[101] It is impossible to give an accurate estimate of the number of houses for which tenants were found. The latter parts of the accounts for the years after 1423 appear to have been concerned with this question.

authority were revoked and a new commission established.[102] These were by no means idle threats, as no less a servant of the Anglo-Burgundian cause than Laurent Calot, the eminent royal secretary, discovered to his cost. On 9 April 1420 he had been given the house vacated by Jean Chastenier, secretary to the dauphin.[103] When such gifts were revoked, he was obliged to attend an auction and bid for the rent, so that he could continue to live in a house on which he had spent large sums in 'sumpteuses reparacions'.[104] Calot was successful at the auction, driving off the opposition with a bid of 23*l.p.*, but the commissioners on confiscations thought that this was not enough and insisted on a rent of 36*l.p.*, which Calot was obliged to agree on 13 July 1422.[105]

Given this rigour in the revocation of grants, one would expect to find that new gifts were rare. Figure 1 shows this graphically; it displays the number of grants of property or rents in the town of Paris recorded by the Chancery in the years 1418–36.[106] After the Burgundian gifts of 1418, very few others are recorded before the establishment of the dual monarchy. It is obvious that the policy of Henry V in Paris was quite different from that which he had adopted in Normandy. While the gift of land in the duchy was one of the principal themes of the conquest, 'serving as incentive, payment and reward',[107] in Paris the emphasis was on clawing back the property given to Burgundian supporters. Not many new gifts were made to 'Burgundians', although Henry did regrant some donations caught by the general revocation early in 1422.[108] Nor did he make any provision for Englishmen other than his brothers the dukes of Clarence and Bedford—and only Bedford's gift was recorded at the Chancery.[109]

[102] AN, P 2298, p. 682; BN, MS n. a. fr. 7931, fo. 390^{r}.

[103] AN, JJ 171, no. 200. [104] Longnon, *Paris*, 272.

[105] Ibid. 273; this rent was reduced in 1427, in recognition of Calot's loyal services.

[106] Compiled from Longnon, *Paris*, and AN, JJ 170–5, including only gifts specifically described as falling within the *ville de Paris*. Grants of rents in the *prévôté* and *vicomté* refer normally to places outside the town.

[107] C. T. Allmand, 'The Lancastrian Land Settlement in Normandy, 1417–50', *Economic History Review*, 2nd ser., 21 (1968), 462. As Dr Allmand says (ibid. 465), the JJ registers provide no guide to the total number of grants made, but I suggest that, for Paris at least, they do indicate the trends over the period 1418–36.

[108] Longnon, *Paris*, 34–7; cf. AN, JJ 171, nos. 185–95; perhaps also the gift to Philippe de Morvilliers of the property of Pierre Ferron (Longnon, *Paris*, 34–7; cf. Sauval, iii. 289).

[109] Longnon, *Paris*, 43–5. For Clarence, see Sauval, iii. 288 (Hôtel de Clisson) and BM Rouen, MS Leber 5870, xii. fo. 51^{v} ('Hôtel Nigelle'?): recorded in the register of gifts of the *Chambre des Comptes*.



FIG. 1 Grants of property and rents in the town of Paris recorded in the registers of the Chancery

As the chart shows, matters were quite different after the deaths of Henry V and Charles VI, when the duke of Bedford was established as regent. In 1423 the number of grants reached a peak. This demonstrates very clearly Bedford's effort to consolidate his position in the capital at the beginning of his regency, to reward men who had advanced the Anglo-Burgundian cause in previous years, and encourage the loyalty of people who would be essential to the future of the regime. Faithful to his brother's memory in many things, Bedford plainly abandoned Henry's tight-fisted policy with regard to the dispensation of property in Paris. Amongst those whose careers had been spent in the capital, Gilles de Clamecy, *prévôt* of Paris in 1419–20, was one who benefited. He had a house in Paris already, of course, but it was his good fortune that it backed on to the rambling *hôtel* of the duke of Alençon. An important part of Alençon's possessions, known as the Hôtel d'Ostrevant, was

given to Clamecy in April 1423, so he was able to extend his dwelling in style.[110] However, it was people from outside Paris who gained most. Leaving aside the case of Queen Isabelle,[111] these were almost all men who had made their reputation in the service of the duke of Burgundy, men whom Bedford now had to bring on to his side. It was hoped that the duke himself would be pleased by such gifts to his followers and family. A gift to Guy, bastard of Burgundy, of a house in the rue Saint-Denis within yards of his father's *hôtel* was made 'pour contemplacion de nostre tres chier et tres amé oncle le duc de Bourgogne'.[112]

That people were still keen to gain possession of houses in Paris can be deduced from the disputes that these grants provoked. Gifts did not always bring immediate satisfaction to their recipients. Guy Guillebaut, treasurer and receiver-general of the duke of Burgundy, received a house in the rue Saint-Sauveur.[113] But when he went to take possession he found the concierge of Jacques de Montberon already installed there armed with a rival gift.[114] Guillebaut succeeded in establishing his ownership after a preliminary skirmish in the *Parlement*. Montberon received some compensation by a grant of rent-charges yielding 600*l.p.* per annum as a temporary measure which, it was hoped, would end when his own lands were released from occupation by the dauphinists.[115] Jean de Pulligny, known as 'Chapelain', was slightly less fortunate: he hoped that a grant of 600*l.t.* of rents on the goods of Pierre de l'Esclat and Jacques l'Empereur would enable him to secure a large house confiscated from l'Esclat to which he had laid claim some time before.[116] Unfortunately for Pulligny, this house had already been given to the Italian merchant Jean Sac, who was a formidable opponent in the

[110] AN, JJ 170, no. 252 (not printed by Longnon): cf. Sauval, iii. 293–4, 313, 654; Berty, *Topog. hist., i. Région du Louvre*, 15–16, 88–93.

[111] Longnon, *Paris*, 85–6.

[112] Ibid. 115. This house was confiscated from Guy Coustel, a cleric who had died at Meaux during the siege. His executors made strenuous efforts to recover the property before finally agreeing to make over the house to the bastard of Burgundy and his mother, Jacquette Saubert in return for 150*l.t.* (AN, X^{1a} 4793, fos. 380^{v}–381^{v}; X^{1a} 1480, fo. 336^{v}). In the *accord*, the guarantee from *maître* Jean Saubert—the bastard's mother's husband—has been crossed out; perhaps he did not want to be involved in this transaction relating to his wife's past (AN, X^{1c} 130, no. 83: 15 Dec. 1425).

[113] Longnon, *Paris*, 71–3.

[114] AN, X^{1c} 129 A, nos. 127–8.

[115] Longnon, *Paris*, 97–9. Montberon had already lost possession of the Hôtel de Besançon, given to him in 1418 (AN, JJ 170, no. 286), which had since been given to Guy Le Bouteillier (Longnon, *Paris*, 88–90).

[116] Longnon, *Paris*, 78–9; Sauval, iii. 289 (where Pulligny is called Jean Chapelain).

courts of law, and Sac's title was soon established beyond doubt.[117] It is plain that, even though there was a large number of confiscated houses in Paris, some were particularly attractive to would-be beneficiaries.

The Chancery recorded only one grant to an Englishman in Paris in 1423, that of the Hôtel des Préaux in the rue des Barrés, given to Richard Wydeville, Bedford's chamberlain, in June.[118] From other sources one can find a few more,[119] but it is evident that Bedford's policy at that stage was to build up his 'Burgundian' support. The balance shifted slightly over the next two years. Bedford himself appropriated the Hôtel de Clisson in June 1424, while Sir John Handford was given a prestigious house in the rue des Bourdonnois.[120] In the months that preceded Bedford's departure for England at the end of 1425 several more gifts were made. While these included donations to Ralph Parker,[121] royal secretary, and to Bedford's four trumpeters,[122] the most important were to Lord Willoughby, the earl of Warwick, and Sir Walter Hungerford. Willoughby received the greatest prize: the enormous *hôtel* of the dukes of Orléans.[123] This *hôtel*, together with its gardens, covered almost 12,000 square yards; like the Hôtel d'Artois of the dukes of Burgundy it straddled the old walls of Paris in the Les Halles quarter.[124] Taken together with the possessions of the count of Vendôme on the left bank (which he claimed by virtue of his title to the county)[125] this made Willoughby perhaps the greatest secular landowner in Paris after Bedford, ahead even of Philip the Good. One can understand why he was prepared to hold out to the end in the defence of Paris, even when the situation was desperate.[126] Warwick and Hungerford had been slightly less lavishly treated, but they both obtained important properties, in the centre of the Grève region. Their gifts were made with the

[117] Longnon, *Paris*, 61–5; BN, MS Clair. 763, p. 108; AN, Y 5230, fo. 30^{v}.

[118] Longnon, *Paris*, 105–6; Wydeville had been given the lordship of Préaux in Normandy in 1418 (ibid. 106 n. 1). He was the father of Richard Wydeville, first Lord Rivers, who married Bedford's widow Jacquetta of Luxembourg (cf. *DNB*, xxi. 885).

[119] e.g. N. Burdet and W. Buckton (below, nn. 134, 137). The earl of Salisbury was given the Hôtel d'Arras in March 1423 (Sauval, iii. 317).

[120] Longnon, *Paris*, 135–7, 124–5; Sauval, iii. 312.

[121] Longnon, *Paris*, 149–52. Cf. below, n. 167.

[122] Sauval, iii. 319, 321.

[123] Longnon, *Paris*, 156–8; still called at this date the Hôtel de 'Behaigne' or Bohème.

[124] Boudon *et al.*, *Quartier des Halles*, i. 186–8.

[125] Longnon, *Paris*, 156 n. 1.

[126] *Fauquembergue*, iii. 178–94: he was the only Englishman to attend the final meetings at which the security of Paris was discussed, Jan.–Mar. 1436.

explanation that they needed somewhere to live in Paris when they came to the capital on royal business.[127]

These and other gifts of 1425 can be seen as an effort on the part of the regent to consolidate the English position in Paris before he left France for a lengthy stay in his home country. Gifts of land and money would be forbidden during his absence.[128] More generally, one can say that gifts to Englishmen were always made with a definite purpose in mind: the recipients were members of Bedford's household and entourage, important councillors, or soldiers who had responsibilities in or around Paris. Or they might be all of these things, as was Sir John Fastolf, who asserted that he had a gift of four houses (that is, four made into one) in the rue des Fossés-Saint-Germain.[129]

Whether on account of their connections with Bedford or because of their involvement in the war most Englishmen spent only a limited amount of time in Paris. John Strelly and William Bedford, *varlets de chambre* of the regent, were given lands in the *prévôté* and *vicomté* of Paris which they found that they were unable to look after properly because they were continually in royal service. They assigned them to Pierre Bouchart, Bedford Herald, in 1431.[130] If seldom in Paris, the English may have lacked commitment to their property there. The *Bourgeois* claimed that no Englishmen except Bedford had even so much as a fireplace built.[131] Naturally, they preferred 'getting' to 'spending', and expenses were likely to be high if a building had been empty for several years. This meant that property that had been given away often suffered from the neglect afflicting many buildings in Paris at this time: in 1428 letters were issued reminding recipients of gifts of their responsibilities.[132] Apart from the costs of repairs, there was the vexed question of the rent-charges with which many houses were burdened. Individuals and institutions were assiduous in claiming these long-established endowments, but Englishmen were no more enthusiastic than anyone else about paying.[133] In the last resort, Sir Nicholas Burdet was prepared to pay seven gold nobles towards arrears of these rents rather

[127] Longnon, *Paris*, 177–80, 196–7. Despite the utilitarian purpose of the grants, Warwick's was for 'ses hoirs et ayans cause', Hungerford's for 'ses hoirs venant de lui en loyal mariage'.

[128] AN, X^{1a} 8603, fo. 90^{r}.

[129] Sauval, iii. 320: 'desquels a joui M. Jean Fastolf, chevalier anglois, sous ombre d'un don qu'il disoit en avoir'. I know of no evidence for Fastolf's gift other than this sceptical comment.

[130] ADSM, Tabellionage de Rouen, 1430–1, fo. 351^{r}: 20 July 1431.

[131] *Bourgeois*, 320.

[132] *Ordonnances*, xiii. 138–40.

[133] For this issue see *English Suits*, 16–17.

than lose possession of his Paris house, but it took until October 1432 to reach that compromise and the original gift had been made on 11 June 1423.[134]

Burdet's opponent in that dispute was the relatively wealthy Franco-Italian esquire, Jean Spifame, acting for his young son. Fixed rents were a valued source of income for such individuals, but for institutions they were vitally important. Problems with confiscated property gave one more twist to the downward spiral into which their finances were locked. Hence the frustrations of the College de Beauvais when Sir William Buckton failed to live up to his obligations. The college claimed 30*s.p.* annual rent on the house at the Sign of the Star in the rue des Prouvoires, abandoned by Jean de La Cloche. Confiscated, it was occupied first by Pierre Girault, receiver of *aides* in Paris, who neglected to pay the 30*s.p.* in 1422.[135] The next year Girault paid 16*s.p.* before vacating the house, to be replaced by a 'chevalier anglois'.[136] In due course this knight promised to pay the rent, but ready money was slow to materialize and so the college agreed to a bargain whereby the Englishman, now named as William Buckton, paid 22*s.* 6*d. p.* towards arrears up to Easter 1428.[137] Unfortunately for the college, matters did not improve at all in subsequent years. Buckton was taken to court but failed to appear on four occasions and, although this should have been sufficient for the college to win their case by default, no ruling was made and no money received. Indeed, having spent 40*s.p.* on preparing documents for the case by the time the English were expelled from Paris, the college had found Buckton's tenure of the house to be a liability in every respect.[138]

Although slow to make any necessary payments, the English were keen to secure possession of their gifts. Buckton no doubt found his house useful when he was captain of the Bastille in the 1430s. Robert Brit, esquire, was quick to defend his grant of the lands of Charles and Milet de Vaudetar when this was challenged by other members of the

[134] AN, X^{1c} 144, nos. 65–6. Burdet's house in the rue Neuve-Saint-Merri had been confiscated from the late vicomte d'Acy, Jean La Personne. The *prévôt* of Paris had ordered Burdet to 'garnir ycelle maison de biens meubles exploictables', in order to guarantee that he would or could pay the arrears: perhaps the house was in a rather bare state.

[135] AN, H^3 2785^7 (1422), fo. 22^r. [136] Ibid. (1423–4), fo. 14^r.

[137] Ibid. (1424–5), fo. 22^v: 'donné a ung chevalier anglois lequel avoit dit quil paieroit'; (1425–6), fo. 26^r; (1426–7), fo. 33^v; (1427–8), fos. 1^v, 29^r.

[138] Ibid. (1430–2). fo. 77^v; H^3 2785^8 (1432–5), fos. 2^r, 35^r, 44^r, 44^v; (1435–8), fo. 50^r.

Vaudetar family.[139] The earl of Suffolk thought it worth his while to embark on a case at the *Parlement* in order to establish his right to a house confiscated from the L'Orfèvre family.[140] He also possessed the Hôtel d'Aligré on the left bank, given first to Arthur de Richemont and then to Suffolk after Richemont's defection from the Burgundians.[141] Suffolk evidently lived in the Hôtel d'Aligré; at least he decided to evict his noisy and badly behaved neighbour, Catherine de Lannoy.[142] Since his household at this time probably included Gilles Binchois, one of the most important musicians of the fifteenth century, Suffolk would have wished for a peaceful environment.[143] He did not, however, bother to pay the rents due to the Hôtel de Ville.[144]

Suffolk was probably a fairly regular visitor to Paris during the 1420s. However, he was in England from 1431 onwards and his Hôtel d'Aligré came into the possession of the duke of Bedford.[145] This was but one more step in the development whereby the regent was obliged to maintain the princely and courtly life of Paris almost single-handed. It follows that Bedford's own residences were of special importance in the geography of Lancastrian Paris.

For his principal home as regent, Bedford selected the Hôtel des Tournelles, occupied by various princes in the first decades of the fifteenth century, and lately vacated by Queen Isabelle.[146] This large *hôtel* near the Bastille was given to him on the authority of Philip the Good and the *Grand Conseil* on 8 October 1422, even before Charles VI was dead.[147] It was there that he stayed with his wife, Anne of Burgundy, after their marriage in June 1423, and Monstrelet comments on the building works undertaken then.[148] Evidently this work had been planned earlier in the year, for on 11 March 1423 Bedford had arranged

[139] Brit was given the lands and possessions, in Paris and outside, on 20 July 1427 (Longnon, *Paris*, 269–70); on 13 Aug. this was challenged by Pierre and Denise de Vaudetar at the Châtelet, and on the 18th the dispute was sent to the *Requêtes du Palais* for resolution, while the crops were gathered and put in a safe place (AN, Y 5229, fos. 67^{v}, 68^{v}). Meanwhile the *Chambre des Comptes* was required to verify the gift (BN, MS n. a. fr. 7931, fo. 391^{r}). But because the *Requêtes* were staffed by relatives of the Vaudetars a special commission had to be appointed (Autrand, *Naissance*, 296).

[140] *English Suits*, 86–91. [141] Sauval, iii. 316.

[142] 'Pour son mauvais gouvernement et les noises qui y etoient souvent' (ibid. 318).

[143] *The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians*, ed. S. Sadie (20 vols., London, 1980), ii. 709. Binchois probably transferred from Suffolk's household to that of the duke of Burgundy between 1424 and 1427. See also Ch. 8, n. 86.

[144] *Comptes du domaine*, i, cols. 4, 54, 60, 212; AN, X^{1c} 144, no. 70.

[145] *DNB*, xvi. 51; Sauval, iii. 579. [146] Favier, *Paris*, 105, 108.

[147] BM Rouen, MS Leber 5870, xii, fo. 51^{r}. [148] *Monstrelet*, iv. 151.

for 1,000*l.t.* to be paid from Norman finances to Jean de Saint-Yon for 'certain reperacions' to his *hôtel* in Paris, and for other expenses in the capital.[149] Various additions were made to the ground of the Tournelles during Bedford's regency. Of these, the most important was the purchase of eight and a half *arpents* of land from the financially hard-pressed church of Sainte-Catherine-du-Val-des-Écoliers on 17 June 1425,[150] but he also made acquisitions from individuals. Jean Le Bourguignon, a labourer and blacksmith living nearby at the Porte Barbette, sold two pieces of land that helped to extend the grounds of the Tournelles towards the walls of Paris, for which he received 200*l.t.*[151] Although Charles VII annulled Bedford's purchase of the land of Sainte-Catherine,[152] the palace continued to be used by the kings of France until 1559, when Henri II was killed while jousting there. The work on the Tournelles was Bedford's material legacy to Paris; the water-system installed in the quarter for the major *hôtels* and the abbey of the Celestins lasted until 1484, although by then it was in considerable need of an overhaul.[153]

The Tournelles was the residence most associated with Bedford's regency in Paris. When in the capital, it was there that he spent most of his time—and money. It was not, however, his only important house in Paris. Before the death of Henry V he had been given the Hôtels de la Grande Rivière and de la Petite Rivière, confiscated from the count of Dammartin, and in June 1424 his holdings were consolidated when he was given the adjacent Hôtel de Clisson.[154] Once in possession of these four large houses in the aristocratic part of the Grève region, he turned his attention to another part of Paris: the area near the Louvre. In December 1424 he held expensive festivities at the Paris *hôtel* of the

[149] BN, PO 2780, Saint-Yon nos. 34–5.

[150] AN, L 919 no. 33. This document was seen by Jaillot in the eighteenth century in the archives of Sainte-Catherine (Jaillot, *Recherches*, iii, 'Saint-Anthoine', 133). There is also a copy in BN, MS Dupuy 223, fos. 21^{r}–23^{r}.

[151] AN, P 76^{2}, no. 63: 3 Sept. 1428. Paid by Jean de Saint-Yon.

[152] Jaillot, *Recherches*, iii. 133 AN, L 919, no. 35. The sale to 'Jehan en son vivant soy disant duc de Bethfort en Angleterre', made 'par contrainte et importunité', was cancelled in return for prayers for the king and queen.

[153] In 1484, the pipes were said to 'tres souvent se rompent et crevent aux champs, parce qu'ils sont trop vieux et furent faits du temps que le duc de Bethfort et autres nos anciens ennemis tenoient et occupoient nostre dite ville de Paris' ('Catalogue des manuscrits entrés a la Bibliothèque de 1903 à 1905', *Bulletin de la Bibliothèque et des Travaux Historiques de la Ville de Paris*, 2 (1907), 49).

[154] Longnon, *Paris*, 43–5, 135–7.

duke of Bourbon, who had been a prisoner in England since the French defeat at Agincourt.[155] Two years later, Bedford made an astute deal whereby he bought the Hôtel de Bourbon outright. The key to the 'purchase' was the perennial problem of rent-charges, for the *hôtel* had been built in the fourteenth century on a site pieced together from some fifteen parcels of land, on which the duke was still forced to pay assorted dues during the time of his imprisonment.[156] Since he was concentrating on trying to pay his ransom the duke was in no position to meet the demands for rents. It does not seem that his concierge had much success in maintaining the building in good order since, by 1424, it was 'wit, vague, ruyneux, et inhabitable', and the chapter of Saint-Germain-l'Auxerrois, the principal claimants of rents on the territory, took steps to protect their income.[157] It was at this point that Bedford not only occupied the *hôtel* for his celebrations, but detected the possibility of a bargain: while he was in England in 1425–7 he prevailed on Bourbon to give him his house in Paris, in return for which Bedford undertook to pay off the considerable arrears of rents.[158] Unfortunately, it seems unlikely that he did so, and when Bourbon died in captivity his heir was faced with an enormous demand for arrears, on which no agreement was reached until 1449.[159]

Thus Bedford obtained possession of the Hôtel des Tournelles, the Hôtels de Clisson, de la Grande and de la Petite Rivière, and du Bourbon. He is also mentioned as occupying the Hôtel d'Alençon, not far from the *hôtel* of the duke of Bourbon[160] and, as mentioned above, obtained the Hôtel d'Aligré from Suffolk in the 1430s. It was by no means unusual for important princes to possess more than one house in Paris. The duke of Berry had owned six in the town, and five more in the countryside nearby,[161] and it is obvious that Bedford hoped to maintain a life-style appropriate to his own rank. The practical question of how he made use of all his houses is, however, very obscure, and it is most

[155] *Bourgeois*, 202. For Bourbon's captivity, see now Jones, 'Beaufort Family', 32–9.

[156] Boudon *et al.*, *Quartier des Halles*, i. 187, 234 n. 5.

[157] AN, S (Property of suppressed ecclesiastical institutions) 60A; letters of 4 Nov. 1425 concerning the *cries* of the *hôtel*, 1424–5. In 1421 it had been inhabited by one Bertrand Vachere, 'comme concierge' (Sauval, iii. 293, 654).

[158] AN, S 60B (Dossier, Hôtel de Petit-Bourbon); vidimus of letters signed by Bourbon at the 'ostel des religieux carmes a Londres': 20 Dec. 1426.

[159] AN, S 60B; *accord* of 30 May 1449.

[160] Sauval, iii. 576.

[161] Favier, *Paris*, 108.



MAP 5. English possessions in Paris 1420–1436
Source: Compiled from references given in the text and from others in Sauval, vol. 3.

unfortunate that Bedford's household accounts for the year 1427–8 were destroyed during the revolution of 1871.[162] It appears that Bedford's bakery (staffed by Englishmen and Frenchmen) was established at the Hôtel de la Rivière, along with other auxiliaries such as the coachmen (*varlez des charioz*) of the duchess.[163] Next door, the Hôtel de Clisson was put to a variety of uses: first rented to a Breton knight, Thomas Carnavelet, it was then occupied in turn by Raoul Le Sage

[162] Some brief extracts made by Vallet de Viriville (BN, MS n. a. fr. 5085, fo. 40^{v}) shed no light on the question of Bedford's Paris houses.

[163] Longnon, *Paris*, 344—presumably La Grande Rivière.

—one of the regent's Norman councillors—and by a trusted English adviser, Sir John Popham.[164]

The possessions of Bedford, and of other Englishmen to Paris, are summarized in Map 5.[165] It is evident that the English occupied houses in Paris appropriate to their rank and role in the capital. John Fastolf, John Popham, and Richard Wydeville, important councillors of the regent, had houses close to one or other of his properties.[166] Ralph Parker, royal secretary, was also to hand while John Harbotel, master of the ordnance, was established in a house near the Tournelles, and the Bastille.[167] Very few Englishmen had any interests on the left bank: in the main they occupied houses to the south of Les Halles and in the centre of Grève that had been confiscated from some of the wealthiest and most influential of the Armagnacs.[168]

A final illustration of the varied issues raised by the practice of the confiscation and regranting of property may be taken from the forfeitures of men who plotted against the English. The vast majority of confiscated properties had belonged to the Armagnacs of 1413–18, but involvement in a conspiracy to restore Charles VII to his capital was obviously an equally serious case of *lèse-majesté*. One of the most important of these plots was that of March 1430 and it was inevitable that the ringleaders should have had their property confiscated.[169] The goods of the executed Jean de Montfort appear in the register of confiscations for 1427–34,[170] while most of the possessions of Jacques Perdriel, who had succeeded in making good his escape when the scheme was exposed, were given to an illegitimate son of the house of

[164] Sauval, iii. 302.

[165] In most cases the locations can be identified with some precision, but it is evident that in a few cases the grant or other reference indicates only the approximate site of the property. Occasionally, a gift will give no indication of the whereabouts of the property, thus the grant to William Peck of the possessions of Guillaume Chanteprime (AN, JJ 175, no. 150).

[166] Sauval, iii. 320, 573; Longnon, *Paris*, 297–8.

[167] In addition to his house in the rue de la Verrerie (Longnon, *Paris*, 150–2), Parker claimed a house in the rue Vieille-du-Temple, but here the *Chambre des Comptes* ruled that another gift had precedence (BM Rouen, MS Leber 5870, xii, fo. 168^{r}; cf. Longnon, *Paris*, 149–50, 280–1). For Harbotel, see Longnon, *Paris*, 283–4.

[168] 'L'intermède anglais perturba le monde des propriétaires, mais non l'espace social de Paris' observes Favier (*Paris*, 112).

[169] For this plot, see Longnon, *Paris*, 301–8.

[170] Sauval, iii. 586. Houses of de Montfort in the rues de la Platrière and des Prouvaires (the former in need of repair) are mentioned in AN, Y 5230, fos. 7^{v}, 8^{v}: 10 and 12 June 1430.

Lancaster, John, bastard of Clarence.[171] Another house confiscated in 1430, the Hôtel de L'Ours at the Porte Baudoyer, was in such a dangerous state that special provision had to be made to render it habitable, and it was occupied subsequently by the pro-English *quartenier* of the district round the Bastille, Jacques de Roye, until his expulsion from Paris along with his masters.[172]

The property that provoked the most controversy was the house confiscated from Jean de La Chapelle, a clerk at the *Chambre des Comptes*. He evidently was one of the most important men in the 1430 conspiracy, one of two to be quartered as well as hung.[173] All his goods in the town, *prévôté*, and *vicomté* of Paris were given to the lord of l'Isle-Adam on 13 April 1430, just five days after La Chapelle's execution.[174] Some months later, La Chapelle's goods were also included amongst other sources of 4,000*l.t.* of annual rent given to l'Isle-Adam for his good services to the Lancastrian cause.[175] However, well before this second grant, opposition to l'Isle-Adam's possession had sprung up in the shape of La Chapelle's widow, who claimed that her dowry of income from a rent-charge should be paid back to her.[176] Against the request of l'Isle-Adam and the *procureur du roi* for her eviction—'faire widier la vesve'—she requested that the king make provision for her according to God's will, adding that knights were supposed to look after people in her position.[177] The response to this was somewhat less than chivalrous, since the *procureur du roi* maintained that even if the king was protector of widows and orphans he could not perpetrate an injustice even on himself: charity, after all, begins at home.[178] He added that her house was really too large for a widow and

[171] Sauval, iii. 586. According to the *Chronique des Cordeliers*, the bastard of Clarence came to Paris 'a grosse puissance dengloix' in April 1430 at the request of l'Isle-Adam, because of the strength of the conspiracy (BN, MS fr. 23081, fo. 496^{v}). After the death of their first recipient, Perdriel's lands were given to Richard, bastard of Bedford, by 5 April 1435 (BN, MS Clair. 763, p. 140).

[172] F. Olivier-Martin, 'Sentences civiles du Châtelet de Paris (1395–1505)', *Nouvelle RHDFE*, 38 (1914), 101–2; *Bourgeois*, 71 n. 3.

[173] *Fauquembergue*, ii. 337.

[174] Longnon, *Paris*, 309–10: letters given at Peronne, 'par le roy, a la relacion de monseigneur le duc de Bourgongne, lieutenant'.

[175] Ibid. 313–16: 4 Oct. 1430. This gift was made by the Lancastrian council at Rouen.

[176] AN, X^{1a} 4796, fo. 222^{v}: 26 June 1430.

[177] Ibid. fo. 223: 'se doivent a ce emploier les chevaliers et a ce est leur profession'. She rejected the suggestion that she could obtain provision privately from l'Isle-Adam, 'qui est grant seigneur et va et vient par lordenance du roy'.

[178] Ibid.: 'se le roy est protecteur des vesves et orphenins, pour ce ne doit il faire iniustice a autruy ne a soy mesmes *quia caritas incepit a se ipso*'.

children, and that even if they did obtain the dowry most of the money would go on rents; it would be better to hire a small house for 10 or 12 francs *per annum* and spend the rest of the money on food.[179]

A fortnight later, l'Isle-Adam was still no nearer to having possession of his house and he and the *procureur du roi* confessed themselves baffled by the widow's erratic replies to their requests for information.[180] None the less, the captain of Paris offered to pay the dowry for a year while the case was concluded, an offer that the widow, looking to the future, declared to be inadequate.[181] For her part, she declared that l'Isle-Adam's chief interest was in stripping La Chapelle's lands and gathering the crops, a claim not without foundation as, at the same time, La Chapelle's son-in-law *maître* Pierre Le Leu (evidently, not all the deceased's children were mere infants) was complaining at the Châtelet against work being carried out on La Chapelle's lands near Saint-Lazare to the detriment of his wife's interests.[182] Meanwhile, the widow held on to possession of her house, seeing it as her best security.[183]

The solution finally brought about, after extensive mediation by the *Parlement*, gave to the widow the properties that her husband had possessed in Paris, and all those elsewhere went to l'Isle-Adam.[184] There is, however, an intriguing sequel to the story since by 4 February 1434 Catherine was married again, this time to a certain Thomas More, esquire, who it seems was none other than the Englishman who had been captain of the Bastille in 1431.[185] It is plain that the resourceful-

[179] Ibid. The next day (27 June 1430: ibid., fo. 224^{v}) the *procureur du roi* and l'Isle-Adam offered to pay some money, without prejudice, if she would allow l'Isle-Adam the house.

[180] The widow, they said, 'donne responses si generales et si estranges quilz ny pevent riens veoir de cler et ne quiert que broillier la matiere pour cuider avoir provision' (AN, X^{1a} 4796, fo. 226^{v}: 10 July 1430).

[181] Ibid.

[182] AN, Y 5230, fos. 11^{r}, 26^{v}: 19 June and 12 July 1430. On the first date Le Leu (an advocate at the Châtelet) demanded La Chapelle's goods on behalf of his wife, to which the *procureur du roi* replied that the king could do nothing until l'Isle-Adam and his heirs died out. The second entry concerns lands at La Villette Saint-Lazare, being worked on behalf of l'Isle-Adam by Jean Petit, 'dit Pigale': the court ruled that Petit should not touch them.

[183] AN, X^{1a} 4796, fos. 236^{v}, 240^{r}: 4 and 17 Aug. 1430.

[184] AN, X^{1a} 1481, fos. 31^{r}–35^{r}; Sauval, iii. 586–7.

[185] AN, X^{1a} 4797, fo. 138^{r}. More was captain of Moret-en-Gâtinois in February 1428 and on 12 June of that year joined the force brought by Salisbury from England as captain of 10 men-at-arms and 30 archers (BN, MS fr. 4484, fo. 14^{v}, 126^{v}). For his time as captain of the Bastille, see Table 4. I know of no other man of this (illustrious) name in Paris at this period, and Catherine's husband and the captain of the Bastille were both esquires.

ness of Catherine de La Chapelle was not confined to the pursuit of her interests in the courts of law. All the same, this was not a union that could survive the English expulsion from Paris: in 1437 Catherine, widow of Jean de La Chapelle, and her children were living in the family house in the rue Frogier-l'Asnier.[186] No mention is made of her husband who, by this time, was occupied in the wars in Normandy and was securing his possessions in the *bailliage* of Caen.[187]

Catherine de La Chapelle was lucky; she was able to obtain a partial restitution of her property within a year of its confiscation. Many of those who lost their possessions earlier, in 1418, had to wait until 1436 before they could begin to recover what they had lost, and for most of the rest the task fell to their heirs. In the meantime some five or six hundred confiscated houses in the capital had exercised the talents of a number of leading administrators, for the problems posed by the flight of the Armagnacs were considerable. It was not only after 1436 that peace had to be restored to society. Under the auspices of the Anglo-Burgundian rulers, and thanks especially to the commissioners of confiscations, the rule of law (albeit a harsh law for the dauphinists) was gradually reasserted. At the same time, grants were brought under strict control, and made in response to particular requirements: by the time of Bedford's regency the Burgundians needed to be encouraged and the English—a few of them—needed to be housed. The losses and gains that followed the coup of 1418 are of interest less for the things involved than for the people, and for the society in which those people lived. For that reason, the study of enemy property—part of the administrative history of Anglo-Burgundian Paris—has also provided much of the background necessary to an investigation of political groups and attitudes.

[186] BN, MS fr. 8611, fo. 47^{v}.

[187] AN, 104 Mi (Collection Dom Lenoir), vol. 26, p. 223. I am indebted to Dr Robert Massey for this reference.

PART III

The People of Paris and the Anglo–Burgundian Regime

6

POLITICS AND SOCIETY

The image of Anglo-Burgundian Paris we have developed so far is that of a society administered and governed largely by consensus. Given the limited resources available, this was inevitable. A token presence of English and Burgundian soldiers and a few dozen erratic sergeants from the Châtelet could not keep an unwilling population in subjection and, though a *dizainier* could doubtless contribute much in the way of local knowledge, his primary loyalty was to his friends in the street and, after that, to the *prévôt des marchands* and the Hôtel de Ville. Thus, without some measure of agreement from the population at large, there could be little chance of action with the necessary common purpose. The final section of this book will describe the sources of this consensus and indicate its limitations. Inevitably, we will consider the relations between the Parisians and the English: how far they were able to act as allies and how, in the end, the regime could not be sustained. We will also discuss the cohesive effect of religion, and especially the large public ceremonies that were so numerous in this period. Before this, however, we should establish a more general picture of Parisian society at the time of the Burgundian ascendancy and the English intervention.

The society of the 1420s and 1430s was built on the uncertain foundations of the disrupted opening decades of the fifteenth century. The Anglo-Burgundian regime fell within a longer period known and remembered as 'le temps des divisions'.[1] From the perspective of 1440, contemporaries could argue readily that the divisions had already begun by 1411, and with them the cycle of banishments.[2] Within the period, people's political status at any time might be defined in terms of how they had fared in the past. Looking back from the relative stability of the early 1420s, Pierre Rousseau, *huissier* at the *Chambre des Comptes* and arch-informer against the Armagnacs, cited his expulsion from Paris in 1417 as a proof of his good 'Burgundian' character, to be taken into

[1] *English Suits*, 11.

[2] '. . . les divisions estoient ja commencées en ce royaulme' (AN, X^{2a} 22, fo. 84^{v}).

account together with his long service in office and good domestic life, as evidence that he was a worthy individual.[3] He was typical of many people who, from being followers of the Burgundian party, went on to support the English. The factionalism of 1411–18 helped to create a society that was ready to declare its allegiance to Henry V and the duke of Bedford.

Thus we cannot confine our attention simply to the years after 1420, or even 1418. Furthermore, many different Parisians compete for attention. Within the great mass of the urban population those who could be politically significant are hard indeed to distinguish. Bearing in mind the limitations of physical coercion in forcing anyone to obedience, it seems possible that even the most humble individual could influence the course of politics. There had been, for example, the unknown man who, in 1413, first raised the cry 'La Paix', which was taken up by the crowd and led to the collapse of the Cabochien movement.[4] In 1418, the young and plebian Perrinet Le Clerc opened the gates to the Burgundians,[5] while the Parisian whose crossbow-bolt halted the progress of Joan of Arc as she clambered towards the Porte Saint-Honoré is totally anonymous,[6] as indeed are the majority of his fellow militiamen whose combined efforts succeeded in destroying the myth of Joan's unstoppable crusade. The English occupation of Paris was finally brought to an end when the men keeping watch at the Porte Saint-Jacques allowed themselves to admit the waiting troops of the Constable de Richemont.[7] The leaders of the state and of the town depended on the support of a very wide range of men who occupied the most lowly positions in the institutions of the Crown or the municipality or—like the guards on the walls—no formal office at all.

Yet, although there was no limit on who might become involved in political events, it is arguable that this was not really a time of popular movements. The cry of an unknown individual may have triggered the collapse of the Cabochien movement, but the dénouement had in fact been prepared by negotiations amongst members of the royal council and bourgeoisie.[8] In 1418, Perrinet Le Clerc was able to make his mark on history only because his father happened to be a *quartenier* and so Perrinet could steal his keys to the gate; the Parisian resistance to Charles VII in 1429 was carefully orchestrated, and the man who admitted the French in 1436 was presumably a responsible individual under the supervision of a *dizainier*.

[3] AN, X^{1a} 4793, fo. 121^{r}. For Rousseau see also Bossuat, 'Rétablissement', 150.
[4] *Bourgeois*, 38. [5] *Monstrelet*, iii. 260–1, 268.
[6] *Bourgeois*, 245. [7] Ibid. 314. [8] Coville, *Cabochiens*, 346–53.

Perhaps, therefore, the broad outline of events—even events in which 'the people' played a major role—was laid down by a controlling élite.[9] Contemporaries were uncertain how to interpret the political importance of the common people. Sometimes their rulers sought a token of support from the whole population. In November 1422, at the beginning of the dual monarchy of Henry VI, the duke of Bedford and the chancellor received the oaths of the principal officers of the Crown and town, and went on to order the *prévôt des marchands* to summon the inhabitants of each of the *quartiers* of Paris in turn, so that they might swear allegiance to the Lancastrians.[10] After the exposure of a plot against the English at Christmas 1422, Bedford again instigated a comprehensive collection of oaths from the Parisians, down to the lowest estates.[11] On other occasions, however, the main priority was to secure the allegiance of the most important officers of the central government (such as the men of the *Parlement* and the *Chambre des Comptes*) together with that of the municipality, university, and the most important clerics.[12] While the government reserved the right to insist on any Frenchman taking an oath to the treaty of Troyes when required, it was only exacted automatically from people entering upon ecclesiastical benefices or public office, or from people doing homage for their lands.[13]

If we go back to the year 1418, we find evidence for both the existence and the composition of a controlling group in Paris. In August 1418

[9] One hesitates to advance a theory of a political élite, let alone to stress the importance of the associations to which the Parisians belonged, after reading the opinion of Richard Cobb—a great friend of the common people of Paris: 'Such an interpretation assumes that a popular movement cannot be self-led and that the common people are too stupid to look after things for themselves. It is a thesis that, for obvious reasons, has always had a strong appeal to the right-wing mind and to the intellectual, two studies in arrogance' (R. C. Cobb, *The Police and the People: French Popular Protest 1789–1820* (Oxford, 1970), 78). One can deflect this assault, which is also aimed at historians of 'various socialist and Marxist tendencies', by stating that even where the people were involved in large numbers it was not a time of popular movements.

[10] *Fauquembergue*, ii. 72–5. There is a lacuna in the records of the audiences of the Hôtel de Ville (between AN, Z^{1h} 7 and Z^{1h} 8), so it is impossible to tell how, or indeed whether, this was done.

[11] 'C'est assavoir, bourgoiz, mesnaigiers, charrettiers, bergers, vachers, porchers des abbayes, et les chamberieres et les moynes mesmes' (*Bourgeois*, 182–3).

[12] BL, MS Harley 861, fos. 37^{v}–39^{r}, contains the forms of oath to the treaty of Troyes by the chapter of Notre-Dame, the university, the vicar-general and officials of the bishop, and the *Parlement*.

[13] Wylie and Waugh, *Henry V*, iii. 227–8.

crowds had rioted and massacred many hundreds of men and women suspected of favouring the Armagnac party: the corpse of the count of Armagnac himself was dragged through the streets of Paris by children of the gutter.[14] This could be seen as a dramatic example of the influence of the common people over the course of politics: certainly, the chroniclers affirm that the Parisian bourgeoisie were simply horrified spectators or victims.[15] None the less, the response of the duke of Burgundy to these outrages is instructive for, while he sought broad support for his faction by proclaiming himself the champion of reform and of the abolition of taxes, he preferred his more menial followers to remain subordinate and to keep their distance.[16] Thus Duke John looked to a political élite to prevent a recurrence of the troubles: between 24 August and 10 September 1418, 1,602 people came forward to swear to be loyal to the king, the duke, and the town of Paris, to resist any threats to the same and prevent any unauthorized assembly.[17] Through these men the duke of Burgundy hoped to be able to keep both a secure Burgudian regime and peace in society.

It is fortunate that the record of this oath of allegiance has been preserved, for many of the people who pledged their support to the Burgundians in 1418 must have remained influential for as long as their faction stayed in control. Certainly, as a survey of a society the document is frustrating, since it very seldom gives the occupations of the bourgeois and is not arranged topographically. Some features stand out none the less. The 1,602 people on the roll constitute some 2 per cent of the population.[18] All are men, which is perhaps surprising given the wealth and prestige of certain female heads of families. When women were deemed capable of running businesses, keeping together the family fortunes during times of civil war, even training in medicine, it seems curious that their formal oaths of loyalty should not have been

[14] *Monstrelet*, iii. 271.

[15] Cf. B. Geremek, *Les Marginaux parisiens aux XIV^e et XV^e siècles* (Paris, 1976), 322–7. Clément de Fauquembergue reports the view that the upper classes knew nothing of what was to be unleashed by the lower orders, but adds the sceptical words 'si comme on disoit' (*Fauquembergue*, i. 159).

[16] The town executioner overstepped the mark not only by leading the massacre of the Armagnacs, but by shaking the duke by the hand and calling him brother-in-law. As punishment he was beheaded by his deputy (Geremek, *Marginaux*, 325; *Bourgeois*, 110).

[17] 'État des bourgeois', in Le Roux de Lincy and Tisserand (eds.), *Paris et ses historiens*, 371–89, preserves the content and layout of this important document; the original was destroyed in 1871.

[18] Assuming a total population of 60–100,000. Cf. Favier, *Contribuables*, 10.

required.[19] More predictable is the substantial number of clergy included in the list: 227 priests, ranging from canons and chaplains of Notre-Dame to men without benefices, comprise over 14 per cent of those who took the oath. Other than the clergy, many of whom possessed the degree of Master of Arts, 92 men have the title of *maître*: 6.7 per cent of laymen in this group had persevered with a university career long enough to obtain this degree. The roll distinguishes one other body of men: those with a function in the municipal organization. The *prévôt des marchands*, Noel Marchand, heads the list, and also noted are 4 *échevins*, 2 former *échevins*, the town clerk, 17 *quarteniers*, 38 *cinquanteniers* and 128 *dizainiers*.[20] The agents of the municipality constituted a further 11.9 per cent of the total and, as we have seen, operated the formal chain of command that extended from the Hôtel de Ville to the streets.

We have, therefore, a masculine élite of whom over a quarter were clerics or officers of the municipality. As one would expect from a predominantly Burgundian sample of the population, it was drawn particularly from those parts of Paris where support for the duke was greatest. It is a relatively simple matter to indicate the churches which sent representatives to take the oath. Amongst the clerics, a large number came from the two great foundations on the Île de la Cité: the Sainte-Chapelle and the cathedral of Notre-Dame. Especially amongst the supporting chaplains and clerks of these institutions and at Saint-Jean-Le-Rond and Saint-Denis-du-Pas, dependent on Notre-Dame, one can see a considerable readiness to come forward to join the ranks of the Burgundians. Elsewhere, the churches with pro-Burgundian clergy can be identified very much as one would expect, with a pronounced emphasis on the region of Les Halles, and particularly on the institutions along the rue Saint-Denis. (See Map 6.)[21] As for the clerics from

[19] Cf. Favier, *Contribuables*, 11–12; Favier, *Paris*, 264–6; Autrand, *Naissance*, 320–1. The unpublished version of Mme Autrand's thesis (Université de Paris-I, Doctorat d'État, 1978) contains an interesting chapter on the role of women in the families of the *gens du Parlement*. As for the opportunities available to women, because Phelipe La Chomete was 'ingenieuse et senclinoit a fait de medicine elle fu mise en ung lieu pour en savoir et y est bien experte'. Employed for a time by the duchess of Burgundy, her reputation declined after her separation from her second husband, who beat her (AN, X^{1a} 4796, fo. 264^{v}: 13 Feb. 1431).

[20] It is puzzling to find seventeen *quarteniers*, since there were only sixteen *quartiers*. However, there may have been a change of office while the oath was being taken: one *quartenier* took the oath several days after his colleagues ('État des bourgeois', 388).

[21] As in the previous chapter, I have indicated a division of the right bank along the rue Saint-Martin, which accords with the contemporary practice in tax administration.



MAP 6. The churches and the Oath of Allegiance of 1418
Note: The numerals show the number of clerics from an institution who took the Oath.

the Grève region, they almost all belonged to places bordering on to Les Halles: the churches of Saint-Martin-des-Champs and Saint-Nicolas-des-Champs, Saint-Merri and Saint-Jean-en-Grève all fall within the Burgundian sphere of influence, and are the four churches mentioned most often by the pro-Burgundian *Bourgeois* of Paris. From places further east, one monk came forward from the monastery of Saint-Anthoine-Le-Petit, but there was no one from the Temple, the Blancs-Manteaux, Sainte-Avoie, Les Billettes, Saint-Paul, Sainte-Catherine, or the Celestins, though these were all important institutions.

As far as the lay majority is concerned, the oath of allegiance is for the most part simply a bare list of names, without indication of place of

residence or occupation. One can go some way towards countering these limitations by means of a comparison with the tax-rolls which survive for the years 1421, 1423, and 1438, but again there are difficulties. The 1421 record, which is the fullest and closest in time, has lost the volume covering the whole of the region of Les Halles. The 1423 roll covers only 502 wealthy individuals who were able to find the ready money to make a bridging loan to the government,[22] and is not arranged topographically anyway. And the 1438 tax covers only 579 people assessed twenty troubled years later. In addition to these problems, the difficulty of making a secure identification in every case suggests that the tax records will be of only partial assistance.[23]

Even so, the identifications that we can make, albeit with varying degrees of confidence, suggest that 275 of the 1,475 laymen who took the oath of allegiance do appear in the tax-rolls later. The geographical distribution of these people is represented in Maps 7(a) and 7(b), according to the quarters in which they were taxed.[24] The incomplete roll of 1421 shows a preponderance of Burgundians on the Cité and left bank, at least as compared with the Grève region to the east of the right bank. But one is bound to suspect that many of the Burgundians of 1418 are missing from the 1421 register because they lived in Les Halles. Thus of the 117 people who can be identified in the 1423 roll, no less than 94 are missing from the incomplete roll of 1421, almost invariably because they lived west of the rue Saint-Martin.[25] The records for the 1438 assessment concern a smaller number of Burgundian supporters, for the vicissitudes of twenty years have taken their toll, and this was in any case a tax that struck only a small proportion of the population. Yet

[22] Guerout, 'Fiscalité', *BEC* 130 (1972), 75–9.

[23] As with the analysis of anti-Armagnac confiscations, all identifications and calculations are my own, but my wife has given invaluable assistance with the indexing of names. As for the identifications themselves, where a man is a *maître* or a *dizainier*, or has a very unusual name, one can be fairly confident in making a connection, but at the other extreme there are men whose names are repeated several times in the tax-rolls. One cannot know, for example, which of three Jean de Beauvais, three Jean des Champs or four Jean Le Fèvres took the oath of 1418: such people have had to be left out of account.

[24] I have followed the identifications of the quarters proposed by Favier (*Contribuables*, 19–20), except that I have indicated the 5 Burgundians of the Dalier quarter of 1438 as having lived on the right bank, since Favier's location on the left bank is certainly wrong (cf. Guerout, 'Fiscalité' (1972), 105, 111). François Dalier himself lived in the rue de la Cossonerie (AN, Y 5230, fo. 21^{r}), as did several others from his quarter (BN, MS fr. 8611, fo. 77^{v}).

[25] Of the 94 who appear in 1423 but not 1421, 35 also figure in 1438. All but 2 of them came from Les Halles.



MAP 7(a). The Oath of Allegiance of 1418 and the tax-roll of 1421
Note: Clearly the loss of the records for Les Halles in 1421 has distorted the picture.



MAP 7(b). The Oath of Allegiance of 1418 and the tax-roll of 1438

one can still see plainly the dominance of the Les Halles region, and especially that part of it associated with trade and commerce.[26]

In 1418, then, John the Fearless could look to a substantial sector of society, including many clerics, the well-organized municipal hierarchy and the inhabitants of Les Halles, to support him against the threats of an Armagnac resurgence and the blood-lust of the crowd. This type of controlling élite formed an essential intermediate layer between the royal council and the other 98 per cent of the population. Apart from the leaders of the municipality, they were not policy-makers themselves, but their support was essential to those people who were attempting to govern. When, in 1421, the duke of Exeter mishandled the arrest of l'Isle-Adam, and found himself besieged in the Bastille by a huge and angry mob, the bourgeoisie of Paris did more than the English archers to restore order.[27] The factionalism created opportunities that Henry V knew how to exploit; it also created a nucleus of support for the Burgundians that could be adopted by the English. We should, therefore, look for the factors that went to create the parties, and examine the legacy left to the English.

At first sight, it is debatable whether the idea of a party had any real content at all in fifteenth-century conditions. The term was used loosely to include anyone to whom one was opposed. Thus for the Anglo-Burgundians the followers of the dauphin might be 'le parti defendu contraire au roi'.[28] This was reasonable enough where kings and princes were involved, but such a definition was also implied where private quarrels were incorporated into the political disputes. People imprisoned in the turmoil of 1418 often said it was their enemies' doing.[29] This type of analysis is rather unhelpful for the historian, and it was highly dangerous for contemporaries: they saw that one had only to say 'here's an Armagnac' for him to be killed, though he might in fact be the best Burgundian in the world.[30] Where party labels were sometimes used simply as a way of defining personal enemies, it was natural for

[26] While the region round the Louvre apparently contains only one man who made the oath in 1418 and paid tax in 1438, the quarters of Saint-Jacques-La-Boucherie, Les Halles, and Saint-Denis contained some 29 men. The 8 in Sainte-Opportune show that this was a quarter of mixed allegiances, since we found a number of Armagnacs there as well.

[27] *Fauquembergue*, ii. 17–18.

[28] e.g. AN, X^{1a} 4793, fo. 43^{v}: 7 April 1421.

[29] e.g. AN, X^{1a} 4792, fo. 73^{r}: 29 Aug. 1418 ('par le fait de ses hayneux').

[30] 'Extrait d'une chronique', *Monstrelet*, vi. 260.

such names to degenerate into straightforward insults, even though it was a serious offence to make a false denunciation.[31] During the course of the Anglo-Burgundian regime, the phrases 'faulz traictre Bourguignon'[32] or 'faulz traictre Armagnac'[33] were being employed in the course of arguments that had nothing to do with politics (the latter insult was whispered in the ear during a dispute in the cathedral of Notre-Dame: other non-political abuse was shouted at full voice). Yet it would plainly be absurd to suggest that the parties were merely expressions of personal hostilities. The archbishop of Sens was not above telling a captive he was a 'faulz traictre Armagnac' who would die in prison, but he was able to show some political justification for the insult.[34]

Although it is easy to see that the divisions created a climate in which the English cause could thrive, it is still difficult to define the precise nature of the factions. The term '*parti*' was used very widely, and not only for the two large groups of Armagnacs and Burgundians. Bourgot L'Oubliere, midwife to the queen and gardener of the Hôtel de Saint-Pol, said in 1420 that under the Armagnac domination she had suffered greatly for following 'le parti de la royne'.[35] Her attachment to the queen was doubtless the result of her employment and, to a limited extent, similar motivations may help to explain the Burgundian party. From 1411 onwards John the Fearless had been identifying key individuals in the town and university and encouraging their loyalty with gifts of money and, above all, with the Beaune wine so much valued in Paris.[36] Once men had shown themselves as supporters of the Burgundian faction they could expect further rewards and more stable pensions and offices in the ducal household.[37] Furthermore, it was important for the leader of a faction to encourage the advancement of such people.[38]

[31] *Bourgeois*, 134 n. 2.

[32] AN, X^{1a} 4793, fo. 25^{r}: 10 Feb. 1421.

[33] AN, X^{1a} 4797, fo. 34^{r}: 26 Aug. 1432.

[34] AN, X^{1a} 4793, fo. 109^{r}: 17 Nov. 1421. See also fos. 120, 121^{v}, 122^{v}. The *Parlement* ruled that the prisoner, who had held the post of 'sergent du roi' at Sens under the Armagnacs, should be brought to Paris.

[35] AN, X^{1a} 4792, fo. 246^{r}: 22 Aug. 1420.

[36] Coville, *Cabochiens*, 148–9, 192; cf. Favier, *Paris*, 149, 288. Philip the Good followed the same policy: in 1424 he gave 2 casks of Beaune wine to both André de Valins and Guillaume Sanguin as well as 1 each to Baude des Bordes, Jean de Belloy, Garnier de Saint-Yon, and Jean Rapiout, and 30 casks to the earl of Salisbury (ADN, B 1929, fos. 159^{r}–163^{r}).

[37] Coville, *Cabochiens*, 398; B. A. Pocquet du Haut-Jussé, 'Les Pensionnaires fieffés des ducs de Bourgogne de 1352 à 1419', in *Mémoires de la Société pour l'Histoire du Droit et des Institutions des Anciens Pays Bourguignons, Comtois et Romands*, 8 (1942), 147.

[38] Lewis, *Later Medieval France*, 154–6; Demurger, 'Guerre civile', 157–86.

Thus the natural progress was from ducal to royal officer, and from the duchy to the capital.

At the level of municipal or royal officers, many of the men who were invaluable to the regime after 1418 had first come to prominence in the service of the duke of Burgundy. Jean Falle, who filled the important post of town clerk from 1422 onwards (his predecessor having defected to the Kingdom of Bourges), was a man who had been in the close confidence of John the Fearless since 1409.[39] Similarly Jean de Pressy, who struggled manfully with the Lancastrian finances in the latter years of the occupation, had previously been receiver-general of all finances and treasurer of wars for the duke of Burgundy; Philip the Good, when count of Charolais, had been godfather to de Pressy's son.[40] Morelet de Bethencourt, *chevalier du guet* from 1425, had been well known in Burgundian circles since the beginning of the previous decade, and Guillaume Sanguin, who stepped into the breach as *prévôt des marchands* in 1429, was a *maître d'hôtel* of the duke as well as being a leader of Parisian society.[41] The list could be a long one, and no doubt it seemed so to those people whose chances of promotion were marred when officers of the duke were imported to high-ranking positions. Gilles Veau had worked in the *Chambre des Comptes* for three decades by the time his colleagues elected him to the rank of *maître* in 1430: naturally, he protested when royal letters appointed an outsider, Guy Le Jay —formerly an agent of Dukes Philip the Bold, John the Fearless, and Philip the Good—to his post.[42] Veau secured the position in the end but, since Le Jay was already *argentier* of the duke of Bedford and a commissioner on confiscations, he had successfully made the transition from Burgundian to Anglo-French administration.[43]

One would have expected former officers of the duke of Burgundy to continue in his party; naturally enough, too, people who had come from the Burgundian dominions to make their careers in Paris tended to

[39] AN, KK 1009, fo. 22^{r}; Pocquet du Haut-Jussé, 'Compte de Pierre Gorremont', 259.

[40] Des Salles, *Mémoires*, ii. 118; *Fauquembergue* contains numerous references to de Pressy's activities.

[41] For de Bethencourt see Ch. 4, n. 114; for Sanguin see D. Bossuat, 'Guillaume Sanguin', 59–67.

[42] AN, X^{1a} 4796, fos. 208^{r}, 217^{r}, 232^{v}, 242^{v}; X^{1a} 1481, fo. 32^{v}. Veau claimed that his rival 'nescript mie bien de la main et nentend point de latin'. Le Jay denied the charges, but appears to have lost interest in the post: the case petered out, and in a subsequent list of the personnel of the *chambre* Veau (Vitelli) appears as *maître* (BN, MS fr. 26054, no. 1496).

[43] AN, X^{1a} 4796, fo. 208^{r}; Sauval, iii. 564.

favour the faction of their overlord.[44] Thus there was sometimes a direct financial or personal link between the duke of Burgundy and key figures in the Burgundian regime in Paris. This cannot have been the sole basis for the party, however, for in a town the size of Paris there must have been many people who supported the Burgundians without having the slightest connection with the duke or his territories. We should try to look within Parisian society for factors which made certain people susceptible to the appeal of the duke of Burgundy.

Amongst influences which seem likely to have been important were the traditions and connections of a family. Certainly, contemporaries often assumed that political loyalties were affected by family background. Defending themselves in a ransom case before the *Parlement*, Gilet and Jacquotin de Coquerel declared that they had inherited their rank from their father—they were nobles following the profession of arms—and also their loyalty—they had served in the wars of the king and of John the Fearless.[45] In Paris under the Armagnac regime, the pro-Cabochien butcher Jean de Saint-Yon had attempted to gloss over his manifold connections with the followers of the duke of Burgundy: even if certain of his 'parens et amis' were in the company of the duke, he had abandoned them as his enemies and, could not be regarded as being of suspect loyalty.[46] Those who challenged him, however, were well aware that he was at least as 'Burgundian' as the rest of his extensive family. Family bonds were invoked again when Guillaume Le Gois, a member of another dynasty of master-butchers, was captured by the Armagnacs in 1419. His brother Jean took action 'pour linterest et affinité de lignage avec son dit frere', in a way that showed that he believed politics and family loyalties were closely linked: he arrested Pierre Herisson, a knight suspected of Armagnac sympathies, in the hope that this would induce Herisson's Armagnac friends and relations to work for Guillaume's release.[47] This was a well-known ploy, but was

[44] See, for the men of the *Parlement*, Autrand, *Naissance*, table 19, 440–1.

[45] AN, X^{1a} 4793, fo. 13^{r}: 21 Jan. 1421.

[46] AN, X^{1a} 4792, fo. 8^{v}: 16 Dec. 1417.

[47] AN, X^{1a} 4792, fos. 165^{r}, 167^{r}: 27 Nov. and 7 Dec. 1419. Naturally, Pierre Herisson objected to the manoeuvre: he denied that he had any 'affinité, acointance, ne congnoissance' with the captor of Guillaume Le Gois, 'et suppose quil eust aucuns de ses parens et amis pardela avec ceulz du party contraire, pour ce ne le devroit on mie arrester' (AN, X^{1a} 4792, fo. 168^{r}: 12 Dec. 1419). One notes that Herisson had married the widow of Jean de Montagu, *grand-maître d'hôtel* of the king of France, who had been vindictively executed by John the Fearless (J. Du Breul, *Le Théâtre des antiquitez de Paris* (Paris, 1612), 955). For other examples of political kidnapping see Autrand, *Naissance*, 152–3.

justified by the assumption that Herisson would share the political sympathies of his relatives.

Yet how true was it that political allegiances were in fact determined by the ties of family loyalty? It is certain that in Italy the extended family was an important ingredient in political life; examples (though rather less striking) can be found in some other parts of Europe as well.[48] It seems that where central authority was weak or non-existent, as was the normal situation in medieval Italy, other bonds were made use of instead; strong government, by contrast, restricted the influence of factions and families. In France the more resolute kings had been able to limit the political power of the family: Joinville praised St Louis for breaking the grip of wealthy Parisian families on the administration of the town.[49] Such success was probably only partial, however, and the disturbances of the early fifteenth century may have given scope for the activity of family groups, and made it necessary for individuals to provide themselves with allies in an unstable world.

The closest study of a section of the Parisian bourgeoisie in the years of Armagnac-Burgundian rivalry and the English domination is that of Mme Autrand on the men of the *Parlement*. Her researches show that the first decades of the fifteenth century were indeed 'le temps des alliés', as the judges sought to secure their position in the lawcourt and in society by inserting themselves in extensive networks of relatives, networks built around the families of the more influential of the presidents of the court.[50] The Cabochiens had correctly detected the prevailing trend towards a nepotism that, at worst, would cast doubt on the *Parlement*'s impartiality.[51] Important as these family groupings were, they were not always 'political' in the party sense. While there was a clear tendency for those members of the court associated with a faction to have relatives in the same camp, this was often not exclusive.[52] This meant that after 1418 many members of the Burgundian *Parlement* had

[48] Heers, *Clan familial*, *passim*.

[49] Cited, ibid. 84–5, 266.

[50] Autrand, *Naissance*, 46–52, 66–89. One should note, however, that the computer has been asked to count the number of relations possessed by members of the court amongst all the 678 people who sat in the *Parlement* between the years 1345 and 1454. In the middle of this period one can count both backwards and forwards, so it is almost inevitable that the number of relatives should have reached a peak. The analysis of the actual family groups remains very convincing.

[51] Ibid. 43–6; Coville, *Cabochiens*, 63.

[52] Autrand, *Naissance*, table 15, p. 435. Of those Armagnacs and Burgundians who had relations in the *Parlement*, over one third had connections with the other party.

connections with the rival institution at Poitiers. The links were often fairly tenuous connections by marriage, but there are also some example of very close relatives (such as father and son) being divided between the two parts of France.[53]

At the *Parlement*, therefore, family connections protected the individual against the uncertainties of the time, but did not force him into one political attitude. Indeed, once France was divided geographically as well as politically, the interests of the family required that representation be maintained in both camps.[54] Such an observation, of course, holds true well beyond Paris and the *Parlement*. From the de La Trémoïlle family in the north-east,[55] to the Albrets in the south-west,[56] the partition between Lancastrian and Valois provoked family divisions, but not usually dissension. Paris was particularly susceptible to the impact of the war, so that tactical division of resources was the best guarantee of a family's continued prosperity. Three members of the de Laillier family kept all options open: Michel stayed in Paris, where he was a *maître des comptes*, Jacquet followed the Armagnac cause in Picardy, and Guillaume appeared at Poitiers in 1420.[57] At first, things did not go well for them: Jacquet's house in Paris was confiscated and given to Jean de Luxembourg in February 1422;[58] later in the same year Michel was exposed as being involved in a plot against the English.[59] Ultimately, however, Jacquet had letters of remission accepted by the *Parlement* of Paris,[60] Guillaume became a mainstay of the *Parlement* of Poitiers until his death in 1434,[61] and Michel—after returning to favour with the English—finally organized the submission of Paris to the French.[62] The family of de Laillier did not suffer from the victory of the Valois, but nor would it have been harmed by the triumph of the Lancastrians.

[53] Dreux de Vailly lived at Paris, while his father was a president in the *Parlement* at Poitiers (ibid. 89).

[54] Cf. Allmand, *Lancastrian Normandy*, 215–16.

[55] Bossuat, 'Rétablissement', 143–4.

[56] M. G. A. Vale, *English Gascony, 1399–1453: A Study of War, Government, and Politics during the Later Stages of the Hundred Years War* (Oxford, 1970), 154.

[57] Favier, *Paris*, 189.

[58] Longnon, *Paris*, 32. As so often, the punishment was to fit the crime. Jacquet de Laillier was minting coins in Guise for the enemy: Jean de Luxembourg was given Jacquet's house in the same month as the county of Guise.

[59] *Monstrelet*, iv. 135. [60] AN, X^{2a} 16, fos. 477^{v}–478^{v}.

[61] Autrand, *Naissance*, 124, 146, 317 n. 105.

[62] *Bourgeois*, 315.

For the Le Coq brothers, the influence of the family operated differently. Pierre Le Coq claimed that it was the hounding of creditors, and consequent disapproval of his family and friends, that led to his sojourn in the Kingdom of Bourges between 1422 and 1428; further financial loss was, however, avoided when his property was given to his brother Hugues, *prévôt des marchands* for the Anglo-Burgundians.[63] Jeanne de Sens stayed in Paris and attempted to maintain her hold on the family inheritance even though her children were in the other obedience, and for the Genciens, too, it was the mother of the family who remained in Paris.[64] What mothers could do, daughters could do: female children of men killed as Armagnacs in 1418 are to be found remaining in Paris to defend the good name of their fathers. Perrin Pilot was condemned to death as an Armagnac in July 1418; it took until March 1423 for his daughter Jeanne to secure possession of his lands against people who claimed them by royal gift.[65] Pierre Emery died in prison in 1418; his daughter and son-in-law, eventually his granddaughter and her husband, adopted the twelve-year fight to recoup the consequent financial losses.[66]

Avoiding the worst effects of the divisions was the main priority for many Parisians. Politics and family interests were closely connected, but it cannot be said that family feuds were the motive power behind the civil strife. There were, however, some families who were solidly members of one party or another: thus it was suspicious to find Philippe de Vitry, the cantankerous precentor of Saint-Honoré, staying in Anglo-Burgundian Paris.[67] It was at a member of the Vitry family that Pierre L'Orfèvre was to hurl the insult 'vous autre Armagnaz' in 1437, a fair comment on the consistent politics of the family over the previous twenty-five years.[68]

[63] Longnon, *Paris*, 102, 289.

[64] Bossuat, 'Famille parisienne', 79–96; Autrand, *Naissance*, 320–1.

[65] AN, X^{1a} 63, fo. 438^{r}; also X^{1a} 4792, fo. 139^{r}; X^{1a} 4793, fos. 215^{r}, 219^{r}, 223^{v}; X^{1a} 1480, fo. 268^{v}.

[66] The case has a complex genealogy of its own and, as with the previous example, is best explained in the final settlements: AN, X^{1a} 67, fos. 103^{v}, 150^{v}; AN, X^{1c} 141, no. 82. See also X^{1a} 4796, fos. 105^{r}, 117^{r}, 137^{r}, 246^{v}, 255^{r}; X^{1a} 1481, fos. 42^{v}, 43^{r}. For the properties of Emery given by the Anglo-Burgundian regime to his son-in-law, Thomas de Herlay, see Sauval, iii. 309, 316, 571–2.

[67] He was under suspicion during the troubles of 1429, but remained in Paris until his death in 1435, when it was found that his relatives were in the Kingdom of Bourges (see Ch. 4, n. 180).

[68] Autrand, *Naissance*, 78.

On the Burgundian side, the most pervasive grouping was that based around *maître* Jean de Troyes, surgeon of the king since 1397, *échevin* in 1412, leader of the Cabochiens in 1413 and *concièrge* of the palace in 1413 and 1418.[69] Although he died before the treaty of Troyes was sealed,[70] his family—by blood and by marriage—permeated the administration until after 1436. His son Henri succeeded him as surgeon of Charles VI and as official surgeon at the Châtelet, becoming surgeon to the duke of Burgundy after the death of the king.[71] Of his other sons (he left seven sons and seven daughters in all), Dyne was a notary at the Châtelet,[72] and Guillaume was an *échevin* in 1430–2.[73] His sons-in-law included Guillaume Lommoy (*procureur du roi* at the Châtelet in 1413),[74] Nicolas de Neufville (Cabochien, *écuyer de cuisine* of the duke of Burgundy, *échevin* 1429–30, 1436–7, 1442–4, and receiver of *aides* from 1433–42),[75] and Morelet de Bethencourt (*chevalier du guet* from 1425–36).[76] Laurent Calot, one of the most important of the royal notaries and secretaries, was his nephew,[77] and the husbands of his granddaughters included Jean Abonnel, receiver-general of the duke of Burgundy,[78] and Louis Galet, *examinateur* at the Châtelet and *échevin* from 1434–6, who left Paris with the English.[79]

The family connections of Jean de Troyes were exceptional, not only for their extent, but also because of the range of activities that they covered, stemming largely from the importance of Jean de Troyes himself. Where a family was connected exclusively to one party or the other, the reasons often lay in its social background. The outstanding examples are certainly the master-butchers who were fanatic supporters

[69] *Bourgeois*, 36 n. 5.

[70] He was dead by 15 April 1420, the date on which his son Henri succeeded him at the Châtelet (BN, MS fr. 20684, fo. 89^{r}). For the dispute over his inheritance see AN, X^{1c} 126, nos. 50–1.

[71] ADN, B 1933, fo. 92^{r}. [72] *Bourgeois*, 36 n. 5.

[73] Favier, *Paris*, 420–1. Guillaume was also in charge of the *barrages* of Paris (AN, PP 110, pp. 119, 132).

[74] *Bourgeois*, 36 n. 5.

[75] Ibid. p. 240 n. 1; ADN, B 1923, fo. 174^{r}; Favier, *Paris*, 422–3.

[76] *Bourgeois*, 36 n. 5. [77] Longnon, *Paris*, 271 n. 1.

[78] ADN, B 1937, fos. 92^{r}, 103^{r}: wedding presents for Jeanne, daughter of Henri de Troyes, and Jean Abonnel (payments Nov. 1425, Apr. 1426).

[79] The 'consanguinité et affinité' of Guillaume de Troyes and Louis Galet is mentioned in AN, X^{1a} 4797, fo. 96^{r}: 20 July 1433. BN, Cabinet d'Hozier, dossier Bethencourt, fo. 22, shows that Jean de Troyes' daughter Philipote, by her first marriage, produced 'trois filles mariées en Angleterre, dont sont venus les sieurs de Galet, de Hardetot, et Sommercy' (extract from an unspecified 'Traicté des Navigations').

of the duke of Burgundy.[80] It would have been inconceivable to have been a Le Gois or a Saint-Yon and not to have been a Burgundian. The Le Gois family in fact controlled the butchery of Sainte-Geneviève on the left bank, while the Saint-Yon family dominated the *Grande Boucherie* next to the Châtelet. Wealthy, important, and as well established as any of the great families of Paris,[81] the leading dynasties of master-butchers still remained outsiders in the society of the well-to-do.[82] Their trade was bloody and brutal, and their business associates were tanners and flayers; thus, because they could not attain to the social rank that their importance suggested, they formed natural leaders of the crowd and agents for the demagogic politics of the duke of Burgundy. They were at the heart of the Cabochien movement; several leading butchers were forced into exile between 1413 and 1418 and the most visible monument to the power of the butchers and the key to Saint-Yon influence—the *Grande Boucherie*—was demolished in 1416 on the initiative of Tanguy du Châtel.[83] But the butchers reappeared in 1418 to claim the fruits of their loyalty, and the *Grande Boucherie* was re-established.[84] Two butchers, Michel Thibert and Marcelet Testard, became *échevins* in the new Burgundian municipality.[85] When, after the murder of John the Fearless, the municipality was revised, Thibert was replaced by his colleague (and relative) from the *Grande Boucherie*, Jean de Saint-Yon.[86]

From 1418 to 1420, therefore, two of the four *échevins* were butchers, and the trade appeared to have won its right to power. But, in fact, they were not to dominate the government of the town: in December 1420 they were voted out of the municipality in favour of four money-changers as *échevins* and a counsellor of the *Parlement* as *prévôt des marchands*.[87] Later, under the dual monarchy of Henry VI, there was usually one butcher *échevin*, but never two, and never a *prévôt des marchands*. The privileges of the *Grande Boucherie* were confirmed,[88] but

[80] See Coville, *Cabochiens*, 101–5, 108–9, for a fine sketch of the influence of the leading butcher families; also J.-A. Durbec, 'La Grande Boucherie de Paris: Notes historiques d'après des archives privées (XII^{e}–XVII^{e} siècles)', *BPHCTH* 1955–6 (1957), 65–125.

[81] A member of the Saint-Yon family was churchwarden of Saint-Jacques-La-Boucherie as early as 1276 (Coville, *Cabochiens*, 103).

[82] Ibid. 104; Autrand, *Charles VI*, 473.

[83] Coville, *Cabochiens*, 397–492; *Ordonnances*, x. 316. The pretext of improving the area in front of the Châtelet had, no doubt, some justification.

[84] *Ordonnances*, x. 468. [85] Favier, *Paris*, 169. [86] See Ch. 3, n. 40.

[87] Favier, *Paris*, 420–1. [88] *Ordonnances*, xiii. 16.

there was still perhaps an estrangement between the English government and the trade which had been essential to the Burgundian victory of 1418. The disillusion with the regime of the English was gradual, and had as much to do with the poor economic conditions as with the policy of Bedford's government. Bringing cattle into Paris with an armed guard was expensive and hazardous, and the decline in the population meant that there were fewer mouths to feed and less money to be made.[89] None the less, it was probably a blunder not to nurse this influential trade during times of difficulty. Matters reached a crisis in 1427 during the siege of Montargis. Simon Morhier, the *prévôt* of Paris, called an assembly of butchers and dictated the quantities of meat that they should provide for the siege-army in a somewhat high-handed manner.[90] The butchers declared their inability to comply, recalled their sufferings at the hands of the Armagnacs, and commented darkly on previous provisioning ventures: 'plusieurs y sont aléz et nen retournent point, lez autres y retournent a leur dommage'.[91] One of their number was sent to prison for non-cooperation, and their leaders were threatened with the same fate. This was not the most sensitive way to handle men whom John the Fearless had treated as his links with the common people of Paris.

The butchers did not make their fortunes at their trade under the Anglo-Burgundian regime, but their leaders did gain the recognition to which they had aspired, and in search of which they had become 'Burgundians'. Jean Le Gois was a general counsellor on all finances in 1419,[92] and at his accession Henry VI used his prerogative right to create one new butcher at the *Grande Boucherie* in favour of Le Gois, even though he already controlled the *Boucherie Sainte-Geneviève*.[93] Garnier de Saint-Yon was librarian at the Louvre from 1419 to 1429, and an *échevin* for nine of the fourteen years from 1422 to 1436.[94] His brother Jean became even more closely tied to the English cause and to the duke of Bedford in particular: he was one of the handful of Parisians obliged to quit the capital in 1436. He may have finished his career as *maître des comptes* at Rouen, exiled from his home town, but in the service

[89] Favier, *Paris*, 293–5.

[90] 'Dist le prevost par maniere de advis, vous ferez tant, et vous tant et tant, mais nul ny donna son consentement' (AN, X^{1a} 4795, fo. 153^{v}).

[91] Ibid., fo. 150^{v}. Even so, the butchers said they were sorry to have to bring this action to defend their rights and declared their continuing loyalty (ibid., fo. 153^{r}).

[92] BN, MS fr. 20684, p. 88: appointed 16 July 1419.

[93] Longnon, *Paris*, 70.

[94] *Bourgeois*, 40 n. 1; Favier, *Paris*, 420–1.

of the Lancastrians he had previously been treasurer and governor-general of all finances of the king of France, and lord of Clichy La Garenne; such positions would not have been available even to the master of the *Grande Boucherie* by any other route.[95]

The butchers did not provide the only families who, for economic and personal reasons, opted uniformly for one side or the other. Even in the homogenous world of the *Parlement* Mme Autrand detects one major division when she connects the judges with their relatives in the Parisian bourgeoisie. There were, on one side, a limited number of interrelated families who were suppliers of luxury goods and held control of the royal mint: these families were solidly Armagnac. Clearly distinguished from them were the families who supplied goods such as grain, cloth, and above all wine to the court and the town: they were solidly Burgundian.[96] While the Armagnac families depended on an extravagant royal court and a monetary policy that guaranteed stable profits from the mint, the Burgundians dealt in goods essential to the town as well as the court, hoped to cut taxes by debasing the coinage, and relied on free trade throughout northern France, and especially with the Burgundian dominions. These Burgundian families of lawyers and merchants had little in common with the dynasties of master butchers beyond their support for the duke—except that, in a different way, they too were social climbers. While the butchers looked for promotion as a reward for loyalty, the status of the traders depended on the continued prosperity of the links between Paris and the Low Countries. Often, the solidly Burgundian families connected with the supplies of Paris had established their wealth and their positions relatively recently; compared with the Armagnac families at the mint they ranked as newcomers to the bourgeoisie, importing themselves along with their goods.[97]

The Burgundian coup of 1418 and the English alliance gave new men the chance to force their way into the administration. The Anglo-Burgundian regime relied in part on the aspirations of men who could

[95] *Bourgeois*, 319 n. 2; for his later career at Rouen see BN, PO 2780, Saint-Yon nos. 36–48, which go up to Oct. 1448, when he was still in office. For Clichy La Garenne see AN, JJ 172, no. 320; AN, PP 110, p. 134.

[96] Autrand, *Naissance*, 76–89; Autrand, *Charles VI* 459–61, 463. For the economic constraints which encouraged the Parisians to side with the Burgundians and the English see Favier, *Paris*, 341–5; J. Favier, *La Guerre de Cent Ans* (Paris, 1980), 463–4.

[97] 'Dans la société parisienne, dans l'échevinage et dans les offices royaux, leur position est moins assurée. Par leur fortune plus récente, par leur qualité de Parisiens de fraîche date, ils font presque figure de nouveaux venus' (Autrand, *Naissance*, 89).

not have advanced without the departure of the Armagnacs. The *Bourgeois* comments disparagingly on Pierre Baille, a man who began his career as a shoemaker's boy and had advanced to the rank of grand treasurer of Maine.[98] For Guillaume Morin, the divisions provided not only the opportunity but the spur as well. Cut off from the support of father and mother, he was obliged to fend for himself. Taking the same lucrative route as Pierre Baille, he found tax-administration to be a source of wealth of dubious legality.[99] Even Jean Bureau, one day to be a mainstay of Charles VII's administration, had begun much lower down the scale in the 1420s. Receiver of taxes in Les Halles in 1423,[100] he used his position as an officer of the Châtelet to profit from the derelict houses that were a consequence of the population fall and expulsions. In 1426 he obtained permission to restore three vacant sites,[101] but the following year was cited as an accessory to a substantial fraud. In this his brother Simon and colleague Jourdain Bricet were accused of making large amounts of money out of preventing the (real) danger of collapse by over-enthusiastic demolition coupled with sale of the materials.[102] Hence, perhaps, the rumours that the Bureau family had discovered a hidden treasure. Other defamatory remarks, concerning their humble origins and loose morals, made by a nun of the Hôtel-Dieu, who had been sent to nurse the dying wife of Jean Bureau, may reflect a general resentment at the social ascent of the brothers.[103] The Bureau family was able to change allegiance in 1436; its opportunism then as in the 1420s may be contrasted with the long histories of many of the traditional Armagnac families. The Armagnac municipality had included Pierre Gencien and Regnault Pizdoe, men whose ancestors had been influential a hundred years earlier.[104] For officers and suppliers of

[98] *Bourgeois*, 224.

[99] AN, Z^{1a} 9, fos. 168^{r}, 173^{v} (Mar.–Apr. 1435). Morin's lawyer defended his client's advance: 'a ce quilz ont dit que cestoit ung povre compaignon quant il vint a Paris, repond que sil sest fait de soy ce ne lui fait deshonneur . . . se un jeune compaignon vient a honneur et chevance par son labeur et diligence il en fait a loer'.

[100] Favier, *Contribuables*, 263. [101] BN, MS Clair. 763, pp. 107, 110, 121.

[102] AN, X^{1a} 4795, fos. 109^{r}–11^{r}: June 1427. Suspicions were raised by the treatment of a house near the Porte Montmartre: 'ces larrons de Chastellet desrobent les maisons et les eglises; on lez fera troter en la Court de Parlement' said an advocate of the latter institution. It was reported that the abbess of Montmartre, who was in a position to complain, had been silenced by the gift of 12,000 roof tiles.

[103] E. Coyecque, *L'Hôtel-Dieu de Paris au Moyen Age: Histoire et documents* (2 vols., Paris, 1889–91), ii. 80–1.

[104] Cazelles, *Paris . . . 1223–1380*, 99.

the Armagnac faction such as the Vitry, the Taranne, the Augier, or the Bonpuits, the ascendancy of the Burgundians was one that overthrew the established order.

For the fortunate ones the Anglo-Burgundian regime provided scope for advancement, particularly advancement into the administration. Office-holding was the principal area of growth in the Parisian economy, for the status and function of the royal officer had been clearly established by the end of the reign of Charles VI, and contraction in business prospects made the security of a post in government particularly attractive.[105] No wonder, then, that the Burgundian coup should have made its biggest impact in areas where government officers lived.[106] The Burgundians had claimed to be seeking reform, but it was a reform that was to proceed in conjunction with their own progress.[107] The English were fortunate to adopt an administration staffed by men with a vested interest in the continued absence of the Armagnacs.

Thus there were numerous overlapping motives which led men to support the Burgundians and the English. Ambition and self-interest certainly played a major role, particularly at the level which we described as that of the political élite, the top 2 per cent. It has been suggested that the factions, Armagnac and Burgundian alike, derive from an approach to politics that would ultimately be made obsolete by the forces of the future, represented by the homogenous and professional institutions of the civil service.[108] With their reliance on alliances and local interests, and on 'programmes' that would appeal to definable sections within the Parisian bourgeoisie, the Armagnac and Burgundian parties were expressions of a type of magnate-dominated polity that was based essentially on patronage and was entirely incompatible with the emergence of 'the State'. There was, however, to be a further element, the most powerful of all, used by the rulers and seized upon by the people as eagerly in the 1420s as by the magnates of the past and the states of the modern world.

[105] J. Favier, 'Une ville entre deux vocations: La Place d'affaires de Paris au XV^e siècle', *Annales: Économies, sociétés, civilisations*, 28 (1973), 1245–79; F. Autrand, 'Offices et officiers royaux en France sous Charles VI', *RH* 242 (1969), 285–338.

[106] See Ch. 5.

[107] Cf. C. Gauvarde, 'Les Officiers royaux et l'opinion publique en France à la fin du Moyen Age', in Paravicini and Werner (eds.), *Histoire comparée de l'administration*, 583–93: outsiders claimed to deplore the factionalism within the ranks of the officers, but performed in much the same way when roles were reversed.

[108] Autrand, *Charles VI*, 469.

To grasp the nature of the consensus that supported the regime, more than purely material matters must be considered. There is no indication that the *Bourgeois* of Paris had any personal advantage from the Burgundians, and nor indeed did he have a very high opinion of John the Fearless or Philip the Good as individuals.[109] But he remained loyal to the Burgundian party long after it became apparent that Philip the Good had minimal interest in Parisian affairs, and the troops of Charles VII were still 'Armagnacs' to him in 1435.[110] The appeal of the Burgundians was emotional as well as materialist, and because of that it went deeper and attracted broader support.

There is a hint of such appeal in the party songs that developed in the second decade of the fifteenth century. It is not at all clear how such songs originated. When the factions first began to develop, towards the end of the fourteenth century, minstrels were forbidden to perform songs concerning the king, the pope, or the princes.[111] It is possible that despite this prohibition a certain amount of musical propaganda was encouraged;[112] in any case, having fired the imagination of the population at large, the factions, especially the Burgundians, attracted an enthusiasm that was largely self-fuelling. Whether prompted from above or not, party feelings were readily perpetuated. Even under the Armagnac domination, small children could be heard in the streets of Paris singing 'Duc de Bourgongne, Dieu te ramaint a joye'.[113] A political song could be highly emotive: in June 1419, a fatal tavern brawl broke out after one young man began to sing 'une chancon des Bourguignons', and ignored requests that he stop.[114] The murder of John the Fearless produced at least one popular song on each side; the siege of Melun in 1420 was the subject of a 'canchon . . . sur les Ermignags' which was ascribed to Henry V and Philip the Good but probably composed by the Picard soldiers in whose dialect it is written.[115]

[109] e.g. *Bourgeois*, 165.

[110] Ibid. 310. When Richemont and his colleagues entered Paris in April 1436, they were still 'les signeurs de la bande devantdicte'—the *Bourgeois*' usual method of referring to the Armagnacs (ibid. 314).

[111] G. Fagniez, 'Les Ménétriers parisiens', *BSHP* 2 (1875), 103–4.

[112] An example of a man sent to spread a political song in 1413 is cited *Bourgeois*, 46 n. 3; cf. for a later period C. Samaran, 'Chanteurs ambulants et propagande politique sous Louis XI', *BEC* 100 (1939), 233–4.

[113] *Bourgeois*, 46. [114] AN, JJ 171, no. 59.

[115] A. Le Roux de Lincy (ed.), *Chants historiques et populaire du temps de Charles VII et de Louis XI* (Paris, 1857), 17, 19–22, 26–30.

Even more widespread than the political songs were the instantly recognizable symbols of the factions. At the end of the last century small lead badges bearing emblems of the king, the dauphin, the duke of Burgundy, and the English were found in the bed of the Seine where, no doubt, they had been thrown when political changes meant that discretion was needed.[116] Wearing distinctive dress was a practice with military origins: by the second half of the fourteenth century French troops were wearing an upright white cross for identification in battle, and the English a red cross.[117] From 1411, the Armagnacs began to wear their characteristic sash, the '*bende*' which identified their band, and in response to this the king ordered that the royal forces should wear the St Andrew's cross of the duke of Burgundy, to which was added a fleur-de-lis to show royal authority.[118] From 1413 to 1418 the '*bende*' was in the ascendant, and was even worn by the army of the king and the duke of Guyenne in 1414.[119] Immediately after the return of the Burgundians to Paris the St Andrew's cross reappeared, being worn by the citizens within hours of the entry of the troops of John the Fearless. It was worn again when the duke himself came to the town and, in September 1419, as a sign of pro-Burgundian solidarity when news of the duke's murder reached the capital.[120] By that time, even the horses of men who wished to appear 'Burgundian' were given a harness bearing the St Andrew's cross.[121] But in the carnage of 1418 the Armagnac sash had not been forgotten: with a vicious irony it was carved into the flesh of the count of Armagnac's corpse.[122]

From 1418 the dauphinists themselves appear to have reverted to the upright white cross, laying claim to be the French and no longer simply

[116] The badges are now in the Musée de Cluny, Paris. Photographs (though not of the English badge) are in Favier, *Paris*, 157.

[117] P. Contamine, *Guerre, État et société à la fin du Moyen Age: Études sur les armées des rois de France 1337–1494* (Paris–The Hague, 1972), 668–9.

[118] *Bourgeois*, pp. 11–12; Sauval, iii. 266: 'pour enseignes le signe du sautoir blanc et de la fleur-de-lis d'or sur l'écu d'azur, afin que d'iceaux on eut connoisance d'entre les ennemis dudit seigneur portans la bende'.

[119] Contamine, *Guerre, État* . . ., 669.

[120] *Fauquembergue*, i. 128, 318; *Monstrelet*, iii. 273; *Chronique du Religieux de Saint-Denis, contenant le règne de Charles VI, de 1380 à 1422*, ed. L.-F. Bellaguet (6 vols., Documents inédits sur l'histoire de France, Paris, 1839–52), vi. 374.

[121] AN, X^{1a} 4792, fo. 168^{r}: 12 Dec. 1419.

[122] *Monstrelet*, iii. 271; note, however, that according to Basin it was the St Andrew's cross that was inflicted on Armagnac's body: a different irony (Thomas Basin, *Histoire de Charles VII*, ed. C. Samaran (2 vols., Paris, 1933–44), i. 58).

the Armagnac faction, to the natural indignation of the Burgundians.[123] In Anglo-Burgundian Paris, there was a mixture of English, French, and Burgundian symbolism. There was little attempt to create the trappings of an English 'party' until after the peace of Arras in 1435 (and thus far too late), when Parisians were ordered to wear the St George's cross.[124] Prior to that date the English had relied on stressing the union of the crowns of England and France in spheres such as the coinage and public ceremony.[125] An intriguing variant on this theme appears to have been adopted in 1434, when a room at the Hôtel de Ville was repainted with the motif of the rose and the fleur-de-lis intertwining.[126] Burgundian symbolism remained strongly in evidence throughout the period. A traveller who journeyed into Charles VII's territory had to hide his Burgundian insignia;[127] in 1429 it was the St Andrew's cross that was taken up by the Parisians when they rejected the propaganda of Brother Richard and prepared for the assault of Joan of Arc.[128] To the end, the symbol of the Burgundians retained its force: when, in 1436, the count of Richemont entered Paris to reclaim it for the French after the peace between Burgundy and France it was a Burgundian standard that he unfurled, and the Parisians were divided as to whether they responded with a Burgundian badge or the French upright cross.[129]

Throughout the period, therefore, the Burgundian badge and faction retained their grip on the loyalty of the Parisians, overshadowing any loyalty to English or French, and were essential to Henry V, Henry VI, and Charles VII as they contested sovereignty over the French capital. Politics from this aspect was emotional and public; it was no longer simply a question of the motivations of the ambitious, but of the feelings of the majority. It was at this level of public life that the Church had a

[123] Jean Juvénal des Ursins, *Histoire de Charles VI, Roy de France*, ed. D. Godefroy (Paris, 1653) 385 and cf. 390. In 1429, people not wearing the 'croix droite blanche' in Charles VII's area of influence were said to be very vulnerable 'car pluseurs furent mors comme escoz et autres par ce quilz ne la portoient' (AN, X^{1a} 4797, fo. 103^{r}). See also M. H. Keen, *The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages* (London–Toronto, 1965), 110–11.

[124] AN, X^{1a} 8605, fo. 33^{r}, and see Ch. 8, n. 148.

[125] J. W. McKenna, 'Henry VI of England and the Dual Monarchy: Aspects of Royal Political Propaganda, 1422–1432', *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, 28 (1965), 145–62.

[126] Sauval, ii. 483.

[127] Lanhers, 'Deux affaires de trahison', 321.

[128] *Bourgeois* 243.

[129] *Monstrelet*, v. 221; *Bourgeois*, 313. Monstrelet regarded it as an important ingredient in the peace of Arras that the Burgundians be allowed to continue to wear the St Andrew's cross, even when in the presence or service of the king (*Monstrelet*, v. 175–6).

special role to play, for the influence of religion in developing the consensus in politics was very considerable. We have seen that an oath of allegiance might be required from anyone whose loyalty was uncertain or especially important, and its significance was, of course, both religious and political. The Anglo-Burgundian regime did not have to go as far as the Armagnacs—who included the threat of damnation in a rigorous oath drawn up as their support crumbled[130]—but someone who swore allegiance and then deviated was still looked upon as similar to a heretic who, having abandoned heresy, relapsed.[131]

As an emotive part of the fabric of life, religion inevitably was involved in the effort to establish loyalties. This could be seen in the wholesale excommunications of the opposition undertaken by the Armagnacs and Burgundians alternately when in power, bringing down the full solemnity of church ritual on political opponents.[132] Even the saints were conscripted into politics, the images in the churches being decked out by the Armagnacs with the '*bende*' or sash of their party.[133] It has been suggested that nationalist feelings helped to promote the cult of St Michael in fourteenth- and fifteenth-century France.[134] Reliance on this saint was perhaps a more fitting counter to the English devotion to the warrior St George than was trust in the peaceful St Denis, the patron saint of France (whose abbey was, in any case, in Anglo-Burgundian

[130] 'Vous jurez par Dieu le tout puissant, par la foy et loy que vous tenez de luy, par la part que vous entendez avoir en paradis, et sur le peril de la dampnation de votre ame . . .' (AN, Y 4^2, p. 163: 4 Aug. 1417).

[131] 'Aprez le serement fait . . . elle ala devers lez ennemis . . . ne doit estre oye *quia relapsa*, ainsi comme on dit *in materia heresis*' (AN, X^{1a} 4797, fo. 253^v: 16 May 1435). See also my article 'Le Régime anglo-bourguignon à Paris: Facteurs idéologiques', in *La 'France anglaise' au Moyen Age* (Actes du 111^e Congrès National des Sociétés Savantes, Section d'Histoire Médiévale et de Philologie, i, Poitiers, 1986 (Paris, 1988)), 58.

[132] J. Heers, *Parties and Political Life in the Medieval West* (Amsterdam–Oxford, 1977), 265–7.

[133] 'Estoit merveilleuse chose à veoir à faire porter aux ymages representans les sains de Paradis et au roy de France, la bende du conte d'Armignac' ('Extrait d'une chronique', *Monstrelet*, vi. 254).

[134] S. Luce, *Jeanne d'Arc à Domrémy* (Paris, 1886), 89–93; C. Beaune, *Naissance de la nation France* (Paris, 1985), 194–6. See now, in particular, C. de Merindol, 'Saint Michel et la monarchie française à la fin du Moyen Age dans le conflit franco-anglaise', in *La 'France anglaise'*, 513–42. Devotion to St Michael remained common in Anglo-Burgundian France; in Normandy and also in Paris. He was one of the patrons of a new *confrérie* established in the church of Saint-Laurent in 1428 (Longnon, *Paris*, 284–5). St George continued the object of English devotions, and the garrison at the Bastille erected a little image of the saint in gilded wood in the chapel (Bournon, *Bastille*, 247).

France after 1420).[135] One can see the propaganda value of the saints in a costly jewel given by Bedford to the chapter of Notre-Dame on 10 September 1422 (the anniversary of the murder of John the Fearless). Under the images of God the Father, a crucifix, and a dove were St Denis and St George, Henry V and Catherine of Valois; after Henry's death Bedford took the opportunity to make a presentation that recalled the essential characteristics of the treaty of Troyes. Once Henry VI was established in his claim to the throne of France, the money struck in his part of the kingdom similarly made use of religious themes for political purposes.[136]

Religion helped to define the 'Armagnac' and 'Burgundian' portions of the right bank, or at least it reflected the geographical division when the parties established political *confréries* as expressions of their factions. In August 1414 several people living around the church of the Blancs-Manteaux received permission to found a *confrérie* in honour of St Laurence. Despite warnings from the *prévôt* against '*monopoles*' or conspiracies, it turned out to be overtly political: according to the *Bourgeois*, over 4,000 people attended the inaugural meeting, each dressed in an Armagnac sash, and it was dangerous to be on the streets without one.[137] The Blancs-Manteaux was at the heart of the Armagnac sector in the centre of the Grève region; on the other hand, the principal church in Les Halles, Saint-Eustace, was certainly a spiritual stronghold for the Burgundians. It was there that a young man tore a provocative Armagnac sash from a statue. If, as the Saint-Denis chronicler says, this was a statue of St Andrew, the patron saint of Burgundy, it was a highly predictable response.[138] In 1418, after the Burgundian coup, it was the turn of the Burgundian supporters to show their strength through the spontaneous formation of a mass *confrérie*, dedicated to St Andrew and meeting in Saint-Eustace.[139] This was an

[135] Thompson, '"Monseigneur Saint Denis"', 15–19.

[136] Grassoreille, 'Histoire politique du chapitre', 150 n. 1; cf. ibid. 191, for the sale of the jewel in 1436; McKenna, 'Henry VI of England', 146–51.

[137] *Bourgeois*, 55; AN, L 912 (Blancs-Manteaux), nos. 38–9. Grant from the king, authorization from the *prévôt* and bishop. St Laurence was chosen because the church had been given his shoulder bone in 1404 (AN, L 912, no. 46). Although the renegade artist/sergeant Jean de Pestivien (cf. Ch. 8, n. 82) denied any Armagnac sympathies, it was claimed that 'il est vray que Pestivien porta la bende a Saint Lorens'. This probably refers to this *confrérie*, rather than to the fair or church of that name (AN, X^{1a} 4793, fo. 98^{r}).

[138] *Religieux*, v. 477; cf. *Bourgeois*, 56 n. 2.

[139] *Bourgeois*, 95.

occasion that linked contemporary political preoccupations to the ancient feudal geography of Les Halles, for the *hôtel* of the duke of Burgundy was in the small fief of Gif, and the lords of the fief were none other than the chaplains of St Andrew's chapel in the church of Saint-Eustace.[140] When he was in Paris in 1424 Philip the Good gave ten francs to the masters and governors of the *confrérie*, so that he could share in the good deeds of the brothers; in the 1430s he provided the church with items to assist with the celebration of Mass.[141]

The large meetings of Armagnacs at the Blancs-Manteaux, and of Burgundians at Saint-Eustace, were obviously politically motivated but, as *confréries*, they were probably exceptional. The numerous ordinary *confréries* certainly played a more important role in the spiritual and social lives of most Parisians. Based in a parish church, a *confrérie* could be associated with a particular craft, trade, or profession; it provided its members with special church services and with festivities, and promoted mutual support in adversity and beyond the grave.[142] The political role of these permanent *confréries* is, however, impossible to assess, because we cannot know enough about them. The most important of all, the *Grande Confrérie Notre-Dame* (the spiritual home of the Parisian élite), had tried at an early stage to avoid committing itself to any one faction in the political divisions; in 1400 the dukes of Burgundy, Orléans, and Berry had all been elected members.[143] Although it attracted wide, non-factional, support,[144] the *confrérie* acknowledged political developments to the extent of receiving Anne of Burgundy, duchess of Bedford, as a member, and it may be that the duke of Burgundy was held in special regard.[145] Another major *confrérie*, that of the *Pèlerins de Saint-Jacques*

[140] A. Lombard-Jourdan, 'Fiefs et justices parisiens au quartier des Halles', *BEC* 134 (1976), 347.

[141] ADN, B 1929, fo. 106^{v}; B 1957, fo. 387^{r} bis (79*l.* 3*s.* 4*d. p.* spent in 1430, 34, 35).

[142] G. Le Bras, 'Les Confréries chrétiennes: Problèmes et propositions', *RHDFE*, 4th ser. 19–20 (1940–1), 310–66; B. Chevalier, *Les Bonnes Villes de France du XIV^{e} au XVI^{e} siècle*, (Paris, 1982), 250–5.

[143] A. Le Roux de Lincy, 'Recherches sur la Grande Confrérie Notre-Dame Prêtres et aux Bourgeois de Paris, suivies du cartulaire', *Memoires de la Société Royale des Antiquaires de France*, 17 (1844), 224–5.

[144] Foundations made during the Anglo-Burgundian regime included one by Jeanne La Gencienne, of a traditionally Armagnac family, and one by the widow of Jean Fortier, councillor of the duke of Burgundy (AN, L 597 (Grande Confrérie aux Bourgeois), nos. 17, 23c).

[145] Le Roux de Lincy, 'Recherches', 225; in 1458, Philip the Good was included in a list of special benefactors, along with several kings of France (ibid. 283).

in the rue Saint-Denis, was sufficiently 'Burgundian' to go to the effort of adorning its church with Burgundian shields after the murder of John the Fearless. In general, however, it adapted to the prevailing wind, decorating its street frontage for the entries of both Henry VI and Charles VII.[146] Like all institutions dependent on endowment income from property, the *confréries* suffered from the population fall and empty houses of the period, but one cannot tell how this affected their political attitudes.[147] At Bordeaux the *confrérie* of Saint-Michel was a centre of conspiracy in the early 1450s,[148] and it is certain that the Parisian authorities feared the secret meetings of the brothers. New *confréries* were ordered to ensure that an official from the Châtelet was present when assemblies were in progress.[149] But whether or not the suspicions of the government were justified cannot be known.

The *confréries*, meeting behind closed doors and leaving scanty records behind, are difficult for the historian to evaluate. Much more striking are the public manifestations of religion, the excommunications or mass assemblies of Armagnacs and Burgundians, the sashes on the images of the saints. Preaching, too, was sometimes more or less openly political. We have noted the importance of the Dominican friar Brother Richard, whose widely-attended public sermons attempted to prepare the way for Joan of Arc's campaign in Paris.[150] He was perhaps exceptional in his appeal, but he was not a unique example of a preacher with political connections, nor as a preacher hostile to the Anglo-Burgundians. In 1423, two successive bishops of Paris had been confronted with the case of Jean Le Fèvre, monk of Sainte-Geneviève and *curé* of Saint-Étienne-du-Mont, a dependent parish church next door to the abbey.[151] Obviously an Armagnac sympathizer, in 1420 he allowed himself to be captured by the enemy at Montlhéry and stayed with them for two years before returning to Paris; he there began a preaching campaign both inside and outside his parish 'soliciter et dogmatisier pluisieurs choses dampnables, sedicieuses, perilleuses, et

[146] H. Bordier, 'La Confrérie des Pèlerins de Saint-Jacques et ses archives', *MSHP*, ii (1876), 394.

[147] The accounts of the *confrérie* at Saint-Gervais of the 'marchands et vendeurs de vins' (who were officers of the Hôtel de Ville) give several examples of rent-charges lapsing or being bought out at this time (*Bibl. de l'Arsenal*, MS 2763, fos. 40^{v}, 42^{r}, 44^{r}, etc.).

[148] M. G. A. Vale, 'The Last Years of English Gascony, 1451–1453', *TRHS*, 5th ser. 19 (1969), 130. The plot there was in favour of the English.

[149] e.g. Longnon, *Paris*, 284–5. [150] Above, p. 109.

[151] AN, X^{1a} 4793, fos. 403^{v}, 420^{r}, 420^{v}, 427^{r}; X^{1a} 1480, fos. 310^{v}, 311^{r}; X^{1a} 64, fo. 170^{r}.

crimineuses'.[152] In response to this highly political ministry, the bishop of Paris, Jean de La Rochetaillée, began to take action against Le Fèvre. But because the offender was a monk of Sainte-Geneviève, he was given over to the abbot for appropriate steps to be taken there.[153] The reaction of the monks was not, however, such as to suggest that they had the slightest intention of punishing their brother: 'l abbé . . . le fist mettre en une tres belle chambre ou on lui faisoit grant chiere et grans biens-venuez en disners et souppers'.[154] Whether the monks supported the politics of Le Fèvre or not, it is quite clear that at the beginning of the dual monarchy at least one man was sent from enemy territory to preach in favour of Charles VII.

The dissident preacher was a rarity, but he was important because of the access that he had to the ears of the crowd, and for the fact that his political message could borrow authority from its religious context. A cleric could have political opinions like anyone else, the clergy constituted a corporation like many others, but the Church still had an exceptional role in political society. Only the municipality had access to a comparable system for spreading information across the town, and that network of *quarteniers*, *cinquanteniers*, and *dizainiers* scarcely had the same emotional appeal. And it was emotion that created the consensus so important to the Anglo-Burgundian regime. The Burgundian party itself was more than the private interests of a section of the political élite: these may have been its roots, but it blossomed into a popular mass party and its fruit was an irrational but powerful 'Burgundian' loyalty. We have indicated some of the ways in which religion affected the party and the broader consensus that grew beyond it; neither the sources nor space in this book will allow a full development of the theme. We can, however, look more closely at one area in which the Church helped to foster unanimity, namely the outdoor processions and ceremonies so common in this period.

[152] AN, X^{1a} 4793, fo. 420^{r}.

[153] AN, X^{1c} 126, no. 16.

[154] AN, X^{1a} 4793, fo. 427^{r}. Because no action was taken by the monks the case was revived by Jean du Nant, received bishop of Paris in Sept. 1423, and the case has come to be recorded because of the jurisdiction dispute. The monks of Sainte-Geneviève do not appear to have been enthusiastic 'Burgundians', or at least none of them came to take the oath of 1418. However, in 1428 a new abbot took an oath to Henry VI (AN, $P\,725^{1}$ no. 61), and as the years passed the abbey became increasingly popular as a goal for religious processions (see Fig. 3).

7

THE IMPACT OF PROCESSIONS AND CEREMONIAL

Political attitudes can be formed not only by what people read or see or want, but also by events in which they share. It is thus interesting to examine the political connotations of any large-scale group activity that offers scope for the distribution of information, the generation of emotional excitement, and the organization of considerable numbers of people. Such events occurred fairly infrequently in fifteenth-century France but, amongst them, processions and major outdoor rituals were of particular significance. The spectacular ceremonies connected with the monarchy will not be the first priority of this chapter, since the basic symbolism and procedures are now fairly well known.[1] Instead, let us concentrate on the less elaborate, but much more widespread, religious processions in which people were not only spectators but participants. If we wish to study the interaction between political events and society during the period of the Anglo-Burgundian regime, then these occasions, on which people were gathered together by hundreds or even by thousands, are useful fields to explore.[2] Accordingly, this chapter aims to do two things in parallel: to determine what these processions were like and to decide what role they played in political life. In the light of conclusions drawn from that study, it is hoped that a fuller understanding of certain royal ceremonies will be possible.

It is important to place the years of the Anglo-Burgundian regime in the context of the fifteenth century as a whole. Indeed, a connection between processions and politics is readily suggested by the number of such events attended by the lawyers of the *Parlement* of Paris over

[1] R. Giesey, *The Royal Funeral Ceremony in Renaissance France* (Geneva, 1960), and B. Guenée and F. Lehoux, *Les Entrées royales françaises de 1328 à 1515* (Paris, 1968) are but two leading examples of the study of royal ceremony.

[2] Helpful perspectives are offered by R. Trexler, *Public Life in Renaissance Florence* (New York–London, 1980); E. Muir, *Civic Ritual in Renaissance Venice* (Princeton, 1981); and N. Z. Davis, 'The Sacred and the Body Social in Sixteenth-Century Lyon', *P&P* 90 (1981), 40–70.



FIG. 2 Processions noted in the records of the *Parlement* of Paris for the fifteenth century

the years. The pattern, as indicated in Figure 2, shows clear parallels to the political history of the century.[3] The councillors missed only one working day in the first decade of the century, and that was to celebrate what they hoped would be the end of the Great Schism (through the election of Pope Alexander V), but the next decades were rather more often disrupted, with a peak of thirteen processions in 1423. Even that may not seem a very large number, but it should be borne in mind that by the fifteenth century the court was a very busy institution and could not afford to leave work without good reason. Indeed, after several more processions in the 1430s and 1440s, they become very rare events for the rest of the fifteenth century: it is, in fact, only with the upheavals of the reign of Francis I (1515–47) that they again became relatively frequent. The attendance of the *Parlement* at such ceremonies thus coincides in a general way with periods of political disturbance, and in

[3] Based on AN (Salle des Inventaires), U 511, 196 ff. This table to the '*Collection Le Nain*' includes a virtually complete set of extracts concerning the attendance of the *Parlement* at processions.

particular with the years 1418–36. Although this period covered less than a fifth of the century, it still included well over half of those religious processions which interrupted the members of the *Parlement* in their daily business.

However, the shortcomings of the graph should be taken into account. The *greffier* of the *Parlement* did not normally mention processions unless the court had to cease sitting in order to attend. Thus, as the court did not sit on Sundays anyway, no Sunday processions are mentioned, and nor are processions during the vacation, nor events that the *Parlement* chose not to attend. The value of the graph is limited to giving a broad pattern for the century as a whole, and to indicating that there is a phenomenon deserving closer investigation.

This investigation must begin with an account of what these processions entailed, the more necessary since they are comparatively rare events in Protestant countries. A fundamental distinction should be made between ceremonial processions—those associated with the important events of the ecclesiastical year, and so occurring annually—and extraordinary processions, held in response to some particular event or need.[4] Most extraordinary processions are of intercession or thanksgiving. It is obvious that the extraordinary processions were more likely to have been associated with political events although, as we shall see, ceremonial ones could also be sensitive to political upheavals. One other distinction should be mentioned: both ordinary ceremonial and extraordinary processions could be either limited to one particular parish, or general, involving an assembly of all the parishes.

Processions could gather together very large numbers of people: the *Bourgeois* speaks of nine or ten thousand people, not counting clergy, at Sainte-Catherine-du-Val-des-Écoliers in 1444, and twelve and a half thousand children at Les Innocents in 1449.[5] Whether or not one accepts such figures, it is certain that many people were involved, and in 1412 the *Parlement* had to abandon hearings since so few of the *procureurs* had appeared because of the processions.[6] As mentioned, the

[4] *The Catholic Encyclopaedia*, ed. C. G. Herberman *et al.* (15 vols., New York, 1907–14), xii, and *The Catholic Encyclopaedic Dictionary*, ed. D. Attwater (London, 1949), under 'Processions'.

[5] *Bourgeois*, 372, 392. According to Juvénal des Ursins, *Histoire*, 242, a university procession of 1412 had been so long that the Rector, bringing up the rear, had not left the Mathurins when the first people arrived at Saint-Denis.

[6] *Journal de Nicolas de Baye, greffier du Parlement de Paris, 1400–1417*, ed. A. Tuetey (2 vols., SHF, Paris, 1885–8), ii. 73.

judges sometimes interrupted their sessions to attend processions, and so did the municipal court at the Hôtel de Ville.[7] In fact, general processions, if held on weekdays, were the occasion of a break in the daily round, and no work was done for four days in one week during a series of such events held in 1423.[8] Thus Philippe de Vitry had a plausible case when he claimed that Marie de Voisines had been able to slip out of the Hôtel-Dieu where she was living, and across the *parvis* Notre-Dame, in order to steal from his room. The theft took place on Corpus Christi Day 1429, in the absence of Vitry, who was taking part in the procession for the day, and when there was hardly anyone else about, for the same reason.[9]

The exact manner in which people were arranged during these events is not always easy to discern. Certainly the basic pattern of procession two by two was used, with the clergy and the laity separate and, amongst the latter, the men and women segregated, the women following the men.[10] When both the university and the townsmen participated together, it seems that one column was made up of university men and one of bourgeois.[11] If royal officers, who were proud of their status, were included, the position was more complicated. For a procession held on 2 October 1420, the following order was recommended:

1st column: clergy, university . . .
2nd column: clergy, *Parlement*, other officers, citizens . . .[12]

Bearing relics, singing hymns, the line moved slowly. The *Bourgeois* attended a procession to Montmartre on 26 May 1427 that took over an hour to get from Montmartre down to Saint-Lazare, and more than an hour on the last leg of the journey, the mile from Saint-Laurent to Saint-Merri. Delayed by the driving rain and by their encounter with the duke of Bedford, who was riding in the other direction and spattered the faithful with mud, the procession was still moving as fast as decently it could.[13] It would be wrong to see these events as excessively rigid or dour and the sermon, which would probably have provided the climax to

[7] AN, Z^{1h} 8, fos. 25^{v}–26^{r}: 8, 13, 15 Mar. 1426.

[8] *Bourgeois*, 184. [9] AN, X^{1a} 4796, fo. 129^{r}.

[10] Cf. the special dispensation made to the women of Beauvais in June 1473 (*Ordonnances*, xvii. 581).

[11] *Bourgeois*, 102.

[12] AN, LL 253, fo. 17^{r}. This volume from the '*Collection Sarrazin*' contains an excellent, and apparently complete, series of extracts from the registers of the chapter of Notre-Dame relating to ceremonial.

[13] *Bourgeois*, 214.

the day, would have been designed to hold the attention of its wide audience with strong imagery, rhetorical flourishes and (perhaps) allusions to current affairs.[14] Furthermore, a procession might mean a day off work and the chance to get out of town with friends: in June 1427 we meet Jeanette, wife of Jean de Luillier, advocate at the *Parlement*, coming back from the procession to Boulogne-sur-Seine with the wife of Geoffrey de Molins, *huissier* at the court, and other '*honnestes femmes*'. They were walking along arm-in-arm.[15]

When considering how these events may have become involved with politics we should return to the distinction between ceremonial processions, which occurred every year, and extraordinary processions, which responded to particular needs. It is, in fact, difficult to be confident about the pattern of the annual cycle, because the ritual year in a town adapted the general Roman calendar to local interests and loyalties.[16] Not only was it local at the level of the town: the basic units of religious life were the parish churches, of which there were thirty-five in Paris.[17] These were the institutions to which most people gave their loyalty in the first instance, a loyalty defined partly by the location of their home, partly by church-going habits: Guillaume Rose, living on the border between Saint-Merri and Saint-Jean-en-Grève, said in 1428 that he did not know for certain which parish his house was in, but that in any case he usually went to Saint-Jean.[18] Each parish would have organized processions to celebrate their own patron saint, as Saint-Merri did in 1428, when an elaborate event was arranged for the saint's day to mark the recent improvement in the weather.[19] Likewise, each religious house would celebrate its patron saint, and each university college its founders and benefactors. These events were normally quite local, and would have served to emphasize the regionalism that existed even within Paris. It was a rare event when, in 1431, the feast of St Thomas Aquinas, 7 March, was taken over for general processions to the Dominicans; evidently the chapter of Notre-Dame was looking for a convenient

[14] No full text of a sermon from the Anglo-Burgundian period survives, but one can catch the flavour from that given by Jean Courtecuisse at the end of a procession for St Vincent's Day (22 Jan.) 1416 (J. Courtecuisse, *L'Œuvre oratoire française de Jean Courtecuisse*, ed. G. di Stefano (Turin, 1969), 193–207; G. di Stefano 'Un sermon français inédit de Jean Courtecuisse, *Justum Audiutorium*', *Romania*, 85 (1964), 417–54).

[15] 'Sentretenoient par les bras' (AN, X^{1a} 4795, fo. 114^{v}).

[16] Cf. C. Phythian-Adams, 'Ceremony and the Citizen: The Communal Year at Coventry, 1450–1550', in P. Clark and P. Slack (eds.), *Crisis and Order in English Towns* (London, 1972), 70–9.

[17] Favier, *Paris*, 20. [18] AN, Z^{1a} 7, fo. 206^{v}. [19] AN, LL 253, fo. 23^{r}.

reason to draw people together, and so selected that date and place.[20] Normally, the Dominicans would have celebrated the great philosopher without representatives from all the churches of Paris.

It seems likely that the majority of processions and celebrations were essentially local, and of only passing concern to people from other parts of Paris. There were, however, a certain number of events that attracted a more general interest.[21] It appears that these tended either to centre on Notre-Dame, at the heart of Paris, or be external excursions into the *banlieu* to visit certain sacred sites on important days. Notre-Dame was, naturally, the principal place for important celebrations connected with the Virgin, and was also the goal on other saints' days when the capital lacked a suitable site.[22] Furthermore, the cathedral was the site of many great public assemblies and the meeting point for most general processions that were heading elsewhere. Amongst processions that did not have Notre-Dame as a finishing point, one should mention that of Good Friday to the Sainte-Chapelle when the kings of France were supposed to show the True Cross.[23] There was normally a procession to Saint-Martin-des-Champs on 4 July each year, and the beautiful church of Saint-Jean-en-Grève was especially important on Corpus Christi Day. This was because it housed a piece of the Host that had displayed miraculous properties when, in 1290, a sacrilegious Jew had attempted to boil it. A miniature in the so-called Pontifical of Poitiers begun for the duke of Bedford shows the duke attending this procession, which is in the Place de Grève, near Saint-Jean.[24] However, within the walls most processions ended at Notre-Dame. Those which went out of Paris visited several of the most important religious sites in the immediate vicinity of Paris every year. In the third week in March, processions were

[20] Ibid., fo. 26^{r}.

[21] This survey is based on AN, LL 253, the *Bourgeois*, and *Fauquembergue*. The processional year overlapped with, but was not identical to, the cycle of religious holidays sketched by J. Favier, *François Villon* (Paris, 1982), 164–8. For much more detail concerning the daily worship of the saints see P. Perdrizet, *Le Calendrier parisien à la fin du Moyen Age* (Publications de la Faculté de Lettres de l'Université de Strasbourg, lxiii, 1933), 68–283, *passim*, but that work has little to say about processions.

[22] e.g. the procession for St Vincent's Day 1416 (above, n. 14).

[23] In fact, this event was held very rarely, and apparently only once under the English (*Fauquembergue*, ii. 128).

[24] Although this manuscript was destroyed in 1871 a 19th-cent. version of this miniature was included in Le Roux de Lincy and Tisserand, *Paris et ses historiens*, facing p. 197. As for the church of Saint-Jean itself, sad pictures of its demolition, early in the last century, can be seen in the Musée Carnavelet, Paris.



A Notre-Dame
B Ste-Chapelle
C St-Germain-l'Auxerrois
D St-Honoré
E Ste-Marie-l'Égyptienne
F Montmartre
G St-Magloire
H St-Jacques-de-l'Hôpital
I St-Martin-des-Champs
J St-Laurent
K St-Merri
L St-Jean-en-Grève
M Ste-Catherine-du-Val-des-Écoliers
N Collège de Cardinal Lemoine
O Bernardins
P Bons-Enfants
Q St-Victor
R Collège de Navarre
S St-Hilaire
T Ste-Geneviève
U St-Marcel
V Jacobins
W Notre-Dames-des-Champs
X Cordeliers
Y Augustins
Z St-Germain-des-Prés

MAP 8. Principal churches used for processions

made to Saint-Victor and, a few days later, to Saint-Marcel. In April, the goal was Montmartre, a second visit to Saint-Victor was made on 21 July, and processions also marked the beginning of trade fairs. These went to Saint-Denis for the start of the international fair known as the Lendit and, on 10 August, the feast of St Laurence, to the church of Saint-Laurent to mark the saint's day and the fair held the same day.

This regular pattern was considerably disrupted by war. In February 1418, shortly before the Burgundian coup, the canons of Notre-Dame ruled that processions that would normally go to Saint-Victor would go to the Bons-Enfants instead, to the Bernardins in place of Saint-Marcel, to the College de Cluny near the Porte Saint-Michel instead of Notre-Dame-des-Champs outside and Saint-Honoré instead of Montmartre.[25] It seems they were keeping as far as possible to the planned routes, but stopping short. This would have been partly because of fear of gangs of soldiers, but partly for the simple fact that, in times of war, the gates of Paris were frequently kept closed. On Monday 18 July 1418 it was decided that processions should go to Saint-Victor on the following Thursday, if the Porte Saint-Victor was open, or failing that to the College de Cardinal Lemoine.[26] Alterations were frequently required over the next decades; in July 1429 the St Victor's Day procession was to be cut short with the vague explanation 'propter tempus modernum', while the reason was more explicitly noted in 1431: 'propter periculum guerris'.[27] As for the traditional March procession to Saint-Victor, this was directed to the Bernardins in 1419, 1422, and 1435 and to the College de Cardinal Lemoine in 1434, while processions to Saint-Marcel were forced to break off at the College de Navarre in 1419, 1422, and perhaps 1432, and at Saint-Hilaire in 1434.[28] Montmartre was equally badly affected as, amongst other disruptions, processions in that direction had to stop at Sainte-Marie-l'Égyptienne in 1422 and Saint-Jacques-de-l'Hôpital in 1435.[29] Even Saint-Laurent, less than half a mile beyond the gates, was often cut off from the traditonal procession that should have marked the saint's feast and fair on 8 August. In 1421 and 1429 the route stopped short at Saint-Sauveur in the rue Saint-Denis and, in four of the last five years of the English occupation, devotees of St Laurence had to be content with a procession to the chapel of the saint in the abbey of Saint-Martin-des-

[25] AN, LL 112, p. 185.
[26] Ibid. 203.
[27] AN, LL 253, fos. 24^{r}, 26^{r}.
[28] Ibid., fos. 16^{v}, 18^{r}, 27^{v}, 29^{v}, 31^{r}.
[29] Ibid., fos. 18^{r}, 31^{r}.

Champs, rather than to his church.[30] The abbey was also used as the site for a scaled-down version of the St Laurence Fair. The *Bourgeois* tells us how in 1429 the Porte Saint-Martin was closed and proclamation made forbidding anyone to go to Saint-Laurent whether for reasons of devotion or trade, on pain of hanging. Instead, crowds of people attended the *fête* in the great court of Saint-Martin-des-Champs, but the *Bourgeois* was disappointed to find nothing for sale except eggs, cheese, and fruit.[31] In every case where a procession had to be cut short because of danger, or because the gate was closed, the organizers of the event arranged to stop at the nearest assembly point inside the gate in the direction that they would have taken ayway. The basic radial pattern was maintained, but truncated, so that there could be no mistaking the abnormality of the times. It could hardly be otherwise when, in the face of closed gates, the faithful turned off the traditional route sometimes (as on St Victor's Day) only yards from their goal.

Bearing in mind that an essential feature of the religious calendar is its regularity, one may guess that the effect of political difficulties was profoundly unsettling. Furthermore, the Parisians hated to feel enclosed. A chronicle of the fourteenth century, describing celebrations in 1382, concludes by commenting cheerfully on the way the gates were left open by night and by day.[32] These happy days were over by the second decade of the fifteenth century, and gates were often closed and sealed off.[33] When permission to reopen a gate was obtained, it was the signal for much enthusiastic activity in the area: the *Bourgeois* gives a proud account of work done by local residents to restore the Porte Saint-Martin in time for the St Laurence Fair in 1425.[34] Since the Porte Saint-Denis was only a couple of minutes' walk away, it may seem surprising that the other gate was so important to the inhabitants of the rue Saint-Martin, but there is no doubt that not only the economic boost of the through traffic, but also the psychological need to feel in contact with the countryside, was very necessary to the Parisians. If one walks in imagination the narrow and stinking streets of medieval Paris one can appreciate the depressing effect of seeing, at the end of the houses, the gate closed in daytime or, worse, walled up. But even where the gates were open, people sometimes hesitated to go out for fear of violence and

[30] Ibid., fos. 18^{r}, 24^{r}, 26^{r}, 29^{r}, 30^{v}, 32^{r}. [31] *Bourgeois*, 243.

[32] BN, MS fr. 4990, cit. *Catalogue des manuscrits français*, iv, ed. H. Omont (Paris, 1895), 463.

[33] Favier, *Paris*, 25. [34] *Bourgeois*, 204.

armed men.[35] At the end of 1431, the English nation in the university of Paris (one of the four groupings of the faculty of arts) feared to take the beadle's mace with them when they went to pay their respects to Henry VI at Vincennes, because of the dangers of taking such a valuable object out of the town.[36]

In this climate of insecurity the disruption of regular ceremonial processions made the political instability obvious to everyone. Just as the material provisioning of Paris was upset by political upheavals, so the spiritual life of the Parisians was equally disturbed. Anyone attending a religious procession in these years might be forced to participate, in a small but significant way, in the upheavals of the time. If this was true even of regular annual processions, it was much more obviously the case when extraordinary events were organized in response to special needs. During the troubled years of Anglo-Burgundian rule these intercessory processions were fairly frequent events. The registers of the *Parlement* mention some sixty special processions in this eighteen-year period, and a similar number are referred to in the records of the canons of Notre-Dame.[37] One should stress that neither of these sources gives a complete picture: the *Parlement* only records interruptions to its working week; the chapter seems to have noted the arrangements only when there was a particular question of organization to be resolved. None the less, they must account for a substantial proportion of the exceptional processions held during these years.

Almost all these special events had as their destination places within Paris. In this they were different from the processions of the regular annual cycle which, as we saw, had routes that often took them beyond the walls. Three sites were of particular importance: Notre-Dame on the Cité, Sainte-Catherine-du-Val-des-Écoliers on the right bank, and Sainte-Geneviève on the left bank. Figure 3 shows how, together, these three account for well over half of all exceptional processions.[38]

Dominating the ritual life of Paris was the cathedral of Notre-Dame. At the physical centre of Paris, its position was in accordance with the

[35] AN, X^{1a} 4797, fo. 123^{r}: 16 Dec. 1433.

[36] G. C. Boyce, *The English-German Nation in the University of Paris during the Middle Ages* (Bruges, 1927), 69.

[37] AN, U 511, pp. 196 ff.; *Fauquembergue*, *passim*; AN, LL 253, fo. 16^{r} ff.

[38] The popularity of these three sites is in striking contrast to the minimal support for destinations outside the walls (only one procession to Saint-Victor, mentioned only by the *Parlement* records and one to Saint-Germain-des-Prés recorded only by the chapter).



FIG. 3 Processions attended by the chapter of Notre-Dame and the *Parlement* of Paris in the years 1418–1436

special devotion to the Virgin which characterized later medieval religion.[39] Coming into Paris in procession on St Barnabas's Day 1428, the villagers of Villejuif had Notre-Dame as their destination, and when they arrived they wished to have mass said for them, naturally enough, but it was not a mass for St Barnabas, even if it was his day, but for the Virgin Mary, and as a result the high mass for the saint had to be delayed until they had finished.[40]

Processions to Sainte-Catherine-du-Val-des-Écoliers and to Sainte-

[39] E. Delaruelle, E.-R. Labande, and P. Ourliac, *L'Église au temps du grand schisme et de la crise conciliare, 1378–1499* (*Histoire de l'Église depuis les origines jusqu'à nos jours*, ed. A. Fliche and V. Martin, xiv (Paris, 1962–4)), ii. 759–60, 777–86.

[40] *Fauquembergue*, ii. 278.

Geneviève were slightly less popular than those to Notre-Dame, but were much more numerous than any others. Sainte-Catherine was, not surprisingly, the favourite destination of the university, given the history of the institutions. In 1201 four celebrated teachers from the embryonic university of Paris had decided to escape the fame of the teaching life and withdraw into a remote valley in Champagne. However, they were soon joined by a number of students, and it was not long before a formal order dedicated to St Catherine was established under the Augustinian rule. In 1229 the wheel came full circle when the canons established a house in Paris to allow the younger members of the order to study in the capital.[41] Inevitably, this church of Sainte-Catherine-du-Val-des-Écoliers—separate from the university but linked to it—was a traditional goal for processions by men from the university.[42]

If processions to Sainte-Catherine show a move from the left bank to the right, processions to Sainte-Geneviève demonstrate the reverse. The abbey, at the top of the steep Mont Sainte-Geneviève, preserved the relics of the patron saint of Paris well away from the Cité and the commercial centre of the right bank. The daily business and the regular worship of the inhabitants of Les Halles and Grève seldom took them to the semi-autonomous Université region.[43] It was important that in times of war or natural disaster this parochialism should break down, and there could be no better way of achieving that end than making a common approach to the patron saint who had shielded the Parisians on so many occasions. While one could explain the fact that the special processions remained inside Paris for fear of violence beyond the walls, staying inside the town had a more significant consequence. In times of peace the regular external processions united the town and the surrounding countryside, in times of trouble the special processions united the Parisians with each other, in a common activity within their town. One can see a type of symmetry: the university taking their relics to Sainte-Catherine, or the town of Paris climbing the Mont Sainte-Geneviève, or all converging on Notre-Dame at the centre. Other sites are relatively unimportant. Processions to the Jacobins are mentioned

[41] Jaillot, *Recherches*, iii, 'Saint-Anthoine', 13–19; E. Raunié, M. Prinet, A. Lesort, and H. Verlet, *Épitaphier du vieux Paris* (5 vols., HGP, Paris, 1890–1974), ii. 262–3.

[42] Cf. *Baye*, i. 93, 100 (an assault on a procession to Sainte-Catherine in 1404); *Bourgeois*, 21 (a procession involving every member of the university, including the children from the schools, in 1412).

[43] Inhabitants of the right bank 'passent peu les ponts et ne font pas entrer dans la carte de leurs dévotions courantes les hauts-lieux de l'Université' (Favier, *Villon*, 53).

six times by the chapter, but not at all by the *Parlement*; other places that receive several mentions include Saint-Martin-des-Champs and Saint-Germain-l'Auxerrois, helping to spread processional routes across the right bank. For the rest, one must note the procession to Saint-Magloire of 15 July 1429.[44] This was held to celebrate the arrival of the duke of Burgundy, who was in Paris to discuss the recent successes of Charles VII and Joan of Arc. It was surely no coincidence that Saint-Magloire was chosen for this event: it adjoined the Les Halles district, the most pro-Burgundian part of Paris.

This brings us back to politics. It is clear that political events affected many processions, and led to the holding of a large number of others. The attitude of people in authority to these events needs to be investigated. How far could the government use religious ceremonies for its own purposes? The first step in answering that question is to determine the influence of political leaders over the events. Certainly, at the palace the king could order the appearance of royal officers such as those of the *Parlement*, *Requêtes*, or *Chambre des Comptes* at important ceremonies, and this was also true of the canons of the Sainte-Chapelle. It was probably an exaggeration to describe the canons as mere servants and chaplains of the king,[45] but obviously the Crown's authority was greater in the chapel of the palace than elsewhere. It was in front of the Sainte-Chapelle that the kings of France were accustomed to show the relics for which St Louis had built the chapel, and this the duke of Bedford did on behalf of Henry VI, showing the Crown of Thorns on 11 August 1423, and the True Cross on Good Friday 1424.[46] Bedford no doubt appreciated the propaganda possibilities of that type of event, since it implied a clear connection between his regency and the traditions of the French monarchy. There is an interesting slip in the sixteenth-century copy of the criminal register of the *Parlement*, where Bedford is referred to as 'le roy en habit royal', instead of 'le régent', when the ceremony of Good Friday 1424 is recorded; one would like to know whether the mistake was in the lost original.[47] Yet there was only a

[44] AN, LL 253, fo. 24^{r}.

[45] Pierre d'Armes, described the canons as 'familiers et domestiques, et . . . ne sont *re vera* que chappellains', but lost his case (AN, X^{1a} 4795, fo. 35^{r}; for the judgement X^{1a} 65, fo. 221^{r}; X^{1a} 66, fo. 44^{r}; X^{1a} 1480, fo. 385^{r}).

[46] *Fauquembergue*, ii. 106, 128. The miniature reproduced by Le Roux de Lincy and Tisserand, *Paris et ses historiens*, facing p. 537, shows Bedford kneeling before the relics, and could possibly allude to these events.

[47] BN, MS Dupuy 250, fo. 141^{v}. The original has been missing for centuries.

After 1429 in particular some people did commit themselves to the campaign against the English. There were conspiracies in March and May 1430 that unsettled the people of Paris,[112] and in September 1432 the *prévôt* obtained permission to take certain nuns from the convent of Saint-Anthoine-des-Champs (between Vincennes and the Bastille), because their evidence was needed after another plot.[113] Then, independently, two new schemes were undertaken in September 1433, both of which were exposed.[114]

Sometimes the plotters had mixed motives. Jean de Montfort, executed in 1430 for his part in the first conspiracy of the year, had not had a successful decade. A royal notary and secretary, he had survived the transition from the Armagnac to the Burgundian regime in 1418, but was then indicted on corruption charges for acting as an agent in the sale of offices, and fined 100*l.p.*[115] Worse was to follow when his practice of forging credit notes and presenting them to unsuspecting widows and executors was exposed: suspended from his office, then handed over to the bishop of Paris as a clerk, he was excommunicated but wrongly released by the bishop in time to participate in the conspiracy of March 1430, for which he was executed.[116] It is hard to avoid the suspicion that he was hoping to make a new life under a new administration. Even the ringleaders of this plot had some material incentives, although perhaps not enough to risk execution unless some deeper beliefs were also held. Jean de La Chapelle surely did not risk his life solely as a consequence of losing a long-running lawsuit over disputed rents the previous month but this may have helped him make up his mind.[117] The cases that another leading conspirator, Jacques Perdriel, had been conducting on

[112] *Bourgeois*, 251–4. The second disturbance was confined to a group of prisoners at the Bastille, but the first conspiracy was much more important, and is described in detail in the pardon of the man who betrayed it (Longnon, *Paris*, 302–8). A minor riot in an ecclesiastical court in May 1430 'quant chacun estoit armé et treublé a cause de la conspiracion qui fu descouverte' is mentioned in AN, X^{1a} 4796, fo. 284^{v}.

[113] BN, MS Dupuy 250, fo. 147^{v}; *Bourgeois*, 287–8; *Fauquembergue*, iii. 65.

[114] *Bourgeois*, 296–7.

[115] Tessier and Ouy, 'Notaires et secrétaires', 868, wrongly ignore de Montfort in noting secretaries who served before and after the entry of the Burgundians (cf. ibid. 886, and *Ordonnances*, x. 463). For the corruption charges see AN, X^{1a} 4793, fo. 389^{r}; X^{1a} 1480, fo. 311^{r}.

[116] AN, X^{2a} 20, fo. 135^{r}; Z^{10} 17 (Excommunications, 1426–39), fo. 7^{v}; X^{1a} 4795, fos. 211^{r}, 302^{v}; X^{1a} 4796, fo. 199^{v}; X^{1a} 1481, fo. 25^{r}; BN, MS Dupuy 250, fo. 145^{v}. For the confiscation of his goods see Ch. 5, n. 170, and cf. AN, X^{1a} 4796, fo. 219^{r}.

[117] AN, X^{1a} 4796, fo. 107^{v}; X^{1a} 67, fo. 87^{v}.

behalf of his wife against the Englishman John Charlton, and the receiver of Normandy Pierre Surreau, are unlikely, of themselves, to explain his hostility to the Lancastrians but will have bolstered his committment to the French.[118]

The fact that Perdriel made a point of referring to Charles VII as 'roi' probably does indicate his strong political convictions,[119] but there is much that cannot be known. The involvement of the abbess and several of the nuns of Saint-Anthoine-des-Champs in the plot of September 1432 may have been a straightforward political venture, or it may have reflected internal tensions. In seventy years preceding the Anglo-Burgundian regime four of the abbesses had been related as aunt to niece, and the series had ended in considerable bitterness with the death in 1419 of Pernelle Le Duc. She was the sister of Guillaume Le Duc, who was to become Bedford's closest ally in the *Parlement*. In 1422, the nuns had begun an action accusing Guillaume of manipulating his sister so as to defraud the convent, and resentment may well have continued into the 1430s.[120]

Whatever the precise motives of the various conspirators may have been, the failures did not stop people observing the ways in which military and political events were developing. In mid-August 1433, over lunch in a tavern on the rue Saint-Martin, conversation turned to the recurrent topics of the war and the hardships of the common people. It was said that matters would never improve until there was a peaceful king, a well-populated university, and a properly-supported *Parlement*.[121] By 1435, similar sentiments had been incorporated in a fifteen-verse poem, in which it was said that the miseries of Paris could never be ended without the blessing of peace.[122]

Such feelings could not lead to effective action until after the peace of Arras. Prior to that settlement, schemes to make an entry with Scotsmen dressed up as Englishmen, or to encourage support for Charles VII by reading his letters of amnesty, were exposed before being put into

[118] AN, X^{1a} 4794, fo. 108^{v}; X^{1a} 4795, fo. 81^{r}, 105^{r}; X^{1a} 1480, fo. 377^{v}.

[119] Longnon, *Paris*, 304–5.

[120] Raunié *et al.*, *Épitaphier de vieux Paris*, i. 138. For Pernelle Le Duc, who 'bonne religieuse mais simple femme estoit', and the ill will between the abbey and her brother Guillaume after her death, see AN, X^{1a} 4793, fo. 155^{v}.

[121] Longnon, *Paris*, 351–2.

[122] 'Complainte sur les misères de Paris composée en 1435', ed. L. Auvray, *BSHP* 18 (1891), 84–7. The poem does not make specific mention of the English, and thus has a different emphasis from that of 1434 printed by Delpit, *Collection*, i. 238–9, which was written to impress upon them the need for action.

limited number of events on such lines and only royal officers could be expected to turn up automatically. Other monks and clergy might expect to be paid specially for their attendance, the sum of 2 *s.* 3*d. p.* being paid to each of the friars who were in procession at the Sainte-Chapelle for the feasts of St Louis in 1430 and 1431, and of St Jerome in 1431 and 1432.[48]

The royal authorities had direct control over any events connected with the palace and the Sainte-Chapelle, but more extensive assemblies of the populace were organized by other institutions, and in particular by the university, the chapter and the bishop of Paris. If the university was concerned chiefly with its own members, the chapter helped to arrange most other events, since the cathedral of Notre-Dame was usually involved at the beginning, if not at the end, of any general procession. If the government wished to arrange a procession it could approach the canons or go through the bishop, although even if the bishop was in favour this did not mean that the opinion of the canons could be ignored.[49] In fact, the general picture is one of consultation: the royal council, the bishop, the university, or the municipality could suggest to the chapter that processions would be advantageous, and conversely, when the chapter decided to hold such ceremonies on their own initiative, they were supposed to obtain permission from the bishop and, in times of political unrest, from the royal council as well.

There were, then, opportunities for the council to initiate general processions for political reasons, albeit through the church authorities. In his pioneering work on Charles VII Vallet de Viriville wrote of the duke of Bedford's policy of bread and circuses; above all the duke provided the Parisians with spectacular events.[50] To the examples he cites can be added religious processions which, it appears, were well appreciated by Bedford.[51] On 7 May 1427, the chapter of Notre-Dame was told how the regent had decided that it would be a good idea to hold general processions for the town of Pontorson, where a long siege by the English was reaching its climax. The canons obediently agreed that a

[48] BL, Add. Chs. 11669, 11778, 11789, 11805. The number of these Franciscans attending varied between 43 and 53.

[49] For the etiquette on this point see AN, LL 295, fo. 352^{r}.

[50] A. Vallet de Viriville, *Histoire de Charles VII*, (3 vols., Paris, 1862–5), ii. 325.

[51] 'S'il [Bedford] engageait une bataille, un siège, l'offensive de pieté se deroulait parallèlement, les processions succèdaient aux masses et aux prières publiques' (M. Pardessus, 'Le Rôle du clergé de Paris pendant l'occupation anglaise de la guerre de Cent Ans' (École des Chartes thesis, 1950), 96).

procession should take place the next day.[52] Such processions in celebration of a victory could have blatant propaganda value for the regent: in the last week in February 1429, when it was obvious that the siege of Orléans was going badly, Bedford ordered general processions to offer thanks for the relatively minor success obtained in the so-called 'Battle of the Herrings', when a supply-train going to the siege was defended by English soldiers and Parisian militiamen against an attack by a Franco-Scottish force. Then, in August 1431, when Paris was preparing for the visit of Henry VI to the capital, a solemn mass with processions celebrated victories recently obtained over the king's enemies.[53] Other causes for celebration were expressed in the same ritual format: for example, the arrival of Henry VI in the world, in France, and in Paris. The first event—his birth—was celebrated by processions in Paris on Christmas Eve 1421:[54] the connotations of the baby as a Christmas child could not have escaped anybody. The birth of the dauphin Louis was celebrated in similar fashion in Poitiers, but they were not so lucky with the date (7 July 1423).[55] For the Parisians, the second arrival of Henry's life—in France (he landed in Calais on St George's Day 1430)—was also celebrated by processions.[56] The third 'arrival'—Henry's 'joyeux avènement' in Paris—was the occasion of an elaborate entry ceremony, itself replete with religious symbolism. The choice of Advent Sunday for the entry must have been deliberate.[57] Henry V, too, had entered Paris for the first time on Advent Sunday, in 1420.[58] Both the calendar and the ritual of the Church could be used for propaganda purposes.

The primary purpose of processions was, of course, religious. Bedford's main aim in calling for them after a victory was to give thanks to God and, during a siege, it was to ask for help. It is none the less certain that the authorities were aware that some features of processions offered particular scope for propaganda and, amongst these, the sermon stood out. Preaching was recognized as a means whereby a government could

[52] AN, LL 253, fo. 21^{v}. The siege had begun on 27 Feb. and in fact ended on 8 May (*Chronique d'Arthur de Richemont, connétable de France, duc de Bretagne (1393–1458), par Guillaume Gruel*, ed. A. Le Vavasseur (SHF, Paris, 1890), 55–6).

[53] AN, LL 253, fos. 23^{v}, 26^{r}. [54] *Fauquembergue*, ii. 33.

[55] AN, U 511, p. 1. Louis was born on 3 July.

[56] *Fauquembergue*, ii. 338–9. [57] *Bourgeois*, 274.

[58] Noted as such in the chapter records (Grassoreille, 'Histoire politique du chapitre', 125 n. 1). Any significance seems to have escaped the *Bourgeois* (p. 144), however, as he merely notes that 1 Dec. was the 'jour Sainct Eloy, qui fut a ung dimenche'.

communicate with the people and special announcements were sometimes made during the Sunday high mass in the parish churches.[59] At the general procession to Notre-Dame on 30 August 1421 the sermon was used to spread news and, indeed, it could be a vehicle for the announcement of military triumphs, such as the surrender of Meaux to the English and Burgundians in May 1422.[60] In this latter instance the sermon actually concluded with a reading of the treaty of surrender, and one wonders how the preacher, who took as his theme John 16:22—'I shall see you again, and your heart will rejoice'—succeeded in turning his discourse to this military text.

Preaching offered some opportunities for the spread of information, but it could be said that the most significant 'propaganda' point about these processions was not any specific message that was put across, but the fact that they took place at all. Normally, large assemblies of people were regarded with extreme suspicion, and in Paris the troubles of 1413 and 1418 had brought home to men in authority the perils of not keeping a firm grip on public gatherings. The fear of large meetings was not only an urban phenomenon: the English captain of Beaumont moved quickly when he heard of a gathering of inhabitants from nearby villages, sending his men to find out what it meant.[61] Yet the towns offered scope for greater disasters than the countryside, and the rioters of August 1418 were in fact diverted from their carnage by the call to take up arms against the enemy at Montlhéry; once they were outside Paris the gates were closed against them.[62] The problem remained one of finding a prevention rather than a cure. Public assemblies were carefully controlled, and a seemingly innocuous event such as the election of new churchwardens required authorization and the presence of a sergeant from the Châtelet.[63] Such restrictions were standard practice in times of political instability: after the failure of a plot against the Armagnacs at Easter 1416 it had been announced that meetings of *confréries* and large weddings were banned until further notice, while any weddings that did take place required the attendance of constables and sergeants, paid for by the bridegroom.[64] Soon afterwards, the Parisians were required to

[59] e.g. AN, Y 6^7, p. 45. This concerned the administration of Les Halles.

[60] *Fauquembergue*, ii. 24, 44. See also the account of a sermon preached against Joan of Arc at the end of a procession in 1431: *Bourgeois*, 270–2.

[61] AN, X^{1a} 4794, fo. 244^r: 16 May 1426. [62] *Bourgeois*, 111.

[63] AN, X^{1a} 4797, fo. 25^v.

[64] AN, Y 4^2, p. 84: published 'a son de trompe' on 5 May 1416; *Bourgeois*, 72.

deposit their arms at the Bastille.[65] The riots of June 1418 that marked the beginning of Burgundian domination in Paris provoked the renewal of such prohibitions: at the crossroads of the capital it was announced that no one, of whatever rank, should organize any assembly without proper authority.[66]

This suspicion of public gatherings was very largely justified. The massacres of 1418 were exceptional in their extent, but the manner in which membership of a group provoked extreme behaviour was not so unusual. Hence *maître* Guy Hennequin, well-born and educated, finding himself on 3 May 1419 caught up in a crowd ready to go to the siege of Beaumont, turned on the *prévôt des marchands* when the venture was called off. He said there was false, treacherous government and every member of the municipality had ten Armagnac hangers-on ('dix armignacs a sa seinture'). Another individual, known by the unpromising name of Barbedefer (Ironbeard), claimed even more ominously that nothing would go well until as many people had been killed as had died already.[67] Against this type of disorder a disciplined procession could be a valuable antidote. In place of chaos or rebellion, some sense of common purpose that was not dangerous to the social fabric could be created. This, at least, was the hope of the rector of the university when he came with a deputation to the chapter of Notre-Dame after the riots of 12 June 1418. He asked that two canons be appointed to discuss some means of pacifying the people through preaching and a solemn procession. The chapter felt that the scheme was highly risky, but agreed to proceed if permission was obtained from the royal council. Since the whole solemnity of the event would be ruined if there was any unseemly conflict over orders of precedence between the chapter and university care was taken to resolve such questions in advance.[68] After this careful preparation all went according to plan and, according to the *Bourgeois*, it was one of the most beautiful processions ever seen. All the parishes of Paris assembled at Notre-Dame and from there went with many candles and reliquaries to Saint-Merri, and thence to Saint-Jean-en-Grève. There the sacred Host that had suffered sacrilege in 1290 was collected, and carried with reverence and praise to Saint-Martin-des-Champs. Beside each *maître* from the university walked a Parisian citizen, so that

[65] AN, Y 4^2, pp. 87–9: 10–13 May 1416. [66] Ibid. 182: 24 July 1418.

[67] AN, X^{1a} 4792, fo. 129^v. Hennequin argued strongly that he had not said what was claimed, but there seems no motive for any misrepresentation.

[68] AN, LL 112, pp. 200–1; also AN, LL 253, fo. 16^r, and *Bourgeois*, 102 n. 1.

the procession was a symbol of unity between town and gown after the upheavals of previous weeks.[69]

Such a ceremony can, then, be seen as something of a propaganda event, harnessing and giving structure to the energies of the crowd. This can be added to the ways in which processions were intended to mould public opinion: they allowed the rulers to present themselves in a favourable light, to publish their successes to a wide audience, and to create an image of ordered, purposeful society that was especially valuable in times of disruption. Thus the response of the royal council as the Anglo-Burgundian regime was disintegrating at the beginning of 1436 was to ask the Bishop to arrange processions. In order to be certain that events did not get out of hand these were to be localized, processions in the parishes rather than *processions générales*, but the decision to hold them was based simply on political considerations.[70] It is in fact indisputable that processions were seen as useful tools by the ruling élite, that is, not only by the royal council but by everyone else responsible for the maintenance of social order. In the example of 1418 discussed above the initiative came from the university and the chapter; in October 1420, when the young Anglo-Burgundian alliance was in a tense state, it was not only the rector of the university, but the *prévôt* of Paris, the *échevins* and various other notables who suggested that processions would be invaluable if peace was to be maintained.[71]

Processions, then, could be propaganda. That this was their essential characteristic as social phenomena seems less certain. There were many events that had only the most tenuous connections with the contentious matters of politics. For example, the weather was very bad—cold and wet—in 1427 and 1428, and several ceremonies were held in response to this, calling on St Geneviève, patron saint of Paris, for her intervention.[72] One could say, perhaps, that these had the function, conscious or unconscious, of uniting the Parisians behind their saint, and played a propaganda role in that way. But there were also the truncated regular processions that we discussed above. These were obviously not propaganda events, as all they showed was the inability of the government to protect its people immediately outside the walls.

It seems preferable to define the social role of ritual in a slightly different way, and to say that the essence was that people participated in

[69] *Bourgeois*, 101–2.

[70] *Fauquembergue*, iii. 81.

[71] 'De necessitate, ad evitandos plures rumores, remonstrandis, et specialiter pro pace manutenenda' (AN, LL 253, fo. 17^{r}).

[72] *Fauquembergue*, ii. 236, 279, 282.

society through its action, and that the undeniable propaganda efforts made in relation to some events were secondary to their general function. People still participated, largely by free choice, and if we stress the unifying action of ritual we can produce an umbrella concept that includes a place for its various different forms. Processions allowed people to share in the failure as well as the successes of their society. For the Parisians, the repulsion of Joan of Arc's attack was a clear success, a municipal and civic achievement made possible by the good work of the citizens. The day before, processions to Sainte-Geneviève had helped to prepare the town; the victory was commemorated by a mass before the altar of the Virgin on its anniversary in 1431 and 1434, and on the latter occasion the great bell 'Jacqueline' was rung at the expense of the bourgeois.[73] If matters had turned out differently, perhaps celebrating the defeat of Joan of Arc would have become a Parisian tradition. On the other hand, the death of the duke of Burgundy's sister, Anne duchess of Bedford, was a real sadness to the Parisian people; in token of affection several of the leading institutions had stopped work in order to attend processions for her health.[74] To say that these processions were a propaganda device would be a distortion, for they allowed the people to express their anxiety about someone for whom their love was genuine.[75]

It is worth bearing in mind that the ceremonies did not have to represent the wishes of the royal council. Some processions were organized by the council, but others came from the ecclesiastical, university, or municipal authorities, and could represent their values rather than those of the monarchy itself. That was obvious when the canons held processions to publicize the needs of the Hôtel-Dieu, which was their particular concern, but could involve autonomous political comment.[76] Thus, after hearing that Henry VI was intending to send a deputation to the peace conference at Arras, the canons of Notre-Dame organized processions to celebrate the good intentions of the king.[77] In effect, while this demonstrated their own opinion of the need for peace, it would have helped to put the English in an unfavourable light when negotiations came to nothing. Furthermore, it is

[73] AN, LL 253, fos. 24^{v}, 26^{r}, 30^{v}.

[74] The *Parlement* (*Fauquembergue*, iii. 71) and the chapter (AN, LL 253, fos. 27^{v}–28^{r}) are explicit that the processions were for the wife of the regent, although the records of the Hôtel de Ville (AN, Z^{1h} 9, fo. 43^{r}) describe them as 'processions generales pour la paix'.

[75] 'La plus plaisant de toutes dames qui adong furent en France . . . et certes, elle estoit bien amée du peuple de Paris' (*Bourgeois*, 289).

[76] AN, LL 253, fo. 18^{v}. [77] Ibid., fo. 32^{r}.

dangerous to filter out a propaganda meaning from an event where non-political symbols may have been much more important for contemporaries. On Palm Sunday 1423, Jean de La Rochetaillée, patriarch of Constantinople and administrator of the see of Paris, went in procession with the canons of Notre-Dame to the abbey of Sainte-Geneviève. As he approached, three monks rushed out, seized the cross that was borne at the head of the procession, and broke it into pieces. Why? Because a processional cross is identical to a cross of jurisdiction, and these monks were not prepared to tolerate any such symbolic claim. Severely provoked by the patriarch, who had undertaken the trial of Jean Le Fèvre, monk of Sainte-Geneviève, on treason charges, and had even imprisoned the abbot and the almoner, three young monks had found the new assault on their privileges too much to stand.[78] The message that the procession had for the monks of Sainte-Geneviève was plain enough for them, but was different, no doubt, from that which other spectators would have received.

There is, then, no question of explaining all processions in the same way. So far as the formation of political attitudes is concerned, these ceremonies had an ambiguous status: on one side, they permitted the authorities to impose certain information on the people; on the other, they allowed the Parisians to share in events that were otherwise outside their experience.[79] The same is true of the great formal entry and funeral ceremonies of the French monarchy. The entry of Henry V, Charles VI, and the duke of Burgundy in December 1420 brought home to the population of Paris that the Anglo-Burgundian alliance was a reality. The use of symbolism in such events allowed people to puzzle over the concepts involved. At the entry of Queen Catherine on 30 May 1422 two ermine cloaks were carried in front of her; people pondered this, but were unable to come to any explanation, unless it signified that she was queen of France and England.[80] The funeral of Charles VI was the occasion for general murmurs and anxiety: why did the duke of

[78] For Le Fèvre's case see Ch. 6, n. 154. Documents concerning the attack on the patriarch's cross were preserved by the monks, along with a copy of the *accords* at the *Parlement* in which the two disputes were obviously linked (AN, L 882, nos. 6, 12–14; X^{1c} 126, nos. 15–17).

[79] Similar ceremonies marked the days before and after the battle of Agincourt in 1415, the victories of Charles VII in Normandy and Gascony, 1449–53, and the war of the Public Weal in 1465, although on the actual day of the battle of Montlhéry processions round Paris were to be made 'sine convocatione populi' (AN, LL 253, fos. 12^{v}–13^{r}, 50^{v}–18^{v}, 71^{r}).

[80] *Bourgeois*, 174.

Burgundy not attend; what justification had the duke of Bedford for laying claim to the regency of France?[81] Even where such events included an element of propaganda they also gave people a chance to confront politics for themselves, and decide what it meant to them.

In royal ceremonies, as in the processions with which we have been concerned for most of this chapter, the organizers were the people who had the greatest opportunity to determine the course of events. When Henry V returned to London after his victory at Agincourt he was met by lavish displays that demonstrated the joy and fierce enthusiasm of the people.[82] His welcome was a celebration of monarchy, showed a full acceptance of Lancastrian rule, but was first and foremost a display by the town for the king. Perhaps Henry's main contribution was to try to discourage pompous speeches and personal praise of himself; certainly there are hints in the king's emotionless features that the Londoners went rather further in their chauvinistic welcome than Henry really wanted.[83] Such matters were not, however, entirely within the king's control. We can end our discussion of ritual and ceremonial by examining the entry of Henry VI into Paris in December 1431 in this light. For although some of the expenses of the actual coronation came out of royal finances, and in fact from English royal finances, the spectacular entry ceremony was arranged by the Parisians themselves.[84] Many influential people had had a share in the planning. The canons of Notre-Dame had sent one of their number to consult the chronicles at Saint-Denis with regard to the previous 'joyeux avènement', that of Charles VI and his queen.[85] The *Parlement* had deliberated long on the dress and comportment that they should adopt.[86] But it was on the municipality that the greatest burden fell, and by studying their accounts for the entry we may determine what their values had been. It was an occasion in which many people could share, whether as actors or spectators, but above all it was the municipality who gave the event its flavour.

It is apparent that the affair was generously funded by the citizens. If

[81] For popular comment see Juvénal des Ursins, *Histoire*, 596, and *Bourgeois*, 180.

[82] C. T. Allmand, 'Henry V the Soldier, and the War in France', in G. L. Harriss (ed.), *Henry V: the Practice of Kingship*, (Oxford, 1985), 125.

[83] Wylie and Waugh, *Henry V*, ii, 268. Henry was equally impassive at his entry into Paris in 1420 (ibid. iii. 224).

[84] The English Exchequer had to fund the building of the dais in the cathedral of Notre-Dame, as well as the alms-giving that was associated with a coronation (PRO, E 101/408/13, m. 6). The municipal accounts are preserved in a seventeenth-century copy and are included in the Appendix.

[85] AN, LL 113, p. 204. [86] Guenée and Lehoux, *Entrées*, 59–62.

one excludes the cost of the *soupé* given for notables of the town after the coronation, but reckons with the gift presented to Henry VI after that ceremony, the total is 1,837*l.* 12*s.* 11*d. p.*, or some 2,297*l.t.* This almost equals the amount spent by Lyon in 1389 (2,300 francs), and exceeds that spent by Tournai in 1464 (1,700*l.t.*) and Amiens in 1493 (2,000*l.t.*).[87] It was conventional to make a substantial gift to the king on the occasion of his first entry. In this case, as the entry was followed two weeks later by Henry's coronation, the presentation was made on the latter date, and on 2 December the only offerings were 65*l.* 12*s. p.*, worth of wine to Cardinal Beaufort and the earl of Warwick.[88] After the coronation the *prévôt des marchands* and *échevins* presented the king with a handsome gold chain ('de grande ouvrage') which, together with a jewel-studded collar, had cost them no less than 1,110*l.p.*[89] This generosity was in tradition of these entries; here 60 per cent of expenditure went on the gift to the king, or 64 per cent if the present to Beaufort and Warwick is included, but this was a far from unusual proportion; indeed, the offering to Louis XI made by the town of Lyon in 1476 took up 95 per cent of their budget.[90]

The lavish expenditure on the gift to the king suggests that the primary purpose of the municipality was to impress the monarch rather than the populace. It did not, however, impress the chroniclers, who fail to mention the presentation. On the other hand, they did take a considerable interest in the pageantry.[91] This began with the portrayal of the nine male and nine female worthies, who greeted the king outside the walls. At the Porte Saint-Denis was a large version of the arms of Paris: a ship containing real people to represent the three estates of Church, university, and bourgeoisie. As the royal party proceeded down the rue Saint-Denis—a canopy over the head of the king—they passed the Fontaine du Ponceau, where mermaids were swimming, wild men cavorting, and wine was supplied. After this they saw a *mystère* of the Nativity, performed by the actors' *confrérie*, then tableaux from the life of St Denis, and at the Fontaine des Innocents a small-scale stag-hunt in a

[87] Ibid. 18 n. 4. [88] Appendix, Art. B 7. [89] Ibid., Art. B 29.

[90] Guenée and Lehoux, *Entrées*, 9 n. 2.

[91] The most detailed account is that in the City of London Letter Book K, printed by Delpit, *Collection*, i. 239–44, and by Guenée and Lehoux, *Entrées*, 62–70. Other substantial notices are given by *Bourgeois*, 274–6, and *Monstrelet*, v. 1–6. All accounts agree on the main stages of the procession, although varying over a few details such as the number of men in the ship at the Porte Saint-Denis. Only the London account mentions the secondary tableau of the *prévôt* and the Parisians that accompanied that of the twice-crowned king.

small-scale wood.[92] Next to the Châtelet, they saw the most politically striking tableau, a boy representing the king, flanked by figures to portray, on his right-hand side, loyal members of the French nobility and, on his left, high-ranking Englishmen. Above him were suspended two crowns; next to this, and a little lower, the *prévôt* of Paris was personified. This was effectively the end of the presentations, for the procession then moved on to the Île de la Cité, to the Sainte-Chapelle, and afterwards back on to the right bank and to the Hôtel des Tournelles, where the party was received by the duchess of Bedford.

In interpreting the spectacles that were offered to the king, participation seems at least as relevant as propaganda. Owners of buildings that faced the route were expected to do something to give a festive air to their property. The *Confrérie des Pèlerins de Saint-Jacques*, for example, invested in a hundred large hooks to suspend their wall-hangings (*tapis*) in front of their church.[93] The '*Confrérie de la Passion de Notre Seigneur Jesus*', mentioned in the accounts, was a group of actors, and thus they presented the mystery play about the Nativity.[94] The butchers offered the miniature stag-hunt, which seems to have been a success with both king and people.[95] However, behind most of the presentations were subsidies from the municipality: 2*l.p.* towards the cost of the worthies, 16*l.p.* for the platform for the *mystère*, and so on. The shield above the gate, the decorations at the fountains, the *ciel* above the king, were all paid for by the municipality, who thus had a large part to play in the shape that was taken by the pageantry.[96] It is therefore striking that the most 'political' of the tableaux, that of the twice-crowned king, is not reflected in the accounts of the Hôtel de Ville. It is not likely that payments are hidden amongst the outlay for 'autres eschafaux'.[97] When other articles are detailed enough to report that the wine which flowed in the fountains was *claret* and that it arrived along lead pipes, it is unlikely that the elaborate setting of this scene would not have been detailed. This is interesting, because the tableau of the king with two crowns was a dramatic portrayal of the claim of Henry VI to be king in both England and France; it was very clearly a piece of propaganda.[98] If it were not the

[92] Appendix, Arts. B 2, 8, 20.
[93] Bordier, 'Confrérie des Pèlerins', *MSHP* 2 (1876), 394.
[94] Appendix, Art. B 2. For this group see Sauval, ii. 678.
[95] Appendix, Art. B 8, 20. Cf. *Bourgeois*, 276, *Monstrelet*, v. 4.
[96] Appendix, *passim*.
[97] Appendix, Arts. B 23, 24, 25.
[98] McKenna, 'Henry VI of England', 151 ff.

work of the municipality, and if they indeed had nothing to do with it, as their accounts suggest, then it must have been elaborated apart from the other presentations.

Where, then, did it come from? It is tempting to believe that the royal council was involved for, as Dr McKenna has shown, it follows a clear pattern which had been established in the presentation of the dual monarchy, and this homogeneity could scarcely have been the result of chance. The actual execution of the project was probably in the hands of the personnel of the *prévôté*. The location of the platform immediately in front of the Châtelet suggests as much, and the details of the secondary tableau which accompanied that of the king with the nobles confirms the conjecture. On this lower platform the *prévôt* of Paris was shown holding a piece of writing in his hand, which he was presenting to the king by way of request. With his other hand he was indicating the principal employees of the Châtelet—'les estas du college du dit Chastellet'—who had a prime position in the scene.[99] After them came a crowd of other people, representing the *prévôt des marchands* and *échevins*, bourgeois, labourers, tradesmen, and inhabitants of the town. Had the municipality had anything to do with this presentation they would have been most reluctant to assign to the *prévôt* the responsibility of representing the town, even in mime. More than that, the men from the Hôtel de Ville must have been dismayed to see the 'estas du college du dit Chastellet' placed ahead of the *prévôt des marchands* and the leading figures of the bourgeoisie. The men of the *prévôté* were taking the opportunity to indulge in some propaganda of their own.

The details of this scene may have been designed by the Châtelet but as the *prévôt*, Simon Morhier, was one of the leading figures in the council in Paris,[100] this does not conflict with the assumption that central government took the initiative in mounting the piece. This is significant, for if one subtracts this item of evident propaganda from the overall sequence the balance of the whole is markedly altered. The Parisians could enjoy the spectacle laid on by the municipality, but it was not in the first instance aimed at them, rather at the king and his party. As Professor Guenée has observed, whereas the other great occasions of royal ceremony—coronation and funeral—were arranged by the king and his close circle, the entry was organized by the people: 'l'occasion d'un dialogue entre un roi plus proche et des sujets moins passifs'.[101]

[99] Guenée and Lehoux, *Entrées*, 69.
[100] Rowe, 'The *Grand Conseil*', 210.
[101] Guenée and Lehoux, *Entrées*, 8.

Henry VI's royal entry was something closer to a Parisian monologue, and the message was plain.

Most of the scenes which confronted the young king on his way into Paris had been designed by men who had little interest in the symbolism that has attracted historians. Certainly the municipality supplied a *ciel* to go above his head, but they did not spend a particularly large sum on this.[102] Their concern was to bring the city of Paris to the minds of the royal party and to stress the king's obligations to its people. Accompanying the nine male and nine female worthies were a goddess and a herald, each bearing the arms of Paris. 'Paris', declared the herald, 'vous reçoit humblement'.

> Gardez-la amoureusement,
> Car cele ville ainsi famée
> Est digne d'estre bien gouvernée.[103]

Again, at the Porte Saint-Denis, it was the arms of Paris that adorned the stonework, and the figures who offered their hearts to the king asked him to 'recevez-lez benigment'.[104] In both cases the emphasis is on Paris, and on the duties owed by the king in return for the loyalty symbolized in the pageantry. The gift made to Beaufort and Warwick is explicitly recorded as being 'pour avoir laditte ville en recommendation'; the trip made to the king at Vincennes was 'luy faire un propos pour le bien de la ville'. Even the wine in the fountains is noted in the accounts with the comment that several of the king's escort drank there, which suggests that this was of significance in justifying the expenditure: at least there the effort of the town hit its target.[105]

Elsewhere the king's Frenchness is emphasized. 'Fleurs de lys' adorned the canopy above his head and 'fleurs de lys à l'écu de France' featured at the Porte Saint-Denis and Fontaine du Ponceau.[106] No dual-monarchy symbolism was to be seen except in the tableau at the Châtelet. A presentation of scenes from the life of St Denis was essentially French, and the accompanying poem reminded the king of his duty to defend the faith as his predecessors had done. Monstrelet's

[102] Appendix, Arts. B 4, 5. These two items total 49*l.p.* (61*l.* 5*s. t.*), but this sum includes an amount for paper decorations for the Porte Saint-Denis and Fontaine du Ponceau, so less was spent on the *ciel* than in other examples given by Guenée and Lehoux, *Entrées*, 21 n. 1. These range from 60 to 100*l.t.*, with the exceptional amount of 300*l.t.*, spent by Tournai in 1464. [103] Guenée and Lehoux, *Entrées*, 65.

[104] Ibid. 66. [105] Appendix, Arts. B 7, 12, 21.

[106] Appendix, Arts. B 3, 4. Guenée and Lehoux, *Entrées*, 68.

comment that the story of St Denis 'fut voulentiers veue des Anglois' shows his awareness of the fact that distinctly French traditions were being evoked for the foreigners.[107] An assessment of the symbolism of the 1431 entry as 'the zenith of English political propaganda in France' rests on the evidence of the tableau of the twice-crowned king, which in reality is not typical of the pageantry laid on by the municipality.[108]

It follows, then, that the royal entry of Henry VI fits into the general pattern ascribed to ceremonial in this chapter. It is not only propaganda, and many motives combine in one event. Against the overt political imagery (limited to the tableau of the twice-crowned king) can be set the heavy investment made by the leading figures of the Parisian bourgeoisie. The municipality was not inherently wealthy, for domaine revenues in the years 1424–8 averaged only 2,053*l.p.*, and had fallen considerably by the 1440s, the decade for which the next accounts survive.[109] To spend 1,837*l.p.* on Henry's visit, which must have absorbed much of the town's modest income from taxation, could only have been justified by the hopes of a substantial return. There is no doubt that many Parisians of less exalted rank than the *prévôt des marchands* and *échevins* were disappointed by the lack of response from the king: no one had a good word to say for him, reckoned the *Bourgeois*, because of the modest celebrations offered by the king, and the neglect of any of the anticipated bounties, such as the deliverance of prisoners and the abolition of taxes—this notwithstanding the unprecedented honours paid at the entry and coronation.[110] For the municipality, it had been an expensive move in a campaign to persuade the English to work seriously for the betterment of the town, and all the more frustrating for that; within three months they were complaining that most of the common people felt that the king had entirely abandoned them, since the much-desired visit to Paris had brought them no relief from their sufferings.[111]

The royal entry and the religious procession had this in common: politics and ceremonial combined to bring affairs of state within the experience of even the humblest citizens of Paris. Often this was done under the auspices of the government, or the ruling élite, but they were never able to make these occasions into tools for their ends only. Ceremonies were sufficiently complicated for many themes to become

[107] Ibid. 67. *Monstrelet*, v. 4.
[108] McKenna, 'Henry VI of England', 180.
[109] *Comptes du domaine*, i, *passim.*
[110] *Bourgeois*, 279.
[111] Delpit, *Collection*, i. 249.

intertwined, and one cannot say that any one aspect of the symbolism was uppermost in the minds of all the spectators and participants. Perhaps the dominant theme of Henry VI's entry was the appeal of the Parisians for help, and perhaps the prevailing effect of taking part in a religious procession in times of crisis was that people could, to a limited extent, share in that crisis. That these processions were truly creative spiritual occasions can scarcely be ascertained from the evidence.[112] It is, however, reasonable to say that ceremonial during the Anglo-Burgundian period was much more than simply an opportunity for propaganda.

[112] Since the public ceremonies of the period took place within established social and political structures, it is doubtful whether they generated 'communitas' as this is understood by the Roman Catholic anthropologist Victor Turner. For a summary of his ideas and terminology see V. Turner and E. Turner, *Image and Pilgrimage in Christian Culture* (Oxford, 1978), 243–55.

8

ENGLISHMEN AND FRENCHMEN IN OCCUPIED PARIS

THE TWO NATIONALITIES

In the absence of the Armagnacs, the Burgundian faction in Paris maintained a remarkable degree of unity amongst the people of the capital. Yet, although we have considered some of the reasons why people supported the duke of Burgundy, and ways in which loyalty to the Anglo-Burgundian regime was encouraged, we are not much closer to answering the question that must particularly intrigue an English historian: what was the attitude of the Parisians to Englishmen as people, and to those aspects of the regime which made it English as well as Burgundian? Here it is perhaps impossible to generalize. According to the *Bourgeois*, the requirement that everyone take an oath to the duke of Bedford in 1423 provoked a broad range of reactions, some doing this cheerfully but others with much ill will.[1] The anonymous *Bourgeois* was not even sure in his own mind what he felt about the invaders since he reckoned that if you were to be captured and ransomed it was better to be taken by the English than by anyone else, and he admired the efficiency of Henry V and the duke of Bedford. Even so, he still saw the foreigners as mean and warlike people, doing little for Paris and spending less, with highly uncivilized notions about catering.[2] Ambiguities can also be seen in the way that Clément de Fauquembergue, *greffier* at the *Parlement*, composed his headings to each year's records. He pointedly omitted the name of the monarch and the regnal year from 1422 onwards;[3] none the less, he normally included a phrase adapted from the book of Ecclesiasticus which implied that it was their own fault

[1] *Bourgeois*, 183.

[2] Ibid. 135, 140, 261–2, 278–9, 320.

[3] F. Autrand, 'Géographie administrative et propagande politique: Le "Rôle des assignations" du Parlement au XIV^{e} et XV^{e} siècles', in Paravicini and Werner (eds.), *Histoire comparée de l'administration*, 274.

that the French now had foreign rulers: his dedication was to Him who 'propter iniusticia transferat regnum de gente in gentem'.[4]

Drawing conclusions about the ways in which the Parisians viewed the English means looking at specific examples, for these show how people applied their ideas of nationality in practice. The occupation of Paris was an opportunity for members of the two races to meet and establish their relationships for themselves, instead of being obliged to leave the formation of ideas to political writers and propagandists. The evidence is undeniably anecdotal, but it does allow us to build up a clear picture of possible attitudes to the occupation, and of the role of the English in their own ultimate failure.

Prior to the treaty of Troyes most French people had probably been fairly ignorant about England and the English, but such notions as they had were largely unfavourable. A short-lived alliance between the Burgundians and the English in 1411 had brought prejudices to the fore, and an Englishman was killed by a butcher acting on the implausible rumour that the English had formed a conspiracy to slaughter all the butchers in Paris.[5] At about the same time the King of Arms of Champagne expressed the opinion that it had been unwise to bring the English into France, since they would be able to destroy the country, and that in any case the disputes between the princes of the blood could threaten the monarchy—as had happened in England.[6] Amongst the educated classes there were some who adopted a more balanced view,[7] but the most important component in opinions of the English before the treaty of 1420 was the war itself. Disputes over the continental possessions of the Plantagenets dated back to the twelfth century and, added to these traditional difficulties, the extended claims of Edward III and then Henry V had led to open warfare and catastrophic defeats for French chivalry. Thus if one wished to find a common denominator amongst the various attitudes held by the French people, it was the enmity between

[4] Ecclesiasticus 10: 8. This was itself an ambiguous maxim, and others used it to remind the English of their own responsibilities (see Ch. 3, n. 8; *Chartularium*, iv. 438).

[5] Letters of remission cited *Bourgeois*, 15 n. 1.

[6] Ibid. 19 n. 2. The idea that the English were naturally seditious came to be used by French propagandists; see P. S. Lewis, 'Two Pieces of Fifteenth-Century Political Iconography', *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, 27 (1964), 319–20.

[7] See L. Mirot, 'Le Procès de maître Jean Fusoris, chanoine de Notre-Dame de Paris (1415–1416): Épisode des négociations franco-anglaises durant la guerre de Cent Ans', *MSHP* 27 (1900), 137–287. Although protesting his loyalty to the French Crown, Canon Fusoris had recommended ending the conflicts with England by a marriage between Henry V and Catherine of France.

the kings of the two countries. Whether people admired English skill and courage or, like the French propagandists,[8] deplored their brutal enforcement of dubious claims to the French throne, the war formed their opinion of the English. As the army of Henry V advanced across Normandy, the most widespread view of the English was that they were the 'old enemy', and the ordinances of Charles VI reinforced this: whenever the invader was mentioned by royal letters in the years preceding the treaty of Troyes he was 'notre ancien ennemi d'Angleterre' or 'notre adversaire'.[9]

It is certain that the Burgundian coup did nothing to soften attitudes to the English. John the Fearless had toyed with alliances with the foreigners before 1418, and after his death the Burgundians would be forced into the camp of Henry V, but in 1418–19 the English remained the ancient enemy of the people of Paris. Indeed, it was believed that if anyone bore goodwill towards the invaders it was the Armagnacs. At the lowest social levels, represented by the rioting crowds of June 1418, the Armagnacs were regarded as quasi-English traitors: 'faulx traitres Arminaz Angloys'.[10] Wild rumours went round that the Armagnacs had made sacks to drown all the women and children of the capital, and standards to put over the gates of Paris when they handed the town over to the English. In the more orderly world of the *Parlement* similar charges could be heard: prior to the 1418 coup, Pierre Girault, nicknamed Riote, had been a well-known supporter of the Armagnacs and it was claimed that since the coming of the Burgundians he had left Paris and was with the English.[11] Meanwhile, the royal council claimed that the dauphinists and 'nozdiz anciens ennemis' were discussing alliances.[12] No mention was made of the fact that, secretly, the Burgundians were also attempting to turn the English presence to their own advantage.

Parisian support for the Burgundians did not bring any automatic sympathy for the English. While the war continued, it remained natural (and correct) to regard them as enemies: cattle merchants bringing animals from Brittany to Paris were captured and ransomed[13] and the English blockade to the north made supplying the capital virtually

[8] For whom see P. S. Lewis, 'War Propaganda and Historiography in Fifteenth-Century France and England', *TRHS*, 5th ser., 15 (1965), 1–21.

[9] e.g. *Ordonnances*, x. 349, 457; xi. 8, 14, 86.

[10] *Bourgeois*, 97.

[11] AN, X^{1a} 4792, fo. 131^{v}: 18 May 1419.

[12] *Ordonnances*, x. 489–92: 13 Nov. 1418.

[13] AN, Z^{1h} 7, fo. 91^{v}.

impossible. Norman landowners arrived in Paris in various degrees of impoverishment because their lands had been overrun by the English[14] and, conversely, Normans who had taken an oath of allegiance to the invaders, for whatever reason, could expect a stormy reception in Paris.[15] The murder of John the Fearless provoked a reappraisal. The leaders of the Burgundian faction needed support against the Armagnacs and the dauphin, the common people wanted peace and, in Paris above all, supplies were needed that could only be obtained through an accommodation with the English. Certainly, the Parisians knew that the English were the old enemies of the kingdom of France. The *Bourgeois* uses the expression '*anciens ennemis*' twice when describing the creation of the alliance and leaves us in no doubt that he regarded the peace as having been forced on the Burgundian party.[16] Yet the traditional hostility was overruled: for the leaders of society it was outweighed by factional considerations: for the common people the need for food took priority. As the negotiations developed, it was the considered opinion of the council in Paris that, were Henry to appear before the capital with his army, the Parisians might rise up in his support.[17]

Contemporaries knew that the Parisians were ready for peace, but an interesting adjustment of ideas was necessary when the traditional enemy became the ally of the French. In an institution such as the *Parlement*, where lawsuits were heard extremely slowly, cases might well be overtaken by events. An inhabitant of Amiens brought to Paris to answer charges of slander and breach of the peace put his action in the context of an English attack on Amiens in August 1419. In the general chaos people were urging death to the English, crying 'Alons contre cez anglois qui sont devant les portes, il lez fault tuer, tuons touz cez anglois', and he joined in the uproar. However, since his case was heard in July 1420—after the treaty of Troyes—he was quick to add that he would be happy to comply with any order forbidding him to speak against the English or the treaty of Troyes in future.[18] As late as May 1422 a case was being heard which involved a horse captured by the English 'avant le traittie'.[19] Referring to the old days could be embarrassing. In attempting to demonstrate the necessity of defence works

[14] e.g. BN, MS n. a. fr. 21286, no. 9; AN, X^{1c} 121, no. 104 (accords over disputed rents—not paid partly because of the invasion); AN, JJ 170, no. 152; AN, KK 17, fo. 92^{v} (grants in compensation for lands lost).

[15] AN, X^{1a} 4792, fo. 91^{r}. [16] *Bourgeois*, 136, 139.

[17] Bonenfant, *Du meurtre de Montereau*, 206–9.

[18] AN, X^{1a} 4792, fo. 231^{r}. [19] AN, X^{1a} 4793, fo. 180^{r}.

carried out in 1417, under the Armagnacs, the *prévôt des marchands* was obliged to point out that they had been useful when the English came before the town as enemies, even though they were now friends and allies of the kingdom.[20] The English might be friends, but what exactly was their status? When Sir John Fastolf, captain of the Bastille in 1421, attempted to stand surety for his agent in a case at the municipal court he was challenged as being from England, and without the necessary lands and possessions in France. This was refuted by Fastolf's lawyer, who drew attention to his fine lands, lordships, and possessions in Normandy, and pointed out that he was resident in Paris at the Bastille, where he was the king's captain.[21] The *prévôt des marchands* accepted Fastolf's security, but the dispute had shown that, in Paris at least, the English were by no means established. Fastolf's lands (recently acquired in any event) were in Normandy, and his Paris address, the Bastille, was scarcely permanent.

This period, when traditional ideas were adapted to new conditions, was a time of hope. One can see this in a revival of optimism about the economy, which had been labouring under great difficulties during the civil war and English invasion. The accounts of the College de Beauvais show how difficult it had been to find tenants for agricultural land in the midst of the war. When men were found to take on the *ferme* of Choisy-sur-Seine in the first half of 1420, it was the occasion for a large dinner at the sign of Notre-Dame in the rue de La Huchette (unfortunately, the good cheer soon evaporated).[22] Certainly the treaty of Troyes brought no immediate end to the disturbances but by June 1422 the hope was that matters would improve before too long.[23] This was said in a case where various ecclesiastical bodies were disputing their respective claims to money from the royal barn at Gonesse, some miles north-west of Paris. Also at Gonesse was land owned by Michel de Laillier: when he rented this out at the beginning of 1422 the terms of the lease plainly implied that a steady improvement in the yields was expected over the coming years.[24]

For French people the justification for the treaty of Troyes was, in part, a desire for revenge over the murderers of John the Fearless and, in part, hope of final peace between the two kingdoms. The problem was to

[20] Ibid., fo. 99^{r}: 7 Aug. 1421.

[21] AN, Z^{1h} 7, fo. 263^{v}; cf. Ch. 4, n. 76.

[22] AN, H^{3} 2785^{7} (1419–20), fo. 10^{v}; (1420–1), fo. 4^{r}; (1422–3), fos. 18^{v}, 19^{v}.

[23] AN, X^{1a} 4793, fo. 188^{r}.

[24] BN, PO 1620, Laillier no. 5. The rent, payable in oats, barley, barley straw, and corn, was to rise steadily for the first three years.

determine how far the English, who had entered France fighting, would change their conduct to suit the alliance.

From the beginning, some representatives of the English authorities treated the ordinary Frenchman with complete disregard. This is exemplified by the unfortunate story of Henry V's cheeses.[25] On 6 September 1420 Jean du Val, a boatman from Rouen, appeared before the municipal court at Paris and described how certain Englishmen, claiming to be commissioners for the supplies of the king of England, had asked him to take a quantity of cheese upstream for them. They promised to meet du Val in Paris, unload the cheese, and pay for the transport. When the boatman and his cargo arrived in Paris, however, there was no sign of the Englishmen. The *prévôt des marchands* sent a sergeant to inspect the evidence and he reported that there were 408 small Rouen cheeses in the boat, of which 60 were in bad condition because of the heat and lack of ventilation. It was ordered that the cargo be unloaded and placed in the nearby tavern called the Hôtel de la Barbe d'Or (close to the Hôtel de Bourbon) until someone should appear to claim it. On 25 September the innkeeper of the Barbe d'Or came to complain as the cheeses had been in store for nearly three weeks and no one had come forward to collect them. They were now in a very poor state because they had burst and overheated, and the smell was highly offensive to the worthy patrons of his establishment. The *prévôt des marchands* ordered that the cheeses be sold and the innkeeper paid but the impression of the English left by the incident, small in itself, did not bode well for the future.

One can, of course, counter that there was nothing new in such behaviour. Over fifty years before, royal letters had attempted to restrain abuses by the suppliers to the households of the king, queen, and princes of the blood.[26] Thus perhaps no one was scandalized when Bedford's purveyor of wine created a scene on the quayside in 1427 by trying to make use of his privileged position to acquire wine which other merchants thought they had already bought.[27] The important factor, however, was not the deed done, but the fact that it was done by or in the name of an Englishman. After the treaty of Troyes better was expected: some Frenchmen had effectively staked their political careers on the success of the alliance, while for the common people it promised a

[25] AN, Z^{1h} 7, fos. 206^{r}, 210^{v}.

[26] AN, Y 6^{7}, pp. 80, 82: letters patent of 16 Mar. and 6 Apr. 1369.

[27] AN, Z^{1h} 8, fo. 72^{v}: 4 Jan. 1427, concerning Girardin Gosson, 'soy disant preneur et commis pour le fait des garnisons de vins pour la despence de monseigneur le regent'.

return to peace, order, and regular supplies. It followed that even a relatively minor act of arbitrary power might provoke a veiled threat that the English presence was in some senses conditional on high standards of behaviour.[28] Meanwhile, the conduct of the English soldiers, though not in itself surprising, was still a reminder that the so-called *paix finale* had come into being in conditions of war.

The English frequently behaved like conquerors rather than allies. Jean de La Trémoïlle complained that his revenues from the toll at Conflans-Sainte-Honorine were greatly diminished because many people, and especially the English, simply refused to pay their dues.[29] It was one thing to say he should be stricter with the defaulters, it was more difficult in practice: the recalcitrant included agents of Bedford and other great lords, and many others simply disregarded his rights. One cannot but sympathize with the unfortunate boatman who was taking three barrels of wine into Paris on 14 September 1420.[30] He had reached Villeneuve when he was hailed by English archers who asked him to ferry them across the river. An eyewitness described how the only reward he received on reaching the other side was to have one of his barrels flung into the river. Other men called to verify his story gave a clear account of the soldiers' aggressive and noisy shouting.[31] One should note that the purpose of the boatman in bringing his story to the notice of the Hôtel de Ville was not to gain redress against the English—they would, almost certainly, have been impossible to trace—but simply to have the 'accident' recorded as a 'cas fourtuite' so that he could escape liability for the loss. Other abuses by English soldiers included the confiscation of wood from river traders, while in 1421 the garrison at Montereau carried out a relatively subtle fraud: hiring out to some Paris merchants a boat which they had stolen.[32] War provided all too many opportunities for disputes of this kind, so that when a Paris merchant was offered a couple of horses by some English soldiers it was natural for him to try to verify their ownership exactly.[33]

Disputes with the English soldiers were most common early in the 1420s but, as a relative degree of order returned to the town and

[28] Cf. Ch. 3, n. 8.

[29] AN, X^{1a} 4797, fos. 15^{r}, 19^{r}, 24^{r}: July–Aug. 1432.

[30] AN, Z^{1h} 7, fo. 210^{r}.

[31] 'Se demenerent moult fort en parlant et hellequerant moult fort contre le dit batelier' (ibid., fo. 212^{r}).

[32] Ibid., fos. 197^{v}, 257^{v}; see also G. Fourquin, 'La Batellerie à Paris au temps des Anglo-Bourguignons (1418–1436)', *Le Moyen Age*, 69 (1963), 722–3.

[33] AN, Y 5230, fo. 33^{v}: 27 July 1430.

countryside, the problems were reduced.[34] Still, however, the risk from passing soldiers was added to the list of natural disasters which afflicted the owners of land,[35] while a resident of Saint-Denis commented gloomily on the depredations of all soldiers: Englishmen, Armagnacs, and Picards had each knocked down a piece of his house as they went by.[36] Of course, opinions were subjective. A man who had rented some land outside Paris claimed that after the advance of Charles VII's troops in 1429 his lands were devastated, crops were spoiled, and he could not be expected to pay the rent. His landlord, on the other hand, rejected that suggestion and said 1429 had been the best year for a long time.[37] This type of question has to be resolved by the economic historian: for the present purpose subjective opinions are sufficient and it is clear that the overwhelming feeling was that the English soldier was violent and domineering. When the merchant Jaquin Ouvrier found that a boat for which he was responsible had been commandeered by the garrison at Montereau he went to the lieutenant and then to the captain of the garrison himself to ask for its return. His offer of two *écus d'or* for the return of the craft was refused and he was unable to find out what had happened to it because no one dared answer back to the English in such cases.[38]

Under certain circumstances it was probably best to take the law into one's own hands. This was certainly the course adopted by Jeannette Bardin, alias La Noire, a prostitute living by the river on the left bank, when two English soldiers started hammering on the door for admittance to her house after midnight. After giving due warning, she flung some stones out of the window, striking—as it turned out—a mortal blow to one of the men.[39] The Parisians could call the law, in the shape of sergeants from the Châtelet, to their aid in cases of abusive behaviour or shoplifting by English soldiers. The sergeants were ready to become involved: 'je te feray bien obeir au roy nostre sire', said one French sergeant as he tried to impose the authority of the English king on an

[34] Fourquin, 'Batellerie', 724.

[35] AN, X^{1a} 4797, fo. 96^{v}: 'estoient avenir lez fortunes dez eaues et inundacions, les fortunes dez chaleurs, lez fortunes dez gens darmes, et les autres pris et fortunes acoustuméez' (20 July 1433).

[36] AN, X^{1a} 4797, fo. 191^{v}: 29 July 1434.

[37] AN, X^{1a} 4796, fos. 246^{v}–247^{v}, 251^{r}: Dec. 1430.

[38] 'Sans ce que on leur osast contredire' (AN, Z^{1h} 8, fo. 80^{r}: 13 Feb. 1427).

[39] Longnon, *Paris*, 142–3. She obtained letters of remission. It is noteworthy that, despite the low status of her trade, Jeannette La Noire appears as a taxpayer in the roll of 1421, albeit at the lowest assessment (Favier, *Contribuables*, 142).

English soldier.[40] It does not seem that the royal council was more indulgent to Englishmen than to native Parisians in the type of offence for which pardons were granted[41] but, inevitably, the passing soldier was a difficult criminal to apprehend, and even in civil litigation Englishmen were liable to disappear to the war for many months, or even to their homeland for years.[42]

One problem that inhibited good relations between Englishmen and Frenchmen was the language barrier. French was still a language with which most, if not all, members of the English upper classes were familiar,[43] but the war had made Englishmen increasingly conscious of their own language and less willing to use the language of the opposition. In December 1418 Henry V went so far as to claim that his ambassadors were ignorant of French.[44] This was certainly false—a native speaker captured by the army at Harfleur had found that several knights in Henry's army 'bien parloyent francoys'[45]—but it made a useful diplomatic ploy.[46] It is, however, possible that knowledge of French had in fact deteriorated in the century prior to the Lancastrian invasion of France. Instruction books in French had been known in England from the thirteenth century but these were originally designed to help polish up spelling and pronunciation; by the end of the fourteenth century more elementary grammars were also required.[47] In Paris, moreover, the English would have to contend with the correct language spoken in the French capital, from which the more 'barbaric' English style of speaking had diverged considerably. Indeed, in the first decade of the fifteenth century John Barton, a Francophile who had studied at the

[40] Longnon, *Paris*, 139; cf. 312 and Favier, *Paris*, 193–4.

[41] Longnon, *Paris*, *passim*.

[42] e.g. *English Suits*, 273 (William Zeman reminds the *Parlement* that servants of lords such as Bedford are frequently changing residence); AN, X^{1a} 4797, fo. 186 (a litigant complains that her opponent, Ralph Parker, 'est en Angleterre passéz ii ans').

[43] See N. Orme, 'The Education of the Courtier', in V. J. Scattergood and J. W. Sherborne (eds.), *English Court Culture in the Later Middle Ages* (London, 1983), 79–80.

[44] Rymer, xi. 655–9.

[45] Mirot, 'Fusoris', 206.

[46] A dauphinist writer of 1420 complained that the principal text of the treaty of Troyes had been drawn up in Latin the more easily to deprive the fleur-de-lis of its rights (Des Salles, *Mémoires*, i. 316).

[47] F. Brunot, *Histoire de la langue française des origines à 1900 i. De l'époque latine à la Renaissance* (Paris, 1905), 374–5; J. Gessler, *Fragments d'anciens traités pour l'enseignement de français en Angleterre* (Paris, 1933); J. Gessler, *La Maniere de langage qui enseigne à bien parler et escrire le français: Modèles de conversation composés en Angleterre à la fin du XIV^e siècle* (Brussels, 1934).

university of Paris, composed his 'Donait françois', as a concise introduction to the correct Parisian speech known in England as 'doulce France'.[48]

English pronunciation of French was rather different from the 'doulce France', and hard for the inexperienced to understand. Henry V's representatives in Paris after the treaty of Troyes allowed the first president at the *Parlement* to expound their message to the court because not everyone could follow their manner of speaking.[49] William Sanderson, taken prisoner at Orléans, had to rely on the services of an interpreter when brought to the Châtelet in Paris to sort out debts arising from his ransom, and expenses when in captivity.[50] Obviously where translators were not available farcical situations could result, at least if we are to believe Henry Brancester when he described how he was obliged to sign a document which turned out to be to his detriment: he could speak no French and the notary no English. (His opponent, it should be said, was of the opinion that Brancester could understand French when he chose.[51]) It is sometimes surprising to learn who could, and who could not, speak French. The dean of Bedford's chapel, John Estcourt, was a member of the French royal council, but in October 1425 he explained to the chapter of Notre-Dame (presumably in Latin) that it was impossible for him to hear the annual confession of those of the chaplains who spoke only French, so that a Frenchman had to be appointed to fulfil this task.[52] Similarly, in 1430 the *Hôtel-Dieu* had to engage an English priest to hear the confessions of sick Englishmen.[53] Some soldiers who were stationed in France for a long time acquired a reasonable fluency: Alexander Russell, a 24-year-old common soldier, knew enough French to dispute the change he was offered in a Paris tavern, and to answer back at the sergeant who challenged him, although

[48] Brunot, *Histoire*, i. 376. [49] *Fauquembergue*, i. 367.

[50] AN, Y 5230, fo. 38^{r}: 5 Aug. 1430. The interpreter (MS: *truchement*) was perhaps neither French nor English: his name was Hance l'Alemant.

[51] *English Suits*, 201, 203, and see the comments p. 201 n. 4.

[52] A. Pirro, *La Musique à Paris sous le règne de Charles VI, 1380–1422* (Collection d'études musicologiques, publiées sous la direction de K. Nef, i: Sammlung musikwissenschaftlicher abhandlungen, i, Strasburg, 1930), 35. For Estcourt see Rowe, 'The *Grand Conseil*', 211, and C. T. Allmand, 'Alan Kirketon: A Clerical Royal Councillor in Normandy during the English Occupation in the Fifteenth Century', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 15 (1964), 33 n. 3, 35 n. 6. High-ranked clerics of the two races probably communicated in Latin, as Canon Fusoris and the bishop of Norwich had done—although that was perhaps to avoid being understood by servants (Mirot, 'Fusoris', 184).

[53] Coyecque, *L'Hôtel-Dieu*, i. 63 n. 1.

(as he conceded) he spoke with an English accent.[54] The *Bourgeois* accepted that there could be language problems: he suggested that mutual incomprehension might explain the apparent meanness of the English in their celebrations for Henry VI's coronation.[55] The onus was clearly on the English to speak French, but there is no evidence that the Parisians made any effort to learn English. Even the spelling of English names was baffling enough to Clément de Fauquembergue and his clerks who, in the course of the *Parlement* records, attempted fourteen different spellings of the name Fastolf.[56] The word 'Fastord' also appeared for 'Stafford' on one occasion: perhaps all Englishmen seemed much the same to the men who had to record their arguments.[57]

Despite the language difficulty, some personal or commercial understandings were developed. In Normandy mixed marriages were common, while at Pontoise the captain's lieutenant, William 'Ocquez', was married to a local girl.[58] In the capital, Thomas Porter, a servant of the duke of Exeter, was married to a Parisian;[59] this match was probably made very early in the period, while Exeter was in command of Paris in 1421. A few years later John Chantreton, an English esquire—and perhaps a priest—was associated with one Marguerite La Cretonne, known as L'Aubelette, a woman variously regarded as his wife, his fiancée, or his mistress, by whom he had had a child.[60] Not all these unions were necessarily happy: the English merchant Thomas Compère was taken to court for the maltreatment of his French wife.[61] On the other hand, the friendship of Gillan, widow of Hanse Cousin of the rue aux Juifs, and John Rossequin, was such that she decided to give him her house in Paris, and other lands in Bagnolet nearby.[62]

In the best-documented love story of the occupation, the Parisian

[54] Longnon, *Paris*, 138. [55] *Bourgeois*, 279.

[56] *English Suits*, 319. Some continental merchants could speak English, however: for example Henri de Lidan, who probably came from Brabant (ibid. 38).

[57] AN, X^{1a} 4797, fo. 106. In this entry 'Fastolf' and 'Fastol' are also written by the scribe, but these mistakes are corrected to 'Stafford'.

[58] AN, X^{1a} 4794, fo. 93^{r}. For marriages in Normandy, see Allmand, *Lancastrian Normandy*, 79–80, 101–3, 248.

[59] *The Itineraries of William Worcester*, ed. J. H. Harvey (Oxford, 1969), 222. Porter and his wife 'de Parys nata' were buried at St Benet's abbey.

[60] AN, X^{1a} 4794, fos. 146^{v}–147^{v}. Chantreton's marital status was important, because on it depended the question of whether, as a 'clerc non marié', he could escape lay jurisdiction for assault charges. [61] *Fauquembergue*, ii. 283.

[62] ADSM, Tabellionage de Rouen, 1434–5, fo. 11^{r}: gift of 21 April 1435 in consideration of the 'bons, notables, et agreables services et plaisirs que lui a faiz Jehan Rossequin, anglois'.

Jeanette Roland declared her intention of marrying Gilbert Dowel, one of Lord Talbot's pursuivants, who had returned to claim her after the English were expelled from the capital. Her parents lived in the rue Saint-Anthoine, and therefore Jeanette and Gilbert would have had plenty of time for fraternization during the period in 1434–5 when Talbot had been captain of the Bastille nearby. But despite her affirmation that as long as she lived she would have no other husband the *Parlement* flatly refused to allow her to become 'anglesche' before the end of the war.[63] At least one marriage broke up with the departure of the English: Thomas More, former captain of the Bastille, left for Normandy to carry on the war there, leaving his wife in Paris. In any case this had been, for her, purely a marriage of convenience after her first husband had been executed for treason.[64] It is, indeed, difficult to believe that any Englishmen stayed on in Paris after the ending of the occupation, given that the war was still continuing. However, when the Lancastrian position in Normandy finally collapsed, a few men did decide to remain in the country of their wives.[65] When the duke of Bedford acted as godparent to the son of Sir Richard Marbury and Katherine de Fontenay, he cannot have guessed that Marbury would one day abandon his English nationality and that young John Marbury (named, no doubt, after Bedford) would plot treason with the French.[66]

As with personal relationships, so with commerce: peace and the union of the crowns opened up the prospect of a new co-operation between England and France which in the end was not to be. Writing from the siege of Sens just after the treaty of Troyes was sealed, an English captain conveyed the hope shared by the war-weary of both sides: 'and now Englysh men goon in to Parys, as ofte as they wil, withoute any saaf conduyt, or any lettyng'.[67] Trade could reopen, and just over a month later English wine merchants were dealing in Paris.[68] At the beginning of July 1420 another Englishman, John Grasse, was shipping corn into Paris,[69] and by the end of the year he was sufficiently confident of Parisian institutions to contemplate bringing a case to the

[63] A. Bossuat, 'L'Idée de nation et la jurisprudence du Parlement de Paris au XV^e siècle', *RH* 204 (1950), 54–7.

[64] See Ch. 5, n. 185.

[65] Griffiths, *Henry VI*, 516, cites the example of the Welsh captain of La Roche Guyon. See also Allmand, *Lancastrian Normandy*, 80.

[66] *Fauquembergue*, ii. 119 n. 1; Vale, *Charles VII*, 123.

[67] Rymer, ix. 911.

[68] AN, Z^{1h} 7, fo. 191^{r}: 26 June 1420.

[69] Ibid., fo. 193^{v}.

Parlement, involving himself and another English merchant.[70] A few Englishmen were interested enough in Parisian trade to pay the entry fee which made them members of the Paris *hanse*, with a privileged trading position in the capital. They did not as a rule intend to transport goods directly from England to Paris, for of the three new bourgeois of Paris identified as English in 1424–5, one lived in Calais, one in Louviers, and the third was already established in Paris.[71] English traders were involved in more localized commerce, playing a part in the daily life and work of northern France.[72] Although there were many opportunities for cross-Channel trade in the mid-1420s, Englishmen were to be found further inland increasingly seldom as the years passed, and scarcely at all after matters became difficult in 1429. When money had to be transferred for the use of English captains in the 1430s the task was, inevitably, carried out by Italian financiers with international connections, rather than by English merchants.[73]

English trade could not compensate for the economic stagnation afflicting wartime commerce, but people could still appreciate the new potential of the union of the two kingdoms. Speaking of the importance of free trade from Paris, through Rouen, to the sea, the *procureur du roi* said that it was a question of the good of the whole of France, and indeed of England as well.[74] Yet any optimism was doomed to disappointment: the 1427 wine harvest was so poor that all exports were banned,[75] and permission to export corn from England to Paris in the 1430s took on the appearance of a relief operation as much as of a commercial venture.[76]

The decline was all too evident to contemporaries. For Guillebert de Metz the year 1400 was when 'la ville estoit en sa fleur', and his description of Paris reflects some of the changes since that date.[77]

[70] AN, X^{1a} 4793, fo. 2^{r}. The action was not, however, pursued.

[71] *Comptes du domaine*, i, cols. 10–11. The accounts for 1420–4 (when one would expect several Englishmen to have registered) do not survive, and there are no definite mentions of Englishmen in the lists for 1425–8, the other surviving years.

[72] For example, in a case heard at the Châtelet, an English merchant living in Chartres was to be the intermediary whereby money was transferred from an English canon of Chartres to the *curé* of Corbeil (AN, Y 5229, fo. 212^{v}: 5 June 1428).

[73] I hope to describe the role of Jean Sac and other Italian merchants in a separate article.

[74] AN, X^{1a} 4794, fo. 238^{v}: 7 May 1426.

[75] AN, $Y\,6^{7}$, p. 52: letters of Bedford of 24 Sept. 1427, published at the Châtelet on 4 Oct.

[76] Rymer, x. 534–5.

[77] 'Description de Paris', 160.

There is nostalgia in his voice as he tells us of the culture of the first decades of the century: 'grant chose estoit de Paris' when the most eminent preachers, scholars, musicians, and craftsmen were at work. Thus the deterioration covered not only the economy, but culture as well. The achievements brought about by the patronage of the dukes of Orléans, Burgundy, Berry, and Guyenne had been undermined by the factional disputes between Armagnacs and Burgundians and dealt a devastating blow by the upheavals of 1418. Two of the outstanding humanists of their generation, Gontier Col and Jean de Montreuil, were amongst those who perished in the massacres. The royal college of Navarre was sacked, and many luminaries of the university made the transition to the kingdom of Bourges, most notably the chancellor, Jean Gerson, and his deputy, Gérard Machet.[78] Similarly, in painting, the first fifteen years of the century were of unprecedented richness, but it has been suggested that 'the occupation by Henry V finally snuffed out the great revival of the arts'.[79] Yet here we ought to distinguish the baleful effects of the party rivalries, which culminated in the carnage of 1418, from the consequences of English rule after 1420. Certainly, the traditions of Parisian miniature painting were continued into the period of the English domination.[80] The duke of Bedford shouldered responsibility for retaining a courtly life in Paris, and this included the patronage of Parisian artists. Of works associated with the duke and with Anne of Burgundy, and worked on in Paris during the regency, the Bedford Hours and the Salisbury Breviary survive in London and Paris respectively; the Pontifical of Poitiers was destroyed in the Paris Commune of 1871.[81]

The workshops of the Parisian artists continued to produce works of the highest quality, but there was probably an underemployment of

[78] The intellectual life of Paris in the early fifteenth century has recently been studied extensively. For a survey by the leading scholar in this field see G. Ouy, 'Paris, l'un des principaux foyers de l'humanisme en Europe au début du XV^{e} siècle', *BSHP* 97 (1970), 71–98.

[79] M. Meiss, *French Painting in the Time of Jean de Berry* (London, 1968), 4.

[80] C. Reynolds, '"Les Angloys, de leur droicte nature, veullent touzjours guerreer . . .": Evidence for Painting in Paris and Normandy, c. 1420–1450', in C. T. Allmand (ed.), *Power, Culture, and Religion in France, c. 1350–c. 1550* (Woodbridge, 1989), 37–55.

[81] For Bedford's books see now J. Stratford, 'The Manuscripts of John, Duke of Bedford: Library and Chapel', in D. Williams (ed.), *England in the Fifteenth Century* (Proceedings of the 1986 Harlaxton Symposium, Woodbridge, 1987) and for a close study of many of his other valuable possessions see Stratford, *Three Inventories of the Goods of John duke of Bedford (d. 1435)* (Society of Antiquaries, London, forthcoming).

labour. We meet in the records, for example, one illuminator named Jean de Pestivien. By 1420 there was little work for him, and he had become a sergeant at the Châtelet, joining the semi-villainous group who constituted the nearest thing to a police force that fifteenth-century Paris possessed, whence he moved, after a brush with the law, to spend some months under arms with the garrison at Montlhéry.[82] Yet artists were still employed: not only painters but craftsmen and goldsmiths, working for the English and Burgundian aristocracies of Church and State. Parisian silver, in particular, was highly prized in England.[83] What destroyed the artistic life of Paris was the decision of Charles VII not to re-establish his court there after 1436. The king was suspicious of the town that had been for so long faithful to the Burgundians and the English. In 1418 he had experienced for himself the terrors of the Parisian crowd rather as Louis XIV, over two hundred years later, was to be marked by the Fronde. Both kings established their courts outside Paris and Charles, by favouring the region of the Loire, was to ensure that Paris would lose the trade in those luxury goods which might also rank as works of art. Bedford and the Anglo-Burgundian aristocracy could not undo the damage wrought in 1418, but Charles VII helped to confirm the eclipse of his capital as a centre of craftsmanship.

The English nobility made some attempt to support French culture, although by promoting the war they had done much to exacerbate the difficulties. One of the few areas where contact across the Channel brought real benefit was music, for here the traditions of England and Burgundy had much to offer each other. This was by no means the first time that performers from the two lands had met, but now a sustained

[82] Pestivien claimed that he 'na point delaissié son mestier de eslumineur, mais y gaigne ce quil y puet gaignier puet bien estre que pour ce que son dit mestier est de petit prouffit maintenant il sest emploié en fait dudit office du sergenterie' (AN, X^{1a} 4793, fo. 98^{r}). For his chequered career see X^{1a} 4792, fo. 245^{r}; X^{1a} 4793, fos. 97^{v}, 252^{v}; X^{1a} 1480, fo. 256^{v}, and especially Longnon, *Paris*, pp. 48–51; X^{2a} 16, fos. 442^{r}, 445^{r}, 451^{r}.

[83] See *The Register of Henry Chichele, Archbishop of Canterbury*, ed. E. F. Jacob (Canterbury and York Society, Oxford, 1938–47), ii. 373, 586, for gold and silver items owned by Bedford and John Estcourt. Bedford's household expenses in 1427–8 included 66*s. p.* paid to a Parisian goldsmith for replating two pots and a ewer (BN, MS n. a. fr. 5085, fo. 40^{v}). Amongst silver owned by Sir Hugh Willoughby (d. 1448) were several pieces with 'the touche of Paris': especially notable were the 12 silver dishes bequeathed to his daughter Maud, which had formerly been owned by Sir Thomas Beaumont (Borthwick Institute, York, Probate Register 2, fos. 180^{v}–182^{v}: I owe this reference to Dr Malcolm Vale). Beaumont presumably acquired the silver before his final disastrous expedition to Paris in 1436. see below.

contact was possible.[84] The general assumption that John Dunstable travelled to France at this time can now be substantiated by documentary evidence,[85] and it appears that Gilles Binchois, perhaps the greatest fifteenth-century Burgundian composer after Guillaume Dufay, worked in the household of the earl of Suffolk in the 1420s, before joining the Burgundian chapel.[86] The 'contenance angloise' of Binchois and Dufay, as seen by their contemporary Martin Le Franc in a well-known poem, may be one of the better products of the Lancastrian occupation.[87] Paris would have provided the meeting place for the musicians of the English and Burgundian nobility. The *Bourgeois*, not normally an admirer of things English, produces the most beautiful phrase in his journal to describe the singing of the Parisians and the English at the funeral of the beloved Anne of Burgundy, duchess of Bedford: 'ilz chantoient en allant, en portant le corps en terre seullement, les Angloys en la guise de païs moult piteusement'.[88] Contacts were not confined to serious musicians and solemn occasions, as is revealed by the gifts made to the minstrels of the duke of Bedford for playing before Philip the Good in Paris in June 1428.[89]

It is, therefore, wrong to regard medieval Parisian culture as having suddenly collapsed in 1420. Yet it remains true that the prime motive of the English was to gain what they could from the war, whether by booty and ransoms or from the acquisition of valuables from the workshops of Parisian craftsmen. As early as June 1420, Henry V's ambassadors were negotiating with the *prévôt* of Paris over a book from the collections of

[84] J. Marix, *Les Musiciens de la cour de Bourgogne au XV^e siècle* (Paris, 1937), 11–12, 24, 78; C. Wright, *Music at the Court of Burgundy 1364–1419: A Documentary History* (Henryville-Ottawa-Binningen, 1979), 30–2, 42–3; N. Wilkins, 'Music and Poetry at Court: England and France in the Late Middle Ages', in Scattergood and Sherborne (eds.), *English Court Culture* 201–3.

[85] A. Wathey, 'Dunstable in France', *Music and Letters*, 67 (1986), 1–31; Stratford, 'Manuscripts', 338; *New Grove Dictionary*, v. 720–5.

[86] See Marix, *Musiciens*, 177–9, 188; *New Grove Dictionary*, ii. 709; Wilkins, *Music and Poetry*, 199. The only evidence for this stage in Binchois's career is, however, contained in an account of an English plot to murder Philip the Good (A. Desplanque, 'Projet d'assassinat de Philippe le Bon par les anglais (1424–1426)', *Mémoires couronnés et mémoires des savants étrangers, publiés par l'Académie Royale des sciences, des lettres et des beaux arts de Belgique*, 33, (1867), 21, 70, 72. The plot itself was almost certainly a fabrication, but the details concerning Binchois are probably accurate. C. Rutherford, 'The Forgeries of Guillaume Benoit', *EHR* 30 (1915), 222–3, shows that the allegations referred to real events where possible.

[87] New Grove Dictionary, xi. 728–9.

[88] *Bourgeois*, 290. This is the punctuation given by Tuetey; perhaps the comma should precede 'seullement'.

[89] ADN, B 1938, fo. 151^r.

the duke of Berry that Henry desired.[90] Even Bedford, who was unique amongst Englishmen in investing heavily in Paris, had a sharp eye for his own benefit. He was responsible for the most spectacular loss to the French monarchy during the time of the English domination, the dispersal of the library of the kings of France.

Of the remarkable book collection built up by Charles V, 853 volumes were still in the Louvre in 1423, and were valued at 2,323*l.* 4*s.* *p.*[91] In accordance with normal practice, King Charles's possessions had been valued with a view to sale. We know that Bedford bought a portion of the library for 1,200*l.t.* when Charles VI's executors were unable to pay for the funeral monuments of the king and queen,[92] and it may be that he paid separately for other books from the collection. So long as he was regent of France, and had a secure position in Paris, Bedford was content to leave the books in the Louvre, and maintain Garnier de Saint-Yon as librarian. But on 13 October 1429 Philip the Good was made lieutenant in the Île de France, while the regent was to occupy himself with affairs in Normandy.[93] One can gauge Bedford's attachment to the library from the fact that just two days after the duke of Burgundy was installed as lieutenant in Paris the regent sent John Salvain, *bailli* of Rouen, to take possession of the books and discharge the librarian.[94] Even prior to this date, Bedford had no doubt extracted a few books from the collection, such as the volume of Livy sent to the duke of Gloucester in 1427. After 1429 the library was probably sent to Rouen, which was seen increasingly as the main seat of English power in France.[95] From there, beyond any doubt, most of the books were brought to England; after Bedford's death his inventories referred to 'the grete librarie that cam owte of France, of which my saide lord, the Cardinal, had the substance'.[96] Whether Beaufort (the Cardinal) held the books as Bedford's executor, or as a book collector himself, is not

[90] BL, MS Cotton Caligula D V, fo. 85^{r}.

[91] *Inventaire de la bibliothèque du roi Charles VI fait au Louvre en 1423, par ordre du régent duc de Bedford*, ed. L. Douët d'Arcq (Paris, 1867). For the prior dispersal of part of the library during the reign of Charles VI see L. Delisle, *Le Cabinet des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Impériale: Étude sur la formation de ce dépôt* (Paris, 1868–81), i. 48–51.

[92] Stratford, 'Manuscripts', 339–40.

[93] *Bourgeois*, 247 n. 5; BN, MS Mélanges de Colbert 380, no. 534, is the original act. The previous arrangement was restored after Henry VI's coronation.

[94] Stratford, 'Manuscripts', 340.

[95] It is possible that Bedford had made further payments between 1425 and 1429, but I know of no evidence that he did so.

[96] Delisle, *Cabinet*, 52.

clear. What is certain is that, although about one hundred books from the Louvre library can be accounted for today, the collection was ultimately dispersed and the majority of the books were lost.[97]

A similar fate befell the rich collection of tapestries of Charles VI. Of the 325 items in the inventory of 1422, roughly half were appropriated by Bedford and his wife, and most of the rest by members of his household or loyal supporters of the Anglo-Burgundian regime.[98] As regent for someone who claimed to be the true king of France, Bedford clearly had some right to dispose of royal possessions as he thought fit, but it was hardly good policy from the point of view of winning the support of the Parisian people: the regent 'touzjours enrichissoit son païs d'aucune chose de ce royaulme, et si n'y rapportoit riens que une taille quant il revenoit'.[99] To this day the beautiful gold cup of the kings of France, made for Charles V and taken to England by Bedford, may be seen in the British Museum.[100] Even devotion could inspire a type of plunder, for it was believed that the English were responsible for the disappearance from the church of the Innocents in Les Halles of a much-prized relic.[101] The English were not only in quest of booty: in his will the earl of Salisbury left 300 *écus d'or* and an annual endowment to the Hôtel-Dieu in Paris, behaviour that would have befitted a French aristocrat.[102] And though Bedford's acquisitiveness was strongly resented, his expenditure—on artists, on building, and on benefactions to the poor—was real.[103]

Yet, in the formation of attitudes it is not realities, but appearances, that matter. All too often there was indeed concrete evidence that the English were arrogant profiteers. Whether or not that was the whole truth did not matter: that it was usually the case with the common soldiers and sometimes the case with the nobles was enough. The Parisians in 1420 had been ready to look forward to a new era of

[97] Ibid. 53.

[98] 'Inventaire des tapisseries du roi Charles VI vendues par les Anglais en 1422', ed. J. Guiffrey, *BEC* 48 (1887), 59–110, 396–444. The exact number cannot be determined because by the end of the period tapestries were being removed without any proper record.

[99] *Bourgeois*, 218.

[100] Made for Charles V, the cup was brought to England by Bedford, given to a Spanish diplomat by James I and bought by the museum in the last century. It may be seen in the Department of Medieval and Later Antiquities. It is very likely that Bedford acquired the cup as part of a ransom payment, and not directly from the royal collections (Stratford, 'Manuscripts', 331–2).

[101] 'Description de Paris', 192 n. 5.

[102] *Register of Henry Chichele*, ii. 392, 396.

[103] For Bedford's gifts to the poor see e.g. *Bourgeois*, 180; BL, Add. Ch. 119.

co-operation and peace. Despite the sustained anti-English propaganda, the war, and the tradition that the English were the 'old enemy', there seems to have been a readiness to make a new beginning. The fact that party differences meant more to the Parisians than did national differences led to the acceptance of the treaty of Troyes and considerable hope for the future. The Armagnacs were known and hated, the English were largely unknown. But after sixteen years the English too were known. Some commercial bonds had been formed, some friendships, even some loves had been established. The positive aspects did not dominate, however: on the contrary, the English displayed a keen desire to make what they could out of the war, and the French were disappointed. Most historians would agree that the Hundred Years War did a great deal to shape French consciousness of their nation. The acceptance of the treaty of Troyes shows that this process had not gone very far by 1420. Sustained contact with the English was to make a considerable difference. For a few years, the Parisians were on 'the frontier' where, perhaps, ideas of 'state' and 'nation' took on a new force.[104] It was clear that the English could not be equally committed to both kingdoms, and the occupation of northern France, and especially of Paris, helped to define what it meant to be English, and what it meant to be French.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE LANCASTRIAN REGIME

The dual monarchy of Henry VI was a failure. It never succeeded in developing that sense of common purpose between English and French that the more reflective—or optimistic—of its supporters had hoped for at the time of the treaty of Troyes. Even with most opponents of the treaty gathered on the other side of the Loire, it was never possible to be entirely secure. From the time that a priest produced evidence that the Lord of l'Isle-Adam, marshal of France, was in communication with the enemy,[105] or that another priest, taking an early morning walk in his garden outside Paris, had heard the wife of the king's armourer plotting with enemy soldiers,[106] there was an obvious need to maintain security. These conspiracies of 1421 and 1422 were exposed and, over the years,

[104] Cf. C. Gauvarde, 'L'Opinion publique aux confins des Etats et des Principautés au début du XV^e siècle', in *Les Principautés au Moyen Age* (Actes du Congrès de la Société des Historiens Médiévistes de l'Enseignement Public, Bordeaux, 1973 (Bordeaux, 1979)), 136–52.

[105] AN, X^2a 16, fo. 466^r.

[106] *Monstrelet*, iv. 104–5; *Bourgeois*, 174–5.

several more were to come to light.[107] Even if they had been put into operation, it is doubtful how successful they would have been: in September 1429 the supporters of Charles VII inside Paris had made little headway with the majority of their fellow-citizens despite the army of Joan of Arc on the other side of the walls.

How strong was support for Charles VII? That there were people in Paris who were at best doubtful about the merits of the English alliance was obvious to everyone, although to identify such people was more difficult, and the attempt might even make matters worse.[108] Except in especially tense times, it was best to leave matters as they were and rely on popular fear of a new upheaval and loyalty to the Burgundian tradition. Complaints about the English were by no means uncommon, and people might have spiced these complaints with hints as to what would happen if the foreigner did not do more for France, but the main motive of such warnings was to obtain greater support from the English, not to hand the capital over to the Armagnacs and the murderers of John the Fearless.

Some claims to have been a supporter of Charles VII in occupied Paris can be looked upon with scepticism. While Guillaume Aimery remained in Paris, his advocate in Poitiers pointed out that Charles VII would need good people (such as Aimery) in the capital if it was to be regained;[109] the argument was plausible, but failed to convince Charles VII's *procureur*.[110] The case advanced by the relatives of Jean Femel, in evidence filed with the *procureur du roi* after 1436, was more original: if Femel had been present in Paris under the English, he had been in hiding, so that it was as if he had been absent. Indeed, they claimed that after the failure of an important conspiracy in 1430 he had not dared show himself until 1436.[111]

[107] See Vallet de Viriville, *Charles VII*, i. 326–7, 368, 425; ii. 140–1, 333–4, for references to plots during the period.

[108] BN, MS n. a. fr. 7627, fo. 206^{r}: appointment of commissioners on 18 Sept. 1429 'pour connoistre, juger, et terminer par voyes ordinaires tous les cas concernans la desobeissance, dautant que le prevost des marchands, les eschevins, et bourgeois setoient plaintes de la rigeur et voies de fait dont le regent usoit contre ceux quon soupconnoit tenir le parti de Charles de Valois'.

[109] Bossuat, 'Parlement de Paris', 35 n. 4; Little, *The* Parlement *of Poitiers*, 147.

[110] As Autrand, *Naissance*, 125, points out. Note also Autrand's suggestion that Aimery's primary loyalty was not to the English, the French, or the Burgundians, but to the duke of Bourbon.

[111] BN, MS Moreau 1082 (summaries of the *rouleaux* of the *procureur du roi*), pp. 4,505–6. Femel had been in Paris 'latité et comme absent'.

practice, and it is doubtful if they would have worked anyway. One would-be conspirator said the latter plan was foolish gossip and bound to fail; instead of gathering twenty people together to start a meeting they would not attract even six.[123] With the duke of Burgundy in alliance with the French from September 1435 onwards, matters were bound to be different, for much of the military and moral substance was removed from the regime in Paris. At the beginning of September Jean de Villiers, lord of l'Isle-Adam and marshal of France, had been hard at work at the siege of Saint-Denis.[124] On the 20th of the month the peace of Arras was sealed and, although Saint-Denis surrendered on the 24th, the English could no longer count on the services of l'Isle-Adam. On the contrary, after explaining his position to the members of the duke of Burgundy's chivalric Order of the Golden Fleece, he returned to the service of the duke.[125]

The end of the fifteen-year alliance with the Burgundians was a devastating blow to English ambitions outside Normandy and can only have accelerated the decline in the health of the duke of Bedford who, since Henry V's premature death in 1422, had laboured to win the respect and allegiance of his French subjects. Bedford did not attend the Congress of Arras where the Lancastrian delegates were severely handicapped by the difficulty of negotiating on the substantive issues during the minority of Henry VI. Finally, Philip the Good was left to drive his own hard bargain with Charles VII. Bedford himself died on 14 September 1435 in Rouen, leaving behind a fragile position in Paris, but remembered by at least one Parisian as being quite unlike his fellow Englishmen, for he was always building and never wanted to make war on anyone.[126]

Philip the Good claimed that his peace with Charles VII was not to be regarded as an offensive alliance against the English.[127] Certainly, Duke Philip showed no immediate desire to campaign openly for the French, but what was more worrying for the administration in Paris was the

[123] Longnon, *Paris*, 304. For plans involving Scotsmen see ibid. 306; *Bourgeois*, 296. These were regarded more favourably, and had worked well at Verneuil (*Bourgeois*, 195–6).

[124] Amongst many documents concerning l'Isle-Adam's role at the siege, see BN, PO 3021, Villiers nos. 30–6; MSS fr. 25772, nos. 975–99, 26059, nos. 2590–2607; AN, K 64, no. 1[12] (Payments, musters, and *quittances*, 15 Aug.–17 Sept. 1435).

[125] Vale, *War and Chivalry*, 48–9.

[126] *DNB*, x. 871; *Bourgeois*, 320.

[127] J. Ferguson, *English Diplomacy*, 1422–1461 (Oxford, 1972), 21; Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, iii. 74; Dickinson, *Arras*, 177.

effect that the defection would have on the Burgundian 'party' in Paris. Since the English had not made their peace with Charles VII, it was open to their supporters to try to maintain the old hostilities regardless of the attitude of the duke himself. When Jean de Rinel, the most eminent anglophile amongst the royal secretaries, returned from Arras, he produced the original letters of Charles VI of 23 September 1420, whereby the murderers of John the Fearless were held guilty of *lèse-majesté*.[128] These were enregistered at the *Parlement* on 14 October 1435, the data on which the *prévôt* of Paris, Simon Morhier, issued a *vidimus* of these same letters so that they could be brought to public notice.[129] Evidently it was hoped that, since the Burgundian faction had already survived the lengthy absences of the duke from the town, it could also continue regardless of Philip the Good's new policy.

None the less, the situation was precarious. On this same 14 October, the body of Queen Isabelle (who had died on 29 September) was taken to Saint-Denis by water, it being too dangerous to make the funeral procession on land.[130] Paris was more isolated than ever, supplies becoming increasingly erratic with each new French success.[131] In the face of the regular 'mutacions' of the towns of northern France, the councillors of the *Parlement* met on 8 November to decide whether or not to open the next session on the 12th of the month as usual. They decided to do so despite external upheavals and internal difficulties (Clément de Fauquembergue, the civil *greffier*, who was never an enthusiastic supporter of the Lancastrians, had gone to Cambrai and did not return).[132] It was fortunate that the councillors decided that this was where their duty lay because, with the duke of Bedford dead and the chancellor making extended visits to Normandy, it was essential that someone provide leadership.[133]

As the weeks passed, this became ever more necessary. On 7 January, Jacques Branlart, a councillor at the *Chambre des Enquêtes*, reported

[128] AN, X^{1a} 8605, fos. 31^{v}–32^{v}: collated with the original supplied by Jean de Rinel. The career of Jean de Rinel, and his sentiments in 1435, are discussed by A. Bossuat, 'La Littérature de propagande au XV^{e} siècle: Le Mémoire de Jean de Rinel, secrétaire du roi d'Angleterre, contre le duc de Bourgogne (1435)', *Cahiers d'Histoire*, 1 (1956), 131–9.

[129] BL, Add. Ch. 13288. [130] *Bourgeois*, 310.

[131] On the day that the English had succeeded in taking Saint-Denis they had lost Meulan, so river supplies from Normandy were still unobtainable. Ibid. 308, 310. Meulan was, however, retaken by the English (Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, iii. 6 n. 4).

[132] *Fauquembergue*, iii. 168.

[133] Louis of Luxembourg was not present for the opening of the *Parlement* and apparently did not return until the following March.

considerable popular unrest arising from the dangers to the town and the inactivity of the *prévôt des marchands*.[134] On the 10th it was decided that a full assembly of notables should be held soon, but the manner in which the threats were growing was apparent the next day, when news came that the bridge at Charenton, less than four miles from the centre of Paris, had been captured.[135] There was thus plenty to discuss when the first large meetings were held on the 12th and 14th of the month, meetings at which Robert, lord Willoughby, doubtless felt conspicuous as the only Englishman. It was decided that new measures should be taken to guard against incursions along the river, and processions by parishes were planned to boost the morale of the Parisians. It was also decided that more letters be sent to the king in England and to the chancellor in Normandy, as well as to the duke of Burgundy and those of his councillors most likely to be sympathetic.[136]

The Parisians may have felt isolated, but they had not been forgotten. While the leaders of the town were meeting at the *Parlement* to discuss their reaction to the impending collapse, one of the town's *échevins*, Louis Galet, was waiting impatiently at Southampton for a ship to take him back to France with his fellow ambassadors.[137] Galet, Pierre Morice, and Jean de Rinel had been paid in Westminster on 16 December 1435 for their mission to England, in which the opinions of the Parisians had been fully reported.[138] The accounts given by Morice and Jan Perier, an envoy from Rouen, of the 'piteulx et lamentable estat de nostre bonne ville de Paris, et de toute nostre seignurie', and of the great desire for peace that existed in France, prompted a letter from the king and council explaining to the towns of Paris, Rouen, and others why they had acted as they had done at Arras and promising a great army in the new year.[139] This was a promise fulfilled only slowly and inadequately: having moved on from Southampton to Portsmouth in search of a passage to France, the ambassadors wrote again complaining

[134] *Fauquembergue*, iii. 175–6. A draft account of Branlart's report had recorded slightly stronger language than appears in the final version (AN, X^{1a} 1481, fo. 111^{v}).

[135] *Fauquembergue*, iii. 176–8. [136] Ibid. 179–82.

[137] Champollion-Figeac, *Lettres de rois*, ii. 437.

[138] PRO, E 404/52/176; Galet and Morice had been sent from Paris 'pro certis causis et materiis specialibus dictam villam moventibus pro commodo ipsius domini regis' (PRO, E 403/722, m. 11), Morice having left France soon after 4 Nov. (BN, PO 1778, Luxembourg no. 41). Educated at the university of Paris, Morice had been a judge of Joan of Arc, and by this time was a canon of Rouen (Denifle and Châtelain, 'Procès de Jeanne d'Arc', 19).

[139] Champollion-Figeac, *Lettres de rois*, ii. 431–5.

that only six ships had been assembled there, not enough for the army which in any case was starting to disband.[140]

The number of messengers from Louis of Luxembourg paid in the winter of 1435–6 reflected the steady decline in the situation on the continent, and although letters to the council at Rouen apologized for the delay in sending aid, the English council was quite unable to give a satisfactory reply to the appeals of the chancellor of France.[141] It was to be still some weeks before Sir Thomas Beaumont and about 800 men were ready to embark as the first part of a projected grand army,[142] and meanwhile events in France had continued along their own course.

The military situation did not deteriorate greatly in the second half of January, but in February popular discontent broke out in a new and unexpected way. In 1430, the earl of Stafford's expedition into Champagne had resulted in the capture of the French knight Guillaume de La Haye, and the rights over La Haye were then acquired by Sir William Buckton, for a time captain of the Bastille, who hoped to exchange him against four English prisoners.[143] However, Buckton's captive turned out to be the subject of prolonged litigation, and by February 1436 he had been transferred to the royal prisons of the Conciergerie. From this central position on the Île de la Cité, where anyone who wanted to speak to him could do so, La Haye was encouraging popular support for himself and for Charles VII: on 11 February, reports reached the *Parlement* that 'gens de petit estat' wanted to go into the prisons and fetch him, so as to make him their 'chief et capitaine'.[144] Scarcely had this threat been countered before a Scottish infiltrator in the guard at Vincennes, assisted by the abbess of Saint-Anthoine-des-Champs, allowed the French to take another of the essential outposts of Parisian security.[145]

[140] Ibid. 438–41. [141] PRO, E 404/52/173, 174, 182; E 403/722, mm. 15, 17.

[142] Beaumont's contingent was to muster at Winchelsea in the latter part of Feb. (Griffiths, *Henry VI*, 201).

[143] AN, X^{1a} 4797, fo. 215^{r}. La Haye had been taken at Brie-Comte-Robert (*Fauquembergue*, iii. 185 n. 2).

[144] AN, X^{1a} 4797, fos. 321^{r}–322^{v}. Note that at this date Jean Bureau was still prepared to act as pledge for Buckton, contrary to the received view that he had rallied to Charles VII in 1434 (e.g. *Dictionnaire de biographie française* (Paris, 1929–), vii. 686). The *Parlement* allowed Buckton's agents to arrange better security for La Haye (*Fauquembergue*, iii. 185–6).

[145] *Bourgeois*, 311 n. 2: 19 Feb. 1436; *Chroniques de roi Charles VII, par Gilles Le Bouvier, dit le Heraut Berry*, ed. H. Courteault, L. Celier, and M.-H. Jullien de Pommerol (SHF, Paris, 1979), 437.

With the return of Louis of Luxembourg from Normandy in March, final efforts were made to restore coherence to a regime that was all too obviously a relic from a different political order in northern France. The chancellor did not attempt to hide the problems and, when he addressed a public assembly of leading officers and citizens on 15 March, he said that any who wished to leave Paris would be allowed to do so, although he insisted that those who remained should take an oath of loyalty.[146] The next day an extended *Grand Conseil*, which included the captain of the Bastille, Lord Willoughby, the bishops of Lisieux and Paris, Jean Le Clerc (the former chancellor), Jean de Courcelles,[147] Gilles de Clamecy, the men of the *Chambre des Comptes*, the *prévôt*, the *prévôt des marchands*, *échevins*, and other bourgeois, issued an ordinance on the maintenance of loyalty and security in the capital.[148] This confirmed the chancellor's rule that if anyone was afraid to stay and take an oath of loyalty he could leave, taking his wife and children with him. No one was to speak against the king's lordship. No one was to wear any badge other than the red cross (of St George), which was to be exhibited by all soldiers, by anyone serving on the watch and, in the event of an assault, by the population generally except the clergy and the infirm, who would be exempt from going to the defence of the town. Any appearance of the enemy before the town should be ignored (except, presumably, by those on guard duty) and people should go about their business as usual. Finally, it was said that no one should go on to the gates and walls except under the orders of their captains (for the soldiers), or of the municipality (for the civilian watch). The level of anxiety can be gauged from the special order, communicated to the chapter of Notre-Dame on 20 March, that canons whose houses in the cloister opened on to the river should take action to seal the doors.[149]

It was not only the attitude of the people that was giving cause for concern: the regime was almost bankrupt. Financial assistance from England, modest at the best of times, had virtually ceased by the end of 1435.[150] As in 1429 desperate expedients were needed. On 10 February 1436 Jacques du Châtelier, the bishop of Paris, who had been the highest ranking man in the royal council in the absence of Louis of

[146] *Fauquembergue*, iii. 188–9.

[147] Courcelles formally replaced l'Isle-Adam as captain of the Louvre on 17 Mar. 1436.

[148] AN, X^{1a} 8302, fos. 32^{v}–33^{r}. Although issued on 16 Mar. the ordinance was evidently a product of the mass meeting of the 15th.

[149] Grassoreille, 'Histoire politique du chapitre', 191.

[150] See Ch. 2.

Luxembourg, had lent 200 gold *saluts*, for which he received a handsome security.[151] By the end of the following month prospects for repayment must have appeared even more bleak, so that when Jean Jamés, the town's master of work, lent 375½ francs on 27 March he insisted on a no less lavish security.[152] Since there was little chance of redeeming the pledge in the two months allowed, and there was in any case a strong probability that the regime would collapse well before then, Jamés was sure to drive a hard bargain. His son, the avaricious *maître* Jacques, 'qui se tue d'amasser biens', would have approved.[153] Finally, on 6 April, when the English regime had only a week to run, Christophle des Moulins lent 65*l.t.* to the hard-pressed *changeur du trésor*.[154] Even with the repayment date cut to one month, he was hardly likely to see his money again.

Money from England was out of the question, and it was virtually impossible even to get advice. Around 15 March Gervaise Le Vulre, a royal secretary, came to England and spent the next two months trying to obtain an answer from the council. Jacot Le Hern, domestic servant of the chancellor, who arrived in London at Easter, was no more successful.[155] Such response as was obtained was, in any case, too late to have any material effect, and Fleur-de-Lis Herald, paid on 19 March for taking letters to the chancellor, the town of Paris, and various other lords, can have brought little cheer.[156] It was obvious that, despite the efforts of Louis of Luxembourg and the financial officers, a sharp blow would bring down the whole ramshackle edifice. John Talbot, commander of the English forces in the area between the Seine, the Somme, and the sea, had almost certainly realized this by the winter of 1435–6, when he moved his centre of command from Paris (where he had been captain of the Bastille and of Saint-Germain-en-Laye) to Rouen,

[151] BL, Add. Ch. 3171: receipt for a richly-ornamented gold representation of the Trinity, received from Guillaume Le Muet, *changeur du trésor*.

[152] BN, PO 2079, Le Muet à Paris no. 13: receipt for a gilded image of Mary Magdalen weighing 50 silver marks; 2 cups, 5 goblets and a gold salt-cellar ornamented with stones and pearls carried on the head of a woman sitting in a garden of pearls. These were to be returned if he was repaid within two months, otherwise they could be sold.

[153] *Maître* Jacques Jamés was to be one of Francois Villon's fictitious executors in the *Testament* (Favier, *Villon*, 161).

[154] BN, PO 2079, Le Muet à Paris no. 12: receipt for a silver ewer and an ornate statue of the virgin contained in a gold casket, to be redeemed within a month.

[155] PRO, E 28/57 unnumbered: 20 May 1436. This letter to Louis of Luxembourg apologized for the lack of response to his envoys; given all the reports coming from France, it had been impossible to know what to say in reply.

[156] PRO, E 403/722, m. 18.

leaving Robert Willoughby to bear the brunt of the inevitable assault.[157] Talbot did, however, leave Willoughby a portion of his mobile retinue, which he had been given to use as he thought fit.[158] We have seen that Willoughby played his part in the town meetings of January to March 1436, but he was powerless to resist the fate that was being prepared.

Both the French and the Burgundians were now anxious to see the end of the English regime in Paris. Early in March Charles VII decided to send the constable de Richemont from Poitiers into the Paris region.[159] To be certain that they would not meet the type of resistance that had confronted them in 1429, however, the French captains needed to be sure that the duke of Burgundy was on their side. Since December Duke Philip had been engaged in negotiations so secret that their purpose was not even entrusted to his account-book; in particular, there was the secret journey of Jean de Belloy, former *échevin* of Paris, l'Isle-Adam, and Franche-Comté Herald, in February to March 1436.[160] Philip was certainly considering provoking the fall of Paris, but he continued to maintain his contacts with the regime there,[161] and it was only from the middle of March that the decisive moves were made, following a final effort at conciliation involving the brothers Jean and Louis of Luxembourg.[162] From 18 March, Philippe de Ternant was in command of a body of troops which were to be used for the reduction of Paris; within a few days he was joined by l'Isle-Adam with another force supplied by the duke for the same purpose.[163] At Pontoise on 3 April they met with Richemont, who had brought his force round from

[157] Pollard, *Talbot*, 21–2. According to Chartier, *Chronique*, i. 184, it was the Parisians who went to Pontoise to ask Willoughby to come to Paris and take command. Talbot was in Rouen by 5 Jan. 1436 (AN, K 64, 1(30)), while Pontoise, with its garrison weakened, was lost around 20 Feb. (Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, iii. 7 n. 1).

[158] In Jan. 1436 Talbot and Willoughby both had personal escorts of 20 men-at-arms and 60 archers (AN, K 64, 1 (29, 30)). Talbot also had an additional retinue of 20 mounted men-at-arms and 60 archers, which he divided, leaving 9 lances and 12 archers 'a la sauvegarde dudit lieu de Paris', and keeping 12 (*sic*) lances and 35 archers 'entour nostre personne' (AN, K 64, 10(15)). The Paris muster was taken on 8 Feb.; that in Rouen, which included another John Talbot, on 29 Feb. (K 64, 1 (32, 34)). Chartier, *Chronique*, i. 223, indicates that Willoughby had some 1,500 men with him at the end.

[159] E. Cosneau, *Le Connétable de Richemont, Artur de Bretagne, 1393–1458* (Paris, 1886), 242–3; *Gruel*, 111.

[160] ADN, B 1957, fos. 126^{r}, 150^{r}; see also Cosneau, *Richemont*, 242 n. 3, for a messenger sent to Charles VII at Tours in Jan.

[161] *Fauquembergue*, iii. 186–7.

[162] Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, iii. 79 n. 2.

[163] ADN, B 1957, fos. 250^{r}, 458^{v}; cf. also fo. 258^{r}, which suggests that l'Isle-Adam was required to assess the situation around Boulogne on his way to the Île de France.

Corbeil via Lagny-sur-Marne, calling in troops from the French garrisons in Champagne and Brie as he came.[164]

Thus, with l'Isle-Adam, Ternant, and Richemont camped in and around Pontoise, the final days of the English occupation were at hand. On 4 April the English garrison was weakened by the desertion of about 400 unpaid soldiers,[165] only to be strengthened by the arrival of Sir Thomas Beaumont with about 600 men a few days later.[166] They had been forced to abandon the supplies they were bringing, but had evaded Richemont's forces on the way towards Paris. None the less, the fate of this force, which had only left England at the end of February, was an unhappy one. Making a sortie from Paris to pillage Saint-Denis and neighbouring villages, they came up against l'Isle-Adam and his men and were routed: the majority were killed or captured (Beaumont was amongst those taken) and the remainder were driven back to Paris.[167]

If any confirmation was needed that the English cause was doomed, then the sight of the remnant of Beaumont's relief forces struggling back to Paris must have been decisive. In fact, however, those whose opinions carried weight in Paris were well aware of what had to be done. Michel de Laillier, who in a career spanning nearly four decades had known his share of intrigues, was ready to make a final volte-face.[168] Careful of his own interests, on Good Friday (6 April) 1436 he had found a tenant for his house and land at Saint-André-sur-Cailli, ten miles north-east of Rouen; obviously he recognized that he would not be able to visit Normandy for some time.[169] Then, in the week after Easter, he began to gather support amongst a nucleus of Burgundian supporters in Les Halles and the university.[170] Finally, he and his fellow conspirators sent word to the waiting French and Burgundian forces that they should be at the Porte Saint-Jacques in the early hours of Friday, 13 April.[171] The

[164] *Gruel*, 112–3. [165] *Bourgeois*, 313.

[166] *Monstrelet*, v. 218. This states that Beaumont's force had come from Normandy, but in fact it had left England in late Feb. (above, n. 142).

[167] *Bourgeois*, 313–14, *Le Bouvier*, 176–7, *Gruel*, 114–15 and Chartier, *Chronique*, i. 211–12, supply varying details about this episode. See also Cosneau, *Richemont*, 243–4.

[168] A. Bloch-Michel, 'Michel de Laillier, bourgeois de Paris (vers 1370–1440)', *Positions des thèses . . . de l'École des Chartes* (1950), 11–12. In 1436 he was 'sinon un vieillard, du moins un routier déjà très expérimenté de la politique parisienne' (B. Quilliet, 'Les Corps d'officiers de la prévôté et vicomté de Paris et de l'Île-de-France de la fin de la guerre de Cent Ans au début des guerres de religion: étude sociale' (Université de Paris-IV, Doctorat d'État, 1977), 479.

[169] ADSM, Tabellionage de Rouen, 1434–5, fo. 239^{v}.

[170] *Monstrelet*, v. 218–19. [171] Ibid. 219, *Gruel*, 118–20.

English and their supporters, although not willing to give up without a fight, gathered themselves and their possessions in the rue Saint-Anthoine, ready to retreat into the Bastille if need be.[172]

The final reconquest was fairly straightforward, once the guards at the gate had been persuaded that their fears of French revenge were groundless. L'Isle-Adam declared that the Parisians would remain under the authority of the duke of Burgundy, whose party they had followed so well over the years, while Richemont had come prepared with Charles VII's letters of amnesty, sealed with the king's great seal.[173] Once the gates were opened, the army swept down through the university district and across the Cité.[174] The three batallions formed under Willoughby, Simon Morhier, and Jean L'Archier (the *prévôt*'s *lieutenant criminel*) were powerless to resist in the face of the readiness of the Parisians to welcome the conquerors. The troop under L'Archier made its way to the Porte Saint-Denis shouting 'Sainct George! Sainct George: traistres Francoys, vous seres tous mors!', but they were met by cannon-fire from the gate, which had already been captured by the citizens of Les Halles.[175] All fell back to the Porte Baudoyer, in the rue Saint-Anthoine, held by the butcher captain Jean Le Gois. The final retreat was into the Bastille.

In order to avoid a siege, and to make a clean break between the old regime and the new, Richemont allowed those inside the Bastille to buy their way out.[176] Pursued by the taunts of the Parisians, they made their exodus on 17 April. Most notable of the departures was Louis of Luxembourg, the chancellor, who was accompanied by Jean de Saint-Yon and Jean L'Archier, the *lieutenant criminel*.[177] Simon Morhier, the *prévôt*, did not make the retreat into the Bastille. After escaping from Paris, he was turned upon by his men, handed over to the French captain Denis de Chailly, and forced to pay a crippling ransom, before he could join his fellow exiles in the newly enlarged Norman administration.[178]

[172] *Monstrelet*, v. 218–19. An inventory of the contents of the fortress had been made by Willoughby on 5 Mar. (Bournon, *Bastille*, 252).

[173] *Monstrelet*, v. 219. Copies of these letters and related documents were, of course, kept by the Hôtel de Ville (AN, K 949, nos. 24–7), and by the Châtelet (Y 4, fos. 3^{r}–4^{v}).

[174] F. von Kausler, *Atlas des plus mémorables batailles, combats et sièges des Temps Anciens, du Moyen Age et de l'Age Moderne* (Merseburg, 1839), 151–2; atlas, medieval section, sheet 14. Cosneau, *Richemont*, 247–9.

[175] *Bourgeois*, 315–17.

[176] Cosneau, *Richemont*, 251–2; *Fauquembergue*, iii. 196; *Bourgeois*, 318; *Monstrelet*, v. 221. According to *Gruel*, 122–3, it was shortage of money that forced Richemont to abandon the idea of a siege.

[177] *Bourgeois*, 319.

[178] On 28 Apr. 1436, his family agreed to sell his lands at Le Mesnil-Aubry to pay the

Louis Galet, *échevin*, had only just completed his return from a frustrating journey to England by the time of the reconquest; compromised in part by his energetic collaborations with Sir John Fastolf, he was obliged to abandon his career at the Châtelet in return for employment in Normandy and a reward for good services.[179] As late as 1458–9, he was serving Henry VI as a diplomat.[180] Pierre Rousseau had no choice but to leave Paris because, as an informer, he was hopelessly dishonoured: taken prisoner, he had lost all his possessions and been ransomed for 160 gold *saluts*.[181] From the *Parlement*, three men continued their service of the Lancastrians by working on the court of the council in Rouen,[182] while at least eight royal secretaries followed their employers to Normandy or England.[183]

The common factor between these exiles was usually nothing more than that they had all been compromised by their activities in the government of the Lancastrians in Paris.[184] There was no deeply-rooted pro-English faction, partly because the numbers of English were never very large, so that bonds of clientage were slow to develop, and partly because the pre-existent Burgundian faction was a ready-made source of support. The patronage of a man such as Fastolf would have to have been multiplied many times over to have had any effect.[185] It was, furthermore, unfortunate though inevitable that the majority of Englishmen who were given grants of land in Paris were given them in areas where property had been confiscated from Armagnacs. This must have

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ransom (Vallet de Viriville, 'Sépultures', 286; BN, PO 2051, Morhier no. 131). Royal letters of 1446 confirming his position on the *Grand Conseil* in Normandy refer to the 'grant et exessive raencon' (BL, Add. Ch. 6971; Roger, 'Morhier', 155).

[179] *English Suits*, 243, 250, etc.; Favier, *Paris*, 237. [180] Griffiths, *Henry VI*, 816.

[181] In recognition of his losses he was paid 50 marks by the English council on 15 May 1437 (PRO, E 404/53/307).

[182] Guillaume Le Duc, André Marguerie, and Simon de Plumetot (Allmand, *Lancastrian Normandy*, 145; cf. Autrand, *Naissance*, 120, 306, for the Norman origins of the latter two).

[183] Jean de Rinel, Laurent Calot, Guillaume de La Barre, Jean Bourdin, Nicaise Turgis, Michel de Paris (J. Otway-Ruthven, *The King's Secretary and the Signet Office in the Fifteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1939)), 91–102, and Jean de Drosay (Allmand, *Lancastrian Normandy*, 145). Gervaise Le Vulre replaced Calot as French secretary in England in 1436 and was still serving in Westminster over 30 years later, in the reign of Edward IV (Otway-Ruthven, *King's Secretary*, 102).

[184] According to Chartier, *Chronique*, i. 223, Parisians unwilling to return to Charles VII were 'particulliers qui estoient officiers ou avoient autre pratique d'iceulx Anglois'.

[185] Thompson, 'Régime anglo-bourguignon', 55–6.

hindered any merging of Burgundian and English loyalties. It was in the area round the Tournelles and the Bastille that such regional loyalty as there was to the English might be found.[186] Jacques de Roye, former *échevin* and *quartenier* of the Saint-Anthoine quarter retreated into English territory in Normandy with his son Philippe in 1436,[187] and the daughter of Pierre Rolant, one of the *cinquanteniers* of the quarter, did all she could to cling to her engagement to an English soldier.[188] De Roye's successor as *quartenier*, Arnoul Turgis, was perhaps loyal enough to Charles VII, but his son Nicaise was amongst the royal secretaries who continued to serve Henry VI, while another son, Jean Turgis, was later to be found in London, serving as harpist to the queen.[189]

Back in Paris, was it a question of a revived 'Burgundian' regime or of a completely new order? The role of the Burgundians in the recapture of Paris had been decisive: Philippe de Ternant and l'Isle-Adam had been paid specially for the expenses of the entry, as we saw, and when the soldiers' wages expired on 18 April, Ternant borrowed more so that his men should not return home until the position was completely secure.[190] Ternant, a knight of the Golden Fleece and chamberlain of the duke of Burgundy, became *prévôt* of Paris,[191] l'Isle-Adam laid claim to the post of *chevalier du guet*,[192] and the municipality was dominated by former collaborators of a decidedly pro-Burgundian aspect. Michel de Laillier, who was rewarded for his role in the 1436 coup by being made *prévôt des marchands*, had followed the most devious political route. On the other hand, two of the four *échevins*, Jean de Belloy and Nicolas de Neufville had been close adherents of the duke of Burgundy for two decades.[193] As for the others, Jean de Grandrue was the son of a man

[186] An important princely palace attracted a host of services around it; in 1425 Guillaume Bouyn moved his small mercerie business to a shop opposite the Hôtel des Tournelles (Longnon, *Paris*, 198).

[187] Jacques de Roye was rewarded with the possessions of Michel de Laillier, 'anemy et adversaire du roy' (AN, KK 500, fo. 7^{v}), while Philippe went to England on official business and was given a 10 mark reward (PRO, E 404/52/390; 53/145).

[188] Bossuat, 'L'Idée de nation', 54; cf. Favier *Contribuables*, 173.

[189] Favier, *Contribuables*, 20; Favier, *Paris*, 237. Perhaps, however, Jean did not come to England until Henry VI's marriage to Margaret of Anjou (cf. Griffiths, *Henry VI*, 776, 831).

[190] ADN, B 1957, fos. 458^{v}–459^{r}. The exploit cost the duke of Burgundy 5,711 *l.t.* in wages.

[191] Favier, *Paris*, 414. He was replaced by Ambroise de Loré in Feb. 1437.

[192] BN, MS Clair. 763, p. 153: it is not clear if he was confirmed in the post.

[193] Cf. Ch. 3, n. 33; Ch. 6, n. 75. Both had recently had their pensions brought up to date by the duke (ADN, B 1957, fos. 103^{v}–104^{r}).

forcibly deposed from the same job by Tanguy du Châtel in 1415[194] and Pierre des Landes, a pupil of the pro-Burgundian merchant Augustin Ysbarre, had been one of a group who lent 1,000 francs to the English regime in 1422.[195]

These were people of experience, leaders who would appeal to the Parisian bourgeoisie, but the administration of the capital was under the general direction of Charles VII's men. Trying to safeguard their positions, the counsellors of the *Parlement* and the *Chambre des Comptes* had gone to Richemont, the king's representative, and it was from Charles VII himself that the order came that the courts should be closed until further notice.[196] Naturally, the Parisians communicated with the duke of Burgundy in the summer of 1436, and the officers of the *Parlement* could rely on the peace of Arras to protect their places when the men from Poitiers eventually made their way back.[197] Parisians of every rank did what they could to carry on as though nothing had happened. Jean de Saint-Yon might have gone, but the butchers of the *Grande Boucherie* elected his scarcely less compromised brother Garnier to be Master in his place.[198] Recent history could not be ignored, however. Garnier was expelled from Paris by Richemont, not to be allowed back until December; on his return he was required to explain what had happened to the king's library during his period as librarian.[199] Despite the promise of the king to the Parisian ambassadors that he would forget the past, it would not be easy.

Much needed to be done. Henry VI's money, with its arms of France and England, had to be taken out of circulation in an orderly fashion.[200] The property rights of people exiled from Paris since 1418 had to be

[194] Above Ch. 3, n. 21; father and son continued to live in Paris under the Anglo-Burgundian regime, the former dying by 1428 (AN, X^{1a} 4795, fo. 325^{v}; 'État des bourgeois', 572; Favier, *Contribuables*, 253).

[195] In Apr. 1434, des Landes spoke of 'Aug. Ysbarre et dautres notables merchans ses maistres' (AN, X^{1a} 4797, fo. 161^{r}). For the loan see AN, X^{1a} 4794, fo. 291^{r}. Charles VII was to become very attached to des Landes, who was *prévôt des marchands* 1438–44 (Favier, *Paris*, 422 n. 10).

[196] *Fauquembergue*, iii. 196–8; Félibien, *Histoire . . . de Paris*, iii. 559–61.

[197] ADN, B 1957, fos. 174^{v}, 176^{v}, 277^{v}; an agent of the duke also accompanied the Parisian delegates to Charles VII (ibid., fo. 275^{r}). The king's replies to the Parisian embassy are printed by Félibien, *Histoire . . . de Paris*, v. 269–70. For the *Parlement*, see R. Delachenal, 'Une clause de la paix d'Arras: Les Conseilliers bourguignons dans le Parlement de Charles VII', *BSHP* 18 (1891), 76–83.

[198] BN, MS fr. 32586 (Register of the *Grande Boucherie*), 21.

[199] Félibien, *Histoire . . . de Paris*, iv. 598; BN, MS n. a. fr. 7627, fo. 419^{v}.

[200] AN, Z^{1b} 3, fos. 181^{v}, 182^{v}.

restored, or their claims set against acquisitions made in good faith by people who had stayed behind: a politically-charged subject governed by contradictory legislation.[201] Furthermore, there was now a new source of property, abandoned by the English and their followers. Those loyal to Charles VII could expect their rewards, and nearly one hundred new gifts of confiscated property were made within a year of the French entry.[202] Definitively, the boot was on the Valois foot: Pierre Rousseau had specialized in tracking down Armagnac property, now his house in the royal palace was confiscated and given to Ambroise de Loré, who was soon to be made *prévôt*.[203]

The war was not over: the civilian watch on the walls would be enforced until all of Normandy had been retaken,[204] there were still conspiracies and rumours of plots to allow the return of the English,[205] taxes for the war-effort continued to be raised.[206] The Parisians found that adopting the cause of their French king was not an unqualified blessing and Charles VII's visit to his capital in 1437 performed 'nul bien' for the town, reckoned the *Bourgeois*, echoing his opinion of Henry VI's coronation six years earlier.[207] Furthermore, the great corporations of the town soon began to display the type of recalcitrance in the face of royal activity that it is tempting to regard as patriotism when directed against the English.[208] The economic situation continued to deteriorate, not to show any real improvement until the mid-1440s.[209] Charles VII had regained his capital, but he had still to win the confidence of the Parisians.[210] This was a project that, if it was attempted at all, would take many years to complete.

[201] Bossuat, 'Rétablissement', 148–9; Vale, *Charles VII*, 151–4; cf. Allmand, *Lancastrian Normandy*, 284–9.

[202] AN, PP 110, pp. 197–203.

[203] Ibid. 199–200; BM Rouen, MS Leber 5870, xii, fo. 84^{r}: 15 Aug. 1436.

[204] Cf. *Comptes du domaine*, i, cols. 562–4, 647–50, 764.

[205] *Bourgeois*, 330–2; Cosneau, *Richemont*, 266–7.

[206] *Bourgeois*, 333–4; Favier, *Contribuables*, 6, 267–97.

[207] *Bourgeois*, 338, cf. ibid. 279.

[208] One example amongst many concerns the chapter of Notre-Dame, which had campaigned keenly for Nicole Fraillon as its nominee for bishop in 1427; defeated then, it fought equally hard to protect Fraillon's post of archdeacon against Charles VII's wish to replace him by Jacques Juvénal des Ursins, only yielding in 1441 (*Bourgeois*, 213 n. 3, 215; Grassoreille, 'Histoire politique du chapitre', 164–9; L. Pommeray, *L'Officialité archidiaconale de Paris aux XV^{e} et XVI^{e} siècles, sa composition, sa compétance criminelle* (Paris, 1933), 10–12, 77–8).

[209] Favier, *Paris*, 348.

[210] See G. Raynaud, 'La Complainte de Paris en 1436', *BSHP* 27 (1900), 36–41.

CONCLUSION: 'FLUCTUAT NEC MERGITUR'

At a distance of five hundred and fifty years, the Anglo-Burgundian regime in Paris stands out as a remarkable stage in the long struggle between England and France in the later Middle Ages, as an English 'occupation' of the French capital. Yet this occupation can in no way be seen simply as a by-product of the larger Anglo-French war, least of all by anyone interested in the experience of the Parisians themselves as vividly evoked by contemporary records. For the people of Paris the period 1420–36 was a new phase not in a foreign but a civil war, and a new aspect to the divisions in the kingdom. In its simplest terms, the Anglo-Burgundian regime constituted the revenge of the traders of the north of Les Halles and of the butcheries over the Armagnac officers of the south of Les Halles and, above all, the centre of the Grève region. For the Burgundian faction, the alliance with the English was a potent weapon in that struggle. Perhaps for some it was alarming to have to use such a weapon, but to defeat people who had conspired to murder the duke of Burgundy any tool had its value. Furthermore, if Henry V and Henry VI were English, they were also respectively the son-in-law and grandson of Charles VI, while Charles VII was inextricably bound up with the Armagnac cause. What value could be attached to the sacred aura of Valois monarchy when dealing with a faction that dared to hang an Armagnac sash on a statue of the patron saint of Burgundy in the principal church of Les Halles?

The story of Anglo-Burgundian Paris has been told on three different levels. Describing Paris as a whole, looking outwards at a crucial stage in the Hundred Years War, we saw a capital that had lost half its kingdom, facing difficulties with regard to the rest and, after 1429, obliged to beg help from England as its own resources dwindled. Looking inside the town, we found that its system of government depended on flexibility and co-operation, not only between the different institutions of local and central government, but also between the rulers and the ruled. Since such co-operation depended largely on the way in which Parisian society was prepared to respond to the needs of the governing institutions, it was necessary to examine the motives of the leaders of society, men who,

whether or not they made policy themselves, were essential to its implementation. The Burgundian faction, it appears, was created partly from men motivated by ambition but, more generally, by an emotional and ideological Burgundian loyalty that had little to do with the duke. This loyalty was so strong that it certainly outweighed any traditional 'French' sentiment, but it also prevented the development of much pro-English support, especially when many Englishmen in the lower ranks persisted in regarding themselves as the conquerors, rather than the allies, of the Parisians.

This book has tried to show the advantages of combining different approaches to history. A close study of administrative issues suggests questions about society; examining society illuminates political events. The happenings of even a few years had to be seen within a resilient framework of central government, municipality, quarters, *dizaines*, parishes, *confréries*, trades, tax regions, and local jurisdictions. Not all of these were destroyed even in 1789. Anglo-Burgundian Paris was not only a part of the history of Lancastrian France, but also a fragment of the continuing chronicle of the French capital. On the surface, this was a period of English domination and therefore unique, but it does not take much to see that, despite the civil war, the banishments, and the division of the kingdom, Paris continued shaken but unbroken, storm-tossed but not submerged.

APPENDIX

A Gift to the Duke and Duchess of Bedford (1424) and the Entry of Henry VI (1431): the Accounts of the Parisian Municipality

BN, MS n. a. fr. 3243. 'Extraits des comptes des aides de la ville de Paris (1413–1647)'

This is a seventeenth-century volume of copies containing 167 folios (paper). Other versions of these extracts, probably based on this one and with spelling that has been further modernized, are to be found in *Bibl. de l'Arsenal*, MSS 3929 and 3945. Item A has been published, and B 29 summarized in B. Prost, 'Présents d'orfèvrerie offerts aux rois et reines de France et aux souverains étrangers à l'occasion de leur entrée à Paris (1424–1563)', *BSHP* 18 (1891), 166–7, but otherwise I do not believe that the collection has been used for the period of the English domination.

[A] [fo. 2^{r}] 1424 Du compte de M^{e} Jacques de Rouen[1] receveur de aide ordonnée par le roy Henry de France et Dangletterre pour lannée commancant a la St Michel 1424 et finissant a pareil jour 1425.

Apert que par lavis et deliberation et consentement de plusieurs notables bourgeois quartiniers et autres gens destat pour ce assemblés en lhotel de ville de Paris le 20 aoust 1424 a esté achetté 90 marcs de vaisselle dargent doré et marqué aux armes de la ville pour faire present de par laditte ville a tres hault et puissant prince monsieur le regent du royaume de France duc de Bedford a sa joyeuse venue et entrée faite en cette ville de Paris apres la glorieuse victoire quil a pleust a notre Seigneur Jesus Christ notre createur et redempteur donner et envoyer a monsieur le regent sur les ennemis du royaume de France devant la ville de Verneuil en Perche et aussy a tres haulte et puissante [fo. 2^{v}] princesse madame la regente sa femme laditte vaiselle et facon montant a 860 salus un quart dor et 8*s.* 4*d.* parisis qui revient a 1015*l.* 16[*s.*] 11*d.* parisis.

[1] Jacques de Rouen, a royal secretary and a former Cabochien, was a commissioner for confiscations 1418–19. He was assessed as a tax-payer in 1438, but was executed, for reasons that are unknown, in September of that year (Ch. 5, n. 32; Favier, *Contribuables*, 278; Sauval, iii. 336).

[B] [fo. 3^{r}] Entrée du roy Henry Dengleterre dans Paris

[1] Payé a Pierre Robilard[2] 2*l.p.* pour lui aider a payer et faire le mistere des neuf preux et neuf preues et lequels ont esteés jouéz a lentrée.

[2] Payé 16*l.p.* aux confreres de la passion de notre Seigneur Jesus Christ en la grand rue St-Denis pour aider a payer les frais tant en eschafaux quautres pour le mistaire de la nativité de notre Seigneur quils on fait faire et jouer a laditte entrée.

[3] 5*l.* 14*s. p.* pour achapt de 8 douzaines de chapeaux doréz pour messieurs les prevost des marchands et eschevins et pour plusieurs bourgeois notables de laditte ville, pour un grand panier de romarin et des viollettes et pour 200 de roses dorées qui furent jettés au devant du roy a la porte St-Denis.

[4] 26*l.* 8*s.* pour un drap dor duquel a esté fait le ciel ou le roy fut mis dessous et lapporterent messieurs les prevost des marchands et eschevins avec plusieurs autres notables bourgeois depuis la porte St-Denis jusquau palais et dudit palais a lhotel des Tournelles.

[5] 22*l.* 12*s. p.* a Jaques Demequerques orbateur pour deux papiers dor fin, pour 200 dor fin pour employer a faire les pentes du ciel qui a esté porté au dessus du roy et autres sortes de papier pour mettre a la porte St-Denis et a la [fo.3^{v}] fontaine du Ponceau.

[6] 8*l.* 8[*s.*] *p.* pour 8 douzaines de peaux dor de dainte pour faire des fleurs de lis a lecu de France mis a laditte porte St-Denis et fontaine du Ponceau.

[7] 65*l.* 12*s.* pour une queue et un muid de vin cleret et de 4 muids de vin vermeil qui ont estés donnés et presentés à monsieur le cardinal de Wixestre[3] et a monsieur de Warwik[4] qui ont accompagné le roy pour avoir laditte ville en recommandation.

[8] 57*s.* 4*d.* a plusieurs compagnons bouchers qui vaquerent le jour que le roy fit son entrée a faire une chasse du serf qui fut faites devant le roy a la fontaine St-Innocent et 12 laperaux qui furent mis en un bois qui estoit sur la terrasse de laditte fontaine.

[9] 14*l.* parisis pour papier doré et 24*l.* chanures pour attacher les habists des hommes sauvages qui ont estés a laditte entrée.

[10] 26*l.p.* a plusieurs pintres pour decorations ausdittes portes St-Denis et fontaine du Ponceau comme fleurs de lis, estoilles, trois istoires de la vie de St Denis.

[11] 26*l.* 14*s.* 8*d.* pour plusieurs piesses de toille de Perses pour mettre au dessus du pont levis de la porte St-Denis pour les pentes de soye de Perse du

[2] Pierre Robillard was a royal horseman in 1436 and a mounted sergeant at the *Châtelet* in 1440 (*Fauquembergue*, iii. 187; *Comptes du domaine*, i. col. 196).

[3] Cardinal Henry Beaufort, bishop of Winchester.

[4] Richard Beauchamp, earl of Warwick.

ciel et pour la doubleure dicelluy et mettre a laditte fontaine et ou a esté represanté ledit mistere.

[12] [fo. 4^{r}] 9*l.* 19*s.* parisis pour habist a 4 tirants qui ont servi audit mistere et despence de bouche et qui a este donné a 60 ou 80 albalestriers qui ont accompagné messieurs les prevost des marchands et eschevins et plusieurs conseilliers et notables bourgeois a Vincennes ou estoit le roy luy faire un propos pour le bien de la ville.

[13] 22*l.* 18*s. p.* a plusieurs massons pour laditte entrée.

[14] 12*l.p.* pour 18 onces ¾ de frange dor et soye.

[15] au tapissier 4*l.* 8*s. p.*

[16] pour 40 aulnes de toille 4*l.* 13*s.* 4*d.*

[17] 76*s.p.* au chasublier pour avoir cousu les toilles.

[18] 300*l.p.* au messieurs les prevost des marchands et eschevins et cler de la ville pour robes pour laditte entrée, Sire Guillaume Sanguin, prevost des marchands, Marcel Testard, Guillaume de Troyes, Henry Aufroy, eschevins et Jean Falle cler de laditte ville.[5]

[19] 5*l.* 8*s. p.* pour 20 septiers et 2 pintes de vin qui furent mis a laditte fontaine du Ponceau pour donner a boire a tous venants au pris de 8*d.p.* la pinte.

[20] 4*l.* 16*s.* pour 12 sommes de houx et genevre vert pour faire le bois de laditte fontaine St-Innocent et au dessus de la fontaine du Ponceau ou estoit les hommes sauvages.

[21] 11*l.* 11*s.* pour 20 septiers de claret qui fut mis aupres de la fontaine du Ponceau dans des laques et descendoit par tuyaux de plomb en pot de lis qui estoit dans le bassin de laditte fontaine et en burent plusieurs chevaliers et gens darmes qui estoient en la compagnie du roy.

[22] [fo.4^{v}] 9*l.* 7*s. p.* pour leschafaux de dessus la fontaine du Ponceau.

[23] 27*l.* 19*s.* 4*d.* pour autre eschafaux.

[24] 28*l.* 7*s. p.* idem.

[25] 10*l.* 15*s. p.* idem.

[26] 7*l.* 8*s.* voitures.

[27] 6*l.* 6*s.* 9*d.* cloux.

[28] 17*l.* 14*s.* 6*d.* serurerie.

[5] Guillaume Sanguin was elected *prévôt des marchands* on 12 July 1429 (Ch. 3, n. 41); Marcel Testard and Guillaume de Troyes were elected *échevins* on 30 July 1430; Henri Aufroy was elected on 1 September 1431 as was the fourth *échevin*, Robin Clément, who is not mentioned so apparently received no new robes (AN, KK 1009, fos. 3^{v}–4^{r}). For Jean Falle, see Ch. 6, n. 39.

[29] Pour un don donnée et presenté de par laditte ville de Paris au roy apres sa joyeuse venue et entrée par luy faite en cette ville de Paris et pieux sacré lui prins et receu en leglise catredalle de Notre Dame de Paris.

A un changeur de Paris 1100 sols dor qui valent 1110 *l.p.* pour vente dune chaisne dor de grand ouvrage, faite et ouvrée a longue feuille dor double, pesant 6 marcs 6 onces et dune fermail dor garny de trois grosses perles, pesant 60 carats et dun beau rubis au milieu presanté par mesdits sieurs prevost des marchands et eschevins au roy apres le sacre en laditte eglise.

[30] 10*l.* 14*s.* 8*p.* pour un soupé en lhotel de ville ou estoit messieurs les prevost des marchands et les eschevins et avec eux plusieurs conseillers et maitres des comptes et autres notables, lequel soupé est detaillé ainsy que plusieurs autres despense pour le meme fait.

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X^1: Parlement Civil.

X^{1a} 63–8 (Judgements and letters); 1480–1 (*Conseil*); 4792–7 (*Matinées*); 8302 (*Aprés-dinées*); 8605 (Ordinances registered by the court).

X^{1c} 121, 125, 126, 129A, 130, 133, 134, 141, 144 (*Accords*).

X^2: Parlement Criminel.

X^{2a} 16, 20, 22, Judgements, letters and—after 1436—hearings of the court).

Y: Châtelet de Paris

Livres de couleur (Orders of the king and the *prévôt*, published through the Châtelet).

Y 1 *bis* (*Livre blanc*: 1209–1472); Y 4 (*Livre vert vieil*: 1377–1531); Y 4^2 (*Livre vieil vert premier*: 1386–1467); Y 6^7 (*Livre noir vieil*: 1294–1464).

Civil jurisdiction

Y 5229–30 (Hearings and judgements).

NB (1) Regrettably, no criminal records of the Châtelet survive for this period; (2) The volumes of *Livres de couleur* Y 1 bis, 4^2 and 6^7 are not mentioned in any inventory of series Y. The references are, however, given in the *Guide des recherches dans les fonds d'enregistrement sous l'ancien régime* (Archives Nationales, Paris, 1958), 93. The documents are apparently copies of the important volumes of the *Collection Lamoignon* conserved at the *Archives de la Préfecture de Police*, which are themselves incomplete versions of the lost originals. Y 6^7 is particularly valuable for this period.

Z: *Juridictionsspéciales et ordinaires*

Z^{1a} Cour des Aides.

Z^{1a} 7, 9 (Hearings and judgements).

Z^{1b} Cour des Monnaies de Paris.

Z^{1b} 3 (Hearings and judgements).

Z^{1f} Chambre du Trésor, etc.

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